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ABSTRACT 
The overarching goal of this thesis is to explain, through conceptual and empirical analyses, 
how companies might utilise network strategies to facilitate achieving their desired 
outcomes from cross-industry and international collaboration in the semiconductor 
industry.  
This research objective was achieved by creating a novel conceptual framework, combining 
theories from the fields of strategy and international business (IB) with theoretical concepts 
and methodological tools from network science. The aim of this approach was to advance 
the integration of social network analysis (SNA) into the fields of strategy and IB, and 
improve our understanding of the strategic and internationalisation decisions made by 
modern businesses. 
This research is accomplished over three separate but connected studies. Disentangling the 
complexity of the overall semiconductor industry network, the first study finds that 
architectural network properties differ substantially between value chain stages, which may 
relate to the facilitatory role of distinct network configurations in the creation of alternative 
governance mechanisms and the implementation of different inter-organisational routines 
and processes at distinct stages of the semiconductor value chain. The tactical configuration 
of alliance relations does form a critical part of the alliance strategies of chipmakers, as the 
second study finds that chipmakers utilise integrated and protective triadic tactics to 
implement distinct alliance strategies, such as establishing cross-industry bridges for R&D 
collaboration. These complex network tactics might, by enhancing governance, facilitate 
maximising the R&D outcomes of strategic alliances in the face of environmental 
uncertainties created by industry pressures; as well as improving the cross-border 
coordination of cross-industry technology transfers and knowledge exchanges. The third 
study finds, namely, that chipmakers also execute their hybrid R&D internationalisation 
strategies through triadic tactics, which may point at the strategic utility of triads in 
overcoming such challenges inherent in creating (novelty) value through international R&D 
collaboration.  
These findings contribute to the fields of strategic management and IB in explaining the 
mechanisms underpinning companies’ network strategies and showing that companies 
utilise complex network tactics to pursue their strategic goals. 
Keywords: Strategic alliances, networks, triads, cross-industry R&D collaboration, international 
R&D collaboration  
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1.1. Research motivation 
Over the past years there has been a growing debate among academics and industry analysts 
alike on the role of strategic alliances and, increasingly, of alliance networks to the 
competitiveness of the firm (Gulati, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 2003; Contractor 
and Reuer, 2014; Kim et al., 2016; KPMG, 2018). Strategic collaboration within and across 
industries as well as within and across national and regional borders has become the 
cornerstone of the innovation and internationalisation strategies of many modern companies. 
Traditionally, the process of selecting the ‘best’ partner or partners was considered the core of 
any alliance formation. The answer to the question what defines the ‘best’ partner(s) is 
debatable, but is driven in principle by the partner’s ability to contribute to the achievement 
of the alliance’s strategic goal, whether this is to minimise cost or maximise value through the 
alliance (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). The success of the alliance broadly depends on the partners’ 
ability to bridge organisational differences, align their strategic vision and goals, and integrate 
operations, inter-personal relations and cultures (Kanter, 1994; Das and Teng, 2000). These 
aspects of alliance integration are, however, not captured by the partner selection approach 
in the traditional strategy literature; which is, therefore, not capable of adequately explaining 
the success of alliances.  
The traditional partner selection principles are inherent in established theories and 
frameworks, such as the resource-based view of alliances (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; 
Das and Teng, 2000) and the dynamic capabilities perspective (Teece et al., 1997), which were 
designed to guide analysing the formation of strategic alliances. Adequately explaining the 
success of alliances, however, also requires analysing the relational configuration of alliances 
through a relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and a network perspective (Coleman, 1988; 
Burt, 1992). 
Using the traditional frameworks, most research has approached explaining the formation of 
alliances exclusively from a dyadic partner selection perspective, without any explicit 
consideration for (1) the other partners of the firm, (2) the partners of the potential partner 
and (3) the presence of alliances between the firm’s existing partners and the potential partner 
(e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000; Colombo et al., 2006; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Van Beers 
and Zand, 2014; Cabral and Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2019). Though, if we accept the premise that 
the firm’s sources of competitive advantage are increasingly located beyond its ownership 
boundaries (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Alcácer et al., 2016), then sharing access to these sources 
with other companies may or may not be desirable in view of the firm’s long-term competitive 
strategy – depending on its long-term strategic vision and goals. The firm’s ability to derive 
competitive advantage from their alliances is therefore not merely determined by access to 
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partner-specific assets (Rowley and Baum, 2008), as has predominantly been argued; but 
rather by access to these assets in combination with how the alliance relations are configured 
and governed by the firm at the network level. This shifts the basis for the firm’s 
competitiveness toward its network advantage (Greve et al., 2014), away from exclusively firm-
specific advantages (Caves, 1971) and collaboration advantages (Kanter, 1994) or inter-
organisational rents (Dyer and Singh, 1998).   
This is an important consideration and should arguably become an integral part of a 
mainstream framework for explaining the formation of strategic alliances. The main 
motivation of this research is, therefore, to combine both mechanisms, namely (1) the strategic 
selection of alliance partners and (2) the configuration of alliance relations, and to jointly 
integrate these mechanisms into a single framework which can also be applied in future 
research to analyse the alliance formations decisions of companies.  
In spite of the growing recognition of the role of strategic networks by scholars across the 
broader field of strategy (Powell and Brantley, 1992; Powell et al., 1996; Gulati, 1998, 2000; 
Gadde et al., 2003; Chetty and Stangl, 2009; Cloodt et al., 2010; Martínez-Noya and Narula, 
2018), there is still a noticeable absence of a dominant and empirically established framework 
in neither strategy nor international business (IB) offering a systematic way of (1) analysing 
the formation of alliance networks across value chains and (2) explaining variance in network 
strategies and resultant R&D outcomes and internationalisation advantages achieved by 
different firms through a combination of insights from established theories in strategy and IB 
on the one hand, and concepts and methodological tools from social network analysis (SNA) 
on the other hand. 
This is not to say that scholars have not made any contributions in this respect. On the 
contrary, the current research is built on the valuable efforts made by scholars thus far to 
introduce the network view into the wider field of strategy (e.g. Madhavan et al., 2004; 
Verspagen and Duysters, 2004; Powell et al., 2005; Robinson and Stuart, 2002; Rosenkopf and 
Schilling, 2007; Rowley and Baum, 2008; Skilton and Bernardes, 2015; Davis, 2016; Kim et al., 
2016; Tatarynowicz et al., 2016) and more recently – albeit to a lesser extent – the field of IB 
(e.g. Cantwell and Santangelo, 1999; Blankenburg Holm et al., 2015; Cano-Kollmann et al., 
2016; Forsgren, 2016; Cantwell, 2017).  
The established strategy literature as a whole, however, is limited in that it does not provide 
sufficient guidance on how alliance network strategies can actually be constructed and 
utilised by business managers to facilitate their long-term innovation and internationalisation 
strategies. On the one hand, much of the extant investigations into the wider topic of alliance 
networks in strategy and IB, whether the formation of alliance networks (Colombo et al., 2006; 
Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Cabral and Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2019) or their implications for 
performance (Baum et al., 2000; Lavie, 2007) or internationalisation (Alcácer et al., 2016; 
Forsgren, 2016), typically use the notion of alliance ‘networks’ or ‘network ties’ in a 
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metaphorical fashion without analysing networks as a strategy for innovation or 
internationalisation – which suggests that there is still a wide lack of understanding of the 
strategic role of networks. These studies typically analyse alliance networks in light of their 
composition, measured by the size or diversity of the firm’s alliance portfolio (Nieto and 
Santamaría, 2007), and consequently give no consideration to the strategic implications of the 
structural configuration of networks and network tactics, and the way in which these can be 
measured. 
On the other hand, work which did incorporate concepts and methodologies from network 
science often focused on demonstrating the importance of network positions, primarily 
measured in terms of network density following Coleman’s (1988) concept of network closure 
(Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005) or using Burt’s (1992) ‘structural 
hole’ concept (Ahuja, 2000a; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Soda, 2011), in relation to performance 
indicators at the firm level. These studies have shown that network positions are important to 
explain performance differences among firms. What they have not explained, however, is how 
firms can utilise networks as a strategy. As such, it is still not well understood (1) how network 
positions and their structural features might facilitate inter-organisational collaboration in 
terms of the collaborative processes and routines established in alliances; (2) how structural 
network effects influence the strategic partner selection process which underlies the firm’s 
ultimate alliance network position; and (3) how the selection of a particular strategic partner 
contributes to the long-term network strategy of the firm. 
Importantly, a lack of understanding of these relationships might lead to misleading research 
results and myopic strategy formulations. Moreover, by combining the relational composition 
and structural configuration of alliance networks into a single framework, we can improve 
our understanding of the strategic and internationalisation decisions made by modern 
businesses. Namely, although the field of IB has long acknowledged the importance of hybrid 
internationalisation strategies, extant IB models cannot explain how firms can configure their 
hybrid strategies to enter into foreign markets and develop internationalisation advantage. 
1.2. Research goal and setting 
The research presented in this thesis bridges these gaps between network science and strategy, 
and advances the integration of SNA into the field of IB. This research is accomplished over 
three separate but connected studies (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) with the overarching goal to explain 
how companies can construct alliance network strategies to facilitate achieving their desired 
outcomes from cross-industry and international collaboration in the semiconductor industry. 
A primary interest in this respect is to uncover how firms can construct distinct network 
tactics based on the partner composition and the relation configuration of the alliance relations 
within their ego networks, and utilise these network tactics to orchestrate the exchange of 
knowledge and the creation of value through R&D collaboration.  
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To achieve this, a novel conceptual framework is created to evaluate the strategic utility of 
network tactics, by combining theories from the fields of strategy and IB with theoretical 
concepts, models and methodological tools from network science. This approach 
demonstrates how the SNA methodology can improve our understanding of the strategic and 
internationalisation decisions made by modern businesses. 
The empirical focus of this research is on the semiconductor industry, because this industry 
has one of the most complex and networked value chain ecosystems in the world (SIA, 2016) 
– making it a particularly suitable empirical context for testing the developed framework. 
Inter-organisational collaboration resembles a widely used strategy by semiconductor 
companies for conducting business activities across the industry’s value chain (Hagedoorn, 
1993; Stuart, 2000; Kapoor, 2010; Gloger et al., 2017) and, notably in R&D, is often undertaken 
within networks of strategic partners based within and outside the semiconductor industry 
as well as within and outside geographical borders (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). The diverse 
population of organisations within this industry network enables investigating how the 
network strategies of semiconductor companies might differ according to the type of value 
chain activity that is conducted in collaboration and the types of partners which are involved. 
A detailed background on inter-organisational collaboration in the semiconductor industry is 
provided in Chapter 2. 
The empirical analyses are performed on a network sample of 1,192 semiconductor 
companies, using a SNA methodology. One of the methodological contributions of the 
research is in the creation of a unique dataset by connecting two separate data sources: OSIRIS 
and Factiva. Overall, this dataset contains 5,465 alliance agreements formed by the 
semiconductor companies with intra- and inter-industry partners as well as domestic and 
international partners during the period 2004-2014. A more detailed discussion on the data 
collection process and the construction of the dataset is provided as part of the first study, in 
Chapter 31. 
1.3. Research objectives 
A number of research objectives are addressed over three independent but connected studies. 
Starting from the premise that the overall structure of a network influences the collective 
behaviour and business outcomes of the organisations within it (Gulati et al., 2000; 
Tatarynowicz et al., 2016), the first study in this thesis (Chapter 3) is focused on examining 
and disentangling the complexity of the entire semiconductor industry network. Specifically, 
the objectives are to highlight differences in the motives of collaboration and inter-
organisational routines and processes between consecutive stages of the semiconductor value 
 
1 The second and third studies presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively, rely on the same network sample 
and will refer to the overview provided in Chapter 3, rather than repeating the same discussion. 
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chain, namely R&D, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, and supply; and to explain 
how these differences are linked to distinct network architectures characterised by varying 
degrees of network connectedness, concentration and clustering.  
This will help to understand (1) the distinct collective outcomes that different types of 
network architectures produce, such as the proliferation of mutual trust and cooperation, the 
exchange of knowledge, and power asymmetries; and consequently (2) how these distinct 
collective outcomes (a) facilitate the inter-organisational routines and processes at particular 
value chain stages, and (b) lead to a collective preference by firms for distinct types of network 
architectures at different stages of the semiconductor value chain. In addition, this analysis 
enables uncovering the existence of dyadic relationships vis-à-vis alternative microstructures 
like triads (Madhavan et al., 2004), through which organisations and alliances are 
interconnected within the distinct networks. These microstructures are reflections of the 
strategic partner selections made by semiconductor companies at the level of their ego 
networks and offer some insight into the existence of distinct types of network strategies 
pursued by them within a given network. 
Deeper analysis of these ego networks is needed, however, in order to adequately explain the 
strategic decision of organising strategic alliances within alternative microstructures as 
opposed to purely dyads. This constitutes the wider objective of both the second (Chapter 4) 
and third (Chapter 5) studies, albeit in the contexts of cross-industry collaboration and 
international collaboration, respectively. The focus in both of these studies is on the 
semiconductor R&D network, which is the most value-adding activity in the semiconductor 
industry (Yinug, 2016), which requires closer collaboration across industries, the exchange of 
knowledge and technologies and the joint application of technical skill and capabilities, 
beyond simply pooling resources, in order to create novelty. Moreover, the R&D ecosystem 
of the semiconductor industry also stands out as a particularly complex network built on both 
dyadic and triadic microstructures with alliances extending beyond the semiconductor 
industry. The choice of network tactic is therefore key for successful innovation and R&D 
internationalisation. 
Specifically, the second study (Chapter 4) introduces and applies the concept of strategic 
utility of triads to evaluate whether, why and how chipmakers construct, through 
(1) structural configuration and (2) relational composition, triadic R&D alliances with intra- 
and cross-industry partners as a means of reducing uncertainty projected upon them by the 
increasing cost of R&D, increasing technological complexity, highly volatile product demand 
and intense competition. As such, an alternative approach to analyse the formation of R&D 
alliances is demonstrated to show how the configuration of R&D alliances within triads can 
enable companies to achieve long-term network advantages. Hypotheses are formulated and 
tested regarding a range of distinct R&D network strategies, using stochastic actor-oriented 
modelling (SAOM). SAOM allows explicitly capturing the interdependencies between the 
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organisations in the semiconductor industry network through tests of structural network 
effects, such as the formation of triadic structures. 
Finally, the third study (Chapter 5) builds on the concept of strategic utility and explores how 
chipmakers can achieve internationalisation advantage by utilising triadic tactics, notably, to 
build cross-industry bridges between strategically selected foreign technology and end-
market partners in cross-regional R&D collaboration. This study advances research in the field 
of IB by offering a framework for analysing the internationalisation of R&D networks, and 
applying this framework through hypothesis testing using SAOM. Specifically, based on this 
framework, the study improves our understanding of how triadic tactics might facilitate 
(1) the enhancement of value and the novelty of value created through international R&D and 
(2) the acceleration of R&D internationalisation. 
Overall, the three studies presented in this thesis enrich the fields of strategy and IB and 
improve our understanding of the innovation and international strategies of modern 
companies. Moreover, they offer recommendations on how firms can utilise their position 
within the industry network strategically to achieve strategic advantage and develop cross-





2. Industry background: Collaboration in the 
semiconductor industry 
With total global sales of US$335 billion in 2015 (Semiconductor Industry Alliance, 2016) and 
its role as core technology enabler for sectors ranging from consumer electronics to medical 
and automotive, the semiconductor industry plays a pivotal role in the growth direction of 
today’s digital economy. Used in anything that is computerised or uses radio waves, such as 
the first transistor radio in the 1950’s, semiconductors – or integrated circuits, microchips or 
just ‘chips’ – now function as the heart of smart phones, laptops, flat-screen displays, medical 
devices, airplanes and military defence systems (see Figure 2.1 for an illustration). The 2 to 2½ 
years that it takes to develop a new generation of chips (Global Semiconductor Alliance, 2016), 
as dictated by Moore’s Law, is so financially and technologically intensive that this industry 
has evolved around one of the most complex, geographically dispersed and intertwined value 
chain ecosystems in the world (Semiconductor Industry Alliance, 2016). 
 
Figure 2.1: Evolution in semiconductor technology (source: Hitachi, 2019) 
To fully comprehend the role of cooperation and the importance of networks to firms in the 
semiconductor industry, a first essential step is to understand the inherent complexities that 
are involved in developing semiconductors, how the semiconductor value chain is structured, 
and how it has evolved over the past decades. This will be explored in the next sections. 
2.1. Characteristics of the contemporary semiconductor industry 
2.1.1. Industry pressures 
There are various unique characteristics that set the semiconductor industry and its ecosystem 
apart from other high-technology industries studied in the strategy literature. Rapid 
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technological advancements, the ongoing emergence of new technological markets, and the 
ever-changing customer demand for specialty products impose short product lifecycles (as 
short as under one year), making the semiconductor industry highly volatile (Figure 2.2) and 
competitive (Katircioglu and Gallego, 2011; Bauer et al., 2011). The development of new 
semiconductor products is therefore best described as a technological race for the quickest 
time-to-market and the best product functionality and performance at minimal cost (Collet 
and Pyle, 2013).  
 
Figure 2.2: Global semiconductor industry revenue growth from 1988 to 2020 
(source: Statista,  2019) 
Achieving these objectives, however, coincides with rising costs in R&D, design and 
manufacturing, due to the ever increasing complexity of chips and the costly need to upgrade 
existing fabrication plants (‘fabs’) in order to keep up with technological change 
(Semiconductor Industry Alliance, 2016). To illustrate: between 1994 and 2014, total R&D 
spending by US semiconductor firms grew at an average annual rate of roughly 33% 
(Semiconductor Industry Alliance, 2015). In 2015, total global R&D investments in the 
semiconductor industry amounted to US$56.4 billion, which equated to industry-wide 
investment rates of between 15-20% – making the industry one of the most R&D intensive in 
the world. By comparison, automakers generally maintain rates of 3% (Heck et al., 2011).  
The cost of a chip design project can reach up to US$200 million, depending on the complexity 
of the chip development and the nature of its end market (Tamme et al., 2013; Global 
Semiconductor Alliance, 2016). Furthermore, the costs involved with constructing a state-of-
the-art fab generally range between US$1.6 billion and US$4 billion2, and developing the 
 




necessary process technologies for the fab can amount up to another US$600 million (Heck et 
al., 2011; Nenni and McLellan, 2013). If we also take into account the short chip generation 
cycles, depreciation costs of a fab can consequently reach up to US$1 billion a year. 
Accordingly, in order to keep unit costs low and protect profit margins, fab owners must strive 
to maximise utilisation of capacity (Katircioglu and Gallego, 2011) or, as described by industry 
participants, ‘fill the fab’ (Nenni and McLellan, 2013). This illustrates well the high levels of 
risk and financial commitment which are associated with the semiconductor industry, as well 
as the resultant high barriers to entry that have made it increasingly expensive and hugely 
difficult for start-ups to establish a presence in the industry. 
In order to mitigate these high investments in R&D, design and fixed capital assets, and to 
overcome the uncertainty of constant technological change, semiconductor firms have long 
readjusted the basis of their competitive advantages. By developing business models centred 
on inter-organisational collaboration and spanning beyond regional borders, notably across 
the Americas, Europe and Asia (Figure 2.3), these firms have been able to achieve operational 
efficiencies and respond effectively to changes inside the industry. China, in particular, has 
been growing rapidly over the last decades (Figure 2.3) – as a market for complementary 
technologies and R&D expertise as well as for the commercialisation of new chip technologies 
(Ernst, 2005). As will become clear from the next sections, the semiconductor industry is 
uniquely structured to enable firms to generate maximum strategic advantage from the wide 
diversity of skills, know-how, human resources, and location-specific assets of strategic 
partners based elsewhere across the globe.  
2.1.2. The semiconductor innovation cycle 
Since the late 2000’s, increased demand for customisation and the growing popularity of the 
System on Chip (SoC) platform have been shaping the strategies of companies in the 
Figure 2.3: Global semiconductor market share by geographical region (source: Statista, 2019) 
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semiconductor industry. The semiconductor industry has since the 1980’s gradually gone 
through an evolution of disintegrating the semiconductor value chain, whereby building 
networks of strategic alliances between chip designers and companies operating at other 
stages of the value chain became essential for success (see Section 2.4 for a detailed overview 
of the evolution of the semiconductor industry). Competing chipmakers eventually ended up 
having access to broadly the same components and manufacturing processes based on the 
same standards. Hence, during the 2000’s, the industry arrived to a phase whereby hardware 
products became commoditised as a result of standardisation, and chipmakers began 
struggling to maintain their profit margins and to differentiate their products in terms of 
performance or cost. 
The industry’s cycle between phases of standardisation and customisation was initially 
described by Tsugio Makimoto in 1987, dubbed ‘Makimoto’s Wave’, who predicted that each 
phase should endure for about 10 years; with the basis of competition swinging as a pendulum 
between (1) innovation in functionality, performance and reliability; and (2) innovation in 
speed, convenience and customisation (see Figure 2.4). In 2010, following a prolonged period 
of standardisation and chipmakers’ failing economic models3 (Wingard, 2014), a new phase 
of customisation was partially set off by the decision of the large system companies Apple and 
Samsung to begin developing their own suite of cell phone application processor chips, 
respectively starting with the ‘Apple A4’ and ‘Exynos 3 Single’ SoCs,  as standard  SoCs 
offered by the semiconductor industry were not meeting their demands for speed, 
convenience and customisation, thus forcing out major chipmakers from the market 
(McLellan, 2014).  
 
Figure 2.4: Semiconductor Pendulum (Makimoto, 2002) 
 
3 For example, in the cell phone and digital TV markets, semiconductor companies attempted to build increasingly 
larger SoC platforms targeting an ever broader set of applications in order to generate the consumer volumes 
necessary to turn a profit. The economies of scale promised by standardized semiconductor platforms fell apart as 




Aside from smart phones, SoCs are increasingly embedded in devices of a wide variety of 
systems, including wearables, cars and sensors; and an essential enabler of the Internet of 
Things (IoT), with the rise of cloud computing, machine to machine (M2M), big data and 
artificial intelligence in particular. A single SoC can integrate multiple core processing units 
(CPUs), a graphics processing unit (GPU), a wireless modem as well as other software and 
hardware to support functions such as a global positioning system (GPS), camera, gesture 
recognition, audio and video. SoCs are highly efficient in the use of space and power in the 
devices into which they are embedded, enabling systems companies in the end-industries to 
design increasingly smaller and thinner devices. Accordingly, the shift towards customisation 
and the integration of hardware, software and systems is being driven by a growing demand 
for application-specific packaging and ever more miniaturised computing power 
requirements for end-systems (Wingard, 2014; McLellan, 2014).  
The complementary technologies which are integrated into SoCs may be developed by the 
same chipmaker, but they are typically sourced from or jointly developed with specialised 
partners within and outside of the semiconductor industry. Consequently, the growth in the 
deployment of IoT devices vis-à-vis traditional devices, such as PCs (see Figure 2.5), implies 
a shift in the R&D activities and processes of chipmakers, with greater emphasis on the 
collaboration between chipmakers and cross-industry partners to integrate an increasingly 
complex technologies into chips.  
 
Figure 2.5: Growth of global devices and connections (source: Cisco, 2016) 
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2.2. The semiconductor value chain and ecosystem 
From conception to completion, the creation of a new generation of chips starts with R&D, 
followed by design, foundry fabrication services (manufacturing), assembly, testing and 
packaging, and finally distribution to the end market (see Figure 2.6). Each of these core stages 
of production is highly specialised, and participants compete on the basis of cost advantages 
or R&D excellence and technological competence. The R&D function of the value chain, 
however, need not necessarily be competitive by definition. In light of promoting 
technological innovations, while also sharing the enormous costs of developing new 
technologies, semiconductor companies may forge joint development projects with rivals, 
universities, national governments, and research institutes.  
Accordingly, over the years, various technology consortia have been established with the 
objective of researching and developing new semiconductor materials, process technologies, 
and manufacturing equipment. Some of the most well-established consortia include 
SEMATECH (Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology) in the US, the Centre for 
Semiconductor Research at the State University of New York, the Industrial Technology Research 
Institute (ITRI) in Taiwan, the Interuniversity MicroElectronics Center (IMEC) in Belgium, and 
the Institute of Microelectronics in Singapore. 
The core of the semiconductor value chain is supported by a number of specialised types of 






IP blocks and cores used 








Raw wafers and 
chemicals 










Chip design software,  
tools and services 
Figure 2.6: The value chain and ecosystem of the semiconductor industry (source: Semiconductor 
Industry Alliance, 2016) 
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semiconductor IP, such as ARM Holdings, CEVA and Imagination Technologies, specialise in 
developing and licensing so-called IP ‘blocks’ or ‘cores’ of integrated circuits to chip designers, 
which integrate these blocks into their chip designs. Electronic design automation (EDA) 
companies, such as Cadence Design Systems, Mentor Graphics and Synopsys, provide computer-
aided design (CAD) services and develop software for designing chips, circuits, and various 
semiconductor IPs, which they license to chip design companies (typically through a 3-year 
time-based license). Raw material suppliers produce and supply raw chemicals, wafers (such 
as crystalline silicon) to foundry players and packaging materials to the assembly, testing and 
packaging segment. Finally, semiconductor equipment manufacturers, such as ASML Holding, 
Applied Materials and Aixtron, produce and supply specialised machines and equipment for 
the manufacturing, assembly, testing and packaging of integrated circuits. 
2.3. Chipmaker operating models 
2.3.1. In-house versus outsourcing chip manufacturing 
Starting in the early 1980’s, the customer-driven demands for speed, convenience and 
customisation along with the rising costs of R&D and manufacturing, sent various waves of 
disruption through the semiconductor industry. The enormous investments required to 
construct a state-of-the-art fabrication facility meant that only the largest and best established 
companies with the ability and necessary resources to afford the immense sunk costs and the 
scale to consistently run the fab at capitalisation rates of at least 90% (Wong et al., 2014), could 
maintain efficiency and survive. This growing importance of specialisation and scale (Naeher 
et al., 2011) led to a series of collaborative revolutions, ultimately vertically disintegrating the 
semiconductor value chain and shifting the basis of competitive advantage away from 
manufacturing to product-development capabilities – placing collaborative networks at centre 
stage. 
Today, the industry is dominated by two key chipmaker types which are based on distinct 
operating models (Figure 2.7): (1) the integrated device manufacturer (IDM), which performs 
all stages of production in-house; and (2) the fabless-foundry model. ‘Fabless’ companies are 
those firms that do not own fabs and concentrate solely on the design stage of the 
semiconductor production process. Running fabs is not efficient for these companies because 
they lack the scale needed for high-volume fabrication (Ladendorf, 2004). However, by 
forging long-term partnerships to outsource the fabrication of their designs to dedicated 
foundries, and the assembly, testing and packaging of their chips to outsourced assembly and 
test companies (or OSATs), they spread the risk and financial costs associated with the short 
product cycles and slumps in chip demand to these manufacturing service providers (Harlin, 
2010). Larger fabless companies may have a larger portfolio of partnerships with various 
manufacturing partners, enabling them to constrain potential opportunism of the supplier, 
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reduce the risk of losing supply, introducing price competition, and achieve faster time-to-
market.  
 
Figure 2.7: The operating models in the semiconductor industry (source: Semiconductor Industry  
Alliance, 2016) 
In the early stages of this industry transformation, the fabless model was infamously 
dismissed with the phrase “Real men have fabs”, as initially introduced by Jerry Sanders, a 
founder and former CEO of US-based Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). Today, however, some 
of the most successful semiconductor companies are in fact fabless, such as Broadcom and 
Qualcomm, and about 40% (Clarke, 2014) of total global semiconductor sales are generated by 
the fabless segment. 
The IDM business recognised the benefits of collaborative ecosystems. Due to the immense 
and increasing costs and risks of setting up, maintaining and upgrading fabrication facilities, 
as well as the increasing competitiveness of the foundry segment, many traditional IDMs have 
resorted to a hybrid model, or ‘fab-lite’ strategies, whereby they perform in-house production 
for specialty devices while outsourcing a share of their process capacity needs to dedicated 
third-party foundry players (Tamme et al., 2013; Semiconductor Industry Alliance, 2016). 
Retaining a share of the production in-house through fab-lite strategies also allows these IDMs 
to hedge against potential opportunistic behaviour of the foundry company and the risk of 
increasing foundry fees.  
Once considered as technology laggards, these specialised foundry companies, such as 
Taiwan’s TSMC and UMC and Singapore’s Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd,  are 
now among merely a handful of firms that are able to afford the increasing cost of owning 
fabs and that have a large enough network of customers to maximise capitalisation and 
efficiency (Ladendorf, 2004). This gives them a cost advantage over traditional IDMs, in turn 
making them an attractive strategic partner enabling IDMs to avoid excessive capacity 
investment risk (Wu, 2014). Accordingly, only a few huge (in terms of capacity) IDMs are able 
to win in the industry’s fierce drive toward efficiency, such as Intel Corp of the US or Samsung 
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disadvantage (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). Accordingly, estimations from 2009 show that 
relatively smaller IDMs are outsourcing varying shares of their production to foundries: Texas 
Instruments (55%), Freescale Semiconductor (23%), STMicroelectronics (20%) and Renesas 
Electronics (10%) (Wu et al., 2014). In a similar vein, in early 2009, the once fully integrated 
AMD spun off its complete chip fabrication facilities due to the climbing costs of maintaining 
and upgrading these plants.  
Table 2.1: Preliminary market shares for the top 10 chipmakers in 2015 (source: 








1 Intel Corp IDM US$49.3 14.0% 
2 Samsung Electronics IDM US$40.7 11.6% 
3 SK Hynix IDM (fab-lite) US$16.9 4.8% 
4 Qualcomm Fabless US$16.2 4.6% 
5 Micron Technology IDM (fab-lite) US$14.8 4.2% 
6 Texas Instruments IDM (fab-lite) US$12.3 3.5% 
7 NXP IDM (fab-lite) US$10.1 2.9% 
8 Toshiba IDM (fab-lite) US$9.2 2.6% 
9 Broadcom Fabless US$8.4 2.4% 
10 Avago Technologies IDM (fab-lite) US$7.0 2.0% 
 
Increasingly more fabless and IDMs pursuing fab-lite strategies have joined the top ten 
chipmakers (see Table 2.1). Beyond this group of top-performing companies, the core of the 
semiconductor industry is essentially populated by fabless chipmakers, IDMs with fab-lite 
strategies that use foundries for leading-edge fabrication processes, or IDMs who 
manufacture all of their chips in-house (Nenni and McLellan, 2013). By outsourcing the 
fabrication of their semiconductor devices, fabless and fab-lite IDMs can compete much more 
effectively with the industry leaders. These chipmakers are advantaged in that they can 
generate a substantial amount of revenue per employee. To illustrate this: in 2015, fabless 
player Xilinx achieved roughly US$2.38 billion in revenues with 3,451 employees, or nearly 
US$690,000 per employee (Xilinx, 2015). By contrast, Cypress Semiconductor Corp, a fab-lite 
IDM, reached US$256,000 per head (Cypress Semiconductor, 2015) and NXP Semiconductors’ 
much larger fab-lite chip business generated only US$136,000 per employee (NXP, 2015). In 
result, growth in global sales by fabless chipmakers has been outpacing that of IDMs over the 
past decades (see Figure 2.8); although IDMs are still leading the industry. 
However, relying on foundry partners for the production of all or a fair share of chips is not 
entirely risk-free. It places a huge dependence on chip makers, and shifting between foundries 
is known as an onerous process due to the various qualifications and extensive tests that 
products must pass in a new factory before they are ready to be sold in their respective end-
markets. This inefficient process would impose a high level of transaction costs, making it 
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imperative to develop mutual trust. It is therefore essential that chip makers build deep 
relationships with their foundry partners and develop strict routines for the exchange of 
information and knowledge. Accordingly, US-based Silicon Labs has been reported to 
exchange information with its Taiwanese foundry partner every week and its chief executive 
would visit the foundry on a quarterly basis to reinforce the strength of their inter-firm ties 
and to maintain a detailed flow of communication (Ladendorf, 2004).  
However, relying on foundry partners for the production of all or a fair share of chips is not 
entirely risk-free. It places a huge dependence on chip makers, and shifting between foundries 
is known as an onerous process due to the various qualifications and extensive tests that 
products must pass in a new factory before they are ready to be sold in their respective end-
markets. This inefficient process would impose a high level of transaction costs, making it 
imperative to develop mutual trust. It is therefore essential that chip makers build deep 
relationships with their foundry partners and develop strict routines for the exchange of 
information and knowledge. Accordingly, US-based Silicon Labs has been reported to 
exchange information with its Taiwanese foundry partner every week and its chief executive 
would visit the foundry on a quarterly basis to reinforce the strength of their inter-firm ties 
and to maintain a detailed flow of communication (Ladendorf, 2004).  
2.3.2. R&D collaboration by chipmakers 
Since the dominant share of chipmakers have adopted either the fabless or fab-lite model, 
competitive advantage across the semiconductor industry is no longer derived from 
manufacturing differentiation, but predominantly from R&D excellence and technological 
leadership (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002); the ability to design the most functional and best 
performing products in the shortest amount of time (Collett and Pyle, 2013). Accordingly, 
every year chipmakers increase their investments into their R&D activities (Figure 2.9) in 




order to meet the changing demands of customers and to stay ahead of competition. Figure 2.9 
suggests that this is especially important to IDMs, such as Intel and Samsung, as their R&D 
investments determine their ability to remain at the forefront of the industry’s technological 
frontier and, consequently, maintain their leading market positions needed to offset their large 
operating costs. Conversely, for those chipmakers who do not have the same amounts of 
resources which they can invest into R&D to advance their value creation capabilities, R&D 
collaboration with strategic partners both within and outside the semiconductor industry is 
especially critical – which enables sharing the increasing cost of R&D, overcoming the 
increasing complexity of chip technologies, meet the changing demands of customers, and 
keep up with competition. 
Consequently, one of the key factors determining who wins in the race for technological 
leadership is the strategic advantage that firms accumulate from establishing superior 
innovation networks of deep and sticky inter-organisational relationships with R&D partners 
in various industries and locking in external resources that enable them to sustain 
technological differentiability. According to research done by Heck et al. (2011), top 
performing semiconductor companies typically have closer relationships with key partners 
and customer. This enables them to enhance their value creation capabilities by leveraging the 
R&D skills and capabilities of strategic partners, as well as accessing deep insights regarding 
ongoing and future market developments and evolving customer requirements. Strong 
networks of strategic partners can also enable access to new IP, capital investments from 
leading foundries which are seeking to provide integrated solutions, or advanced-packaging 
technologies, among other resources. 
Each operating model has its own way of using R&D collaboration to combat the intense 
competition. Beyond the outsourcing of production, technology licensing has had a long 
tradition in the semiconductor industry. IDMs and fabless firms generally build strong 
Figure 2.9: Top semiconductor vendors by worldwide R&D expenditure (source: Statista, 2019) 
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licensing relationships with specialised IP developers and EDA software providers. 
Developing the increasingly complex chips which the markets demand has become so costly 
and slow, that even or those firms that have the necessary in-house capabilities it is more 
efficient to license IP from specialised suppliers (Tamme et al., 2013). The strategic rationale 
of building networks of strategic ties to IP suppliers revolves around securing the latest 
advancements in logical and circuit blocks, processor cores and chip design tools, while 
concentrating internal R&D resources on developing more value-added IP. Ultimately, this 
enables accelerating time-to-market. Similar collaborative responses to competitive pressures 
are also manifest on a horizontal basis, between rivals. For example, in 2005, chipmakers Cree 
Inc (USA) and Nichia Corp (Japan) signed a long-term cross-licensing agreement in order to 
battle competition by sharing new production technologies to lower fabrication costs (Nichia, 
2005). Configuring networks of both vertical and horizontal alliance partners may thus carry 
important strategic implications for the firm. 
Even the modern foundry business has recognised the importance of building superior 
alliance networks. Foundry players now compete by collaborating with and licensing various 
types of semiconductor IP from IP suppliers and fab-lite players and by building large 
networks of third-party EDA centres in order to optimally support fabless/fab-lite customers 
with designing and producing their new generations of chips. As a case in point, through a 
network of partnerships with various IP providers, South Korean foundry firm MagnaChip 
provides its customers with direct access to proven IP which would otherwise be costly for 
them to develop in-house (MagnaChip, 2019). Accordingly, foundries are able to attract new 
customers by developing a network of strategic IP partners; enabling them to leverage the 
status of their partners, offer new and sophisticated products and services, and to expedite 
the process of reaching high volume production of new chip designs (Naeher et al., 2011). This 
illustrates well the importance of strategic alliances and the transfer of IP to the competitive 
advantage of firms across the semiconductor industry. 
Chipmakers may also outsource chip development in addition to chip fabrication. Consider 
the example of Fujitsu, which used to fabricate system chips in-house, making it a natural 
competitor to other companies in the foundry segment – until 2010. Fujitsu conceded to the 
increasing competitive strength of the foundry segment and resorted to outsourcing a share 
of its production to rival TSMC – a strategic relationship which soon thereafter was deepened 
by including the joint development of new advanced products (Nikkei, 2010). Nowadays, 
Fujitsu assumes the role as broker between chip users in the end-markets and its partner TSMC; 
observing new customer requirements and assigning production and development 
responsibilities. 
The joint development of new technologies and products, however, is not confined to only 
the core of the semiconductor industry. Suppliers of semiconductor manufacturing machines 
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and equipment, also, are using a combination of horizontal and vertical alliances as a means 
of pooling R&D resources and spreading the increasing cost of developing new 
manufacturing tools, which can reach up to tens of millions of dollars (Baldwin, 2005). 
Accordingly, the use of joint development pacts, contract-manufacturing and sourcing 
agreements has become a common trend in this segment of the industry. 
Furthermore, universities and research centres play a critical role in semiconductor R&D, 
particularly at the pre-competitive stage of fundamental R&D (Rea et al., 1997; Bruynseraede, 
2009; Logar et al., 2014). These partners possess specialised fundamental research expertise 
and may provide chipmakers with early access to technological breakthroughs or knowledge 
about new fields of semiconductor technology, and can facilitate chipmakers in identifying or 
redirecting new innovation opportunities. Hence, many chipmakers invest heavily in forging 
R&D partnerships with universities and research centres. As a recent example, in 2013 TSMC 
established multiple research centres at four universities in Taiwan, and the company also 
partners with top universities in the USA, both to cultivate new talent and to collaborate on 
the development of new semiconductor technologies (TSMC, 2020). The Interuniversity 
Microelectronics Centre and the Fraunhofer Society, as well as the more recently established 
nanoelectronic Computing Research (nCoRE) and the Joint University Microelectronics Program 
(JUMP) in the USA, are other examples of long-term partnerships where chipmakers and 
universities/research centres collaborate pre-competitively to advance chip architectures and 
system designs while spreading the rapidly increasing cost of R&D (Semiconductor Industry 
Alliance, 2019). 
In this race for technological leadership and the search for external resources, current partners 
can be crucial sources of information regarding new partnering opportunities. For instance, 
mutual distributing partner China Electronic Appliance Shenzhen Co., Ltd. played a pivotal role 
in connecting US-based Freescale Semiconductor and Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric (a Chinese rail 
transportation company), whom subsequently established a joint R&D laboratory for 
microelectronics applications (Business Wire, 2007). Similarly, the association with industry 
leaders also bears other clear strategic benefits to the semiconductor firm. In 2006, Agilent 
Technologies jointly developed a new test solution in cooperation with Freescale Semiconductor. 
The then vice president of Agilent stated that the close association with an industry leader 
such as Freescale is essential to its strategic position in the industry (Agilent Technologies, 
2006), which is due to the obtained access to Freescale’s widely-adopted chipset platform, as 
well as its established distribution channels and customer relations with (influential) end-
users (Stuart, 2000).  
While these examples of strategic partnerships provide a good indication of the types and the 
extent of alliance activities in the semiconductor industry, they only scratch the surface of the 
true complexity and dispersion of the global semiconductor industry network. In fact, many 
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chipmakers collaborate with the same partners, serve the same customers, and use the same 
suppliers. This overlap of relationships adds further complexity to the partnering decisions of 
firms and the way in which they structure their alliance networks.  
Furthermore, the growing demand for SoCs to enable an increasing range of new product 
innovations has been calling for a change in the way chipmakers operate and compete. This 
is especially true for fabless chipmakers, as they dominate the SoC segment (Saito, 2009). 
Whereas the collaborative strategies of chipmakers were traditionally focused on developing 
better performing chips at a lower cost, the emergence of the IoT and wearables has been 
increasing the value of embedded systems and associated application software in products, 
requiring chipmakers to shift their strategic focus to developing highly integrated solutions 
with dedicated functions aimed at enabling actual applications. Accordingly, opportunities 
for new chip development projects are closely linked to end-user industries (Zhang and 
Roosmalen, 2009) and have been calling for the transition to a ‘silicon to services’ business 
model (Global Semiconductor Alliance, 2018). 
To capture value and avoid becoming obsolescent, Bauer et al. (2015) concluded that 
chipmakers should deliver fully integrated solutions, covering multiple layers of the 
technology stack – if they are to extract full value from the IoT. This implies that chipmakers 
need to complement their traditional capabilities in chip design with capabilities in software 
development and system integration. Closing the gap between these capabilities is critical as 
it determines the difference between the ability to develop a high- or low-end product. 
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2.4. Evolution of collaborative activities in the semiconductor 
industry 
Since its emergence in Silicon Valley in the 1950’s, the semiconductor industry has gone 
through a number of disruptive revolutions which transformed the industry’s production 
process and innovative efforts and placed the importance of strategic partnerships centre 
stage. As a further contextual supplement to the main analyses performed in this thesis, below 
follows a description of the various stages through which the semiconductor industry has 
evolved over the past decades (Figure 2.10 provides a visual illustration). Where it is not 
explicitly stated, information has been adopted from Nenni and McLellan (2013). 
1950’s ~1980 – In-house production era 
Over the first 30 years leading to the early 1980’s, the semiconductor industry was vertically 
segregated, following the integrated manufacturing model. Companies that owned 
manufacturing facilities researched, developed, manufactured and marketed their own 
products. During this period, there was virtually no collaboration between these firms. Inter-
organisational interaction primarily revolved around the supply of semiconductor devices for 
military and mainframe applications. 
1980’s – Initial collaboration revolution 
Initial collaborative activities between semiconductor firms began to develop in the wake of 
the emergence of the personal computers market during the 1980’s. In order to manage excess 
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Figure 2.10: Evolution of collaborative activities along the semiconductor industry life cycle (source: 
created by the author) 
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IDMs started offering smaller firms design, manufacturing, and packaging services. The first 
fabless semiconductor companies, such as Xilinx (est. 1984) and Chips & Technologies (est. 
1985), operated a business model based on strategic partnerships with these IDMs in order to 
tap into their excess manufacturing capacity. This marked the earliest stage of the outsourcing 
revolution which led to what we now call the fabless semiconductor industry.  
In 1987, the establishment of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) gave 
birth to the foundry segment which consequently enabled the emergence of the fabless 
operating model. Initially started as a provider of semiconductor manufacturing services to 
IDMs who were suffering a deficit in their own fabs, TSMC’s focus shifted towards the fabless 
and fab-lite ecosystem after increasing numbers of these players entered the industry. 
Essentially, TSMC made it possible for fabless chipmakers to have their products 
manufactured on a contractual basis. This meant that they no longer had to rely on in-house 
fabrication facilities, enabling them to focus their internal resources on the design stage of the 
semiconductor production process. 
The year 1987 also saw the development of SEMATECH, one of the first consortia between the 
US government and US-based semiconductor manufacturers – as a response to Japanese 
competitors and as a means of jointly conducting R&D concerning semiconductor 
manufacturing techniques (Hof, 2011). From 1996 onwards, however, SEMATECH 
abandoned the initial US government-driven initiatives and shifted its focus towards joining 
broader industry participation from across sub-sectors and becoming a unified global 
consortium (Sematech, 2013). This is also when the wider semiconductor industry saw 
increased activity in R&D collaboration between semiconductor organisations within and 
across national borders. 
The period of the 1980’s also marked the emergence of Electronic Design Automation (EDA) 
as an industry. Large electronics/semiconductor companies, such as Intel and Hewlett Packard, 
had traditionally performed EDA in-house. In 1981, however, these companies spun off their 
EDA groups, enabling them to emerge as a specialised business and offer their design 
products and services to the electronics companies through 3-year time-based licensing 
agreements (as it was initially introduced by Avant!). Nowadays, this is still the predominant 
means of collaboration between EDA providers and chip makers. 
1990’s – The semiconductor IP licensing revolution 
Economic downturn during the 1990’s led semiconductor companies to also spin off their 
internal IP groups to cut costs, leading to the rise of a new segment of dedicated IP providers. 
Subsequently, with the establishment of ARM Holdings in 1990, the new IP segment witnessed 
the rise of the microprocessor IP business model, which revolved solely around developing 
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and licensing IP ‘blocks’ to chip makers for incorporation into their chip designs. These 
licenses involve upfront fees and the payment of royalties for each chip sold. 
The IP business model was further changed as it became clear that the timely availability of 
high quality IP libraries was an important enabler of the foundry business – to attract and 
optimally support customers. The explosive growth of the Internet and rising demand for 
more advanced mobile communications products inflated the importance of a rapid time-to-
market and increasingly drove the basis of competitive advantage towards technological 
excellence. This further reinforced the importance of inter-organisational collaboration. In the 
late 1990’s, Artisan forged a partnership with TSMC that gave chip designers free access to 
Artisan IP libraries if they used TSMC as their foundry partner. This changes the IP model 
from an upfront licensing model to a royalty-based model backed by the foundries. Today 
TSMC has the largest commercial IP catalogue, its IP Alliance Program (TSMC, 2019), which is 
part of its Open Innovation Platform, which encompasses hundreds of millions of dollars 
invested in the fabless enablement ecosystem. 
The increased availability of various kinds of IP through licensing agreements to chip makers 
considerably lowered barriers to market entry and eased the process of designing more 
complex chips. 
2000’s – Rise of the outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) segment 
Although outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) companies had been in 
operation since the late 1960’s (as pioneered by Amkor Technology in 1968), it was only from 
the early 2000’s onwards that part of the segment made the transition from low-end, 
commoditized service businesses to technological differentiators. As a result of the slowing 
pace of radical innovation in the front-end segment of the semiconductor industry, pressure 
on the industry to deliver more complex and technically differentiated semiconductor devices 
meant that the OSAT players had to offer innovative and sophisticated packaging solutions 
with an eye to improving chip performance (Naeher et al., 2011). The increasing demand for 
technological differentiation led to the separation of a group of high-end OSAT players from 
the commoditised mainstream companies. 
In the high-end segment, the development of close collaborative relations with partners across 
the semiconductor industry became essential to achieving technical differentiation. 
Accordingly, OSAT companies have become actively involved in the joint development with 
(1) system design companies, to develop new and better performing packaging solutions; (2) 
IDMs, to combine front-end and back-end manufacturing capabilities and technologies; (3) 
foundries, to develop new technologies for advanced processes and leverage both partners’ 
respective strengths in semiconductor manufacturing under a ‘total’ integrated 
manufacturing service. (Cross-)licensing agreements, with a rivalling OSAT player or a 
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foundry partner, have also become a more popular strategy to secure new packaging 
technologies as well as lowering manufacturing costs. 
2010’s – Open-source innovation revolution 
After half a century of continued growth and technological advancements, the modern 
semiconductor industry is characterised by shrinking revenues and tightening profit margins 
amid shifts in chip demand and the ever-increasing R&D and manufacturing costs (Global 
Semiconductor Alliance, 2016). According to industry experts, the emergence of the Internet 
of Things (IoT), which encapsulates ‘smart’ technologies such as smart wearables, smart cars, 
smart homes and smart cities, is likely going to be the key growth driver for the semiconductor 
industry over at least the next decade (Simon, 2015). The rising cost of chip development, 
however, is hampering the IoT market from achieving its full potential. This has encouraged 
semiconductor companies to explore new ways of collaborating for innovation; most notably 
through open-source innovation. 
By collaborating with open-source software developers, chip makers have begun to bring 
innovative chips to market while achieving a cost advantage by avoiding multi-million dollar 
licensing fees which are usually paid for the incorporation of software stacks. Moreover, this 
minimises contractual risks associated with intellectual property. As a case in point, in 2015, 
IBM and fabless chip maker Xilinx forged an alliance to address emerging applications like 
machine learning and big data analytics by integrating IBM’s open POWER architecture with 
Xilinx’ chips (IBM, 2015).  
Another recent trend in light of reducing development costs has been the concept of open-
source hardware (rather than software). In a pioneering move, researchers at the University of 
California, Berkeley have developed an open-source ‘instruction set architecture’ named 
RISC-V4, allowing anyone to design and fabricate RISC-V chips without the need to purchase 
an expensive license. This open-source alternative has been gaining increased industry 
support from the likes of Google, Hewlett Packard, IBM, NVIDIA, AMD, Qualcomm, Lattice 
Semiconductor, Oracle and many others. However, industry experts believe that it will likely 
take a few more years before this open-source hardware movement will receive full support 
from the wider semiconductor ecosystem (Hemsoth, 2016). 
 
4 https://riscv.org/  
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3. THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTER-ORGANISATIONAL 
COLLABORATION: A NETWORK VIEW ON ALLIANCE 
FORMATIONS IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 
3.1. Introduction 
Over the past decades, inter-organisational collaboration through alliances has become an 
integral part of the competitive strategies of many companies. This is especially true in highly 
competitive and volatile environments, such as high technology industries with disintegrated 
value chains (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995), characterised by falling profit margins due 
to increasing fixed costs (notably R&D) and investments in fixed capital assets (Sahlman and 
Stevenson, 1985; Klepper and Graddy, 1990). This threatens firm survival and amplifies the 
importance of coping effectively with uncertainties around rapid technological 
advancements, the ongoing emergence of new technological markets, and short product 
lifecycles that result from the non-stop, changing customer-driven demand for specialty 
products.  
Competitive advantage, in this kind of business environment, is derived from the ability to 
develop functional and reliable products at the speed, convenience and customisability 
demanded by customers (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). Responding to these demands 
effectively requires the firm to design and manage an efficient value creating system that 
permits for the flexible and rapid commercialisation of products. Arm’s-length agreements 
between the innovator and other actors, in this situation, are typically not efficient as partners 
may be required to make investments that are relation-specific (Teece, 1986). Vertical 
internalisation without scale economies is also inefficient as this requires the firm to upgrade 
and redesign the complete chain of value-added activities following the development of every 
new product generation. Instead, with the basis of competition resting on speed, responsiveness 
and convenience, and the complexity and cost of developing new technologies often 
stretching beyond the internal capabilities and financial resources of the firm (Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002), interdependency between organisations and their resources becomes the 
industry standard. As a consequence, the extent to which the firm can gain a competitive edge 
over its rivals is heavily dependent on the access that it has to, and influence over, critical 
resources located outside its own boundaries (Gomes-Casseres, 1994, 2003; Dyer and Singh, 
1998).  
This implies that companies have to collaborate beyond arm’s length by forging enduring and 
strategically significant ties that are governed by specific inter-organisational arrangements, 
such as licensing agreements, outsourcing agreements, R&D partnerships and joint ventures. 
Since the 1990s, strategy scholars have shown that the proliferation of these alliances has led 
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to companies becoming increasingly embedded in extensive and complex inter-organisational 
networks (e.g. Normann and Ramirez, 1993; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Gulati, 1995b, 1998; 
Powell et al., 1996; Gulati et al., 2000). These inter-organisational networks have been termed 
variously as “trading networks” (von Hippel, 1988), “innovation networks” (Freeman, 1991), 
“value constellations” (Normann and Ramirez, 1993), “alliance constellations” (Gomes-
Casseres, 2003), “alliance networks” (Gulati, 1998) and “strategic networks” (Gulati et al., 
2000). They are viewed, in general, as a form of market and organisation which connects 
different organisations with different resources and competencies to jointly create and capture 
value and achieve competitive success.  
The modularised structure of many high tech industries dictates that innovating companies 
design networks of alliances at the interface of different stages of their value chain, connecting 
to strategic partners such as competitors, complementors, suppliers and customers. These 
alliance networks provide firms with access to complementary assets that are essential for the 
rapid commercialisation of new innovations, including R&D capabilities, intellectual 
property, manufacturing processes, logistics and distribution channels. The importance of 
establishing networks of inter-organisational relationships with various kinds of external 
partners to the innovation process has been well-documented in the literature on open 
innovation (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003; Gassmann, 2006; Gassmann et al., 2010; Huizingh, 2011). 
Within such a relational structure of organisational interdependence lies the inherent strategic 
challenge for firms to effectively configure and manage their alliance networks in order to 
generate the desired strategic outcomes.  
Over the past 20 years, an increasing number of studies have shifted the level of their analyses 
from the individual alliance towards the of the alliance network, in order to explain 
organisational outcomes such as growth (e.g. Powell et al., 1996), innovation output (e.g. 
Ahuja, 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Nooteboom et al., 2006; Boschma and Ter Wal, 2007; 
Capaldo, 2007; Shiri, 2015) and access to venture capital (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Others 
have underscored that the ability of the firm to accomplish its desired strategic outcomes and 
achieve competitive success depends on the way in which it orchestrates its network activities 
(Hacki and Lighton, 2001; Dhanasai and Parkhe, 2006). This implies that rather than solely by 
complementing ones internal resources with the critical resources of an individual strategic 
partner, it is also the way in which resources from multiple network partners are assembled, 
structured and managed within the firm’s network or value creating system that determines 
the magnitude of strategic benefits that it may derive from a collaboration (Vanhaverbeke and 
Cloodt, 2006). 
Research has also highlighted that the patterns of “connectivity and cleavage” (Wellman, 
1988: 26) which define the overall structure or architecture of industry-wide, 
inter-organisational networks can also help to explain various collective business outcomes, 
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such as disseminating knowledge and other resources, transmitting signals of partner 
reliability, constraining opportunism, or establishing norms of cooperation and trust through 
shared third-party ties (Granovetter, 1973; Gulati, 1995a; Rowley, 1997; Uzzi, 1997; Walker et 
al., 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 2000; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; 
Schilling and Phelps, 2007). An industry-wide network encapsulates all organisations and 
their alliance ties in a given industry. It is the aggregate of all, potentially interlinked, ego 
network structures (i.e. the alliances between the focal firm and its partners, plus the alliances 
among its partners), and its architecture represents the overall pattern that describes how all 
industry network participants are connected to one another. While the benefits associated 
with particular network architectures have been relatively well-documented, there has been 
a noticeable shortage of research explaining the causes of variation between the distinct 
architectural properties of inter-organisational networks in different industrial environments. 
Only a small number of more recent studies have compared large-scale, inter-organisational 
networks across different industries to identify the sources of variation between the 
architectural properties of these networks. For instance, Verspagen and Duysters (2004) 
compared the technology alliance networks of the chemicals and food and electricals 
industries for small-world properties. Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007) suggested that the 
architecture of networks is associated with the technology dynamism, product modularity 
and architectural control that characterise the industries which they represent. Finally, 
Tatarynowicz et al. (2016) showed that, among six industries, differences in technological 
dynamism and demands for value creation lead to distinct architectural network properties.  
These studies, although valuable in themselves, have left an important area unexplored. The 
concept of product modularity in particular, resulting from the rapid and ever-changing 
customer demands for value creation, has been used in well-known work to understand the 
disintegration of value chains as seen in many of today’s high tech industries (Christensen 
and Raynor, 2003). Modularity, within this logic, forces companies to collaborate, through 
multiple types of strategic relations, with specialised partners in several or all of the distinct 
activities of an industry’s value chain. It is therefore important to distinguish between 
different types of sub-networks within a single industry-wide network, and to understand 
how these different sub-networks are built in the first place. Interestingly, quantitative 
research on the organisation of inter-organisational activities at different stages of an 
industry’s value chain is still in its infancy. Such investigation calls for an understanding of 
how the drivers of collaboration and the inter-organisational routines and processes that 
characterise alliances in different value chain activities lead to distinct network architectures. 
This is necessary if we are to adequately link the different network configurations that firms 
pursue to the collective outcomes that they seek at different stages of the value-added chain. 
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With the aim of shedding light on this matter, this chapter examines networks of 
inter-organisational alliances, at distinct stages of the value chain of the semiconductor 
industry, and explores why their architectural properties differ across value-added activities. 
Although the architecture of a network can be measured in various ways, this chapter will 
focus specifically on the indications of network connectedness, centralisation and clustering. 
Understanding the variation in these architectural properties of distinct sub-networks 
requires shifting the focus from the role of the individual alliance towards the role of the 
alliance network, which implies linking the collective outcomes related to particular network 
configurations to the value-added activities for which these networks are used. Concurrently, 
with alliances constituting the foundational building-blocks of a network, it is important to 
also consider the wide range of arrangements that firms can use to govern their alliances as 
well as the associated inter-organisational routines and processes, upon with a given alliance 
network is built in the first place.  
Following this line of reasoning, the relational properties that characterise an alliance relation 
between a pair of organisations should ultimately dictate the collective outcomes, as provided 
by particular network configurations, which are needed to effectively manage the strategic 
interdependence between them and to carry out the value-added activity for which their 
alliance was initiated. For instance, one could argue that the establishment of norms of 
cooperation and trust, as induced through shared third-party ties, is crucial to alliances that 
require a higher degree of relational commitment and investment for the value-added activity 
at hand to bear fruit – but less to others. The relational properties of alliance relations can, 
accordingly, be expected to indirectly influence the architectures of distinct alliance networks 
at different value chain stages. Due to the widespread modularisation across high tech 
industries, the appropriateness of a given network architecture, as will be argued, can 
therefore not be sufficiently understood without considering the value-added activity for 
which the network is used alongside the nature of the inter-organisational relations upon 
which it is founded. 
This implies that the differences in the architectures of alliance networks cannot be adequately 
captured by one-dimensional conceptual frameworks. Accordingly, we must integrate 
different lessons that past studies have taught in the light of (I) the drivers of collaboration, 
(II) inter-organisational routines and processes, (III) value chain analysis and (IV) social 
network analysis into a single comprehensive conceptual framework. The need for combining 
theoretical views has previously been stressed by Madhok and Tallman (1998), Amit and Zott 
(2001), Gomes-Casseres (2003), and Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt (2006). Accomplishing this was 
beyond the scope of these past studies, and no attempts have been made since then. The 
present chapter will thus seek to advance existing theory by developing a multi-dimensional 
conceptual framework and applying this to analyse variation in the architectural properties 
of alliance networks at distinct value chain stages, in the global semiconductor industry. 
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With this objective in mind, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next 
section explores in greater depth the role of strategic alliances and the importance of inter-
organisational routines and processes in determining strategic outcomes. The third section 
examines how semiconductor companies use the routines and processes to conduct distinct 
value-added activities in collaboration. The fourth section reviews the social network 
literature and discusses the benefits associated with particular network configurations. 
Finally, the fifth section explores how the particular patterns of relation-building that firms 
use can help to predict differences in the architectural properties of alliance networks at 
different stages of the (semiconductor) value chain. Several hypotheses are formulated and 
tested in the subsequent sections. 
3.2. The nature of strategic alliances 
3.2.1. The drivers and benefits of inter-organisational collaboration 
To adequately comprehend the sources of variations in the architectures of alliance networks, 
it is essential to first understand the fundamental motivations that drive firms to enter into 
the alliances that make up different kinds of networks. In general, alliances entail long-term 
arrangements through which at least two independent partners work together to carry out 
particular business activities and gain access to specific strategic benefits (Duysters and 
Hagedoorn, 1993; Tsang, 1998). Over the past decades, studies have found that firms 
collaborate with other organisations for various explicitly formulated reasons which can 
mostly be linked to the content of the activities at the various phases of the innovation process; 
from R&D and product development to marketing and distribution (Hagedoorn, 1993).  
To explain the roles of alliances in the light of these activities, scholars have drawn upon 
various fields of theorising, including transaction cost analysis (Williamson, 1981), resource 
dependence (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976), social exchange (Levine and White, 1961), 
organisational learning (Kogut, 1988), the resource-based view (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1996; Das and Teng, 2000) and competitive strategy (Porter, 1980). Narula and 
Hagedoorn (1999) have organised the motives for inter-organisational collaboration along 
strategic and cost-economising lines. Broadly speaking, the strategic motives revolve around 
the need to enhance the long-term value of the assets of the firm, which firms can achieve by 
(1) accessing complementary resources and capabilities, (2) learning, (3) sharing risk or 
uncertainty, and (4) accessing markets, and tend to be reflected more in horizontal and cross-
industry alliance agreements (Martínez-Noya and Narula, 2018). By contrast, the cost-
economising motives relate to the need to improve efficiency or reduce costs, and are more 
often inherent to vertical alliance agreements (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999), such as in 
manufacturing, marketing and supply activities. Other studies have also identified 
motivational elements which are not necessarily related to a single particular business activity, 
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such as necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, stability, legitimacy, reduced competition or 
revenue enhancement (Oliver, 1990; Glaister and Buckley, 1996).  
Access to knowledge, complementary resources and learning 
Contrary to traditional views, research has shown that firms do not solely seek to achieve 
competitive advantage using their internal resource. Instead, firms often seek to leverage the 
critical resources and capabilities which are located outside of their boundaries by forging 
collaborative relations with other organisations (Dyer, 1996, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998). The 
formation of alliances can thus be driven by the need for access to strategic resources 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996) or, as Tsang (1998) theorised, the need to create rents, 
expand resource usage, diversify resource usage, imitate resources and dispose of resources.  
Specifically, the role of alliances often revolves around the need to share and advance research 
and transfer basic scientific and/or technological knowledge (Hagedoorn, 1993). Some 
motives are related to sharing the state-of-the-art or other knowledge-based resources such as 
manufacturing or customer-related information (Teece, 1986; Shan, 1990). Accordingly, some 
scholars have conceptualised the role of inter-organisational alliance ties as “pipelines”, or 
closed conduits, through which knowledge and technology flow from one organisation to 
another (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). However, alliances typically involve more than 
merely the transfer of knowledge or other resources (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). They often 
entail the development of longer-term relations, based on reciprocity, balance and mutual 
support (Oliver, 1990) through which organisations actively work together to join their 
complementary skills and talents with the aim of conducting concrete research activities or 
overcoming the increasing complexity and interdisciplinary nature of new technological 
areas. The overarching purpose of these relations is to pursue common or mutually beneficial 
objectives. This can also be related to monitoring the evolution of technologies to identify new 
strategically valuable complementarities (Hagedoorn, 1993). Alliances can therefore provide 
great potential for generating new innovations (Contractor and Lorange, 1988), achieving 
economies of scope (Hagedoorn, 1993), and accelerating the R&D process in those industries 
where rapid time-to-market is essential (Gilsing et al., 2008) – which firms on their own would 
have otherwise been unable to achieve. While such collaborations are usually done in good 
faith, it has been reported that firms may also be driven by the potential opportunity of 
secretly capturing some of their partners’ resources or capabilities (Hagedoorn, 1993). 
Shared risk or uncertainty 
The role of alliances has also been commonly described by scholars as a strategic tool for 
overcoming technological complexity and hedging against risk and uncertainty (Porter and 
Fuller, 1986; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006), especially in the 
areas of R&D, production and marketing (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Das and Teng, 
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2000). Alliances which are driven by this motive can help to reduce risk and uncertainty in a 
number of ways. Generally, alliances are often formed when the cost of the partnership is less 
than the cost of the investment undertaken by an individual firm alone (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988). More specifically, alliances can involve collaborating organisations aligning 
their supplementary or complementary resources (Das and Teng, 2000). In the former 
situation, partners join a comparable amount of similar resources to their collaboration. For 
example, by contributing a more or less similar amount of financial resources, firms can 
spread the risk of large projects or particularly capital intensive activities among multiple 
firms. By complementing dissimilar resources, however, firms can achieve economies of scale 
and/or scope which enable them to more easily diversify into new product markets and 
expand into new end markets (Hagedoorn, 1993). Ultimately, this can reduce the market risk 
associated with relying on a single type of product and increase the speed of attaining a return 
on investment (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). 
Access to markets 
A rich literature has also highlighted the role of alliances in entering foreign markets and 
creating new markets and products. The wider field of international business, in particular, 
has shown that alliances are not bound by national boundaries and they can enable firms to 
overcome their liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) by combining certain of their business 
activities with those of a partner based in another country or geographic region, in order to 
enter a particular foreign market (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Although a firm may 
possess the capability and resources to produce products, a lack of international experience 
and knowledge of foreign markets may imply that it is unable to efficiently expand into 
foreign markets independently. Alliance partners located in the local market can therefore 
help to reduce the costs and risk associated with international expansion. Furthermore, 
organisations collaborating on the development of new products and processes can leverage 
their alliance relationship to jointly monitor new market opportunities and environmental 
changes within and outside of their core industry (Hagedoorn, 1993). 
Improved efficiency or reduced costs 
The formation of alliances can be driven by an organisation’s attempt to achieve economies of 
scale when insufficient product demand and increased unit costs and downtime in the case of 
internal production would otherwise impact negatively on its long-term competitiveness 
(Oliver, 1990; Glaister and Buckley, 1996). This need for cost efficiency as a driver of 
collaboration has been famously emphasised by the transaction cost perspective (Williamson, 
1981, 1985). This perspective holds that alliances can be used to economise on the costs of 
transactions, specifically, in the light of vertical linkages and the transfer of technology, such 
as costs associated with negotiating and re-negotiating contracts, and the need to monitor 
partners (Dyer, 1997). These transaction costs arise fundamentally from a fear of opportunism 
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on the part of the contract partner, and they grow as firms make larger relation-specific 
investments and as uncertainty and the frequency of recurring transactions increase (Oliver, 
1990). Firms may thus find that the intermediate governance structures of longer term 
alliances mediate their transactions more efficiently than arm’s-length agreements, as they 
reduce the costs of bargaining over profits from relation-specific assets (Williamson, 1985). 
Inter-firm specialisation, by leveraging the comparative advantage of each alliance partner, 
can then enable collaborating organisations to achieve economies of scale (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988). Concurrently, this allows firms to avoid the uncertainties and difficulties 
associated with a possible merger (Mariti and Smiley, 1983). 
Other motives and benefits 
Scholars have identified various other motives to explain the formation of alliances between 
organisations. For instance, firms have long used alliances to strategically alter the 
competitive landscape by allying with potential or existing rivals (Porter and Fuller, 1986); in 
order to reduce competition through collaboration or to put pressure on the profits of a 
common rival (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). By forging ties with the partners of existing 
competitors, firms can also reduce the value that the competitor appropriates from these 
partners (Madhavan et al., 2004). Similarly, allying with rivals, e.g. through licensing, can also 
be done with the purpose of enhancing revenues, to avoid complacency and to create ‘second 
sources’ to encourage the market to adopt one’s product or technology (Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger, 1996). 
Furthermore, in her review, Oliver (1990) puts forth that inter-organisational relationships are 
driven by necessity, stability, asymmetry and legitimacy, in addition to the earlier discussed 
need for reciprocal relations and cost efficiency. The need to conform to host government 
policy or particular legal or regulatory requirements, as a necessity, for example, has long 
been a key factor explaining firms’ decision to enter into alliances (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). 
The formation of alliances therefore need not be voluntary. For instance, governments in 
many of the developing countries allow foreign companies to enter their markets under the 
condition that they collaborate with a local partner. Similarly, collaborative activities in certain 
strategic sectors of a country’s economy are often subject to government requirements which 
are aimed to protect it.  
More commonly, alliances have been considered to constitute voluntary actions, which are 
often reflective of strategic responses to environmental uncertainty. Uncertainty around the 
availability of critical resources within the firm’s business environment along with a lack of 
knowledge on environmental changes and the availability of potential partners implies that 
alliances provide a means to gain access to resource flows, knowledge and exchanges which 
are required for it to carry out its strategy (Paulson, 1976; Pennings, 1981). This provides 
stability to a company’s business (Oliver, 1990).  
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Conversely, however, the scarce nature of particular critical resources has also been argued to 
prompt firms to enter into alliances in an attempt to gain power or control over the 
organisations possessing the critical resources (Provan et al., 1980; Oliver, 1990); in particular 
those operating upward and downwards along the supply chain (Harrigan, 1985). This has 
been a central premise of the resource dependency perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Access to critical resources in general would arguably enable firms to reduce the lifecycle of 
their products and increase their time-to-market, which are consequently also believed to 
constitute motives for collaboration (Hagedoorn, 1993). In a similar fashion, a firm may also 
use an alliance as a means to improve its legitimacy by connecting with a particular high-
status partner (Baum and Oliver, 1991). This enhances its own organisational status and 
improves the external perception of its ability to create a valuable product (Oliver, 1990). 
3.2.2. Modes for collaboration and inter-organisational routines and processes 
An alliance is not a discrete event. Each alliance is embedded in a broader network of other 
inter-organisational relationships. Concurrently, alliances are not homogenous and can 
encompass various relational properties and be driven by various motives – as discussed 
previously. Understanding the variation in the architectures of alliance networks that were 
created for distinct value-added activities requires comprehending the roles of alliances 
within these broader networks and their fundamental inter-organisational routines and 
processes, upon which these networks are built.  
Inter-organisational networks, at their very core, are social fabrics of strategic 
interdependencies between organisations. Organisations are interdependent to the extent that 
they may own strategically critical resources or capabilities which are beneficial to, but not 
possessed by, another (Gulati, 1995b). Organisations perceive this interdependence when 
resources are scarce (i.e. critical) and they are unable to internally generate the necessary 
resources, such as materials, information, specialised skills, technologies, and market access 
(Aiken and Hage, 1968; Oliver, 1990). Past research around the subject of resource dependence 
has long shown that organisations use alliances to manage, at least partially, their 
interdependencies and generate strategic advantage (Whetten, 1977; Pfeffer, 1978; Barringer 
and Harrison, 2000). Accordingly, the ability to achieve organisational success increasingly 
hinges on the firm’s access to and control over scarce resources beyond its own boundaries; 
or the power that it has over other organisations that own the required resources, relative to 
other industry players (Ulrich and Barney, 1984; Pfeffer, 1987). 
Alliances, within this logic, constitute the social building-blocks of networks.  Selecting the 
most appropriate organisational mode to shape a strategic relation and achieve a specific 
strategic outcome, such as the development of a new technology, is at the centre of a 
company’s commercialisation strategy (Pisano, 1990; Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; 
Chesbrough, 2003). Various studies have been dedicated to describing the different inter-
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organisational modes from which companies can choose to shape their relations with partners 
beyond arm’s length (e.g. Pisano, 1990; Hagedoorn, 1993; Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; 
Chesbrough, 2003; Dyer et al., 2004; Contractor and Reuer, 2014; Choi and Contractor, 2016). 
However, limited work has been done thus far to connect the logic underpinning this tactical 
decision to the structures of alliance networks. 
Organisational modes vary in the level of control needed to manage uncertainty in the light 
of appropriation concerns, as advocated by transaction cost economists (Williamson, 1985, 
1991), and otherwise reduce the costs of coordinating5 activities across organisational 
boundaries through “superior information-processing mechanisms” (Gulati and Singh, 1998), 
as emphasised by organisational sociologists – to efficiently deliver the quality and 
technological and product specifications demanded by customers. The relative need for 
control and coordination will differ depending on the type of arrangement and the nature of 
the relation (Lumineau and Malhotra, 2011). The continuum of hybrid inter-organisational 
arrangements stretches from non-equity modes that involve low levels of hierarchical control, 
such as licensing agreements or joint R&D agreements; to joint ventures in which partners are 
tied through equity shares and which offer greater hierarchical control (see Figure 3.1). These 
types of alliance are necessarily aimed towards different missions or tasks, embody different 
degrees of partner interaction, involve different financial and managerial investments, and 
entail varying levels of risk (Contractor and Reuer, 2014). 
 
Figure 3.1: The traditional continuum of organisational modes (Source: created by the author) 
Concurrently, any alliance is formed voluntarily by organisations who seek to create value 
that is greater than each of the collaborating organisations would be able to create individually 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). Importantly, value can be generated in different ways depending on 
the purpose of the alliance, and partners’ estimated value of their alliance may differ 
depending on their own subjective valuation of the anticipated alliance outcome. The pursuit 
of certain outcomes requires different levels of coordination between the collaborating 
organisations and thus involves varying degrees of interdependence. For example, the 
transaction value approach (Zajac and Olson, 1993; Dyer, 1997) stresses that the choice of 
organisational mode may be aimed towards maximising the joint value created by the 
 
5 Gulati and Singh (1998) define coordination costs as “the anticipated organisational complexity of decomposing 
tasks among partners along with ongoing coordination of activities to be completed jointly or individually across 
organisational boundaries and the related extent of communication and decisions that would be necessary”. 
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collaborating organisations, at the cost of sacrificing transaction cost efficiency, such as when 
organisations collaborate to learn from one another or to develop a new product. By contrast, 
the logic of created value will be inherently different when an organisation outsources the 
manufacturing of its product to a specialised partner in order to achieve greater cost efficiency, 
and this is likely to demand a different level of coordination.  
The extent of interdependence therefore depends on the motive of the alliance. While some 
alliances which are aimed at joint value creation may involve high levels of interdependence, 
resulting from a complex and overlapping division of resources that require ongoing 
coordination and alignment of tasks and joint decision making between partners; other 
alliances, aimed at improving cost efficiency, may entail a simpler division of resources with 
minimal coordination and inter-organisational interaction (Gulati and Singh, 1998). 
Accordingly, depending on the logic for value creation, the choice of organisational mode has 
to ensure a particular level of operational coordination of tasks and flows of complementary 
assets, information, technologies and materials between the collaborating organisations; and 
strategic coordination of the distribution of returns to the created value (Teece, 1992). 
Striking the right balance between cost efficiency and value creation, and coordinating 
accordingly the interface of labour, tasks, products and economic returns, is essential if a 
company is to develop and profitably commercialise new technologies. Regardless of the 
precise motive, as Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt (2006) noted, the choice of the organisational 
mode of an alliance tie should be examined from the tie’s role in the firm’s network. In other 
words, the choice depends on the need for cost efficiency versus value creation; the answer to 
which naturally resides in the nature of the value chain activity that is to be conducted under 
the collaborative arrangement.  
In the first place, however, it is crucial to understand precisely how the organisation of any 
alliance can provide firms with the necessary control and coordination needed to accomplish 
the anticipated cost- or value-driven benefits which they have set at the initialising stage of 
their alliances. As discussed previously, past studies that have investigated how companies 
collaborate for competitive advantage have underscored improving cost efficiency, learning 
and the pooling of complementary resources as important motives for collaboration. 
Naturally, deriving strategic benefits from inter-organisational relations does not happen 
spontaneously; firms must be sufficiently committed to and invested in building idiosyncratic 
relationships that are mutually beneficial, rare and difficult to imitate (Gulati et al., 2000).  
As partners perceive gradually higher levels of interdependence, they must interact more 
intensively to coordinate the disentanglement of an increasingly more complex array of tasks 
and to ensure ongoing mutual adjustment and adaptation. More integrated collaborative 
arrangements are generally capable of providing greater coordination needed to ultimately 
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achieve competitive advantage (Gulati and Singh, 1998). In order to understand how 
organisations accomplish this, Dyer and Singh (1998) put forward the relational view.  
The firm’s ability to generate competitive advantage from an alliance, they argue, is 
conditioned on the extent to which the relationship is idiosyncratic and increases as the 
relationship moves away from the attributes of basic arm’s-length agreements. This implies 
that inter-organisational relationships vary in the intensity of the fundamental routines and 
processes through which the collaborating partners organise their joint activities. The 
relational view thus holds that, fundamentally, organisations can create the control and 
coordination needed to generate their desired strategic benefits by (1) making relation-specific 
investments; (2) developing knowledge-sharing routines; (3) combining complementary 
resources and capabilities; and (4) employing effective governance mechanisms to lower 
transaction costs. 
Committing to relation-specific investments 
The successful and profitable commercialisation of an innovation requires the firm to create 
strategic assets that can be utilised in conjunction with the complementary assets of a strategic 
partner which can only be accessed beyond arm’s length, through arrangements such as joint 
R&D, licensing, manufacturing, marketing and distribution agreements (Teece, 1988). The 
strategic nature of these assets dictates that they are either specialised to the innovation at hand 
or co-specialised to induce a mutual dependence upon the collaborating organisations (Teece, 
1992; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). This implies a certain degree of inter-organisational 
specialisation, which companies can achieve by making significant investments that are specific 
to a particular relation and thereby less or non-redeployable in other relations (Williamson, 
1985; Oliver, 1990). The willingness to make such relation-specific investments, again, stems 
from the need for coordination and is hence expected to increase as higher degrees of task 
interdependence demand more specialised assets to be dedicated to coordination (Scott, 1981). 
Arguably, designing a tightly integrated production network with high degrees of inter-
organisational specialisation allows the firm to create competitive advantage (Asanuma, 1989; 
Dyer, 1996).  
In theorising about the concept of relation-specific investments, the relational-view builds on 
the work done by Williamson (1979, 1985), who identified site, physical and human asset-
specific investments as the main types of relation-specific investments made by firms. 
Investments are site-specific when they are made to locate successive, immobile production 
stages in the same vicinity to enhance coordination and lower inventory and transportation 
costs. Physical asset-specific investments are capital investments which are made to tailor a 
production process to a particular transaction partner (e.g. by purchasing machinery, tools or 
other equipment). Finally, investments are human asset-specific when firms gain experience 
working together and accumulate specialised information, language and know-how 
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necessary for efficient and effective communication. Human co-specialisation is hence 
essential for improving time-to-market (Dyer, 1996). 
The downside of making any of the above relation-specific investments is that they expose the 
firm to a greater risk of opportunism (Klein et al., 1978). This situation requires a governance 
structure that is able to enhance partners’ confidence in one another that they will accomplish 
their respective obligations as agreed upon signing the alliance agreement, and act predictably 
and with goodwill instead of opportunistically (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Davis, 2016).  
Accordingly, many studies have underscored the importance of trust as a foundation for 
alliances as this enables partners to more efficiently commit to relation-specific investments 
(e.g., Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1997; Das and Teng, 1998; Gulati and Sytch, 
2008), as well as reputational sanctions as a means of imposing high social costs on 
opportunistic behaviour (Gulati et al., 2000). 
Developing knowledge-sharing routines 
Learning from and with partner organisations is essential for efficiently coordinating activities 
across organisational boundaries. Indeed, a large body of literature has emphasised the 
benefits of learning and knowledge transfer associated with inter-organisational collaboration 
(e.g. Von Hippel, 1988; Levinson and Asahi, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; 
Zhang et al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2009). Ultimately, translating inter-organisational learning 
into competitive advantage requires that the firm systematically develops, stores and applies 
the new knowledge that it acquired from a partner organisation (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Grant, 1996).  
This implies that collaborating organisations should strive to develop inter-organisational 
knowledge-sharing routines. In their relational-view, Dyer and Singh (1998) define such a 
routine as “a regular pattern of interfirm interactions that permits the transfer, recombination, 
or creation of specialised knowledge”. This follows the similar logic of informal know-how 
trading as described by Von Hippel (1988), which entails the routine and informal trading of 
proprietary information between technical personnel of partner organisations. The 
knowledge-sharing routines that exist in multiple collaborative relationships may, 
collectively, be an indication of the firm’s capability of managing knowledge flows in alliance 
networks (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). 
It is further argued that knowledge-sharing routines can only be effectively created in the 
presence of two main sub-processes. Firstly, partner-specific absorptive capacity, or the firm’s 
ability to recognise and integrate valuable knowledge from a specific alliance partner (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Dyer and Singh, 1998), is essential. Secondly, the arrangements employed 
to govern the alliance should incentivise knowledge sharing and discourage free-riding, such 
as through equity stakes or informal norms of reciprocity. 
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Complementing resources and capabilities 
The modularisation of product architectures dictates that distinct value-added functions are 
tightly integrated and in close and continuous communication, in order to ensure a successful 
innovation process – from initial technology development to final commercialisation (Teece, 
2000). This implies that developing new technology, manufacturing designs and distributing 
end products often necessitates organisations to combine their existing resources (Teece, 1986, 
1992). In theory, complementary resources could be generic in nature and thus be procured in 
the market on competitive terms. In this case, however, they would be valuable yet bear 
relatively little strategic importance to innovation (Rothaermel and Hill, 2005). 
Complementary resources, such as technological know-how, high-end manufacturing 
processes or reputation, rather tend to be specialised to specific innovations, meaning that 
they cannot be accessed through basic market-based contracts (Teece, 1992; Oliver, 1997; 
Chetty and Wilson, 2003).  
Dyer and Singh (1998), therefore, suggest that the process of innovation requires the firm to 
collaborate with organisations who are active or specialised in particular value-added 
activities and who possess distinctive resources which, in combination with the firm’s existing 
internal resources, would create greater value than when these resources would be used in 
isolation. This value-creation potential, however, depends on the extent to which the resource 
combination is indivisible and inimitable resulting from the co-evolution of capabilities and 
the establishment of a long-term relationship. Consequently, unique combinations of 
distinctive resources can generate significant competitive advantage. 
As argued by Teece (1992), the interdependence between distinctive resources can, naturally, 
vary considerably. Some resources are more generic and widely possessed than others, and 
they may also differ in terms of their relative strategic importance to the generation and 
commercialisation of an innovation. This should largely depend on the nature of the value-
added activity and the structural characteristics of the sub-sector (value chain stage) from 
which complementary resources are to be sourced. 
Employing effective governance mechanisms 
The way in which a collaborative relationship is governed defines the processes by which 
organisations interact and perform joint decision-making, and thus bears implications for the 
strategic outcome that alliance partners may realise. Governance influences the costs of 
transacting and coordinating activities across organisational boundaries, as well as the risks 
of opportunism and thereby the willingness of collaborating organisations to make relation-
specific investments, to share knowledge, and to pool specific complementary resources (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). Effective governance should, therefore, provide the structure for an efficient 
collaborative relationship and incentivise mutual cooperation and joint value-creation. 
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From a relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998), alliances can be governed through third-party 
enforcement and self-enforcement of agreements. Proponents of the transaction cost 
perspective would argue that dispute resolution requires access to a third-party enforcer, such 
as the state (i.e. legal contracts) or a legitimate organisation authority (Williamson, 1991). 
However, in those cases where the anticipated outcome of a transaction does not exist at the 
time of signing, such as the development of a new technology or product, ex ante contractual 
agreements are ineffective as they cannot be accurately written to specify or enforce the 
division of returns (Teece, 1992).  
Self-enforcing governance mechanisms are more effective in such situations. Formal 
safeguards, or economic hostages, such as equity stakes or symmetric investments in 
specialised or co-specialised resources, can be used to control opportunism by increasing the 
financial commitment of the partners (Klein, 1980; Williamson, 1983). Moreover, equity 
holdings may also provide access to the board of directors and potentially some control in the 
strategic coordination of the partner organisation (Teece, 1992).  
On the other hand, informal (social) safeguards, such as trust or embeddedness (Powell, 1990; 
Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1997) and reputation (Larson, 1992), can supplement or replace formal 
safeguards (Granovetter, 1985). Indeed, trust is widely considered as imperative to the success 
of any strategic alliance (e.g., Sherman, 1992; Gulati, 1995a; Lavie et al., 2012), as it typically 
leads to loyalty and commitment to the partnership at hand (Schurr and Ozanne, 1985). When 
both trust and commitment exist in a partnership, as posited by Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) 
commitment-trust theory, then partners are encouraged to (a) make and work at preserving 
relation-specific investments through close collaboration; (b) resist the lure of reaping short-
term benefits in favour of the longer-term benefits of remaining with existing partners; and 
(c) consider potentially high-risk, high-reward actions because of the belief that the partners 
will act in the interest of the partnership rather than opportunistically. Accordingly, past 
research has argued that informal safeguards provide a more efficient and effective means of 
safeguarding relation-specific investments and facilitating the sharing of knowledge (Hill, 
1995; Uzzi, 1997) through reductions in the costs of bargaining and monitoring (Sako, 1991). 
Taken together, these inter-organisational routines and processes suggest that the 
competitiveness of the firm is determined, to a large extent, by the scope of its alliance network 
and the way in which it organises its alliance relations. These relational concepts provide a 
necessary theoretical foundation for understanding the strategic role of networks. Before 
connecting the relational concepts offered by the relational view to the literature on network 
configurations, the next section will first examine the inter-organisational routines and 
processes of collaborating organisations in the semiconductor industry, at distinct stages of 
the value chain. 
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3.3. Inter-organisational collaboration across distinct value chain 
activities in the semiconductor industry 
At its very core, the firm constitutes a chain of activities that are performed to design, produce, 
market, deliver and support its product. Each activity is intended to add value to the output 
of the preceding stage. This is encapsulated by the concept of the value chain, as put forth by 
Porter (1985). This implies that competitive advantage is realised when the output produced 
by the sum of the individual value-added activities performed by the firm is perceived by 
customers as more valuable than the output of a competitor. However, each activity is distinct 
and may yield advantage to a different degree, depending on how it is executed.  
With alliances being an essential part in many of the modularised high tech industries, distinct 
value-added activities are often jointly performed. Consequently, the competitive advantage 
that firms derive is naturally linked to the inter-organisational routines and processes that 
describe how distinct value-added activities are conducted in collaboration. It is therefore 
important to distinguish between distinctive value chain activities while assessing the 
differences in inter-organisation routines and processes, in order to understand the role of 
alliances and networks in generating competitive advantage in a particular industry. 
This section connects the first two theoretical dimensions of the comprehensive conceptual 
framework developed in this chapter: the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and value 
chain analysis (Porter, 1985). The case of the semiconductor industry is introduced, which is 
known for having one of the most complex and networked value chain ecosystems in the 
world. First, a general understanding is offered regarding the roles that alliances play in the 
value-creation process of this high tech environment. It is essential to understand which kinds 
of arrangements chipmakers use and for which specific reasons. This is followed by an 
examination of the inter-organisational routines and processes that define the strategic 
relationships developed by semiconductor companies in different value chain activities. 
3.3.1. Modes of collaboration in the semiconductor industry 
Starting from the early 1980’s, the customer-driven demands for speed, convenience and 
customisation along with the rising costs of R&D and manufacturing, sent various waves of 
disruption through the semiconductor industry. The growing importance of specialisation to 
achieve higher performance speed and lower cost in line with Moore’s Law (Heck et al., 2011; 
Gloger et al., 2017) – due to the growing role of chips serving an increasingly wider variety of 
applications across industries – needed to meet the ever-changing customer demands, had 
long driven semiconductor innovation and led to the vertical disintegration of the 
semiconductor value chain. Specialisation also implied that product architectures, which were 
once fully integrated, became modular – giving space for specialised chipmakers and 
suppliers to enter chain of value-added activities.  
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With the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) in the 2010’s, the basis of competitive advantage, 
or the value of chips, is no longer measured solely in terms of performance and price, but to 
a greater extent in terms of power consumption, miniaturization, software, configurability 
and durability (Gloger et al., 2017). Namely, in the IoT, chips function as the heart of a myriad 
of industries, including medical, automobiles, consumer electronics, military defence, 
aerospace, manufacturing, telecommunications, logistics, utilities and so forth. This means 
that semiconductor companies now compete on their ability to make the best functioning 
chips for very specific purposes, within the shortest amount of time.  
Among the strategies that semiconductor companies can adopt to distinguish themselves in 
the technological race, the ability to develop and leverage “access relationships” (Stuart, 2000) 
with strategic partners at the interface of different value-added activities has been one of the 
core tactical elements. Collaboration plays a crucial role in the ability of semiconductor 
companies to operate efficiently and effectively, as it allows accessing critical knowledge, 
resources and capabilities from which they can learn and which they can recombine to 
produce chips in line with customer demand. This involves creating and managing 
technology and service ecosystems by collaborating with universities, governments, research 
institutes, downstream players, suppliers, end-customers as well as rivals; conducting 
cross-industry technological innovation; and efficiently managing various sales channels 
(Gloger et al., 2017). Strategic relationships are organised through different modes across the 
value-added activities of the semiconductor value chain. The semiconductor value chain, 
along with the dominant organisational modes at each stage, is depicted in Figure 3.2. 
The creation and commercialisation of a new generation of semiconductor chips starts with 
R&D and design. These comprise the stages where innovation is conducted. The designing of 
chips, in particular, is where the most significant amount of value-added is generated. A 
substantial amount of intellectual property is contained in the designs created by skilled 
engineers using highly sophisticated computer software and equipment (Semiconductor 
Industry Association, 2016). Digital chip designs are subsequently manufactured by 
foundries, assembled, tested and packaged, and finally distributed to the end market (see 
Figure 3.2). These core stages of production are populated by chipmakers, manufacturers and 
distributors, who are supported by material and equipment suppliers and IP and software 
vendor. Correspondingly, strategic relationships within these distinct production stages are 
organised through different organisational modes and essentially revolve around three core 
activities: technological innovation, manufacturing and distribution/marketing; and supply. 
The next section discusses how the value chain activities in the semiconductor industry are 
organised through inter-organisational routines and processes with the aim to achieve 





Figure 3.2: Organisational modes depicted along the semiconductor value chain (partially adopted from Semiconductor 
Industry Association, 2016) 
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3.3.2. Inter-organisational routines and processes in the semiconductor 
industry 
Over the past decades, the semiconductor industry has evolved into a set of networks of 
collaborating organisations, each specialised in a particular value-added activity to 
collectively form a complex innovation system (Dibiaggio, 2006). Naturally, creating and 
capturing value from inter-organisational collaboration does not happen spontaneously. Each 
value-added activity is inherently different in terms of its purpose, is driven by different 
motivations, and requires a distinct pattern of interaction and coordination of tasks when 
conducted in collaboration (Okada, 2000). Even among semiconductor companies, according 
to a survey published by Kapoor (2010), joint activities with partners are coordinated by 
varying internal departments, such as marketing, engineering or different. Relationship 
building is therefore a matter which concerns not just executives but also different 
organisational disciplines. The inter-organisational routines and processes which are used by 
semiconductor companies to coordinate different value-added activities are discussed below. 
Technology partnering 
In order to meet stringent customer demands while maintaining profit margins, the 
development process of a new generation of semiconductor chips must be highly productive 
to efficiently translate ideas, investments and engineering efforts into the best functioning and 
valuable chips. Developing a new chip can cost up to US$200 million, depending on the 
complexity of the chip and the nature of its end market, and cane require over two years 
(Tamme et al., 2013; Global Semiconductor Alliance, 2016). In this process, quality and speed 
are paramount.  
The high costs and risks associated with these projects, along with the diverse technological 
competences which are required, have made partnerships increasingly important over the 
past decades – even for the well-established chipmakers. To illustrate, Okada (2000) indicated 
that inter-firm R&D accounted for an average of 91.8% of the total R&D budget of 
semiconductor companies in Japan. This can involve simply providing technical support, 
licensing technology, joining a development project, membership to a technology consortia, 
or more significant commitments like minority equity investments (Chesnais and Thomas, 
2017). Some of the most well-known consortia include SEMATECH (Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Technology) in the US, the Centre for Semiconductor Research at the State 
University of New York, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in Taiwan, the 
Interuniversity MicroElectronics Center (IMEC) in Belgium, and the Institute of Microelectronics 
in Singapore.  
To develop a highly functional chip, joint development projects must be coordinated to bring 
together specialists from a multiplicity of technical disciplines into various activities and 
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facilitate a process of joint decision-making between the partners involved. Specifically, these 
projects must provide opportunities for learning through the exchange of state-of-the-art 
knowledge, and resource pooling, in order to share the immense costs associated with the 
development of increasingly complex chips while leveraging the complementary expertise of 
a partner.  
Especially with the current rise of the IoT, the capability to integrate different hardware and 
software components into a functional product is increasingly becoming a distinctive element 
of chipmakers’ technology strategies (Dibiaggio, 2006; Global Semiconductor Alliance, 2016; 
Patel et al., 2017). In particular, as Bauer et al. (2015) and Bauer et al. (2017) have noted, the 
ability of chipmakers to successfully create and capture value nowadays depends heavily on 
their software capabilities – which they are still developing –, making licensing and joint 
development agreements efficient tactics through which they can rapidly learn from other 
organisations and strengthen their capabilities.  
The increasing importance of complementary technologies and skills while mitigating 
development costs implies that semiconductor companies are reciprocally interdependent and 
that inter-organisational specialisation is critical in order to develop a well-functioning chip; 
and therefore, to keep up in the race for technological leadership. Moreover, semiconductor 
companies collaborate closely with suppliers of materials and equipment to coordinate the 
ongoing development and compatibility of advancements in materials, design tools and 
manufacturing equipment and processes (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2014). 
Furthermore, some chief executives, for instance, have noted that it has become increasingly 
difficult for integrated device manufacturers to differentiate their products purely on the basis 
of core manufacturing process technologies (Clarke, 2008). The rising development costs has 
made these semiconductor companies mutually dependent on one another, to the extent that 
they are better off sharing the costs of developing a common process technology. Moreover, 
innovations in chips designs are, in fact, highly dependent on developments in manufacturing 
process technology and leading chipmakers and foundries therefore often seek one another’s 
complementary skills and technologies in order to advance towards a new manufacturing 
standard (Dibiaggio, 2006). Furthermore, licensing agreements are a critically important tactic 
for leveraging the IP from other chipmakers or specialised suppliers which is required to 
develop a new chip without boosting development costs (Bauer et al., 2015). As modern chip 
designs are becoming increasingly more complex, integrating various IP blocks for distinct 
functions (Fangaria, 2014), it has become impossible for any chipmaker to develop every 
technological component in-house. Some fabless semiconductor companies have made it their 
core business to cater to this group of chipmakers by designing and selling innovative 
solutions and IP through licenses or patents (Dibiaggio, 2006). As it turns out, some research 
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indicates that chipmakers obtain on average 34% of their IP from their strategic partners 
(Kapoor, 2010). 
Needless to say, mutual trust and reliability between partners are essential in such high-risk 
projects. The penalty of any late product introduction is significant (Appleyard, 1996), such as 
a considerable loss in market share, making any opportunistic behaviour highly disruptive. 
Moreover, the costly and risky nature of chip development projects therefore requires 
chipmakers to carefully identify areas of complementarity, potential partners and the 
appropriate type of partnership, and they must ultimately be fully committed to their 
collaboration by making the necessary relation-specific investments (Chesnais and Thomas, 
2017).  
Core IP blocks, for example, are often licensed from existing suppliers, including pure-play IP 
vendors, Electronic Design Automation solution suppliers, and specialised design-services 
providers (Poltronetti, 2007). Co-specialisation with an existing licensing partner is often 
necessary as it is not always the case nowadays that IP blocks can be instantly incorporated 
into a chip design; moreover, specialised software tools must also often be developed jointly 
with the IP provider (Dibiaggio, 2006). This is due to the increasing constraints being placed 
on the design of chips. When partners share prior experience working together, however, they 
are able to establish a strong team dynamic, which is critical to reduce communication errors 
and improve the quality of feedback, allowing engineering teams to be highly productive 
(McKinsey, 2017).  
Such team dynamics are even more essential during collaborations of a more exploratory 
nature, as they inherently bear the lion’s share of the cost and risk involved in the chip 
development process. This is why semiconductor companies, in this case, typically opt for 
more integrated joint development agreements or even equity-based joint ventures or joint 
research centres. By making larger relation-specific investments in physical facilities, new 
equipment, tools and/or software, semiconductor companies are able to substantially increase 
stability in their partnership and reduce the uncertainty associated with exploring new 
technologies and markets – as had long been suggested by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). 
Moreover, equity-based joint ventures/research centres in particular provide a platform where 
partners can physically bring together their engineering teams and stimulate the exchange of 
knowledge and information through face-to-face contact.  
While physical proximity is not an equally predominant occurrence in non-equity joint 
development agreements, although this could arguably enhance the innovation process, 
semiconductor companies have developed particular knowledge-sharing routines to 
overcome the constraints of geographic distance. For example, globally dispersed chip 
designers are able to collaborate with engineers at TSMC of Taiwan in real time using an 
internet-based platform (EE-Times, 2000). This facilitates the accuracy and speed of 
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communications between different teams of engineers, while mitigating the costs of setting 
up an equity joint venture. Moreover, it is in general not uncommon for chipmakers to invest 
in their long-standing relationships with particular past partners to leverage pre-established 
trust and working routines; either by extending an existing collaboration or by initiating a 
new partnership through a similar or different type of collaboration agreement.  
In principle, however, this does not in isolation guarantee a company’s willingness to commit 
to a partnership and to share knowledge. In collaborations between competing chipmakers, 
for instance, higher degrees of secrecy and a reluctance to share specific technical information 
generally tend to prevail (Appleyard, 1996). Some research even refers to extreme cases in 
which collaborating semiconductor companies pursued portions of their own R&D agendas 
independently, while still sharing technology and R&D costs (Okada, 2000). To incentivise 
their partners to commit fully to their collaborations, semiconductor companies have been 
reported to use various governance mechanisms. Especially in high-profile projects, minority 
stock ownership can be used to enable semiconductor companies to join a development 
process, which signals long-term commitment while enabling the partners to shorten the 
development cycle (SMIC, 2015). Such more complex governance mechanisms help to 
drastically reduce the cost of bargaining over profits from relation-specific investments 
(Williamson, 1985). In addition, certain semiconductor equipment developers have forged 
partnerships with customers (i.e. chipmakers), who provide sales guarantees or co-fund the 
development of new semiconductor manufacturing equipment, in order to reduce risks and 
generate a return on their development investments (Mahindroo and Santhanam, 2015). 
Overall, the technology partnering strategies of semiconductor companies can be considered 
to be characterised by high degrees of interdependence and cooperation (Okada, 2000). 
Manufacturing partnerships 
The process of manufacturing semiconductor chips consists of two sub-processes: front-end 
manufacturing, i.e. the fabrication of an integrated circuit on a wafer; and back-end 
manufacturing, i.e. the testing, packaging and assembly of the fabricated chips. The chip 
fabrication process, in particular, is a highly restrictive activity due to the enormous capital 
risks associated with setting up, maintaining and upgrading fabrication facilities. Generally 
speaking, the costs involved with constructing a state-of-the-art fab can easily range  up to 
US$10 billion (Mokhoff, 2012), and developing the necessary process technologies for the fab 
can amount up to another US$600 million (Heck et al., 2011). By contrast, the costs of setting 
up a new, leading-edge chip packaging line generally amounts to between US$100 million 
and US$200 million (Lapedus, 2016). In manufacturing, the name of the game is achieving the 
scale needed to generate a return on the significant investments in fixed capital assets and the 
development of manufacturing technologies.  
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While a limited number of semiconductor companies have been successful in setting up 
efficient and profitable fabrication operations, the fast majority of chipmakers have either 
partially or completely spun off or outsourced the fabrication and packaging of their chips to 
specialised manufacturing service providers. This allows most chipmakers, notably the 
fabless players, to mitigate the high costs of manufacturing by accessing specialised 
complementary assets while fully focussing their core business on the designing of chips.  
However, this strategy typically coincides with extreme dependency on a few or, in some 
cases, a single manufacturing partner. As one operations executive noted in an interview, a 
strong relationship between a chipmaker and foundry partner is paramount (Ladendorf, 
2004). Semiconductor foundries lay out specific chip design rules and share SPICE (Simulation 
Package for Integrated Circuit Emulation) models according to which chipmakers must 
design their chips. While this implies a significant degree of asset specificity, adhering to these 
rules and models also minimises the need for ongoing coordination and thus keeps overall 
transaction costs low (AlixPartners, 2013). These relationships must therefore be nurtured 
over the long term, as shifting between foundries is an onerous process which requires 
searching for a new manufacturing partner as well as re-qualifying and re-testing products in 
accordance with their design rules and models (Ladendorf, 2004). However, to hedge against 
potential opportunistic behaviour of a single partner, the risk of increasing manufacturing 
fees or losing supply, some larger chipmakers collaborate with multiple foundry partners. 
Indeed, research by Kapoor (2010) indicates that chipmakers are more dependent on their 
foundry partners than vice versa, indicating a relatively small extent of mutual adjustment. 
By contrast, the same study also shows that back-end manufacturing suppliers tend to tailor 
their operations considerably more to the requirements of chipmakers. 
Strong customer relations, from the foundry’s perspective, are also crucial as foundries can 
naturally only invest in a limited range of process technologies with which they can attract 
customers. In other words, foundries rely on their network of customers to design chips using 
the manufacturing technology that they have on offer, in order to achieve scale and scope 
economies and maintain an efficient manufacturing operation (AlixPartners, 2013). In tackling 
this challenge, TSMC’s Open Innovation Platform constitutes a prime example and the 
industry’s largest ecosystem of design partners, technology and manufacturing capabilities 
(TSMC, 2019). Although the majority of the partnerships encompassed by such ecosystems do 
not involve any equity investments, the establishment of joint ventures between major 
manufacturers is not uncommon. For instance, in 2014 the integrated device manufacturer 
Micron Technology began sourcing specialised assembly and packaging services from 
Powertech Technology through the formation of an equity joint venture. With estimated 
investments of over US$200mn in equipment and a physical facility, this partnership involves 
a significant degree of asset specificity acting as an effective governance mechanism. 
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Indeed, there is research indicating that back-end manufacturing suppliers tend to 
considerably tailor their operations to the requirements of semiconductor companies (Kapoor, 
2010). The same study also suggests, as illustrated above, that chipmakers are more dependent 
on their foundry partners than vice versa, signifying a relationship which is not necessarily 
reciprocal or based on mutual adjustment. Either way, however, inter-organisational 
partnerships in the area of semiconductor manufacturing do involve considerable relation-
specific investments.   
High levels of mutual trust, as a governance mechanism, and a smooth transfer of information 
are essential in these manufacturing partnerships. Both front- and back-end manufacturing 
suppliers share extensive information with their chipmaker customers; on future plans for 
technology development and production capacity expansions, as well as proprietary technical 
information and process monitoring data (Kapoor, 2010). In light of achieving a rapid time-
to-market, chipmakers must also have direct access to current, reliable and accurate 
information on a foundry’s design rules and process technologies. Major foundries, such as 
TSMC and UMC Group, have therefore developed specific internet-based tools which enable 
chipmakers to access this information from anywhere in the world and which distribute 
information on planned changes in design rules and manufacturing processes (Macher et al., 
2002). In addition, information exchange routines generally also take a more personal form. 
For example, US-based Silicon Labs has been reported to exchange information with its 
Taiwanese foundry partner every week and its chief executive would visit the foundry on a 
quarterly basis to reinforce the strength of their ties and maintaining a detailed flow of 
communication (Ladendorf, 2004).  
Contract manufacturers, both front- and back-end, are clearly considered by chipmakers as 
strategic partners; not merely sub-contractors who are dealt with at arm’s-length. Moreover, 
these strategic relationships also increasingly include services beyond the manufacturing of 
chips, such as the procurement of components as well as logistics (Ertel, 2006), and are thus 
more integrated than otherwise considered by classical scholarly reasoning. 
Distribution and marketing partnerships 
In the semiconductor industry, technological competence, product performance and 
functionality, and access to advanced manufacturing technology, while paramount, make up 
only one side of the equation for success in maintaining a sustainable competitive advantage. 
The rate of product obsolescence is especially high in the logic chip segment, which is by far 
the largest segment of the overall chip market (Wong et al., 2014), as inter-generation chips 
are not substitutable (Dibiaggio, 2006). Time-to-market is therefore a crucial competitive 




The semiconductor industry is one of the most globalised in the world and chipmakers 
maintain vast networks of foreign customers, in various end-markets. To rapidly and 
efficiently market and sell their new generations of products, most chipmakers maintain close, 
long-term partnerships with one or multiple distributors who push sales through direct 
contact with customers (Batra et al., 2016) and they occasionally engage with other 
chipmakers to jointly market their products. Leading fabless chipmaker Xilinx, for instance, 
has reported that its dedicated distributing partner, Avnet, accounted for 75% and 59% of total 
net accounts receivable in 2016 and 2017 respectively (Xilinx, 2017). Similarly, Texas 
Instruments, a major fab-lite chipmaker, reported that roughly 60% of their semiconductor 
sales to their 100,000 customers are concluded by distribution partners (Texas Instruments, 
2016). To avoid becoming overly dependent on a few dedicated partners, larger chipmakers 
tend to diversify their distribution partnerships across multiple distributors within each major 
geographical region and product area, allowing them to increase their market access and 
exposure to a wider range of business customers, such as those in the SME segment (e.g. 
Maxim Integrated, 2017). 
Importantly, these relationships involve more than just a traditional contractual arrangement 
and typically involve the establishment of a certain degree of co-specialisation. By 
collaborating with dedicated distributors, chipmakers are primarily able to reach a broader 
range of customers in a cost-effective way by leveraging the complementary assets of logistics 
partners, such as local market expertise, established distribution channels and logistical 
networks. Reaping the benefits of complementarity, however, requires that chipmakers are 
committed to share information on production forecasts and replenishment plans with their 
logistics partners, in order to optimise transportation costs and ultimately ensure on-time 
delivery to customers (Ertel, 2006). As is the case for graphics chip designer Nvidia, this also 
involves jointly defining the pricing and timing of new products in close collaboration with 
retailers and distributors (Nvidia, 2016).  
Furthermore, distribution partners in particular also often provide timely customer service 
and support on behalf of the chipmaker. As an example, in addition to warehousing and 
inventory management, Xilinx’ distributors also provide customers with engineering support 
in designing Xilinx chips into their end-products (Brown et al., 2000). In fact, Xilinx built a 
global network of over 250 qualified strategic partners through the Xilinx Alliance Program 
(Xilinx, 2019) whose engineers have been trained and certified to assist customers with 
integrating Xilinx devices into their end-products. In order to qualify for membership to the 
alliance program, however, potential strategic partners must have collaborated with at least 
one of Xilinx’ sales representatives or dedicated distributors; and they must have at least one 
complementary product and/or service which can be re-combined with Xilinx’ products in 
order to penetrate new applications and product/geographical markets (D&R, 2010). Such 
alliance programs are not rare occurrences. Other examples include Intel’s Global Distribution 
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Network (Intel, 2019); NXP Semiconductor’s Partner Program (NXP, 2019); and Renesas’ 
Alliance Partner Program (Renesas, 2019). Similarly, chipmakers occasionally also collaborate 
with one another in the marketing of combinations of complementary products, with the aim 
of catering to customers’ need for flexibility, high performance and quicker time-to-market 
(e.g. Business Wire, 2005; Lattice Semiconductor, 2007).  
Such a networked, multi-market approach is increasingly important in the current era of the 
IoT (Bauer et al., 2015) and signifies a considerable degree of product customisation towards 
the specific needs and applications of customers. However, as Batra et al. (2016) note, to 
achieve an effective logistics approach through collaboration, chipmakers must sufficiently 
incentivise their partners to focus on those products, customers and geographical markets 
which complement in-house sales efforts and which are in line with the chipmaker’s strategic 
objectives. This can be done through economic incentives, such as the payment of a financial 
compensation for increasing sales of a particular product. In addition, according to one 
distribution agreement signed by chipmaker Altera and Arrow Asia Distribution in 2001 (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2001), chipmakers can also oblige their distributors to 
maintain a particular value worth of inventory of specific selection of products at a price set 
by the chipmaker. This creates a safeguard against potential opportunism by forcing the 
partner to make investments in physical relation-specific assets. This incentivises the partner 
to engage in value-creation activities in the best interest of the relationship. All in all, the 
establishment and maintenance of strategic partnerships in the area of marketing and 
distribution go well beyond signing a basic unilateral contract. 
Customer-supplier relationships 
The semiconductor industry can be described as a fast-paced environment characterised by a 
proliferating product variety, resulting from the ongoing introduction of new product 
generations even before existing products reach a peak in their maturity. As a consequence, 
product life cycles tend to overlap and demand periods for individual products typically 
stretch from six months to two years, thereby forcing chipmakers to diversify into multiple 
product markets (Brown et al., 2000). Keeping up in this product development race is not an 
easy task as customer demand is notoriously difficult to predict due to the ever-changing 
demands for specialised products and faster delivery (Ertel, 2006).  
However, by establishing extensive networks of suppliers of materials and equipment, 
product complementors as well as end-customers, semiconductor companies can overcome 
these challenges and attain significant competitive advantage. Semiconductor companies 
typically source generic materials and equipment through shorter-term contracts from 
multiple suppliers in order to reduce the risk of supply disruptions (Semiconductor Industry 
Association, 2014). Spot markets are less efficient in the case of specialised materials, such as 
rare earth gases, helium and liquid hydrogen, as these materials are subject to greater price 
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increases and/or shortages (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2014). To hedge against 
these risks, semiconductor companies engage in long-term partnerships. Although data on 
the duration of supply contracts have been absent from the extant literature, the 
Semiconductor Industry Association reports that these long-term agreements typically last for 
at least two years (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2014).  
Aside from the mere supply of goods, these partnerships provide a platform through which 
semiconductor companies and their suppliers can exchange critical information. While this is 
important in the light of responding to situations of variable demand (Ertel, 2006), the lack of 
substitutes for key materials renders the process of replacing existing material inputs highly 
complex – potentially leading to modifications in existing production processes and tools – 
and therefore necessitates that finding and qualifying new materials is done in close 
collaboration with both material and equipment suppliers (Semiconductor Industry 
Association, 2014).  
Ultimately, those semiconductor companies which can leverage their support networks to 
maintain a consistent input of production resources and price stability are more likely to be 
perceived as reliable suppliers by their customers (Ertel, 2006). Reliability is the bedrock of a 
strong customer relationship, which in many cases goes beyond the traditional conception of 
a basic buyer-seller agreement. In fact, customer relationships in the semiconductor industry 
are typically highly reciprocal in nature and involve some degree of co-specialisation outside 
their respective manufacturing operations. This is most notably the case in the market 
segments for logic chips, including microprocessors, microcontrollers and digital signal 
processors (DSP), and programmable logic devices (PLD), as both these types of chips can 
flexibly be programmed to perform a variety of functions and are therefore not commodities 
which can be sold through spot market agreements (Dibiaggio, 2006). With a 57% share in 
total chip sales in 2013, these segments account for the majority of value-added activity in the 
integrated circuit market (Wong et al., 2014), which provides an indication for the importance 
of close customer relationships within the wider semiconductor industry. By contrast, in other 
semiconductor markets, such as memory chips and analog semiconductors, arm’s-length 
agreements are more widespread (Kleindorfer and Wu, 2003). 
As research by Kapoor (2010) indicates, customers tend to share information particularly on 
volume projections and product development status, as well as some proprietary technical 
information, and to a lesser extent on their general business strategy and product costs. In 
particular, the routinized provision of demand signals is an important enabler of chipmakers 
to effectively address variability in supply and demand (Ertel, 2006). Concurrently, the 
willingness of a customer to share information is typically reciprocated by a greater 
involvement of the chipmaker in the value-creating activities of its customer (Kapoor, 2010). 
For example, makers of PLDs, like Xilinx and Altera, design their chips in such a way that 
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their customers can configure the logic underlying the chip at the post-manufacturing stage 
using specialised software (Brown et al., 2000). Assistance with the customisation of 
integrated systems, optimising performance or otherwise is often provided at the customer’s 
site via dedicated channel partners or highly skilled in-house teams of engineers who are 
specialised in different applications (Bauer et al., 2015; NVIDIA, 2016; Xilinx, 2017).  
In addition to product design, semiconductor companies tend to also be involved in activities 
surrounding their customers’ cost reduction and long-term technology planning (Kapoor, 
2010). Moreover, on some occasions semiconductor companies work together with a 
complementor, such as a communications equipment company, to combine their existing 
hardware and/or software components into an integrated solution for a specific application of 
a joint customer, like a manufacturer of cellular handsets. Clearly, these described inter-
organisational processes between semiconductor companies and their customers involve a 
certain degree of coordination in order to align their respective product designs. At the same 
time, the reciprocally interdependent nature of these supply relationships creates a visible 
collateral bond in the form of symmetric relation-specific investments and subsequently 
incentivises both partners to engage in mutually beneficial value-creation initiatives. 
3.4. The strategic configuration of alliance networks 
3.4.1. Alternative relational network configurations  
The structure of an alliance network plays a pivotal role in determining the performance 
differences among firms (Dyer and Singh, 1998). It can be defined by the number of firms, the 
relative characteristics of firms, as well as the intensity, the range, the types and the 
geographical and sectoral openness of inter-firm alliances between the firms (Burt, 2001); and 
thus the asymmetric access that industry players have to markets, materials, information, 
knowledge, technology or other requirements crucial to the execution of their strategies 
(Madhavan et al., 1998).  
While the overall structure of a network can represent the competitive landscape of an 
industry or value chain segment, alliances function as the “network pipelines” allowing 
knowledge and information to flow from one firm to another (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). 
Moreover, the structure of an ego-level alliance network, i.e. the pattern that describes how 
the focal firm and its partners are connected, determines the degree to which individual firms 
can access different resources. Ultimately, it is important for managers to ally with those 
partners that enable them to secure key positions in the wider industry network.  
Amidst the evidence offered by previous studies indicating that the network positions of firms 
in inter-organisational networks matter to their strategic actions and outcomes (e.g. Powell et 
al., 1996; Walker et al., 1997; Gulati, 1999; Rowley et al., 2000; Gilsing et al., 2007; Shiri, 2015), 
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there has been a debate about what it means to be ‘better connected’. Beyond the fact that 
relations with other firms in the network can provide the firm with the potential to accumulate 
strategically important network advantages and benefits, what matters in this equation as 
well are the identity of the alliance partners and the pattern of ties that exist among 
them (Gulati, 1998). This pattern of ties is especially important as it is likely to determine the 
value of the obtained advantages, and therefore firms must carefully configure their networks 
of alliance ties in order to gain privileged access to various kinds of resource flows (Powell et 
al., 1996; Uzzi, 1996).  
The social network literature has been divided when it comes to examining the association 
between the configuration of firm-level networks and network advantage. According to some 
scholars, strategic network advantages arise from densely connected network configurations 
whereby the firm’s partners are also partners (Coleman, 1988; Walker et al., 1997; Uzzi, 1997; 
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). These configurations are considered advantageous to the 
extent that they are “integrated” or “closed” (Greve et al., 2014) and firms should thus strive 
to maximise the interconnectedness among their direct alliance partners. By contrast, others 
advocate that network advantages derive from the brokerage opportunities that are generated 
by an open network configuration (Burt, 1992; Soda, 2011), representing a “hub-and-spoke” 
structure which consists of disconnected partners (Greve et al., 2014). Accordingly, superior 
competitive advantage ought to be achieved by being positioned between dense networks 
instead of within them. Rather than enhancing interconnectedness, firms should configure 
their networks to maximise disconnections (or structural holes) between their direct alliance 
partners and ally with those firms that have many other partners (i.e. indirect ties). Finally, 
another group holds that these two distinct types of configurations instead provide 
complementary properties (Baum et al., 2010; Gilsing et al., 2007; Gobbo and Olsson, 2010) 
which can be combined into a “hybrid” network structure (Greve et al., 2014) that offers a 
wider variety of network advantages and associated benefits depending on the context. 
An important insight from past research has been that the emergence of closed and open 
network structures ought to be the product of the inherent differences in the strategic 
motivations of firms, and that either of them are advantageous to the extent that the firm is 
engaged in exploitation or exploration of know-how (Rowley et al., 2000); is partnered with 
incumbent industry players or new entrants (Walker et al., 1997); or is situated in a 
technologically dynamic or stable industry (Tatarynowicz et al., 2016). Likewise, the 
formation of either of these different network configurations should also depend on the 
underlying nature and the strategic rationale of the transactions for which particular alliance 
networks are used (Ahuja, 2000). This means that the feasibility of specific alliance 
arrangements, the distinctive capabilities of the partners, and the level of mutual trust should 
play important roles in shaping the advantages and benefits that firms can accumulate 
through closed or open network configurations (Afuah, 2013).  
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Ultimately, this should reveal that different alliance networks are not configured by firms in 
homogenous ways (Shipilov, 2012); but rather that the structural configuration of one type of 
alliance network may be driven by a need for closure while the structural configuration of 
another kind of alliance network may reflect a need for access to brokerage opportunities.  
3.4.2. Comparing the strategic benefits of alliance network configurations 
The degree to which the alliance strategy of a firm is designed to exploit existing technologies, 
skills and information through, for example, joint production or licensing agreements; to 
explore emerging innovations through joint development pacts; to constrain potential 
opportunistic behaviour of partners; or to develop trust, behavioural norms and knowledge 
sharing routines (Uzzi, 1997; Walker et al., 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Noboeka, 
2000), among other strategic outcomes, likely dictates the network benefits that the firm needs 
as well as the appropriateness of particular structural network configurations.  
In particular, the firm’s ability to derive strategic benefits from their alliance networks, 
according to past research, depends on the pattern of interconnectedness (or 
disconnectedness) among their alliance partners (Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1992). Two main, 
contrasting views, as introduced previously, have dominated the literature. According to 
Coleman’s (1988) original work around closed networks, and the various past studies that 
have adopted his views, firms ought to derive various benefits from being embedded in 
densely interconnected alliance networks whereby the firm’s partners are also partners. This 
concept revolves around the idea that those firms which are cohesively tied are able to 
effectively routinize knowledge-sharing practices and joint problem solving (Uzzi, 1997; Dyer 
and Noboeka, 2000) as well as stabilise their alliance relations by establishing mutually 
understood norms of cooperation and trust (Granovetter, 1973; Gulati, 1995a; Rowley, 1997; 
Walker et al., 1997). Increased trust can subsequently facilitate the proliferation of 
triangulation among alliance partners (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005), whereby the richness 
and reliability of information that the firm obtains from its partners can be assessed through 
cross verification from multiple sources. This should consequently enhance the absorptive 
capacity of the focal firm (Gilsing et al., 2008). Accordingly, densely interconnected alliance 
network structures impose a certain degree of interdependence on the focal firm and its 
partners (Skilton, 2015), which benefits them to the extent that they are able to share and 
obtain fine-grained information about each other (Gulati, 1998). Without these structural 
benefits, sharing and combining resources with strategic partners, and making large relation-
specific investments are bound to be unproductive and highly inefficient (Coleman, 1988). 
Furthermore, firms can also leverage their densely interconnected alliance networks as 
mechanisms for constraining opportunism (Coleman, 1988; Gulati, 1995a; Walker et al., 1997; 
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). Should a certain actor deviate from the established norms of 
cooperation, whether that concerns poor quality of investments or opportunistic behaviour, 
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information regarding such acts of free-riding will travel rapidly to other firms in the densely 
interconnected network and the actor will consequently be sanctioned (Walker et al., 1997). 
This can result in a severe loss of reputation, drastically limiting the actor’s ability to find new 
alliance partners who are willing to collaborate (Ahuja, 2000). This mutual monitoring 
capability inherent in dense alliance networks therefore provides members with the economic 
incentive to act honestly and trustworthy (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988).  
Opponents of the high density argument, however, criticise that it creates risks of undesirable 
spillovers and prevents firms from accessing and utilising diverse resources, and 
consequently creating novelty value (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). Namely, in dense 
alliance networks, the densely disseminated nature of information and knowledge means that 
the novelty benefits of direct and indirect alliance ties are limited because many other firms 
have equal access to it (Gilsing et al., 2008). Accordingly, Burt’s (1992) original theory of 
structural holes advocates that direct alliance ties provide access to distinct flows of new 
information, alternative ways of thinking, and entrepreneurial opportunities to the extent that 
this entails allying with mutually unconnected alliance partners (Ahuja, 2000; Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003; Soda, 2011). By bridging such ‘structural holes’ or gaps in the flows of 
information between network participants which are not connected to each other, firms can 
gain strategic access to non-redundant resources which can consequently enhance their 
capacity for novelty creation (Burt, 1992; Ruef, 2002).  
Other benefits associated with brokering structural holes may be derived from a power 
advantage which originates from the firm’s ability to negotiate, arbitrage and exercise control 
over the flows of information and knowledge between its disconnected alliance partners (Burt, 
1992; Kilduff and Brass, 2010; Soda, 2011). Accordingly, the firm can withhold or distort 
information to their advantage and leverage its bargaining power by playing off unconnected 
partners against each other in an attempt to secure favourable transaction terms or 
discouraging the potential opportunistic behaviour of partners (Gulati, 1998; Afuah, 2013; 
Greve et al., 2014). 
Overall, it can be argued that if the successful execution of a firm’s alliance strategy relies on 
access to rich and reliable information, cohesive, dense network configurations should likely 
be optimal. Conversely, constructing networks rich in structural holes should be beneficial 
when the successful execution of the firm’s alliance strategy depends on access to novel, non-
redundant information and the identification of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
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3.5. Hypothesis development: the properties of alliance network 
architectures 
The aggregate of all ego networks of alliances surrounding all firms in an entire network 
defines the overall structure or architecture of that entire network – which therefore reflects a 
specific pattern that represent the collective collaborative behaviour of all the firms within the 
network at hand. This behaviour can reflect a collective tendency towards forming open or 
closed networks, depending on the network benefits which firms are seeking to attain. 
Namely, the architecture of a network greatly influences the way in which information, 
knowledge and other resources are diffused among organisations within it. The cohesiveness 
of networks can lead to particular collective outcomes, as past studies have indicated (Gulati, 
1995b; Rowley et al., 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 2000; Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004), and this can subsequently shape the 
performance of firms (Bell, 2005; Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Gilsing et al., 2008). 
Given the role of network architectures in shaping the nature of the collective outcomes which 
firms can reap as a result of their positions in a network, the following will be argued: which 
collective outcomes firms seek depends on the (a) value-added activity that they are 
performing in collaboration with a partner organisation and (b) the rationale and collaborative 
nature of their partnership; and variation in the architectural properties of networks can 
therefore be explained through these factors. Network connectedness, clustering and 
centralisation are important architectural properties which can be used to understand how 
patterns of inter-organisational collaboration differ between value chain activities.  
Table 3.1 integrates the various theoretical concepts discussed previously into a 
comprehensive framework and offers a structured overview illustrating which network 
architectural properties are expected to be observed in the distinct value chain modules as 
well as why. 
3.5.1. Network connectedness 
The connectedness of a network indicates how integrated or fractured the overall network is. 
Highly interconnected networks are a reflection of firms’ collective tendency towards forming 
dense networks of alliance relationships. As previously discussed, this tendency is especially 
said to come forth from the ability of dense networks of relationships to promote the 
establishment of mutual norms of cooperation and trust between organisations (Granovetter, 
1973; Gulati, 1995b; Rowley, 1997; Walker et al., 1997; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) and 
facilitate the routinisation of knowledge-sharing practises (Uzzi, 1997; Dyer and Noboeka, 
2000), by functioning as coalitions against potential opportunism and mechanisms to inflict 
considerable reputational damage (Coleman, 1988; Gulati, 1995a).  
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Accordingly, intense connectivity among organisations in a network ought to be found in 
environments where the build-up of trust prevails as an essential part of the inter-
organisational processes established by collaborating organisations. Trust is particularly 
critical in situations where firms face extensive uncertainty and risk, such as in activities which 
are exploratory in nature, where the effectiveness of formal contracts as a governance 
mechanism is limited (Nooteboom, 1999, 2002). Without trust induced by an interconnected 
network structure, as Coleman (1988) suggested, the sharing and combining of resources with 
inter-organisational partners, and making large relation-specific investments are likely to be 
unproductive and inefficient. 
In the production of a new generation of semiconductor chips, the development stage of a 
new chip most closely resembles such a context, as it is known as a notoriously expensive and 
sophisticated value-added activity which is subject to extensive uncertainty and risk. 
Chipmakers therefore collaborate to share the costs and risks associated with these uncertain 
development projects. This is predominantly done through non-equity joint development 
agreements, and to a lesser extent through equity joint ventures, as flexibility to rapidly move 
into new technological areas and product markets is essential. Although substantial amounts 
of value and IP are created at this stage, the anticipated outcome of any given joint chip 
development project does not exist at the time of signing. This comprises a major difference 
with other, downstream value-added activities in the semiconductor industry, where 
outcomes can be more easily specified ex ante. Moreover, the risk of any form of opportunism 
in the development of a new chip could be detrimental to the competitive and financial 
position of a chipmaker. 
Accordingly, a governance structure must be in place which is aimed towards maximising the 
joint value of the output of a joint development project and minimising the potential for 
opportunism. Specifically, this structure should incentivise the collaborating chipmakers to 
share their technical knowledge, combine their complementary technological competences, 
and make substantial relation-specific investments in the interest of the partnership. Ex ante 
contractual agreements are ineffective in this case, as they can neither be written to sufficiently 
safeguard the partners involved against opportunism, nor specify or enforce a division of 
returns to a product which has not been developed yet (Teece, 1992). Chipmakers therefore 
occasionally use equity investments as a governance mechanism, for instance through 
participation in setting up an equity joint venture or acquiring a minority equity stake in a 
partner’s business as part of a non-equity joint development agreement. 
Self-enforcing agreements or trust, by contrast, enable organisations to overcome the limited 
effectiveness of formal contracts on the one hand and the inefficiency of equity stake 
investments on the other hand (Granovetter, 1985; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Importantly, mutual 
 
 
Table 3.1: Multi-dimensional conceptual framework, presenting a systematic overview of expected sub-network architectures at distinct semiconductor value chain stages 
(source: created by the author) 
Value chain module R&D Design Foundry 
Assembly, testing 
and packaging 
Distribution Production inputs and outputs 
Type of network Technology Manufacturing Distribution/marketing Supply 
Characteristics of value chain 
activity 
Highly specialised and increasingly 
complex and expensive. Aimed at 
generating innovative technological 
breakthroughs and creating significant 
value-added. Exploitative and exploratory 
in nature and subject to high levels of 
uncertainty and risk. 
Predominantly highly restricted due to 
immense fixed capital requirements. 
Achieving economies of scale and scope is 
essential to long-term survival. 
Segment populated with a large number of 
distributors and potential joint marketing 
partners across all geographical regions and 
major product markets. Rapid time-to-
market through efficient and effective 
channel strategies is imperative to 
chipmakers’ competitive advantage. 
Supply chains are increasingly seen as 
strategic differentiators as customer 
demand is becoming more difficult to 
predict. Supply does mostly not involve 
high levels of specialisation. 
Drivers of collaboration Accessing specialised complementary 
resources and capabilities; learning; and 
sharing the costs and risks entailed with the 
development of semiconductor chips. 
Mitigating the substantial costs of 
manufacturing by leveraging assets 
specialised to fabricating and packaging new 
generations of chips. 
Improve cost efficiency while rapidly 
maximising market access and customer 
reach, including smaller customers which 
might otherwise be overlooked.  
Improving cost efficiency, achieving price 
stability and reducing the risk of supply 
disruptions.  
Dominant type of organisational 
mode 
A variety of alliances based predominantly 
on non-equity ties, such as R&D 
partnerships and licensing agreements to 
retain strategic flexibility while rapidly 
accessing diverse critical resources. Equity-
based ties, such as JVs, technology 
acquisitions and minority equity 
investments, occur less frequently. 
Predominantly customer-supplier relations 
based on non-equity ties, with most 
chipmakers completely outsourcing the 
manufacturing of their chips to dedicated 
foundries and/or back-end manufacturers. 
Costly JVs occur less frequently. 
Non-equity based customer-supplier 
relations, linking chipmakers to a wide range 
of distributors and marketing partners across 
the globe. 
Predominantly customer-supplier 
relations based on non-equity ties, with 
some collaborative activity organised 
through arm’s-length contracts with the 
potential for longer-term relationship 
building. 
Integration and interdependence 
of joint activities 
Low to high integration. Collaboration is 
long-term and aimed at joint value creation; 
involving a complex and overlapping 
division of technical resources and 
capabilities which requires ongoing 
coordination and joint decision-making. 
Partners perceive high degrees of reciprocal 
interdependence. 
Medium integration. Deep and sticky 
relationships aimed at enhancing transaction 
cost efficiency. Cost of ongoing coordination 
of collaborative activities is minimised due 
to predetermined design rules and SPICE 
models. Mutual adjustment is more 
prevalent with respect to back-end 
manufacturing. 
Medium integration. Close and long-term 
relationships with a single or multiple 
dedicated channel partners to improve cost 
efficiency; extending beyond arm’s-length to 
include qualified customer service and 
engineering support on behalf of 
chipmakers.  
Low to medium integration. A variety of 
short- and longer-term agreements with 
multiple suppliers of generic and 
specialised materials and equipment, and 
customers of generic and programmable 
chips. Relations often involve some degree 
of mutual adjustment. 
Relation-specific investments Extensive specialised investments in 
physical and site-specific assets and human 
co-specialisation, to facilitate the 
coordination of joint decision-making and 
task execution, and stimulate the exchange 
of knowledge. 
Significant asset specificity, as chipmakers 
must design their chips in line with the 
design rules and SPICE models defined by 
foundries. Co-specialisation is more 
prevalent in relations between chipmakers 
and back-end manufacturers. Switching 
foundry partners is also highly costly. 
Overall relatively low degree of co-
specialisation. Some co-specialisation 
resulting from technical and sales training 
provided by chipmakers to channel partners. 
Distribution partners may also be obliged to 
invest in maintaining large stock of specific 
products. 
Non-asset specific investments in arm’s-
length agreements; with some degree of 
co-specialisation to the extent that 
chipmakers are closely involved in the 
value-creation activities of customers. 
 
 




Highly reciprocal, with partners actively 
transferring, recombining or creating 
specialised knowledge. Overlapping 
knowledge bases are essential. 
Extensive sharing of technical and 
operational information between chipmakers 
and manufacturing partners, with occasional 
visits to the manufacturers’ sites. 
Two-way flow of production- and market-
related information, also involving training 
routines, to align company goals with 
distributors’ strategies and ensure on-time 
delivery to customers. 
Longer-term supply partnerships involve 
information sharing routines to combat 
periods of variable demand. Customers 
share a variety of information, enabling 
chipmakers to address demand 
variability. 
Complementary resources and 
capabilities 
Exploitation of licensable IP, technology 
and software and joint exploration of new 
technologies by combining complementary 
development skills and capabilities of 
redundant and non-redundant partners, to 
develop novel and functional chips.  
Front- and back-end chip manufacturing is 
often outsourced to exploit the specialised 
assets and capacity of dedicated 
manufacturers.  
Chipmakers exploit the existing market 
knowledge and distribution network of the 
partner. These are typically not specialised to 
a particular chip generation; however, 
specialised investments in technical and 
sales training enhance the indivisibility of 
resources. 
Materials and equipment are sourced 
from secondary markets and are mostly 
not specialised to specific chip 
generations; however, triadic supply 
agreements involving complementors 
often entail more specialised resource 
combinations and greater indivisibility. 
Effective governance Stabilised relationships created primarily 
through trust relations and reputation, as 
development outcomes cannot be specified 
ex-ante. Equity stakes are also used, 
although relatively less frequently. 
Manufacturing relations require high 
degrees of trust as a means of ensuring the 
continuous sharing of information and 
safeguarding relation-specific investments, 
due to high partner switching costs. 
Economic incentives to encourage sales 
growth of particular products; or economic 
hostages in the form of relation-specific 
investments in physical assets (i.e. stock) as a 
means of safeguarding against potential 
opportunism. 
Supply agreements are mainly enforced 
through legal contracts, with some 
agreements involving economic hostages.  
Expected properties of overall network architecture  
Connectedness High connectedness functioning as 
effective governance structure to promote 
mutual trust and norms of cooperation 
while safeguarding substantial specialised 
investments through a social reputation 
mechanism. 
Low connectedness resulting largely from 
chipmakers’ commitments made to partner-
specific design rules and SPICE models. 
Low connectedness resulting from the 
largely generic nature of relationships and 
low switching costs, which mitigates the 
need for reputation-induced governance. 
Low connectedness resulting from the 
largely generic nature of relationships and 
low switching costs, which mitigates the 
need for reputation-induced governance. 
Clustering High clustering to enhance the diversity of 
technical resources and capabilities needed 
to generate novel product innovations. 
Low clustering due to the vertical nature of 
manufacturing relationships 
Low clustering due to the vertical nature of 
distribution/marketing relationships. 
Low clustering due to the vertical nature 
of customer-supplier relationships 
Centralisation Low centralisation with privileged access 
to diverse knowledge and technologies 
concentrated among a number of central 
technological leaders. 
High centralisation due to highly 
specialised and nature of assets and inter-
firm relationships and capital-intensive 
value chain activity, enabling a select few 
manufacturers to establish a high degree of 
centrality. 
Low centralisation due to generic nature of 
value chain activity and relatively low 
degree of co-specialisation, which lead to 
lower costs of switching to other partners 
and little space for concentration of network 
power. 
Low centralisation due to generic nature 
of value chain activity and relatively low 
degree of co-specialisation, which lead to 
lower costs of switching to other partners 




trust can effectively be established by firms within networks characterised by high degrees of 
connectedness. Highly interconnected networks thus function as governance structures 
enabling semiconductor companies to effectively and efficiently safeguard their enormous 
specialised investments into chip development projects, while also facilitating the exchange 
of sensitive and highly tacit technical knowledge.  
Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect to identify architectural patterns of higher network 
connectedness among strategic technology alliances at the R&D and design stage of the 
semiconductor value chain, in comparison to the sub-networks of alliances at other value 
chain stages. The following is hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 1 Network connectedness is the highest in the network of technology 
alliances, as compared to other alliance networks. 
 
3.5.2. Network clustering 
The downside of excessive network connectedness is that it can lead to the homogenisation of 
knowledge and information available within a network (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). Knowledge 
and information diffuse rapidly between densely interconnected organisations and this is 
likely to render conventional rather than novel. Moreover, with high connectivity comes an 
increased risk of unwanted spillovers, constraining the firm’s ability to appropriate significant 
value from particular knowledge or information (Gilsing et al., 2008). Concurrently, high 
degrees of interconnectedness may cause established incumbents to collectively resist 
adopting a new or innovative way of thinking; thus creating a barrier for newcomers to 
introduce technological innovations that could potentially disrupt existing markets and 
production processes (Uzzi, 1997; Kraatz, 1998). The main argument against network 
connectedness has therefore been that it limits the possibilities for novelty creation (Lazer and 
Friedman, 2007; Gilsing et al., 2008; Tatarynowicz et al., 2016). 
By contrast, research pioneered by Burt (1992) has shown that less interconnected networks 
rich in structural holes are better at preserving diversity. Organisations within these networks 
are able to reap efficiency and brokerage advantages by forging non-redundant ties. 
Concurrently, Burt (2001) suggests that the need for network closure or openness is not 
necessarily an ‘either/or’ matter, as both structures provide different benefits which are 
valuable for different activities or purposes. The structure of a network sets the stage for a 
firm’s ability to innovate (Tolstoy and Henrik, 2010).  
We may find that networks in which organisations require some degree of connectedness to 
induce trust as well as a sufficient extent of openness to access complementary, novel 
information and knowledge will have an architecture that exhibits a high degree of network 
clustering. Accordingly, clustered networks are populated by interconnected groups or 
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clusters of organisations that are linked on the basis of similarity or complementary, which 
induce a common identity, trust and reciprocity norms (Grannovetter, 1973; Coleman, 1988); 
which can stimulate joint problem solving by increasing the diffusion of alternative 
interpretations of and solutions to problems (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994); and which 
maintain non-redundant bridges to organisations in other clusters to ensure access to novel 
information and knowledge (Schilling and Phelps, 2007). This combination of structural 
network properties provides information transmission capacity (Burt, 2001) and ultimately 
enhances the possibilities for firms to recombine resources into novel solutions (Schilling and 
Phelps, 2007). In line with this logic, Krugman (1991: 142) described clusters as “dynamic 
arrangements based on knowledge creation, increasing returns and innovation in a broad 
sense”. 
Although access to critical complementary resources is important in relation to all of the 
value-added activities in the semiconductor industry, such as access to technology, 
manufacturing capacity, marketing, distribution and after-sales support, it is the need for 
complementary resources in combination with the need for mutual trust which renders high 
degrees of clustering most probable among strategic technology alliances at the R&D and 
design stage of the semiconductor value chain. Indeed, a wide range of studies has indicated 
that clustering enhances the firm’s ability to innovate (e.g. Baptista and Swann, 1998; 
Morosini, 2004; Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Boja, 2011). 
As discussed previously, chipmakers which engage in the joint development of new chips or 
manufacturing processes predominantly arrange this activity non-equity joint development 
agreements and, although less frequently, through equity joint ventures. These types or 
alliances involve relatively significant degrees of interdependence between partners in 
comparison with the customer-supplier relationships seen in relation to the other value chain 
activities of the semiconductor industry. This is due to the more integrated nature of joint 
development agreements, which is the result of the substantially greater specialised 
investments made under these agreements along with the active sharing of knowledge and 
complementary technological resources and capabilities. This requires collaborating 
chipmakers to interact more intensively on joint development projects, in order to coordinate 
the division of a complex array of technical tasks and investments and ensure high levels of 
ongoing cooperation and joint problem solving.  
Complementary IP is typically also licensed from, mainly, several leading IP developers and 
integrated into newly developed chip designs. Licensing is a relatively uncomplicated means 
of accessing complementary technology which requires relatively little coordination. 
Although this type of agreement does not account for the majority of collaborative activities 




All in all, however, chipmakers collaborating on joint development projects require a network 
structure which not only offers a self-enforcing governance mechanism that safeguards their 
specialised investments and preserves their critical resources, but which also provides access 
to non-redundant resources and capabilities necessary for advancing the existing 
technological standards. It is therefore reasonable to argue that patterns of high network 
clustering ought to be exhibited among strategic technology alliances at the R&D and design 
stage of the semiconductor value chain. Accordingly, the following is hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 2 Network clustering is the highest in the network of technology 
alliances, as compared to other alliance networks. 
 
3.5.3. Network centralisation 
One of the principal concepts of network structure is centrality, which indicates the position 
of an organisation relatively to other organisations within a network (Borgatti, 2005). In other 
words, centrality indicators capture the patterns of alliance relations maintained by a given 
organisation, along with the processes by which information and knowledge are potentially 
mobilised within the overall network and the firm’s ability of accessing these flows (Borgatti, 
2005). Network centrality has been long linked by network researchers to effects such as 
power (Krackhardt, 1990; Alderson and Beckfield, 2004), influence and prestige (Wasserman 
and Faust, 1994), reputation (Gulati, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000) and status (Podolny, 1993), and 
can therefore be viewed as an indication of an organisation’s level of network dominance over 
other organisations in the network. 
 Network power, in this respect, is therefore inherently relational and results directly from the 
connectedness of a given individual organisation. With each relation being a potential source 
of relevant information, resources or influence, firms have power to the extent that they are 
well-connected and function as central hubs of knowledge and information. Powerful firms 
thus derive strategic advantage from their ability to control the mobilisation of resources 
through their various alliance partner networks (Galaskiewicz, 1979; Burt, 2004), coordinating 
action and withholding or distorting information to their advantage; their extensive 
bargaining power (Crook and Combs, 2007); and their ability to become better informed about 
trends, developments and new business opportunities within the overall network (Gilsing et 
al., 2008). In addition, high levels of power have been shown to strengthen customer-supplier 
relationships (Maloni and Benton, 2000; Benton and Maloni, 2005), enable economies of scale 
(Cox, 2001) and enhance the ability to design and coordinate distribution channels (Kähkönen 
and Virolainen, 2011). 
The distribution of network centrality among all the organisations in a network gives rise to 
the architectural property of centralisation (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). This indicator 
captures the connectivity among all organisations in a network by measuring the degree to 
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which the overall network is clustered around one single firm (Freeman, 1978). In other words, 
network centralisation provides an indication of the extent to which flows of information, 
knowledge and other resources are controlled by a single dominant organisation. 
While network power, to a certain degree, can arguably be important across all value-added 
activities within the semiconductor industry, whether in the light of curtailing opportunism, 
improving cost efficiency, or increasing access to technical skills, technology, or new product 
or geographical markets; the strategic benefits associated with network power ought to be 
particularly essential in the manufacturing of semiconductor chips. The key to explaining 
variation in the degree of network centralisation between the manufacturing network and the 
other alliance networks along the semiconductor value chain is economies of scale. 
The competitiveness of semiconductor companies hinges on their ability to generate 
innovations for new markets as well as their ability to achieve the productivity required to 
compete in mature markets. Whereas innovativeness, as discussed, should require high 
degrees of network connectedness and clustering, productivity requires high degrees of 
network centralisation. To maintain a semiconductor manufacturing operation, a 
semiconductor company must be able to make substantial capital investments in 
manufacturing facilities and technology development. As most chipmakers are unable to 
accomplish this, they mitigate these extreme costs by outsourcing the fabrication of their chips 
to specialised foundries. Due to the enormous cost of manufacturing, there are only a handful 
of foundries that offer their services, whereas in other value-added activities, such as 
semiconductor distribution, specialised channel partners are plentiful as they are not bound 
by substantial capital investments. While the availability of potential partners should help to 
explain some of the variation in the centralisation of distinct alliance networks, this is 
fundamentally due to high capital requirements as well as the ability to maintain a productive 
operation. 
The foundry’s ability to sustain productive, however, relies to a large extent on economies of 
scale generated by consistently high foundry capitalisation rates, which naturally requires 
sufficient demand from a network of customers. By aggregating the business of multiple 
fabless chipmakers, foundries can achieve the scale required for the enormous capital 
investments and risks that they take on (Wong et al., 2014) and consequently achieve 
competitive advantage over less productive foundries. The name of the game is, therefore, 
building large, centralised networks of customers. 
By laying out their specific chip design rules and SPICE models to which new chip designs 
must conform, and which drastically increase the cost of switching foundry partners, 
foundries can ‘lock’ their chipmaker customers on to their process technologies. While this 
implies a certain degree of asset specificity which minimises the need for ongoing 
coordination, it also reduces the foundry’s risk of losing customers to rival foundries and 
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consequently enables it to maintain high levels of productivity. All in all, the following is 
hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 3 Network centralisation is the highest in the network of manufacturing 
alliances, as compared to other alliance networks. 
 
3.5.4. Network properties in other value chain modules 
The nature of collaborations in the areas of distribution/marketing and supply should not 
demand the same extent of strategic network benefits as do chip development alliances and 
manufacturing partnerships. The main reason ought to revolve around variation in the need 
for specialised versus generic complementary resources along with the vertical nature of 
customer-supplier relationships. Whereas the joint development of new semiconductor chips 
demands combining highly specialised technological resources and capabilities, and the 
fabrication of chips through outsourcing requires access to specialised process technology, 
with any chip design needing to conform to specific design rules and models; the 
distribution/marketing of chips and the supply of materials, resources and end-products 
generally requires access to resources which are more generic to the innovation at hand. In 
turn, this allows predicting how the architectural properties of these alliance networks should 
vary in comparison to the networks of technology and manufacturing alliances. 
Both distribution/marketing and supply relations are largely driven by the need for cost 
efficiency and access to complementary resources, whether that is established local 
distribution channels or production materials and equipment. For the most part, unlike is the 
case in especially the area of semiconductor manufacturing, these complementary resources 
are generic to the extent that they are exploitable and have many available providers. With 
time-to-market being critical to the competitive advantage of any chipmaker due to the high 
rate of product obsolescence in the majority of the chip market, chipmakers require rapid 
access to markets and customers. While some chipmakers (e.g. Xilinx) have reported to rely 
mainly on a single dedicated distribution partner, many others (such as Maxim Integrated) 
diversify the distribution of their chips across multiple partners within every major 
geographical region and product area in order to increase market access and exposure while 
mitigating excessive dependence on a single partner and reducing potential opportunism. 
With the exception of specialised materials and equipment which have relatively few potential 
suppliers, semiconductor companies mostly source generic materials and equipment, from 
multiple suppliers in order to maintain a consistent input of production resources and price 
stability. Demand for semiconductor chips is notoriously variable and thus the general tactic 
is to maintain a large network of partners in order to lower the risk of supply disruptions, 
reduce the cost of switching suppliers and curb potential opportunism in general; without 
requiring the mutual trust and inflow of innovative resources provided by high degrees of 
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partner interconnectedness and network clustering needed in highly specialised joint chip 
development projects. 
Accordingly, some degree of network power ought to be necessary to improve the 
chipmaker’s competitive position within the network, while also strengthening its 
relationships with suppliers and customers and enhancing its ability to design and coordinate 
distribution channels, as suggested by Maloni and Benton (2000) and Kähkönen and 
Virolainen (2011) respectively. Concurrently, in both the distribution/marketing and supply 
of semiconductor chips, the need for access to a wide range of strategic partners should 
outweigh the importance of having a densely interconnected network of partners that can 
function as a reputation mechanism to safeguard relation-specific investments and the sharing 
of operational, logistical and market-related information and knowledge. Taken together, the 
following is hypothesised:  
Hypothesis 4 Network connectedness, clustering and centralisation are low in the 
networks of (i) distribution/marketing alliances and (ii) supply 
relations. 
3.6. Research methodology  
3.6.1. Data collection 
The data collection process for this research is comprised of two main stages, with the aim of 
creating a new dataset by connecting two separate data sources: OSIRIS and Factiva. As a first 
step, an initial sample of semiconductor firms was collected from the OSIRIS database. These 
firms were classified as being active at the core of the semiconductor industry as indicated by 
their primary US SIC codes (code 3674: “Semiconductors and related devices”). The sample 
was selected randomly, without the imposition of any selection criteria besides firms’ primary 
US SIC codes and their ‘active’ status; and therefore no selection bias based on their country 
of origin, firm size or otherwise was introduced into the sample. The selection in OSIRIS 
resulted in an initial sample of 483 publicly traded semiconductor firms who were either 
active or established during the 11-year period of 2004-2014.  
The present research focuses on the collaborative activities of firms in the global 
semiconductor industry for a few reasons. Semiconductor companies have conventionally 
been engaging in large numbers of horizontal, vertical and cross-industry partnerships 
(Hagedoorn, 1993). This provides a suitable context that permits studying the development of 
networks of alliances over time. Moreover, the semiconductor industry is home to 
heterogeneous players, ranging from smaller, specialised chip producers to large and 
integrated manufacturers (Stuart, 2000; Wong et al., 2014). 
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The second stage of data collection revolved around the collection of data on alliance 
formations announced by the 483 semiconductor firms selected during the first stage. Factiva 
was used as the primary data source during this stage. Factiva provides an aggregation of 
content from various news sources, including newspapers, magazines, journals and 
newswires. In constructing the dataset for this study, searches for alliance announcements 
during the period 2004-2014 were made in Factiva using the names of the 483 semiconductor 
companies as well as key words relevant to alliance announcements, such as “alliance”, 
“partnership”, “agreement”, “joint venture”, “cooperation” and “collaboration”. Searches in 
Factiva were made on a company-by-company basis.  
A number of important considerations were made during the process of collecting the data 
on the formation of alliance agreements by the 483 semiconductor companies, in line with 
Duysters and Hagedoorn (1993) who created the MERIT-CATI alliance databank using 
Factiva. First of all, the boundary of the network was determined on the basis of the industry 
affiliation of the focal firms in the sample as indicated by OSIRIS, namely the semiconductor 
industry. Searching Factiva within the boundaries of this semiconductor industry network 
resulted in the identification of both intra-industry alliances and intra-industry alliances, as 
cross-industry collaboration constitutes an essential part of the innovation activities of 
semiconductor companies (Andén et al., 2015; Global Semiconductor Alliance, 2018). 
Therefore, alliance formations between semiconductor companies and partners located 
outside the semiconductor industry were also recorded in the dataset. Importantly, the 
network boundary did not extend to cover all alliance ties formed by all the partners of the 
focal semiconductor firms; therefore, alliance ties formed between the non-focal partner 
organisations were not collected and recorded when these ties did not form part of a multi-
partner alliance (i.e., three or more partners) with at least one focal semiconductor firm, as it 
would be practically impossible to gather alliance data on a network of potentially thousands 
of organisations. Moreover, since the current research is focused specifically on the 
collaborative strategies of semiconductor companies, if alliance ties formed by non-focal 
partner organisations are not formed with at least one focal semiconductor firm, either within 
a dyadic or multi-partner alliance, then these ‘missing’ ties would fall outside of the network 
boundary and would therefore not be of interest to this research.  
Secondly, a copy of the main points raised in each of the alliance announcements was saved 
in the database. This covered the names of the companies participating in the alliance, the year 
of formation, and a description of the overall goal or objectives of the alliance. Importantly, 
this also enabled recording (1) the names of partners beyond the focal firms, (2) whether a 
given alliance is dyadic or multi-partner (e.g., triadic) in nature, and (3) any alliance ties 
between non-focal partners in order to capture cross-industry triadic alliances within the 
boundary of the network. Often, the announcement specified the type of alliance agreement 
on which it reported, such as a joint development agreement, licensing agreement or a supply 
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contract; however, when this was not specified, the description of the alliance agreement 
would enable to derive the type of alliance which had been formed. The types of alliance 
agreements specified in the dataset were determined in line with the types recorded in the 
MERIT-CATI databank (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1993). 
Thirdly, the company names mentioned in any alliance announcement found in Factiva were 
checked against the actual names of the focal companies recorded in the sample created in 
OSIRIS. Namely, it could occur that some companies, based in entirely different industries, 
carry similar names; therefore, it was important to ensure that alliance data were collected for 
the semiconductor companies actually recorded in the sample. In addition, all alliance 
announcements were read through in case references were made to the semiconductor 
industry or any other industry; and in the rare case of doubt these companies’ websites were 
visited to ensure they were indeed affiliated to the semiconductor industry. This helped to 
further ensure that the correct alliance data were collected for the companies in the sample. 
Fourthly, foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises were recorded as individual 
companies and any alliance formations formed by these companies were registered against 
their own names in the dataset, rather than against their parent organisations. This 
consideration was made in line with research demonstrating that foreign subsidiaries do often 
operate and make strategic decisions, such as the formation of alliance network relations, 
autonomously (Boehe, 2009; Gammelgaard et al., 2012).   
Finally, although there are a number of limitations to the data collection approach used for 
this research, such as that companies generally do not publicly announce every single 
collaborative relationship they establish; smaller and less-known firms might be more likely 
to appear less often in the media; and our coverage of reported alliance announcements was 
limited to English-language press journals, Factiva has been deemed a reliable source as it also 
constituted the primary data source for the MERIT-CATI alliance databank (Duysters and 
Hagedoorn, 1993), which has yielded numerous articles in the alliance literature (e.g. 
Hagedoorn and Narula, 1996; Hagedoorn et al., 2005; Dittrich and Duysters, 2007). The 
MERIT-CATI databank has, however, not been updated since the early 2000s and therefore it 
has been decided to establish a new dataset reflecting more recent alliance trends. 
3.6.2. Sample composition 
During the second stage of the data collection process, data on alliance formations were found 
for 285 out of the 483 semiconductor firms in the initial sample. This sample of 285 firms forms 
the basis for this research and is composed of companies located in a total of 22 countries (see 
Table 3.2), creating an international context for the research.  
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Table 3.2: Composition of initial sample by country of origin, in terms of firm counts and alliance 
agreements formed throughout the sample period of 2004-2014. 
Country of 
origin 
Firms Alliances Country of 
origin 
Firms Alliances 
Count % Count  % Count  % Count  % 
USA 95 33.3% 3,528 58.2% France 2 0.7% 93 1.5% 
Taiwan 87 30.5% 796 13.1% Canada 2 0.7% 92 1.5% 
South Korea 29 10.2% 166 2.7% Australia 2 0.7% 27 0.4% 
Japan 24 8.4% 304 5.0% India 2 0.7% 8 0.1% 
China 14 4.9% 184 3.0% Switzerland 1 0.4% 145 2.4% 
Netherlands 4 1.4% 181 3.0% Hong Kong 1 0.4% 14 0.2% 
Singapore 4 1.4% 61 1.0% Belgium 1 0.4% 12 0.2% 
United Kingdom 4 1.4% 29 0.5% Denmark 1 0.4% 6 0.1% 
Germany 3 1.1% 263 4.3% Finland 1 0.4% 5 0.1% 
Israel 3 1.1% 131 2.2% Italy 1 0.4% 4 0.1% 
Malaysia 3 1.1% 16 0.3% Philippines 1 0.4% 2 0.0% 
     Total 285 100.0% 6,067 100% 
 
These sample firms are largely, but not exclusively, based in the US, Taiwan and other parts 
of Asia; and these firms are consequently also involved  in the vast majority of all alliance 
agreements, with US semiconductor firms accounting for roughly 58% of all alliances. This is 
reflective of the nature of the semiconductor industry (Ernst, 2005; Semiconductor Industry 
Association, 2016). The sample also highlights the highly diverse cross-industry nature of the 
industry’s partner ecosystem (see Table 3.3), with the vast majority of inter-organisational 
alliance partners based not within the semiconductor industry itself, but rather in other public 
and private sectors.  
Table 3.3: Full sample composition by industry affiliation 
Industry affiliation # firms Proportion 
Semiconductor core industry 635 19.3% 
Semiconductor satellite industry 557 17.0% 
University research centre 102 3.1% 
Research institute 66 2.0% 
Government 90 2.7% 
Other industries* 1,832 55.8% 
Total 3,282 100.0% 
*See Appendix A for an overview of the top 50 of ‘other’ industries 
Furthermore, the majority of alliance agreements were formed by fabless chipmakers and 
IDMs, which are the two main types of chipmakers (see Table 3.4). On average, these 
chipmakers types tend to differ considerably in overall size, both in terms of annual revenues 
and the size of their labour force. Although fabless chipmakers proportionally invest more in 
R&D, their overall smaller size ought to constrain them in terms of their absolute investments 
which they can commit to R&D on their own. R&D collaboration should therefore be 
69 
 
particularly critical to their ability to drive semiconductor innovation in competition with the 
larger and less constrained IDMs. 
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics broken down by semiconductor company type  







Count % Count % Revenues* 
Number of 
employees* 
Fabless chipmakers 141 49% 2,639 43% 24 512,186 1,156 22.7 
Manufacturing 
equipment makers 
44 15% 731 12% 33 740,565 1,445 15.1 
Assembling, testing 
& packaging 
28 10% 245 4% 28 826,589 2,152 2.5 
IDM 17 6% 1,406 23% 30 7,303,674 20,222 17.1 
Materials 16 6% 144 2% 30 758,255 2,222 4.4 
Other electronic 
components 
12 4% 76 1% 25 130,701 232 26.0 
Foundry 11 4% 481 8% 23 3,315,695 2,322 5.9 
Distributors 8 3% 57 1% 32 588,611 263 0.1 
IP core design 8 3% 288 5% 22 85,997 132 38.1 
Total 285 100% 6,067 100%     
*Measures of firm size, innovativeness and years of operating are averaged across all firms with the same industry affiliation, taking 
the most recent data available for each firm 
Broadly speaking, we define alliances in line with Duysters and Hagedoorn (1993), namely as 
collaborative agreements which serve the common interests of independent partners who are 
not tied through majority ownership. While most of the alliances in the dataset can be related 
to technology collaboration where joint innovative activity or the exchange of technology 
forms at least part of the agreement, such as R&D, licensing and joint ventures; the dataset 
also includes alliance agreements where manufacturing, marketing and distribution or supply 
activities form a core part of the agreement (see Table 3.5 for an overview of all the types of 
alliance agreements covered in the dataset). In addition, data was collected on the year of 
alliance formation and the names, locations and industry affiliations of the alliance partners. 
Partners’ industry affiliations were verified using OSIRIS and the Capital IQ database. 
Overall, the dataset covers 5,465 alliance agreements, equating to a total of 7,581 alliance ties, 
formed between the 285 focal semiconductor firms and their partners. While the number of 
alliances refer to the actual agreements signed between a pair or group of partners, the notion 
of alliance ties captures the number of dyads and the direction of the dyadic alliance 
relationship; i.e. a single alliance based on a reciprocal dyadic relationship contains two ties 
(from partner AB and BA). 
In total, the sample contains 3,282 organisations based across 59 countries (see Appendix B), 
which can be split into 1,192 semiconductor companies (as classified either by primary or 
secondary semiconductor activities) and 2,090 other types of cross-industry partner 
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organisations, including satellite semiconductor firms6, universities, research centres, 
government bodies as well as a firms active in neighbouring industries and end-industries.  
Table 3.5: Overview of alliance types included in the dataset 
Alliance type Relations Description # alliances # ties 
R&D partnership Joint development agreement 
Development or (re)-
engineering of new products 






 Technology consortium 
 Joint research pact 
 Interoperability alliance 
 Joint reference design 
 R&D contract 
 State intervention R&D 
 Joint development kit 





Contract to sell or receive 







Licensing Acquisition or sale of a 








 Porting agreement 
Distribution/ 
marketing partnership 
Distribution agreement Agreement to jointly 
distribute and/or market 










Outsourcing agreement Agreement to manufacture 
products in joint partnership 







 Second sourcing 
 Mutual second sourcing 
Technology joint 
venture 
Technology joint venture Agreement to set up a joint 
entity for the development 





Technology acquisition Technology acquisition Acquisition or sale of a 










investments, funding or 







 Government funding 
  Total number of alliances 5,465 7,581 
 
6 Satellite semiconductor firms are companies whose primary US SIC code does not classify their primary business 
as being in the semiconductor industry, but who do have secondary activities in the semiconductor industry. 
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3.6.3. Construction of final network sample 
On the basis of the conceptual framework developed in this chapter, Table 3.6 below provides 
an overview illustrating how the different types of alliances included in the dataset are 
divided to make up the relational building-blocks of distinct sub-networks representing 
collaboration in relation to the different value-added activities within the semiconductor 
industry. Variation in network architectures will be analysed based on these four types of sub-
networks. 










- R&D partnerships 
- Technology licensing 
agreements 
- Technology acquisitions 










More specifically, variation in network architectures between these distinct sub-networks will 
be analysed through a cross-sectional comparison. The primary interest of this study is not in 
analysing and comparing the sources driving the annual structural evolution of distinct sub-
networks, but rather in understanding and explaining the variation in the architectural 
characteristics of sub-networks resulting from alliances formed over a longer period of time. 
The cross-sectional approach is appropriate in the context of this study, because strategic 
alliances generally do not last only for a single year.  
In fact, although data on the exact duration of the alliances in the sample were unavailable, 
during the data collection process press reports announcing the formation of alliances by 
semiconductor companies were often found to state that these were of a ‘multi-year’ nature. 
Moreover, an average alliance duration of five years has been a conventional assumption 
adopted by past studies on the formation of alliances  (e.g. Stuart, 2000; Robinson and Stuart, 
2002; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Gulati et al., 2012; Tatarynowicz et al., 2016). 
For the purpose of this study we therefore follow past research in assuming that strategic 
alliances in the semiconductor industry last for five years. Therefore, the sample of alliance 
formations is split into two consecutive five-year periods (2005-2009 and 2010-2014), to ensure 
that the architectural properties of the sub-networks can be compared for consistency between 
the two periods, while allowing to make a cross-sectional comparison between two periods of 
equal length. Concurrently, alliances formed during the year 2004 are excluded in this study, 
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leaving a total network sample of 3,051 organisations and 4,915 alliance agreements, equating 
to 6,888 alliance ties, formed during the period 2005-2014.  
In line with the formulated hypotheses, the alliance network data are converted into 
one-mode adjacency matrices, with semiconductor firms and their partners representing both 
the rows and columns of each matrix. Two matrices, one for each five-year period, are created 
for each sub-network using data on the relevant types of alliance ties which define each of the 
networks along the semiconductor value chain (see Table 3.6).  
3.6.3. Network analysis method 
The created network matrices are visualised using Gephi, a comprehensive tool for visualising 
network data, and analysed for different measures of network structure, namely network 
connectedness, clustering and centralisation using UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al., 2002). UCINET 
is a software package used for analysing network data and it has been one of the most widely 
used tools for analysing the structural properties of networks of inter-organisational 
relationships (e.g. Gulati, 1995b, 1999; Baum et al., 2005; Ahuja et al., 2009).  
Although UCINET does provide functionality for visualising network data, Gephi provides 
considerably more layout algorithms which can be used to visually highlight important 
structural features of networks. In particular, this study will employ the Fruchterman-
Reingold algorithm (Fruchterman and Reingold, 1991) to visualise the distinct alliance 
networks. This is a force-directed layout algorithm, which means that it considers a force 
between any two nodes in a network, with the basic idea to enable the researcher to move 
nodes within the network and change the forces between every pair of nodes. This provides 
an easy way to visually identify structural differences between distinct network graphs. 
Although network graphs cannot provide any statistical proof with regards to the specific 
hypotheses under investigation, they do offer important suggestive evidence. To reinforce this 
evidence, the network representations are accompanied with overall network metrics of 
connectedness, clustering and centralisation, in order to quantify the structural configurations 
of distinct alliance networks. 
The connectedness of a network indicates how integrated or fractured the overall network is; 
or the extent to which any organisation in a network is linked to another organisation, whether 
directly through an alliance relationship or indirectly through other organisations in the 
network. The connectedness of a network is defined by Krackhardt (1994) as the proportion 
of pairs of nodes that can reach each other by a path of any length; i.e., the proportion of pairs 
of nodes that are located in the same network component. Thus, a network can have a 
maximal connectedness of 1.0 when any given organisation can reach every other 
73 
 
organisation within the network. Accordingly, network connectedness indicates whether all 
organisations in a network belong to a certain common system.  
Conversely, disconnectedness of a network is defined by the number of ‘violations’ (i.e. those 
cases where a pair of network actors cannot reach each other) of the connectedness condition. 
Dividing the number of actual violations by the theoretical maximum of this function, then, 
gives rise to a degree to which a network is disconnected. In turn, a network connectedness 
score is obtained by subtracting the degree of disconnectedness from 1.0. This is formally 
defined as follows: 




where Krackhardt (1994: 8) defines 𝑉 as the “number of pairs of points which are not mutually 
reachable, and the maximum number of violations is the total number of pairs of 
organisations = 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2”. 
To measure the extent of clustering in each alliance network during each five-year period, we 
calculate the network average clustering coefficient. The clustering coefficient of an individual 
organisation in a network can be measured as the proportion of its partners who are 
themselves directly connected to one another. In turn, the clustering coefficient of a complete 
network is obtained by calculating the mean of this measure across all organisations in the 
network. This can be formalised as follows: 






where 𝐶𝑖 captures the local clustering coefficient of an individual organisation 𝑖 in a given 
network; or the proportion of strategic partners of 𝑖 that are connected. In other words, 𝐶𝑖  is 
the probability that two partners of c are also partners of each other. The clustering coefficient 
𝐶̅ for the overall network, then, is calculated by dividing the sum of 𝐶𝑖  by 𝑁 organisations in 
the network. Whereas network connectedness captures the connectedness of the whole 
network, the clustering coefficient captures the extent to which the overall network contains 
localised knots of dense connectivity (Schilling and Phelps, 2007). The network average 
clustering coefficient hits its maximum score of 1.0 when, across the whole network, all 
partners of 𝑖 are connected to each other. 
Network centralisation, on the other hand, indicates the degree to which a network’s core is 
composed of a small number of highly central organisations through which all alliance ties 
run. This decreases the distance between any two network actors (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994) and thus influences the transmission capacity of the network. Specifically, network 
degree centralisation is used in this study, which measures the extent to which one 
organisation in a holds all alliance ties (i.e. incoming as well as outgoing ties) in a network 
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(Borgatti et al., 2013). Degree centralisation is based on the variation in degree centrality (i.e. 
the total number of immediate alliance ties) of all individual organisations within a network 
divided by the theoretical maximum variation (Freeman, 1978). The centralisation score is 
formally expressed as follows: 
𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
∑ 𝐶𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐶𝐷(𝑛𝑖)
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝐶𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐶𝐷(𝑛𝑖)
 
where 𝐶𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the largest degree centrality score across all of the organisations in a given 
network; 𝐶𝐷(𝑛𝑖) is degree centrality of organisation 𝑛𝑖; and 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝐶𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum 
possible variation in the degree centrality of organisations within a network. Network degree 
centrality has a maximum score of 1.0, which is reached when all alliance ties are centred 
around one single organisation. 
3.7. Results: Analysis of network architectures across distinct alliance 
networks 
3.7.1. Visual patterns within the overall industry network 
To offer an initial glance at the size and complexity of the network of alliance ties created by 
semiconductor firms, a visual representation of all alliance ties formed from 2005 through to 
the end of 2014 is provided in Figure 3.3. The size of the nodes is based on degree centrality 
(i.e. the total number of alliances formed by the node over the period); their colour reflects 
their sectoral affiliation7 to either (a) the core of the semiconductor industry, (b) satellite 
semiconductor industries, (c) university research centres, (d) public research institutes, (e) 
government or (f) other industries; and their shape represents their regional origin, namely 
North America, Europe, Asia or ‘Other’. These regional affiliations reflect the regional 
concentration of semiconductor value chain activities (Semiconductor Industry Association, 
2016). The colour of alliance ties indicates their functional activity: technology (purple), 
manufacturing/production (blue), distribution/marketing (green) or supply (yellow).   
A number of features stand out from the graph. Technology alliances (purple) are mainly 
clustered at the centre of the network, which is a clear indication that organisations with 
strong R&D capabilities and rich intellectual property are highly sought for collaboration. 
Judging by their central presence, these partners are often affiliated to satellite semiconductor 
industries (e.g. suppliers of IP and software, or diversified firms with secondary activities in 
the semiconductor field) – aside of other core semiconductor firms (yellow) – and are located 
across the range of geographical regions. 
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Close-up of the core of the network 
 
Figure 3.3: The industry network comprised of all alliance ties formed over the 2005-2014 period 
In addition, few university research centres (green), such as IMEC in Belgium, and public 
research institutes (blue), like the Institute for Microelectronics in Singapore, also appear as core 
technology partners. These organisations are allied with the likes of Intel, AMD, 
STMicroelectronics, Freescale and TSMC – who are among the largest and most active 
participants in the network, and are positioned at the core of the network.  
Overall, the network is comprised of a wide diversity of participants from various 
geographical regions and sectoral fields. Both white (‘other’ industries) and red (satellite 
semiconductor industries) nodes are predominant partners in the network, which suggests 
that inter-industry partnerships are a crucial part of the collaborative strategies of 
semiconductor firms. American organisations (circled nodes) are particularly active in the 
semiconductor network – which is reflective of the overall industry. However, the large 
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presence of organisations from the range of other geographical regions both at the core and 
towards the periphery of the network, who are important partners also to the American firms, 
underscores the true global nature of the semiconductor industry network. 
3.7.2. Cross-sectional analysis of variance in the architectural properties of 
distinct alliance networks  
Visualisations of the four different alliance networks are shown in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 
on the next pages; each network representing the operation of distinct industrial activities, 
with alliance ties depicting the flow of knowledge, technology, goods, services or equity 
between organisations. The size of the nodes in the networks is based on the number of 
incoming ties. Specifically, these network graphs allow identifying the architectural patterns 
that describe how semiconductor companies, collectively, build networks of alliances as well 
as how and why the architectures of these networks vary across distinct value chain activities. 
A cross-sectional comparison between two 5-year periods then allows examining the 
consistency of the obtained results. The graphical network representations are accompanied 
by overall network indicators of network connectedness, clustering and centralisation (also 
summarised in Table 3.7), which allow describing the architectural configurations of distinct 
alliance networks. These network measures are relative indications of network structure and 
thus allow directly comparing the architectures of distinct alliance networks. 
Table 3.7: Overview of cross-sectional results (highest scores are underlined) 
Network 
properties  





2005-2009  0.77  0.02  0.00  0.01  
2010-2014  0.75  0.02  0.01  0.00  
Clustering  
2005-2009  0.25 0.02 0.02 0.07 
2010-2014  0.27  0.00  0.00  0.08  
Centralisation  
2005-2009  0.11  0.25  0.05  0.07 
2010-2014  0.07  0.21  0.03  0.15  
At first sight, the distinct alliance networks clearly depict very different architectures. By 
measures of network connectedness (0.77 during 2005-2009 and 0.75 during 2010-2014) and 
clustering (0.25 during 2005-2009 and 0.27 during 2010-2014), the network of technology 
alliances is substantially more cohesive than the other networks, all of which exhibit a greater 
extent of dispersion of organisations – thereby providing support for both Hypothesis 1 and 




Network of technology alliances 
2005-2009 
 
Network of manufacturing alliances 
2005-2009 
Tie colour indicates alliance type (1.892 ties; 2,130 incl. repetitive ties) 
Size of nodes is based on in-degree centrality (1.026 nodes) 
Number of network ties: 157 ties; 235 incl. repetitive ties 








Clustering coefficient: 0.017 
 
Network of marketing alliances 
2005-2009 
 
Network of customer-supplier partnerships 
2005-2009 
Number of network ties: 255 ties; 264 incl. repetitive ties 
Size of nodes is based on in-degree centrality (277 nodes) 
Number of network ties: 795 ties; 959 incl. repetitive ties 








Clustering coefficient: 0.065 




Network of technology alliances 
2010-2014 
 
Network of manufacturing alliances 
2010-2014 
Tie colour indicates alliance type (1.864 ties; 2,045 incl. repetitive ties) 
Size of nodes is based on in-degree centrality (990 nodes) 
Number of network ties: 86 ties; 149 incl. repetitive ties 
Size of nodes is based on out-degree centrality (105 nodes) 
Density: 0.003 
Connectedness: 0.753 
Centralisation: 0.072  
Clustering coefficient: 0.272 
Density: 0.008  
Connectedness: 0.015 
Centralisation: 0.208 
Clustering coefficient: 0.000 
 
Network of marketing alliances 
2010-2014 
 
Network of customer-supplier partnerships 
2010-2014 
Number of network ties: 191 ties; 203 incl. repetitive ties 
Size of nodes is based on in-degree centrality (226 nodes) 
Number of network ties: 716 ties; 903 incl. repetitive ties 








Clustering coefficient: 0.078 
Figure 3.5: Visualisations of distinct alliance networks, displaying ties formed over the 5-year period 2010-2014
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In turn, the network of manufacturing alliances is most highly centralised (0.25 during 2004-
2009 and 0.21 during 2010-2014), thus confirming Hypothesis 3; while both the networks of 
distribution/marketing agreements and supply relations score consistently lower on the three 
network metrics, thereby confirming Hypothesis 4. The following paragraphs will examine 
these results in more detail. 
The network of technology alliances consistently exhibits substantially higher degrees of 
network connectedness and clustering across both periods in comparison to the other alliance 
networks. A number of collaborative patterns become particularly clear from the visual 
representations of this particular network, which should help to comprehend why this 
network is relatively highly interconnected and clustered. These structural patterns 
correspond strongly to the importance of mutual trust and norms of cooperation in, 
particularly, joint development agreements, which make up the majority of alliances in this 
network. 
The technology network resembles a complex system of interconnected and clustered 
organisations densely tied through a number of different types of technology alliance ties. 
Clustered at the core of this network are mainly organisations which are interconnected 
through highly technical R&D partnerships (red ties) and joint ventures (light blue). 
Organisations engaged in these types of alliances, as argued previously, require trust as a 
self-enforcing governance mechanism, or a ‘mutual monitoring device’, to safeguard their 
specialised investments and to ensure that all parties involved conform to agreements 
concerning the routinised sharing of knowledge within their partnerships. Highly 
interconnected alliance networks can function as effective governance structures which 
facilitate establishing such a collaborative environment. 
Concurrently, we can observe equity investments (dark blue ties), technology acquisitions 
(green) and particularly licensing agreements (yellow) connecting central actors with 
unconnected partners at the network’s periphery. As indicated by the patterns that describe 
how these particular ties connect organisations within the network, these ties are not primarily 
used to construct a network as a means to promote mutual trust and norms of cooperation, 
but rather to source non-redundant knowledge and technology from unconnected partners at 
the periphery in order to advance existing technological standards. In line with Burt’s (1992) 
concept of structural holes, this is a crucial network tactic of firms to enhance their innovative 
capacity. 
Taken together, this architectural pattern is referred to by network scholars as a 
core/periphery structure (Borgatti and Everett, 1999), which implies a certain degree of 
asymmetry in organisations’ access to information and technical knowledge flowing through 
the wider network. This gives central network actors the ability to build up trust among one 
another while also gaining an advantage over their less central counterparts when it comes to 
80 
 
accessing specialised complementary technologies and skills and learning about new business 
and partnering opportunities, new technological developments, and other trends within the 
semiconductor industry. Moreover, this architectural structure enables central actors to 
leverage their dominant network positions to improve their competitive position within the 
wider semiconductor industry, by controlling the distribution of technical information and 
knowledge within the network. As previously hypothesised, these are the key network 
benefits that describe the strategic foundations upon which the network of technology 
alliances is built. The evidence obtained from the network analysis supports this. 
Indeed, as is the case in the network of technology alliances, a network architecture 
approaching a core/periphery structure can consequently also give rise to a high degree of 
centralisation. However, the dominance of a few central network actors in this case is not 
nearly as clear in the network of manufacturing alliances, where a considerably higher degree 
of centralisation can consistently be observed in both time periods.  
The ability to fabricate semiconductor chips is a relatively scarce skill and an activity which 
has been highly restricted to only a hand-full of specialised organisations, in large part due to 
the immense fixed capital requirements, as is clearly reflected by the few large nodes that 
dominate the manufacturing network; specifically the Taiwain Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Corporation (TSMC), Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation of China, and Tower 
Semiconductor Ltd of Israel. The visualisation of this network is indicative of a completely 
different collaborative and competitive landscape in comparison to that in the other alliance 
networks; with chipmakers being collectively driven to cut costs and enhance efficiency by 
outsourcing the front- and back-end fabrication of their semiconductor devices to a few 
specialised manufacturers.  
The competitiveness of semiconductor manufacturers in general and foundries in particular 
depends on their ability to achieve high levels of productivity, in order to maintain a state-of-
the-art manufacturing operation with sufficient profit margins to survive over the long-term. 
As can be drawn from the network graph, this operational challenge limits the availability of 
manufacturing partners. However, the graph also shows that the majority of chipmakers are 
invested in a relationship with a single long-term manufacturing partner, while fewer, mainly 
large chipmakers, outsource their business to multiple foundries and/or back-end 
manufacturers. For most chipmakers, the size of their business does likely not justify going 
through the onerous process of passing various qualifications and tests in line with specific 
chip design rules and SPICE models defined by foundries, and coordinating multiple of these 
long-term relationships. In turn, this provides foundries in particular with guaranteed 
markets and lower risk of losing customers, enabling them to maximise capacity utilisation 
and productivity. Importantly, as opposed to the highly interconnected and clustered 
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technology network, the main collective network benefit sought by participants within the 
manufacturing network is scale economies. 
This does not imply, however, that partnerships between chipmakers and their 
manufacturing partners do not need to be governed by trust. On the contrary, although the 
outcome of a manufacturing partnership can be specified ex-ante in a contract, trust is 
essential in these relationships due to the high cost of switching foundry partners as well as 
the negative impact of losing a customer on a foundry’s productivity. Chipmakers and 
foundries in particular are therefore reciprocally interdependent. Chipmakers can, however, 
leverage their immediate networks of strategic technology partners, who may outsource to 
the same manufacturers, as a means of imposing reputational sanctions on those 
manufacturing partners that deviate from the established norms of cooperation.  
As further hypothesised, the visualisations of the networks of marketing alliances and supply 
contracts, along with the accompanied network indicators, illustrate that neither network 
stands out as especially interconnected, clustered or centralised. For the most part, both 
networks exhibit higher degrees of centralisation than connectedness and clustering, which is 
indicative of semiconductor companies’ collective tendency towards constructing alliance 
networks which enable achieving cost efficiency through access to complementary resources 
and capabilities, and increasing bargaining power through brokerage as a means of 
minimising the potential opportunistic behaviour of strategic partners and playing off 
partners against each other.  
This finding is in line with the previously discussed motivations underlying the formations 
of distribution/marketing agreements and supply contracts. Both kinds of alliances mostly 
involve the exchange of generic, rather than specialised, complementary resources and 
capabilities, such as access to geographic and product markets, local market knowledge and 
the supply of raw materials and equipment, in order to achieve cost efficiency. This should 
imply a greater availability of potential partners possessing these assets, as can be seen by the 
relatively large populations of actors in both networks and the groups of multiple partners 
circling around many of the semiconductor companies. Such large networks of unconnected 
alliance partners not only enable semiconductor companies to source complementary 
materials from a diversity of sources, but also provide an effective mechanism to avoid 
becoming over-reliant on a single partner and reduce the risk and cost of potential 
opportunism. This is not to say that distribution/marketing and supply alliances do not 
involve any degree of co-specialisation, as chipmakers do need to be committed to sharing 
information with their partners in order to reap the benefits of complementing their in-house 
resources and capabilities with those of partners. Rather, having multiple partners to 
collaborate with on distinct value-added activities lowers the cost of terminating one 
relationship and shifting business to another. This collective network strategy is evidently 
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reflected by the network graphs and network indicators and corresponds to the inter-
organisational processes and routines described earlier in this chapter. 
3.8. Discussion & conclusions 
In view of improving our understanding of the strategic role of networks in inter-
organisational collaboration, the central premise of this study has been that variation in the 
overarching structures of networks are due to fundamental differences in the collective 
collaborative arrangements of firms in relation to distinct value chain activities. As such, it is 
argued that variation in the architectural configurations of different alliance networks comes 
forth not solely from the nature of the value chain activity for which a network is used, but 
more fundamentally from the drivers of collaboration and the inter-organisational routines 
and processes which define why and how a value chain activity is jointly conducted and upon 
which a given alliance network is founded.  
To disentangle the complexity of the entire semiconductor industry network, a distinction was 
made between different types of sub-networks within the overarching industry network, as 
defined by distinct semiconductor value chain activities, in order to understand how these 
different sub-networks are built in the first place. Specifically, we distinguished between 
networks of alliances related to technology and product development, manufacturing, 
distribution/marketing, and the supply of materials, equipment and end-products. Variation 
in the architectural properties of these networks was analysed in terms of network 
connectedness, clustering and centralisation. 
Different network configurations are associated with distinct collective network benefits. 
Whereas densely interconnected networks function as effective self-enforcing governance 
mechanisms that can be leveraged by firms to constrain opportunism and facilitate the 
establishment of mutual norms of cooperation and trust through shared third-party ties; high 
degrees of clustering can further enhance a network’s information transmission capacity 
(Burt, 2001) while also increasing the diversity of knowledge within a network and improving 
the innovativeness of firms. Finally, high degrees of network centralisation provide a single 
or a few dominant firms with privileged access to knowledge flowing through the network 
along with the ability to control the dissemination of resources among other organisations in 
the network.  
Thus, in order to explain the variation in the architectural properties of distinct sub-networks, 
the collective outcomes related to particular network configurations were linked to the 
value-added activities for which these networks are used as well as to the inter-organisational 
routines and processes describing how these activities are conducted in collaboration. 
Accordingly, we argued that the differences in the architectures of alliance networks cannot 
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be adequately captured by a one-dimensional conceptual framework, and hence different 
lessons that past studies have taught in the light of (1) the drivers of collaboration, (2) inter-
organisational routines and processes, (3) value chain analysis and (4) network analysis were 
integrated into a single comprehensive conceptual framework.  
On the basis of this framework, it was specifically hypothesised that the highest degrees of 
network connectedness and clustering should both be found in the network of technology 
alliances and that the highest degree of network centralisation should be found in the network 
of manufacturing alliances. Finally, relatively low degrees of these properties should be 
exhibited by the networks of distribution/marketing alliances and supply contracts. 
These hypotheses were examined using data on the formations of eight different types of 
alliances by semiconductor firms during the periods 2005-2009 and 2010-2014. The obtained 
results provide evidence suggesting that differences in the motivations for collaboration and 
inter-organisational routines and processes, at different value chain stages, result in distinct 
network architectures characterised by different degrees of connectedness, clustering and 
centralisation. Specifically, the results indicate that joint value-added activities that are driven 
primarily by the need to access highly specialised and technical complementary resources and 
capabilities, and which are characterised by high levels of uncertainty and risk; which require 
partners to commit to significant relation-specific investments and the sharing of critical 
knowledge; and in which outcomes cannot be specified ex-ante, are associated with high 
degrees of network connectedness and clustering.  
In contrast, those joint value chain activities which are driven mainly by the need to access 
and exploit complementary resources and capabilities in order to improve cost efficiency, 
such as in manufacturing, are associated with relatively centralised network structures. In 
particular, the extent of network centralisation is amplified when the availability of potential 
strategic partners is low, as is the case among specialised semiconductor manufacturers due 
to the highly specialised nature of semiconductor manufacturing as well as the extreme fixed 
capital costs associated with this.  
These findings have several important implications to future research and the advancement 
of theories to explain the alliance decisions of firms. First and foremost, to the researcher’s 
knowledge, this study is the first to have put forward a multi-dimensional conceptual 
framework to advance our understanding of the sources of variation in the architectural 
characteristics of sub-networks of joint value chain activities within a single industry. An 
important distinction from past studies is that this framework enables accounting for several 
different types of alliance relationships and their associated inter-organisational routines and 
process as the fundamental network building-blocks. The absence of these relational aspects 
has previously been acknowledged as a research limitation by Schilling and Phelps (2007). 
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Future research may adopt this framework to as a basis for better explaining the collaborative 
decisions made by companies. 
Using this framework, the study has highlighted that the semiconductor industry resembles 
a highly complex network of interdependent collaborative relationships interconnecting 
organisations from within and outside of the semiconductor industry, (1) built on structurally 
distinct sub-networks of alliances formed in different value chain segments, which are in turn 
(2) defined by alternative open and closed micro-level network structures in addition to 
dyadic structures. This resembles an important empirical contribution because it illustrates 
that the formation of inter-organisational alliances takes place within relational structures 
which are more complex than the dyadic relational structures upon which most extant alliance 
research has been built. 
Furthermore, the study demonstrates that variance in the architectural characteristics of 
distinct sub-networks of value-added activities is unlikely to emerge due to chance and rather 
points at underlying strategic reasons linked to the fundamental nature of companies’ alliance 
strategies upon which these networks are built. The technology alliance sub-network, for 
instance, reflects a collective preference of semiconductor companies for closure and building 
a relatively interconnected network which can function as a governance structure and 
facilitate the establishment of mutual trust and cooperation as well as the flow of knowledge 
and resources necessary for joint R&D between the organisations within the network. By 
contrast, the other sub-networks, such as the manufacturing sub-network, are more 
concentrated and less interconnected and consequently reflects an inherently different 
collective preference of semiconductor companies for particular relational structures. 
Accordingly, this suggests that alliance networks might not only provide firms with access to 
external resources, as commonly assumed in research on alliance formations; but that they 
function as mechanisms that can enable the achievement of distinct network advantages. 
However, a few limitations to this study should also be acknowledged. Firstly, this study is 
industry-based, which implies that the obtained results cannot likely be used to generalise 
about the differences in network architectures within other, especially low-tech, industries. 
This does not mean, however, that this study does not contribute to advancing our 
understanding of the strategic importance of alliance networks. In fact, the framework 
introduced in this study is not limited to the semiconductor industry and can therefore be 
applied to explain variation in the architectures of sub-networks in other industries. 
Furthermore, the study is subject to the unavailability of data indicating the duration of 
alliance agreements. We built on limited insights provided by previous studies and assumed 
that alliance last for five years on average; however, the incorrect specification of the duration 
of different types of alliances could potentially change the obtained results. Future research 
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could investigate in depth the duration, along with other contract terms, of different types of 
alliance agreements across various industries. 
Future research could advance this study by examining inherent multiplex nature of industry 
networks. Different sub-networks of alliance relationships might not emerge and evolve in 
isolation from each other when they are built by the same set of organisations. Past 
research (e.g. Shipilov, 2012) has thus underscored the importance of also examining how a 
firm’s embeddedness in multiple types of alliance relationships could simultaneously 
influence the outcomes that firms attain through their network strategies. This consequently 
constitutes a fruitful avenue for future research.  
Ultimately, the present study offers important insight into the organisation of alliance 
networks and the collective strategic benefits which can be obtained from distinct network 
architectures. From a managerial perspective, it suggest that managers should recognise and 
understand the different collective network benefits which their firm can derive from 
particular network positions. Understanding its position within the wider industry network 
will help to shape its competitive advantage through the accumulation of network benefits. 
As such, this study not only contributes to the academic field but also to managers’ 
understanding of the impacts that network structures may have on business outcomes. 
Deeper analyses of firms’ ego networks performed in the next two chapters will offer further 





4. EXPLORING THE FORMATION AND STRATEGIC CONSTRUCTS 
OF TRIADIC CROSS-INDUSTRY R&D ALLIANCE STRATEGIES 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters demonstrated that the semiconductor industry has evolved into a 
large and highly complex network, which spans across multiple value chain activities. More 
specifically, this network possesses characteristics of a partner ecosystem which (a) 
interconnects not only chipmakers but also a vast majority of other types of organisation; (b) 
is built on different microstructures, including not only dyads but also triads and multi-
partner alliances; and (c) in which these microstructures are formed beyond the core 
semiconductor industry to connect organisations from adjacent industries, such as 
manufacturers, various types of technology complementors, suppliers and systems 
companies. 
The semiconductor R&D network, in particular, is highly complex due to the diverse 
population of organisations from the core semiconductor and adjacent industries. Moreover, 
R&D is of particular strategic importance to chipmakers because the wide range of 
intellectual property and technologies that are developed and combined at this stage of the 
semiconductor value chain add the most value into the final product (Semiconductor 
Industry Alliance, 2016). Therefore, adequately understanding the essence of strategies in 
R&D networks is essential for both strategists and the advancement of the strategy 
literature. Hence R&D comprises the empirical  context for both the current and the next 
chapter.  
The goal of the current chapter is to investigate and explain how chipmakers can utilise 
network tactics to maximise the R&D outcomes of their strategic alliances. This investigation 
is conducted by (1) developing a conceptual framework for evaluating the strategic utility of 
triadic tactics for R&D collaboration and (2) developing hypotheses to test chipmakers’ 
tendency to configure their R&D alliance relations within triads in response to industry 
pressures. Concurrently, this chapter advances the common dyadic approach to analysing 
the formation of R&D alliances (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000; Colombo et al., 2006; 
Sampson, 2007; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008; Mukherjee et al., 2013) and reveals the essence 
of R&D collaboration in the semiconductor industry through a triadic framework.  
The importance of triads stems from past research emphasising that the formation of R&D 
alliances resembles an interdependent process whereby the chipmaker’s strategic partner 
choice is, in fact, influenced by not only the firm-level attributes of potential R&D partners, 
but also by the existing R&D alliance relations between potential R&D partners and other 
organisations within the industry network (Contractor et al., 2006; Ahuja et al., 2012; Kim et 
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al., 2016). Triads constitute the smallest microstructure in a network within which dyadic 
alliance relations interconnect (Madhavan et al., 2004). A triadic framework, contrary to 
traditional dyadic frameworks used by the majority of extant research on R&D alliances, 
therefore enables analysing whether chipmakers configure their R&D alliances within triads, 
as opposed to dyads, to maximise their R&D outcomes; by explicitly capturing the influence 
of the characteristics and existing R&D alliance relations of potential alliance partners on the 
formation of new R&D alliances (Choi and Wu, 2009).  
As such, triads also explicitly capture the facts that (a) the R&D strategy of a firm might join 
several complementary partners together in a development project and that over time the 
partner portfolios of organisations might evolve to overlap, consequently interconnecting 
the organisations through separate dyadic relationships with common partners (Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2006; Davis 2016); and (b) the strategic goal of the R&D project changes depending 
on the functional specialisation of the partners involved within the triad. This is 
encapsulated by a company’s partner selection decision, which comprises a core mechanism 
determining the value that a company may capture from triadic R&D strategies. 
Importantly, this chapter asserts that the strategic utility of R&D alliances is not solely 
defined by the selection of specific types of partners, but also by the way in which R&D 
alliance relations are configured within triads. It is important to differentiate triadic forms of 
R&D collaboration because they are strategically distinct from pure dyadic collaboration and 
they have lacked attention from the strategy literature. Moreover, better understanding the 
strategic utility of triads has far reaching management implications. Chipmakers have 
different strategic options for the configuration of R&D alliances within triads – which are 
broadly divided into two strategic approaches based on models of network closure 
(Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1997; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) and network brokerage (Burt, 
1992; Soda, 2011), in which the presence or absence of dyadic alliance relations either ‘closes’ 
(or integrates) a triad or marks it with a ‘structural hole’.  
Through the formation of integrated triads, chipmakers might enhance mutual trust and 
establish shared norms of cooperation through the interconnectedness of partners (Coleman, 
1988) – by forming three-way R&D alliances; allying with common and potentially 
redundant partners; or mediating the establishment of interconnecting alliance ties between 
partners. Such an inclusive strategy essentially fosters full open innovation (Chesbrough, 
2003), whereby the chipmaker is able to efficiently utilise R&D alliances to both (a) exploit 
technological assets located beyond its own boundaries in conjunction with its own existing 
assets, and (b) capitalise on R&D partners’ technological assets to jointly explore and 
develop new technologies; as opposed to closed innovation, whereby the chipmaker rather 
develops and commercialises new technologies internally (Chesbrough, 2003; Van de 
Vrande et al., 2009). Moreover, through close collaboration this strategy can reduce 
environmental uncertainties (Boyd, 1990) which are projected onto chipmakers’ R&D 
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activities from pressures existing in the industry (see Chapter 2), including the exponential 
increase in the complexity of technological progress and the associated capital requirements; 
the volatility of product demand and consequently the shortening chip life cycle; and 
intense competitive pressures. In addition to the benefits associated with collaborating with 
multiple partners, such as sharing the risks and costs of R&D and shortening the R&D 
process; network closure enhances the diffusion of information and knowledge among all 
partners in a triad, enables mutual monitoring and sanctions opportunistic behaviour 
(Coleman, 1988, 1990), which are strategic benefits that can help to reduce such 
uncertainties. 
In contrast to pursuing the benefits of integrated triads, a chipmaker might aim to arbitrage, 
and gain control over, the flows of information and knowledge between unconnected parts 
of the R&D network through the disconnectedness between its partners; by deliberately 
forming alliances with partners who do not collaborate among themselves and/or by 
imposing contractual exclusivity upon its partners. Such a protective network strategy creates 
brokerage opportunities that enable chipmakers to protect exclusive access to specialised 
knowledge or other strategic assets. In result, the benefits of R&D collaboration are not 
equally shared and are controlled by a gatekeeper (Burt, 2010). This strategy consequently 
embodies open innovation to a lesser degree than inclusive network strategies, as the 
protective intentions of the chipmaker do not encourage collaboration beyond exploiting the 
existing technological assets of a strategic partner (Van de Vrande et al., 2009). 
In spite of the evidence showing the strategic implications of both of these triadic strategies 
(see Section 3.4. of Chapter 3  for a review), there has been a lack of attempts by strategy 
scholars, chipmakers’ strategists and industry analysts alike to explain and understand how 
triads can help chipmakers to maximise the R&D outcomes from their alliances in the face of 
industry pressures. Strategy scholars’ traditional explanation of the formation of R&D 
alliances has largely been limited to the need of companies to gain access to, and control 
over, strategic information, knowledge, skills and other complementary assets flowing 
through the wider network (Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Williamson, 1991; Powell et al., 
1996). However, it is essential to also consider whether or not access to these strategic assets 
is to be openly shared or deliberately protected as reflected by the structural patterns of the 
company’s triadic tactics. 
The partnering strategies pursued by chipmakers seem to reflect the traditional logic of 
pursuing short-term benefits from gaining access to partners’ assets, as no past research or 
documentation could be identified during this study to indicate that chipmakers’ strategists 
utilise a systematic approach to understand the scope of the available network strategies and 
to assess and derive the strategic benefits of their network strategies. As such, this chapter 
contributes to the traditional strategy literature by enhancing our conceptual understanding, 
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as well as develop strategic implications for chipmakers, of how a partner selection based on 
partner-specific interests might fit into a company’s long-term network strategy. 
The assumption that the formation of triads by chipmakers is merely the by-product of its 
pursuit for partner-specific assets has thus left an important and relatively unexplored gap 
in the strategy literature. Such a one-sided conceptualisation is deficient and, if followed by 
chipmakers, will result in a myopic strategic position in the industry. To develop a 
comprehensive conceptual approach and managerial implications, however, it is imperative 
to consider (1) partner selection and (2) network configuration as two complementary 
elements of strategic utility. 
This chapter makes conceptual contributions to the field of strategy by exploring and 
introducing the concept of strategic utility as a twofold construct. Firstly, the strategic and 
network approaches to analysing the formation of R&D alliances are merged into a 
framework of strategic utility. Secondly, this framework is used to evaluate the strategic 
utility of alternative microstructures; specifically, how triadic alliance structures can enable 
firms to reap long-term network benefits from their R&D collaborations, such as improved 
trust and norms of collaboration among partners, more efficient integration of 
complementary resources and superior project outcomes. 
Empirically, this evaluation is aimed at addressing a number of strategic research questions, 
such as (1) whether inclusive or protective triadic strategies are pursued by different types 
of chipmakers to mitigate external uncertainties and industry pressures; (2) whether there is 
similarity or dissimilarity in preferences for these two triadic strategies between the two 
major types of chipmakers; (3) whether the establishment of cross-industry bridges between 
adjacent industries through triads encompasses a strategy that is more distinctly pursued by 
a single type of chipmaker; (4) whether triadic R&D strategies are driven by (a) knowledge 
sharing and deep collaboration in the light of open innovation or (b) countering or mirroring 
the strategic moves of rivals.  
Building on the conceptual framework, eight hypotheses are developed to test the 
tendencies of chipmakers to configure their R&D alliance relations, with strategically 
selected partners who differ in their functional specialisation, within triads. The hypotheses 
are therefore not merely designed to test whether or not chipmakers do form triads vis-à-vis 
dyads, but more specifically to test whether chipmakers utilise these triadic tactics to 
conduct fundamental R&D, to link and collaborate with partners across technological sectors 
and end-markets, and to develop co-opetitive relations for R&D collaboration as a means of 
responding to industry pressures. These hypotheses are tested on a new dataset containing a 
network sample of chipmakers and their partners covering R&D alliance formations during 
the 11 year period 2004-2014, using stochastic actor-oriented modelling (SAOM). Such an 
approach, combining the configuration of R&D alliance relations and partner choices of 
companies as core elements of triad formations, is important for understanding and 
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developing implications of triadic tactics for R&D collaboration and has, to our knowledge, 
not been applied in past alliance research. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we develop the 
conceptual framework and explore the concept of strategic utility and the mechanisms by 
which chipmakers are able to utilise triadic tactics to maximise the R&D outcomes of their 
strategic alliances. The hypotheses are then formulated in Section 4.3 on the basis of this 
conceptual framework, followed by a discussion of the research methodology and SAOM 
specifications in Section 4.4. The statistical results are presented in Section 4.5 and 
interpreted in Section 4.6. Finally, conclusions and implications are discussed in Section 4.7. 
4.2. Development of the conceptual framework 
4.2.1. Alliances as a strategic response to reduce industry pressures on 
semiconductor R&D outcomes 
The successfulness of semiconductor R&D strategies rests on the ability of the 
semiconductor company to optimise its R&D outcomes, both process- and output-related, of 
its R&D activities; whether in terms of the speed and cost efficiency of the R&D process or 
the innovativeness and time-to-market of the R&D output. As highlighted in Chapter 2, 
however, high levels of industry pressures due to the increasing cost and complexity of 
semiconductor R&D, the ever-changing customer demand for speciality products and 
intense competition amplify the uncertainty around the ability of individual semiconductor 
companies to achieve their desired R&D outcomes. Mitigating this uncertainty and adapting 
to these industry pressures requires semiconductor companies to organise and reconfigure 
their R&D activities strategically, in ways which build on their existing resources and 
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; King and Tucci, 2001). 
There is a consensus among alliance scholars that strategic alliances provide governance 
mechanisms enabling companies to share and reduce uncertainty and costs in such high 
pressure environments (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Porter and 
Fuller, 1986; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gomes-Casseres, 2003; Mahnke and Overby, 2005; Lavie 
and Rosenkopf, 2006; Contractor and Reuer, 2014). However, in spite of the notable 
contributions of several scholars (e.g. Powell, 1990; Gulati, 1998; Gomes-Casseres, 2003; 
Madhavan et al., 2004; Afuah, 2013; Kim et al., 2016), the wider literature has largely 
refrained from building on these studies to explain how companies can (1) actually utilise 
alliances strategically to maximise the outcome of R&D in the face of industry pressures and 
(2) configure their alliance relations as well as how these configurations affect the outcome 
of their joint R&D activities. Such explanations are essential to more adequately understand 
the actual role of alliances in enhancing R&D outcomes because – as demonstrated in 
Chapter 3 – joint R&D activities in high pressure environments like the semiconductor 
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industry form a highly complex network of interdependent alliance relations, and the 
configuration of the alliance relations in this network may influence the governance of joint 
R&D activities as suggested by Powell (1990). Moreover, this also helps to better understand 
how companies’ strategic assets are created (Afuah, 2013). Ignoring the configuration of 
alliance relations can consequently lead to inaccurate research insights and myopic strategy 
formulations. 
This chapter therefore focuses on explaining how individual chipmakers respond to 
industry pressures and maximise their R&D outcomes by configuring their R&D alliance 
relations within complex ego networks. Disentangling the complexity of ego networks 
requires a triadic framework in order to capture the inherent interdependence that exists 
among the R&D alliance formation decisions of chipmakers (Contractor et al., 2006; Choi 
and Wu, 2009). In addition, as the strategic objective of any R&D alliance is not merely 
concerned with the formation of an inter-organisational relationship but more importantly 
with the optimisation of a chipmaker’s R&D outcomes in the face of external uncertainties, it 
is essential to introduce a new construct which is able to characterise and capture (1) the 
effect of alliance relations on R&D outcomes and (2) the strategic intent of the chipmakers to 
optimise their R&D outcomes through alliances.  
4.2.2. The strategic utility of alliance networks for optimising semiconductor 
R&D outcomes 
To develop this construct, we leverage the concepts of expected utility (Bernoulli, 1954) and 
social utility (Camerer, 1997) from the field of behavioural economics and apply these in a 
strategic context. These concepts are both directly relevant to analysing how companies can 
optimise their R&D activities through strategic alliances, because they explain, respectively, 
how companies make alliance decisions with uncertain R&D outcomes and develop 
governance structures in alliances based on social mechanisms such as mutual trust (Das 
and Teng, 1998) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 for a discussion on the importance of trust as a 
governance mechanism in alliances). To capture (1) the expected utility of alliance partner 
choices and (2) the social utility of relation building as two complementary core aspects of a 
single view on explaining how companies utilise R&D alliances strategically to minimise the 
uncertainty of R&D resulting from industry pressures and maximise the outcomes of their 
R&D activities, we put forward the concept of strategic utility.  
Thus, the maximisation of strategic utility (i.e. R&D outcomes) through alliance networks, in 
essence, encapsulates the value generated following the initiation of an R&D alliance. 
Specifically, it is the outcome of a dual decision made by the company, which has roots in 
two strands of literature. On the one hand, the field of strategy has long built on the 
resource-based view (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Das and Teng, 2000), the relational 
view (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and the dynamic capabilities perspective (Teece et al., 1997) to 
92 
 
underscore the strategic motivations underpinning alliance formations (Hagedoorn, 1993) 
and, more specifically, the importance of partner-specific interests as the main driving force of 
R&D partner choices in the company’s pursuit to enhance the value of their R&D outputs 
(Zajac and Olsen, 1993) while overcoming environmental uncertainties owing to incomplete 
knowledge (Sydow et al., 2013); largely from a dyadic point of view.  
The social network literature, on the other hand, offers a complementary, triadic view 
(Caplow, 1959, 1968; Siltaloppi and Vargo, 2017) stressing that it is not solely the access to 
partner-specific resources which shapes the strategic utility of an R&D alliance, but also the 
way in which the access to and exchange of these resources is governed via the strategic 
configuration of the company’s alliance relationships within its wider ego network as 
reflected by the degree of interconnectedness of the company’s R&D alliances (Coleman, 
1988, 1990; Burt, 1992, 2010). Concurrently, companies’ alliance partner selections might also 
be driven by a pursuit for network benefits resulting from the interconnectedness or 
disconnectedness of their partners (Rowley and Baum, 2008; Greve et al., 2014). 
Triadic alliance configurations have, however, not been fully recognised in the strategy 
literature, in spite of the growing evidence underscoring the strategic benefits that a clear 
network strategy could unlock (Coleman, 1990; Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 1997; Ahuja, 2000; Uzzi and 
Gillespie, 2002; Bell, 2005;  Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Greve, 2009; Afuah, 2013; Shiri et al., 2014; 
Kim et al., 2016). Notwithstanding this growing body of evidence, the strategy field as a 
whole has given insufficient consideration to the question of how, then, an R&D partner 
selected for its partner-specific benefits might fit into a company’s long-term R&D network 
strategy. 
The concept of triads came forth from the social network literature, where they are 
essentially defined as groups comprised of three alliance partners with any possible 
configuration of alliance relations among them (Simmel, 1950; Davis, 2016), with closed 
triads (Coleman, 1988) and open triads marked by a structural hole (Burt, 1992) as the most 
famous examples. Triads are fundamental to any ego network as they form the 
microstructures within which dyadic alliance partnerships are formed and interconnect to 
shape the company’s ego network (Madhavan et al., 2004). In essence, the concept of triads 
enables conceptualising and investigating the relational dynamics between chipmakers and 
their partners and the strategic implications of alliance strategies within a network by 
explicitly taking into account how one alliance relation is affected by the presence or absence 
of other alliance relations (Choi and Wu, 2009). This can naturally not be achieved by 
studying dyadic alliance relations in isolation.  
Past research has shown that different forms of alliances can be conceptualised and analysed 
empirically within a triadic framework. Alliance relations within triads can be built through 
different organisational forms whereby the three partners in a triad may be connected 
through a single three-way alliance agreement or through independent parallel dyadic 
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alliances (Davis, 2016). Moreover, the relational dynamics which can be conceptualised and 
observed within triads are not only applicable to those within groups of three alliance 
partners, but also to those within larger multi-partner alliances, such as technology 
consortiums (Davis, 2016) or large alliance constellations (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Das and 
Teng, 2002). Importantly, however, the current research does not distinguish between these 
types of triadic alliances as the main interest is in investigating how triadic alliance network 
strategies might provide chipmakers with strategic outcomes beyond those achievable 
through dyadic alliances; not in examining how triads emerge or are built-up. This approach 
follows past research on triadic alliances, such as Madhavan et al. (2004). 
Accordingly, the configuration of companies’ R&D alliance partners and relationships 
should therefore be analysed through a triadic framework. As such, the (1) combination of 
the company’s network partners resulting from its strategic partner choices as well as (2) the 
configuration of its alliance relationships within its wider ego network, together, constitute 
the two core mechanisms which determine how strategic utility can be derived within R&D 
alliance networks and maximised through triads. Both mechanisms are illustrated in Figure 
4.1.  
The notion that companies’ approach to building R&D alliance networks is driven by a 
pursuit to maximise the strategic utility through the strategic configuration of their R&D 
alliances within triads is especially relevant to the strategic context of semiconductor R&D – 
as will be discussed next. This discussion is guided by a review of the mechanisms 
determining how the configuration of R&D alliance partners and relations within triads 
might shape the strategic utility attainable from R&D alliances. Figure 4.2 provides a 
schematic overview of these mechanisms, all of which have been associated with important 




Combination of strategic 
partners in ego network 
(strategic partner choices) 
Configuration of alliance 
relations in ego network 
(governance structure) 
Strategic alliance response 
to industry pressures 
(alliance formation) 
Figure 4.1: The concept of strategic utility (source: created by the author) 
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Strategic partner choices within triads in the face of uncertainty 
Although semiconductor R&D, like any R&D process, is inherently uncertain (Narula and 
Hagedoorn, 1999) because R&D outcomes are difficult to predict, this uncertainty is 
amplified as the development of semiconductor devices becomes increasingly more complex 
and the risk of not meeting the intended R&D outcomes rises as a result of the rapidly 
increasing capital requirements for semiconductor R&D, volatile demand and intensive 
rivalry. These uncertainties challenge chipmakers to select those R&D alliance partners who 
can contribute the most value in view of achieving their desired R&D outcomes with the 
least amount of uncertainty.  
The configuration of strategic partners in the chipmaker’s ego network thus constitutes a 
core mechanism which, via the enhancement of the value of R&D outcomes, shapes the 
strategic utility which the chipmaker may derive from its network of R&D alliances. In view 
of enhancing the value of R&D outcomes through strategic alliances, past studies have 
emphasised the strategic motives underlying R&D alliances (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999) 
and have thus most notably linked R&D alliance formations and partner choices to the need 
for certain or timely access to scarce, complementary resources and capabilities (Hennart, 
1988; Williamson, 1991; Narula and Dunning, 1998; Colombo et al., 2006), opportunities for 
learning through access to non-redundant knowledge (Powell et al., 1996; Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; Baum et al., 2010; Shiri et al., 2014; Martínez-Noya and Narula, 2018), access 
to commercially viable ideas (Laursen and Salter, 2006), as well as access to new markets 
(Hagedoorn, 1993). Concurrently, strategic partner choices aimed at capitalising on 
complementary financial and strategic assets naturally also enable chipmakers to economise 
on costs (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999), such as by sharing the total investments required 
for an R&D project. 
Importantly, these partner-specific benefits are not merely sourced from a single type of 
partner but rather from a diverse network of R&D partners specialised in different 
functional areas within the innovation ecosystem, such as competitors, cross-industry 
partners, customers, suppliers, universities, research centres and government organisations 
Figure 4.2: The  mechanisms underpinning the maximisation of the strategic utility of R&D alliances configured 
within triads 
• New value creation with complementary resources 
• Access to and appropriation of new ideas and non-
redundant knowledge 
• Diversity and cross-partner complementarities in triads 
Maximise  
strategic utility 
(R&D outcome) Configuration of alliance 
relations in ego network 
(governance structure) 
• Mutual trust and cooperation built-up in relational triads 
• Social control through captive triadic relations 
• Effective exchange of tacit knowledge and technologies 
Combination of strategic 
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(Teece, 1992; Narula, 2001; Chetty and Wilson, 2003; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Kedia 
and Mooty, 2013; KPMG, 2018). As such, we consider partner diversity in light of the 
differences among partners’ strategic assets, which define their functional specialisations 
and complementary roles in relation to the chipmaker (Parkhe, 1991; Duysters et al., 2009). 
The network analysis results presented in Chapter 3 demonstrated a high degree of partner 
diversity within the semiconductor R&D network.  
The diversity of strategic partners may be reflective of (1) chipmakers’ pursuit for different 
kinds of R&D outcomes (Lavie and Singh, 2012; de Leeuw et al., 2014), such as 
(re)combining their existing resources with (non-)redundant partner-specific assets to 
advance technological progress in line with customer demand or overcome technological 
complexities (Duysters and Lokshin, 2011; Wassmer and Dussauge, 2011; Oerlemans et al., 
2013; Cobeña et al, 2017; Garcia Martinez et al., 2017; Subramanian and Soh, 2017), or 
mitigating technological, capability and market risks (Wassmer and Dussauge, 2011); as well 
as (2) changes in their R&D objectives as reflected by changes in the complementarities of 
the partners involved in the their ego networks (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). For example, 
a chipmaker might select an R&D partner for its technological complementarity and to 
reduce its exposure to risks of technological obsolescence; or for its expertise regarding the 
commercial exploitation of technology and to mitigate uncertainties arising from market 
pressures like volatile demand (Wassmer and Dussauge, 2011). 
This logic suggests that the strategic utility that chipmakers may derive from their R&D 
alliances in response to industry pressures can be better understood when we consider that 
the type of industry pressure a chipmaker is responding to with an R&D alliance may be 
reflected in its choice for a functionally distinct type of R&D partner to gain access to a set of 
specialised complementary assets. Importantly, chipmakers might search for and select 
those R&D partners who can complement one another (Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt, 2006; 
Sarkar et al., 2009) within triads as a means of maximising the strategic utility attainable 
through an R&D alliance as a result of triadic partner synergies. This resembles a key 
strategic benefit which sets triadic alliance relationships apart from dyadic alliance 
relationships, as these types of partner synergies cannot be achieved within dyads. 
Moreover, these partner synergies are maximised when integration within alliances 
promotes not only pooling resources, but importantly also creating new technological assets 
and knowledge as an outcome of this triadic collaboration. This creation of new value and 
novelty, however, depends on whether partners are able to establish effective governance 
structures as will be discussed next. 
Effective governance through the configuration of alliance relations within triads 
The mere signing of an alliance agreement with a selected R&D partner does not, however, 
automatically guarantee that this partner will commit to cooperate in line with the terms of 
the agreement (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Gulati, 1995a). Effective governance is imperative to 
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ensuring that R&D collaborations run efficiently and requires that chipmakers configure 
their alliance network relationships in ways which encourage cooperation in view of 
efficiently (re)combining resources, exchanging knowledge, creating new value and 
developing new technologies and knowledge within triads. 
There is not a single universal approach toward establishing effective governance; it 
depends on several factors, including the strategic purpose of the alliance, the assets which 
are committed to the alliance by the partners (Contractor and Reuer, 2014) and the type of 
knowledge which is shared (Contractor and Ra, 2002). Although practically all alliances 
have legally drawn up contracts at the base of their governance structures (Das and Teng, 
1998; Reuer and Ariño, 2007), legal contracts alone are not necessarily sufficient to ensure 
efficient collaboration and minimise relational risk (Das and Teng, 1996) in terms of 
opportunism.  
The configuration of alliance relations within triadic network structures can, instead, 
function as a more effective governance mechanism, because they might foster trust and 
commitment, control, and change the balance of power. To determine how chipmakers can 
actually configure their R&D alliances in triads to develop effective governance structures as 
a means of maximising strategic utility, we leverage the prominent models of network 
closure (Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1997; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) and network brokerage 
(Burt, 1992, 2010; Soda, 2011) and conceptualise two major triadic network tactics: integrated 
triads and protective triads. 
Integrated triads are formed when R&D alliance partners are configured in three-way 
alliance relationships. These integrated triads function as ‘relational’ types of alliance 
governance structures which can reduce power asymmetry among partners, due to shared 
access to the same partner-specific assets, and encourage partners’ commitment to the 
partnership as well as improve enhance the equality of benefit sharing as each partner is 
likely to participate more actively in the joint activities. Namely, the high level of closure 
(Coleman, 1988) among R&D partners in integrated triads creates an opportunity to develop 
mutual trust effectively (Uzzi 1996; Ahuja, 2000; Rowley et al., 2000). The presence of 
densely connected relations among the partners within the triad can create reputational 
hostages (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005) based on the collective monitoring and sanctioning 
of R&D partners (Granovetter, 1985; Rowley et al., 2000). In result, this can instil a sense of 
trust among R&D partners that each will act in the interest of the partnership. Partners are 
thus encouraged to remain loyal to the partnership and engage in relation-specific 
investments, as opposed to potentially acting opportunistically, as suggested by Morgan and 
Hunt’s (1994) commitment-trust theory (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). In addition, the 
development of trust within integrated triads can enhance the transaction cost efficiency of 
negotiating, monitoring and enforcing legal contracts, and facilitate contractual flexibility 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Lavie et al., 2012; Kranenburg et al., 2014).  
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The high level of density in integrated triads has often been associated with the presence of 
redundant ties, such as strong ties which developed over a longer term through repeated 
interactions (Granovetter, 1973; Gulati, 1995a; Hagedoorn and Frankort, 2008) and ties 
between partners who are cognitively similar in terms of their knowledge bases and 
functional specialisation (Shiri et al., 2014), and consequently with higher levels of 
redundancy of information and knowledge as partners share their R&D alliance relations 
(Burt, 1992; Rowley et al., 2000). Arguably, however, as mutual trust improves the 
predictability of the partner’s cooperative behaviour and its factual cooperation and 
commitment (Gulati, 1995b; Das and Teng, 1998), the relational governance enabled in 
integrated triads ought to consequently enhance collaboration with non-redundant R&D 
partners who are cognitively different as it facilitates communication and the exchange of 
tacit and fine-grained knowledge (Uzzi, 1996, 1997; Gereffi et al., 2005; Afuah, 2013) in line 
with the common objectives of R&D alliances and with greater certainty that partners will not 
misappropriate any of the R&D outcomes. Integrated triads do not, however help to build 
up control over flows of knowledge and the transfer of technology. 
Protective triads, on the other hand, are formed when R&D alliance relationships are 
configured to create a ‘captive’ type of alliance governance structure (Gereffi et al., 2005) on 
the basis of stronger social control mechanism induced by the broker position (Burt, 1992, 
2001) of a leading chipmaker between its R&D partners. This type of governance structure 
may enable chipmakers to minimise relational risk by locking in (capturing) the R&D 
partner through transactional dependence or contractual exclusivity – ultimately to 
maximise their own desired R&D outcomes. This triadic tactic, however, increases power 
asymmetry and thus it does not induce mutual trust as a governance mechanism which 
could facilitate the efficient exchange of tacit knowledge, and as such it is arguably 
particularly suitable for R&D alliances intended to govern the transfer codified knowledge 
from the R&D partner to the chipmaker (Uzzi, 1997) – owing to its relatively easy 
transferability as compared to tacit knowledge. 
Ultimately, both integrated and protective triads do help to increase the strategic utility 
which chipmakers can derive from their R&D alliances, albeit through different governance 
mechanisms. Moreover, whether or not the chipmaker may increase strategic utility through 
either of these triad types depends also on their strategic goals, such as whether they aim to 
achieve technological leadership through market dominance or enhance their access to novel 
technologies and knowledge. 
4.2.3. Maximising strategic utility through triadic network tactics 
Chipmakers derive strategic utility from their R&D alliances to the extent that the 
configuration of their R&D partners and alliance relationships in triads contribute toward 
(1) alleviating the increasing cost of semiconductor R&D by enhancing the speed and cost 
efficiency of the R&D process; (2) overcoming the increasing complexity of semiconductor 
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technologies through efficient knowledge exchange and learning; and (3) adapting to 
changing customer demand and intense competition by enhancing the innovativeness and 
time-to-market of R&D outputs through more efficient and effective (re)combining of 
resources and capabilities. 
Thus, the way toward maximising strategic utility through triadic network tactics is not a 
straight one. To understand, then, under what condition which triadic network tactic would 
yield most strategic utility, it is important to consider (1) the types of distinct strategic 
outcomes that either triadic network tactic create via distinct governance structures; (2) the 
types of industry pressures in response to which chipmakers are best off capitalising on 
these distinct strategic outcomes; as well as (3) the types of R&D alliance partners who, 
based on their functional specialisation, would contribute the most value to (a) maximising 
the desired R&D outcomes and (b) reducing the uncertainty created by these industry 
pressures. These elements are illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
The configuration of alliance relations within the ego network is an important strategic 
choice for managers, and can arguably influence the scope and nature of the chipmaker’s 
internal R&D activities in different ways in view of shaping the openness of semiconductor 
innovation. Namely, network position and network density, i.e. the extent to which the 
chipmaker’s alliance partners are interlinked, which result from managers’ decisions about 
alliance network configurations, have previously been connected to the extent of open 
innovation (Boschma and Ter Wal, 2007; Gilsing et al., 2008; Lyu et al., 2019). In view of 
forming and configuring a new R&D alliance, chipmaker managers thus have to decide 
whether (1) to strengthen their ego networks to create an open innovation environment 
based on close cooperation to potentially both exploit existing technologies and jointly create 
new technological assets; or (2) to expand their ego networks in search for exclusive access 
to new, exploitable knowledge and resources within a relatively more closed innovation 
environment. While extant research on alliance networks has associated triadic alliance 
configurations with the achievement of important strategic outcomes, scholars remain 
divided about the relative strategic utility which chipmakers may attain within protective 
and integrated triads.  
While some might argue that the choice to broker R&D alliance relations or to integrate R&D 
alliances within triads would not constitute a universal strategic response to all strategic 
challenges (Gilsing et al., 2007; Baum et al., 2010; Gobbo and Olsson, 2010), the scope of 
distinct strategic outcomes attainable through either of the triadic tactics (see Figure 4.3) 
might arguably render one of them a relatively superior means to maximising strategic 
utility. The question is: which strategic outcomes are likely most beneficial to maximising 





Figure 4.3: Relationship between triadic alliance network tactics and (1) the maximisation of strategic utility in terms of collaborative and competitive network benefits; and (2) the formation of 
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In view of maximising R&D outcomes, scholars have generally linked the sources of novelty 
value to brokerage opportunities within protective triads (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Burt, 
2001), while closure among R&D partners within integrated is often associated with the 
development of a chipmaker’s capacity to effectively recognise and capitalise on the value in 
these opportunities (Burt, 2001; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005; Gilsing et al., 2008).  
Configuring R&D alliances within protective triads yields strategic utility to the extent that it 
enables chipmakers to, first of all, secure and maintain exclusive access to new, 
heterogenous knowledge possessed by non-redundant R&D partners at the opposite end of 
a structural hole – often via ‘weak’ ties (Granovetter, 1973; Perry-Smith and Shalley, 2003) – 
in view of exploring opportunities for novel resource combinations (Gilsing and 
Nooteboom, 2005; Soda, 2011). Chipmakers can consequently reduce the risk of becoming 
locked-in or overembedded within their networks as a result of closure (Uzzi, 1997; Rowley 
et al., 2000). Furthermore, brokerage can uniquely enable a chipmaker to lead the 
collaborative development process for a new chip by strategically configuring notably 
captive R&D alliance relationships as a means to (a) maintain control over the mobilisation 
of resources between ‘captured’ network partners (Galaskiewicz, 1979; Burt, 1992, 2004; 
Rowley and Baum, 2008); (b) to coordinate action and withhold or distort information 
flowing between R&D partners who are indirectly connected via the chipmaker, to 
maximise the strategic value of its sources (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004); and (c) to play off 
disconnected partners against each other (Gulati, 1998). The brokerage opportunities created 
with this triadic tactic consequently enable chipmakers to maximise their own returns on 
innovation, while limiting the appropriation of R&D outcomes by their partners. 
Consequently, the choice to broker alliance relations is made at the expense of the power 
symmetry and mutual trust among R&D partners. 
Concurrently, however, some research suggests there is a threshold beyond which the 
strategic utility derivable from protective triads declines. Firstly, there is a limit to the 
chipmaker’s capacity to actually capitalise on and integrate and recombine new knowledge 
and resources (Perry-Smith and Shalley, 2003), in terms managerial capacity as well as 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Secondly, the re-negotiating of new 
alliance agreements may, especially with ‘weak’ connections, increase transaction cost 
inefficiencies (Shiri et al., 2014). Moreover, in spite of the access to non-redundant, novel 
opportunities, the maximisation of strategic utility via protective triads might arguably be 
constrained in the context of the semiconductor industry, where efficient, reliable and close 
cooperation are required to effectively integrate various complementary technological assets 
and meet the desired R&D outcomes with minimal exposure to opportunism and industry 




This is not to say that protective triads do not yield strategic utility in view of maximising 
the R&D outcomes of chipmakers. However, these constraints do suggest that the 
development of the chipmakers’ capacity to actually capitalise on novel opportunities in 
R&D alliances in order to maximise strategic utility, needs to be supported by an effective 
relational governance structure which facilitates learning through knowledge exchanges and 
the creation of new knowledge through the joint application of technical skills and 
capabilities, in addition to complementing existing technologies and knowledge, within, 
essentially, an open innovation environment (Ahuja, 2000; Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; Gilsing 
et al., 2008; Chiaroni et al., 2010; Huizingh, 2011).  
Centred on close cooperation, such an environment can be created by configuring R&D 
alliance relations within integrated triads; where, (1) on the one hand, collective monitoring 
and sanctioning foster mutual trust and commitment among the R&D partners in the triad, 
establish a balance of power relations through equal access to knowledge (Cook and 
Emerson, 1978), and reduce chipmakers’ exposure to the risks of opportunism and 
knowledge appropriation; and (2) on the other hand, three-way communication can 
facilitate the mitigation of intra-triad issues of conflict, interference and influence during the 
joint R&D process (Davis, 2016).  
Integrating R&D alliance relations with strategically selected R&D partners within triads 
consequently creates a fundamental basis for networks of learning (Powell et al., 1996) and, 
indeed, effective open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006), and enables developing new 
technologies and knowledge in addition to complementing existing resources. The 
integrated triadic tactic, namely, first of all enables chipmakers to leverage mutual trust to 
enhance the ease and efficiency with which fine-grained information and tacit know-how 
are exchanged with its R&D partners, and subsequently to capitalise on partners’ tacit 
knowledge to develop and enhance their internal absorptive capacity to search, explore and 
find external resources, new ideas, technological opportunities and routes to market needed 
to create and commercialise novel R&D outcomes (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Chesbrough, 
2003). Secondly, closer cooperation through three-way communication among the 
chipmaker and its R&D partners in the triad may improve the coordination and division of 
tasks between multiple R&D partners (Davis, 2016), and enable the chipmaker to efficiently 
capitalise on the (re)combination potential of cross-partner resource complementarities to 
accelerate the R&D cycle and enhance time-to-market. 
The open innovation process may be accelerated as a result of ‘triangulation’ among the 
R&D partners (Rowley et al., 2000; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005; Gilsing et al., 2008). This is 
a distinctive feature inherent to integrated triads whereby the chipmaker can leverage the 
absorptive capacity of a third partner to better understand, evaluate and integrate more 




enable chipmakers to effectively bridge larger cognitive distances to potential R&D partners, 
notably cross-industry partners based outside of the core semiconductor industry, who 
possess a distinct variety of knowledge and technological resources; and, contrary to 
traditional conceptions (Gilsing et al., 2008), facilitate chipmakers in avoiding technological 
lock-in by efficiently expanding the scope and depth of their external search for 
complementary assets and information possessed by diverse sources – and, in result, 
enhance the novelty value of their R&D outcomes (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Rowley et al., 
2004; Laursen and Salter, 2006; De Leeuw et al., 2014). Similarly, chipmakers might, through 
a process of ‘network transitivity’ (Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002), leverage specific 
complementary assets of one R&D partner to enhance the value obtainable from another 
R&D alliance relationship within the same integrated triad. 
The pursuit for these cooperative outcomes of integrated triads reflect what Madhavan et al. 
(2004) describe as a ‘clustering’ motive, whereby chipmakers aim to maximise strategic 
utility by bundling the value creation capabilities of a cluster or close group of R&D 
partners. Importantly, this triadic tactic is not restricted to maximising the strategic utility of 
cooperative R&D alliance relations, as it has long been known that rivals, too, collaborate for 
R&D (Madhavan et al., 2004; Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco, 2004). Yet, how 
companies actually utilise network tactics for competitive purposes in R&D remains 
relatively under researched (Contractor and Reuer, 2014). By exception, several studies do 
highlight important strategic outcomes attainable through integrated triads in view of 
changing the nature of competition through co-opetition (Brandenburg and Nalebuff, 1996); 
which may or may not reflect joint value creation intentions.  
Past research suggests that integrating R&D alliance relations with rivals within triads can 
facilitate in symmetrising market power balance, in order to reduce intra-triad competitive 
conflict and to stimulate mutual cooperation and the pursuit of shared interests (Morgan 
and Hunt, 1994). Integrated triads can, thus, render competitive relations ‘functional’, or co-
opetitive (Brandenburg and Nalebuff, 1996), to the extent that rival chipmakers may 
cooperate in the exploration of new knowledge and research into new technologies and 
product applications, and compete in the exploitation of the jointly created R&D outcomes. 
Furthermore, both Gimeno (2004) and Madhavan et al. (2004) suggest that configuring co-
opetitive R&D alliance relations within integrated triads may also function as a way for a 
chipmaker to counter the alliance decision of a rival R&D partner by forging an alliance with 
the same partner, thus cancelling the rival’s brokerage advantage and reducing the value 
which it can appropriate from this partner. 
Ultimately, the maximisation of strategic utility within triads is the result of a joint decision 
by chipmakers concerning (1) their strategic partner choices, in view of creating novel 




relations, in view of developing effective governance. In the next section we will develop 
distinct triadic ‘constructs’ to explore and hypothesise how, by combining effective 
governance within triads with strategic partner choices, chipmakers might maximise the 
strategic utility of their R&D alliances in response to several industry pressures. 
4.3. Hypothesis development 
4.3.1. Constructing R&D strategies through triadic alliances 
Semiconductor companies face pressures to organise their joint R&D activities within triadic 
structures to mitigate the risks and uncertainties that arise during the R&D and 
commercialisation process as a result of the (1) growing financial capital requirements of 
chip development projects paired with shrinking profit margins; (2)  increasing complexity 
of semiconductor technologies; (3) high volatility of product demand in end-industries; and 
(4) intense competition within and beyond the core semiconductor industry, in technology 
and end-markets.  
Table 4.1 provides an overview of these industry pressures along with the risks and 
uncertainty that these project upon the two major types of chipmakers, IDMs and fabless 
chipmakers, which the hypotheses will focus on.  
The aim of this chapter is to develop hypotheses to demonstrate how chipmakers achieve 
their R&D alliance strategies through constructing distinct triadic constructs. These 
hypotheses are formulated to test the formation of network strategies defined by (1) the 
configuration of R&D alliance relations within triads, as illustrated in Figure 4.3 and 
discussed in Section 4.2, and (2) the strategic partner choices made by the chipmaker (see 
Table 4.2 for an overview of the key R&D partner types), in response to the industry 
pressures shown in Table 4.1. 
The hypotheses are developed as follows. Each of the industry pressures are addressed 
separately, starting with the formation of triads as a network tactic for enhancing the 
efficiency of fundamental R&D, followed by triadic tactics for enhancing cross-industry 
R&D collaboration, reducing the uncertainty caused by demand volatility, and developing 
co-opetitive R&D alliance relations. The strategic advantages of distinct triadic 
configurations are discussed in line with the links identified in Figure 4.3, between the 
strategic outcomes of distinct triadic tactics and the industry pressures. Descriptions of the 
strategic challenges posed by industry pressures are subsequently linked to choices for 
specific types of R&D partners typically combined within chipmakers’ ego networks (see 
Table 4.2). This is done by identifying the alliance-specific assets of these R&D partners, the 
nature of relations characterising these alliances, and characterising their partner-specific 




Table 4.1: Main industry pressures and risks faced by chipmakers (source: created by the author) 
Impact of industry pressures and strategic risks Extent of uncertainty 
Industry 
pressure 
Risk Impact IDM Fabless 
Increasing 
cost of R&D 







• Failing to keep up with advancement of 
fundamental and complementary cross-industry 
technologies. 
• Becoming technologically locked-in. 
• Failing to develop highly integrated and 
functional semiconductor devices which systems 
companies will want to integrate into their 
systems. 
• Failing to achieve a return on R&D investment. 
• Reduction in 
demand for R&D 
output. 




(pressure at both chip 











• Failure to keep up with changing customer 
requirements. 
• Failure to introduce a new, enhanced and 
valuable product generation at the start of new 
demand cycle relative to rivals. 
• Failure to reach, compete and diversify in end-
industries. 
• Loss of profits. 




cycle due to close 











• Falling behind competitors’ time-to-market. 
• Falling behind technological advancements of 
competition. 
• Intense price competition. 
• Loss of revenue, 
profit margins and 
total profits. 




focus on domination in 
large product markets) 
High 
(fragmented system-
level chip segment) 
 
Table 4.2: Specification of partner types in the semiconductor R&D ecosystem and partner-specific complementarities (source: created by the author, using industry reports and alliance announcements) 
 
Partner type R&D output 
Alliance-specific 
assets/processes 


















• Core technology • Chip design 
• Manufacturing process 
 
• Co-development (direct R&D 
involvement) 
• Integrated design lifecycle. 
 
Fabless chipmaker • Chip design  • Core technology • Chip design 
 
• Co-development (direct R&D 
involvement) 
• Flexibility to change chip architecture and design 
implementation and productization. 
Foundry/OSAT • Manufacturing 
process 
• Production capital • Manufacturing process • Co-development (direct R&D 
involvement) 
• Licensing / co-development 
• Alignment of chip design process with manufacturing 
technologies and advancement of process development. 
• Advancement of process development. 
• Proprietary process technology. 
Distributor • Chip design • Commercialisation 
of R&D output 
• Market access • Co-production • Alignment of development process with end-markets and 




















(increases value of 
end product) 
• Software 
• Electronic components 
• Applications technology 
• Material technology 
• Fabrication technology 
• Semiconductor IP 
• Applications IP 
• Chip design skills 
 
• Licensing of patented 
technology 
• Co-production 
• Co-development (direct R&D 
involvement) 
• Promotion of technology 
• Capability to customise complementary technology. 
• Capability to align development process with application-
specific expertise. 
• Capability to contribute to process of chip architecture 
design and design implementation. 
• Advancement of process development. 
• Specialised know-how of materials development for 
semiconductor devices. 
• Technology adoption for application development. 




• Support technology 
(standardised 
technologies) 
• Chip design tools 
• Semiconductor IP 
• Applications IP 
• Manufacturing 
equipment 
• Licensing of patented 
technology 
• Integration of standardised 
components 
• Co-development (direct R&D 
involvement) 
• Proprietary semiconductor technology. 
• Methodologies and tools for IP integration and virtual 
design collaboration. 
• Proprietary applications technology. 









• Fundamental R&D 
 
• Co-development (direct R&D 
involvement) 
• Joint research 
• Specialised research expertise and facilitation in 
identifying or redirecting industrial innovation 
opportunities. 
Investor • Chip design 
• Manufacturing 
process  
• Financial support • R&D funding 
 
• Provision of funding • Financial funding for R&D. 
End-industry • Chip design • Project initiation • Systems specifications 
 
• Initiation of project • Alignment of systems specifications and end-user feedback 
with development process. 
Government 
 
• Chip design 
• Manufacturing 
process 
• Project initiation 
with/without R&D 
grant 
• Systems and/or 
fundamental R&D 
specifications 
• R&D grant 
• Initiation of application-specific 
or fundamental project 
• Provision of R&D grant 
• Alignment of development process with requirements of 
large-scale, national technology projects. 
• Grants for fundamental and application-specific R&D. 
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4.3.2. Increasing R&D costs: Enhancing efficiency of fundamental R&D through triads 
The rising cost of semiconductor R&D is one of the primary drivers for chipmakers’ 
decisions to form R&D alliances as a means of sharing the cost of R&D and reducing 
exposure to risk and uncertainty around their ability to generate a return on R&D 
investments; especially in terms of fundamental R&D. According to the Global 
Semiconductor Alliance (2016), capital investment requirements for research into and the 
development of semiconductor technologies have been on an exponential growth trajectory 
tracking the pace of technological progress as predicted by Moore’s Law.  
With traditional R&D strategies, such as in-house R&D or dyadic forms of R&D alliances, it 
would be very challenging for chipmakers to commercialise fundamental innovations with a 
return on their R&D investments and maintain long-term innovativeness. The risks and 
uncertainties, namely, weigh on chipmakers’ profit margins (AlixPartners, 2013) due to the 
increasing difficulty of quickly capitalising on opportunities to commercialise new 
fundamental innovations. This may subsequently inhibit them to invest in new R&D 
projects and generate future revenue growth, which may, eventually, result in a loss of 
market share. These pressures consequently add to chipmakers’ perception of uncertainty in 
relation to their long-term competitiveness and survival, and shift their priority away from 
fundamental R&D toward application-specific R&D, the outputs of which can be 
commercialised faster; both domestically and abroad in line with chipmakers’ 
internationalisation ambitions. 
In the face of pressure to increase R&D investments to remain technological leadership, it is 
imperative for chipmakers to enhance R&D efficiency to reduce uncertainty. Especially at 
the stage of fundamental R&D, the strategic configuration of R&D alliance relations within 
triads is important as this can improve the efficiency of the R&D process by effectively 
governing the alignment and coordination of chipmakers’ R&D investments with those of 
multiple other organisations within the semiconductor ecosystem (Miller et al., 2012; KPMG, 
2016), while also sharing the cost of R&D and increasing the speed of the R&D process. 
To examine the utilisation of triadic alliances in response to the rising costs and risks of 
R&D, we focus on the configuration of chipmakers’ alliances for fundamental R&D, where 
these risks are particularly acute. Fundamental R&D activities often involve a high degree of 
interdependence among the R&D programs of partners within and outside the core 
semiconductor industry, and longer-term investments targeted at industry-wide or network-
wide R&D objectives. As such, joint fundamental R&D is essential to ensure alignment of the 
pace of technological advancement across the semiconductor industry’s value chain 
modules (Miller et al., 2012) and often involves collaborations with universities and research 
centres at the technological frontier of the industry. 
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Universities and research centres provide open access to specialised expertise and know-
how regarding the latest and most advanced fundamental technological breakthroughs. 
Consequently, they often function as (international) R&D hubs at the centre of the industry’s 
innovation network where chipmakers are joined with – often multiple – other actors from 
the industry and the scientific research community on R&D projects within an open 
innovation model that is based on the sharing of cost, risk and IP (Bruynseraede, 2009).  
Universities and research centres, as fundamental R&D partners to chipmakers, fulfil an 
important role in directing innovative activities, as they can provide chipmakers with 
updates on, and access to the latest technological advancements, and they can leverage their 
informational network advantage to link chipmakers with new opportunities to develop 
and/or commercialise innovations that could result from combining their complementary 
specialised assets with those of a third partner (Bruynseraede, 2009), such as other 
universities/research centres, other chipmakers, technological complementors, suppliers or 
end-market companies (see Table 4.2).  
In this context, the integration of fundamental R&D alliance relations within triads is likely to 
fulfil a critical role in enhancing the efficiency of fundamental R&D. Integrated triads, 
namely, function as ‘bridges’ connecting technological ‘think tanks’ like universities and 
research centres to strategic partners in, for example, complementary technology and end-
markets, while effectively stimulating these organisations to cooperate closely and share 
their knowledge and expertise in line with a common strategic goal. Chipmakers can thus 
capitalise on this bridging tactic as a means of efficiently combining fundamental 
breakthrough technologies with core semiconductor and application-specific 
complementary technologies developed at other stages of the semiconductor value chain, as 
well as integrating these into end-systems or products for rapid commercialisation.  
By bridging the disconnect between these think tanks and technology and end-markets 
within integrated triads, chipmakers can thus accelerate the fundamental R&D cycle, 
enhance time-to-market and consequently increase R&D efficiency and reduce the pressure 
of rising R&D costs. Figure 4.4 provides a schematic view of the triadic form of R&D 
collaboration that can be manifested and which will be used in the empirical analysis. The 
following is hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 1a Chipmakers have a significant tendency to conduct fundamental R&D 
through integrated triadic alliances. 
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Importantly, between chipmakers, IDMs and specialised fabless companies operate 
inherently different business models (see Chapter 2) and even though they are both exposed 
to pressure coming from the rising cost of fundamental R&D, the strategic utility of 
configuring fundamental R&D alliances within integrated triads as a means of adapting to 
this pressure might be different for IDMs and fabless chipmakers due to the efficiency of 
fundamental R&D which is achievable on the basis of their business models.  
IDMs compete with fabless chipmakers in chip design and with foundries in manufacturing, 
which requires a highly efficient division and allocation of resources for the advancement of 
semiconductor technologies as well as fabrication processes. In contrast to fabless 
chipmakers, which enjoy a shorter cycle time from chip development to fabrication as they 
outsource fabrication to specialised foundries (Hung et al., 2017), IDMs thus take on greater 
risk resulting from a wider scope of fundamental R&D investments. Moreover, the costly 
consequences of failing to optimise the utilisation of their fabrication capacity following a 
lengthy R&D process puts greater pressure on IDMs to ensure they are able to rapidly 
commercialise their fundamental R&D outcomes. The rapid and efficient integration of new 
fundamental breakthroughs with complementary technologies and end-systems via bridges 
between think tanks and R&D partners based at other stages of the semiconductor value 
chain is therefore essential, and ought to render integrated triads an advantageous triadic 
tactic for IDMs in particular. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 1b IDMs have a greater tendency than fabless chipmakers to conduct 
fundamental R&D through integrated triadic alliances. 
4.3.3. Increasing technological complexity: Cross-industry R&D collaboration through 
triads 
Chipmakers are challenged to invest heavily in the development of increasingly complex 
chip designs and to rapidly adapt these designs to the system or product-specific 
requirements of end-market customers. The complexity of chips is determined by the 
amount of functionality (in terms of modular IP components) that is integrated into the chip. 








Core chip technologies 
Complementary 
tech./end-systems 
Fundamental R&D partner types Complementary asset combination 
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System-level designs, such as SoCs, are the most complex (Ernst, 2005) and are usually 
tailored for integration into specific end-products. Consequently, the development of highly 
complex chips requires a wider range of specialised knowledge and skills to be mobilised 
across technological and end-markets. How can chipmakers configure their R&D alliance 
relations to effectively coordinate the cross-industry integration of these technologies, 
components, knowledge bases and technical skills at the lowest cost? 
The risk of not accomplishing this efficiently is logically amplified by the size of the costs of 
R&D and operations as well as failure to achieve rapid time-to-market or a first mover 
advantage – which boosts sales and enables the temporary maximisation of profit margins 
through premium, monopolistic prices. Accordingly, chipmakers experience uncertainty to 
the extent that they are unable to foresee their advantage vis-à-vis competition to more 
rapidly and efficiently achieve and commercialise innovative chip designs. 
To reduce this uncertainty, chipmakers collaborate closely with complementary technology 
partners, i.e. strategic partners which operate in ‘satellite’ industries outside of the core 
semiconductor industry (see Table 4.2), as well as systems partners operating in end-
markets. The integration of software, in particular, has been essential to the enablement of 
multi-functionality in chips (Global Semiconductor Alliance, 2012; Andén et al., 2015); used 
by end-industry partners to enable the Internet of Things. Importantly, the strategic utility of 
these partnerships resides not merely in their function to establish access to different fields 
of knowledge and complementary resources as a means of driving the advancement of new 
chip developments, and to share the increasing cost and risks of semiconductor R&D; but 
also in their potential to accelerate the commercialisation of new chip innovations (Kapoor, 
2012) by tactically linking access to complementary technologies with access to down-stream 
revenue streams and commercial opportunities in end-industries within triads. As such, 
configuring their R&D alliance relations with technological complementors and end-
industry partners within triads can enable chipmakers to achieve strategic advantages 
beyond those of cost and risk sharing, by accelerating overall time-to-market. 
Prior research supports the utilisation of triadic tactics by chipmakers as a means of 
developing cross-industry linkages. Namely, Kapoor (2010) shows that chipmakers with 
strong collaborative relationships with technological complementors, with whom they 
exchange information on market-specific applications and technology roadmaps, also tend 
to have strong collaborative relationships with end-industry customers in light of, as 
indicated by chipmakers’ involvement in customers’ long-term technology road mapping 
and cost reduction planning. As such, by strategically coordinating the triadic flow of 
knowledge between themselves and their technological complementors and end-industry 
partners in view of maximising their desired R&D outcomes, chipmakers can direct the 
creation and extraction of value from their collaborative R&D activities (Dhanaraj and 
Parkhe, 2006). Chipmakers can establish cross-industry linkages to overcome the 
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aforementioned challenges and maximise strategic utility either by (1) bridging the gap 
between technological complementors and systems companies through integrated triadic 
alliances or (2) brokering cross-industry relations through separate dyadic alliances.  
A bridging tactic, formed through integrated triads, can be utilised by chipmakers to more 
effectively resolve the challenge of integrating a variety of complementary technologies and 
IPs within systems and achieving rapid commercialisation, by directly aligning the 
development of (customisable) chip technologies with end-user feedback and systems 
specifications. Integrated triads, namely, function as effective governance structures based 
on mutual trust, which foster cooperation and a mutual sense of reliability among the R&D 
partners, and enable coordinating cross-industry knowledge exchanges and triangulation 
among R&D partners. By integrating their R&D alliance relations within triads, chipmakers 
can consequently enhance their ability to bridge cognitive distances between R&D partners 
based in different industries and who might have different views on management practices, 
R&D routines, strategic visions, goals and views on competition. These differences are more 
challenging to overcome through traditional dyadic alliances. Furthermore, effective 
governance in integrated triads helps to establish a balance of power relations through equal 
access to knowledge (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Molm, 2014) and will, if the complementary 
technologies are successfully integrated and commercialised, equalise partners’ shares in the 
returns on innovation. This is an important outcome because it helps to avoid failure of R&D 
alliances due to conflicts over the distribution of returns on innovation. 
By contrast, a brokering tactic, formed through protective triads, results in very different 
configuration of R&D alliance relations within triads. Brokerage does not stimulate cross-
fertilisation among cross-industry R&D partners, but rather helps to protect a chipmaker’s 
exclusive access to complementary technologies and end-market knowledge and end-user 
feedback through a different governance structure, which tactically isolates R&D partners 
from other parts of the networks. This tactic can, therefore, be utilised by chipmakers to 
separate the development of (novel) technology combinations from their integration into 
market-specific systems, and consequently enables chipmakers to control the process of 
developing and commercialising new chip technologies. Concurrently, this gives 
chipmakers an unequal power advantage over their triadic R&D partners, which they can 
leverage to marginalise these partners through the appropriation of R&D outcomes, such as 
property rights and profits from innovation. 
The decision to pursue either of these two triadic tactics is not straightforward and is likely 
to be different for IDMs and fabless chipmakers operating on the basis of inherently 
different business models. Between IDMs and their fabless counterparts, IDMs are 
inherently exposed to relatively greater risk of not accomplishing a return on innovation; 
first of all, due to the large (capital) expenditures of operating and maintaining their 
fabrication facilities; and secondly, as even a small drop in sales will have a detrimental 
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impact on the IDM’s operational efficiency. These operational pressures challenge IDMs to 
dominate a single or few large, select markets in order to offset their overall operating costs 
(Kapoor, 2012). 
Fabless chipmakers, by contrast, do not face these operational pressures and therefore enjoy 
greater flexibility to focus their R&D strategies on the development of novel customised and 
application-specific innovations for small end-markets with limited sales prospects (Saito, 
2009). The development of complex, integrated SoCs has therefore been a key focus of 
fabless chipmakers; predicated on the their ability to effectively recombine an increasingly 
wider variety of complementary technologies and knowledge from R&D partners based in 
both technology and ends-markets, in view of developing chip technologies tailored to the 
system requirements set by end-market partners (Ernst, 2005). 
IDMs, therefore, ought to be more likely than fabless chipmakers to pursue brokerage tactics 
through protective triads; as it would enable them to maintain their technological leadership 
and protect exclusive access to downstream revenue channels by controlling the process of 
developing and commercialising new chip innovations through comparatively monopolistic 
network positions (see Figure 4.5). These brokerage tactics can give IDMs a power 
advantage over their R&D partners and consequently enable maximising their R&D 
outcomes by cutting off technological complementors from participating in the further 
development and/or commercialisation of new chip technologies as well as appropriating 
their partners’ shares in the profits from innovation. In fact, there have been reports of 
accusations towards Intel, one of the leading IDMs, regarding the expropriation of firms 
possessing critical complementary technologies (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002).  
By contrast, fabless chipmakers ought to derive more strategic utility, than IDMs, from their 
cross-industry R&D alliances through bridging tactics. This triadic tactic, namely, would 
facilitate fabless chipmakers in integrating the development and commercialisation of 
application-specific SoC technologies tailored to specific systems requirements; first of all, 
by linking the process of recombining complementary resources with the end-market 











Bridging tactic Brokerage tactic 
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experience and access to end-user feedback possessed by end-industry R&D partners within 
triads; and, secondly, by creating an effective governance structure to stimulate close cross-
industry cooperation, coordinate the three-way exchange of knowledge, and subsequently 
to overcome cognitive barriers between R&D partners from technology and end-markets. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
Hypothesis 2a Fabless chipmakers are more likely than IDMs to form triads that bridge the 
gap/disconnect between technology complementors and systems companies in 
cross-industry R&D collaboration. 
Hypothesis 2b IDMs are more likely than fabless chipmakers to broker relations between 
technological complementors and systems companies. 
4.3.4. Product demand volatility: Market-driven R&D through triadic alliances 
Particularly in the space of customisable and system-level chips are chipmakers faced with 
rapidly changing demand from end-markets for chips which integrate greater functionality, 
enabled by combinations of a growing range of complementary technologies, and 
performance (in terms of a chip’s  processing speed). The demand volatility means that 
chipmakers are pressured by short chip life cycles and, subsequently, limited time to yield a 
return on R&D investments; which, in combination with competitive threats, challenges 
chipmakers to construct R&D alliance strategies which enable both accelerating the chip 
development cycle and enhancing the novelty of R&D outcomes in response to external 
market forces.  
It is particularly interesting to analyse how fabless chipmakers might respond to this 
pressure, because they are relatively more exposed to demand volatilities than IDMs, owing 
to their focus on developing customisable and system-level chips. This challenges fabless 
chipmakers to decide between (a) reinforcing their application-specific R&D network 
strategy within their current product markets or (b) expanding their R&D network into new 
product markets. While there are various reasons for firms to expand into different product 
markets (Skilton and Bernardes, 2015), here we focus on the potential R&D partner choices 
of fabless chipmakers within triadic R&D alliance structures and the product market 
decisions that are reflected by these choices. 
Past research suggests that the competitive pressures present in the fragmented fabless 
segment should encourage chipmakers to expand into other product markets (Baum and 
Korn, 1999; Skilton and Bernardes, 2015). In real business settings, however, fabless 
chipmakers are also confronted with the challenge to overcome cognitive distance to their 
R&D partners (Boschma, 2005), as well as a lack of market experience and an established 
base of application-specific resources and capabilities relevant to a new market. This renders 
the decision of a fabless chipmaker to expand into new product market uncertain and prone 
to risk of failure. 
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Fabless chipmakers can, however, tactically configure their R&D alliance relations within 
integrated triads to enable effectively utilising their R&D alliances to learn from and 
leverage partners’ complementary resources and market experience. This can enhance their 
capacity to bridge and derive novelty value from cognitive distances (Saviotti, 1996; Gilsing 
and Nooteboom, 2005) and, subsequently, to pursue entry into different product markets; or 
strengthen their existing market-specific development capabilities. Moreover, if the alliance 
governance structure is built on mutual trust and commitment within an integrated triad, 
then the fabless chipmaker may also be able to enhance cooperation among its R&D 
partners, communication and consequently time-to-market, as well as reduce uncertainty 
and the risks of conflict and opportunism as emphasised by commitment-trust 
theory (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
These integrated triadic tactics may be observed as at least two triadic constructs, aimed at 
leveraging the partner-specific resource complementarities of either specialised foundries or 
IDMs. These are the two types of R&D partners which possess the dynamic manufacturing 
capabilities needed by a fabless chipmaker to either accelerate its chip development cycle in 
a current product market or to leverage the established development cycle of a strategic 
partner. 
The first triadic tactic (see Figure 4.6-a) involves expanding an established long-term 
foundry partnership into R&D to reinforce its market position, coined the ‘virtual IDM 
model’ (Sperling, 2012), in order to (a) enhance cross-industry coordination, (b) achieve 
tighter integration between the development and integration of complementary IP or system 
components and advancements in manufacturing technology, and (c) enhance joint 
competitiveness against IDMs. The second triadic tactic (see Figure 4.6-b) entails seeking 
cooperation for R&D from a potentially competing IDM in order to (a) leverage the IDM’s 
dominant market position and its access to complementary technologies and downstream 
revenue streams to gain a foothold in a new product market, while (b) sharing the cost of 
R&D by leveraging the IDM’s large financial assets and (c) combining the IDM’s core 
technological assets and manufacturing process capabilities with its own technical assets.  













Which triadic R&D alliance strategy has the potential to yield greater strategic utility? The 
fact that established, interdependent fabless-foundry partnerships are based on a history of 
collaboration and thus provide a basis of mutual trust, reliability and norms of cooperation 
upon which cross-industry R&D collaborations can efficiently be built and coordinated to 
respond swiftly to volatility in the demand cycle, creates a strong case for arguing that 
fabless chipmakers ought to derive strategic utility from involving their foundry partner in 
triadic cross-industry R&D alliances. This also follows the consensus among past studies 
that past collaborations strengthen future, longer-term partnerships (Nohria and Garcia-
Pont, 1991; Gulati, 1995a; Rowley et al., 2004) and increase their success rate (Browning et al., 
1995; Khanna and Rivkin, 2006). Moreover, Okada (2000) offers research evidence 
suggesting that fabless chipmakers can shorten the design cycle, and thus reduce 
uncertainty, by closely integrating manufacturing capabilities into the chip R&D process.  
Between fabless chipmakers and IDMs, similarity in their skills and capabilities reduces 
cognitive distance and should, subsequently, enhance the potential for cooperation (Gilsing 
et al., 2008). Past research provides strong indications that fabless chipmakers and IDMs are, 
however, likely to experience competitive conflicts within their alliance, and this might 
consequently undermine the potential for joint value-creation (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; 
Rowley et al., 2004). Although integrated triads may improve the conditions for 
collaboration by preventing competitive conflict and reducing the risks of opportunistic 
behaviour and the appropriation of R&D outcomes by the IDM, they may not incentivise 
competing fabless chipmakers and IDMs to engage in long-term collaboration based on 
mutual trust and commitment, because any overlap in their competitive goals can lead 
competition to overshadow cooperation (Kogut, 1989; Hamel, 1991). The lack of trust 
between fabless chipmakers and IDMs might therefore lead this triadic tactic to yield greater 
strategic utility for short-term rather than long-term collaborative goals, such as entering a 
new product market, where certainty about the R&D outcomes of fabless chipmakers 
remains clouded by rivalry. Taken together, these arguments suggest that, when 
collaborating with either technology complementors or systems companies: 
Hypothesis 3a Fabless chipmakers are more likely to form integrated triadic R&D alliances 
with Foundries than with IDMs. 
The ability of a fabless chipmaker to keep up with the demand cycle does not only depend 
on the speed of its development cycle, but – as discussed previously – also on its ability to 
keep up with the increasing technological complexity of chips demanded by customers. As 
such, fabless chipmakers have the strategic options (1) to tighten the alignment of chip 
design and advancements in manufacturing technology with the integration of 
complementary technology, IPs and systems components within integrated triads; or (2) to 
enhance the alignment of chip design and manufacturing processes independently from 
cross-industry R&D collaborations across technology and end-markets.  
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Would fabless chipmakers derive greater strategic utility from closely integrating its R&D 
alliance relations with foundries and other technology partners within triads or from 
segregating their ego network of R&D alliances to these partners? Fabless chipmakers would 
arguably prefer to integrate the development and commercialisation of new chip 
technologies, through cross-industry R&D collaboration with technology complementors 
and end-industry partners, separately from their R&D alliances with foundries. Close triadic 
cooperation with a foundry would, namely, be necessary only to stimulate closer 
communication and cooperation in view of coordinating the alignment of the development 
of chip technologies with a foundry’s upgraded, next generation process technology (Saito, 
2009); or to coordinate the validation of IPs integrated into new chip technologies, targeted 
at a new application or product market, for manufacturing with existing process 
technologies.  
These validation procedures are, however, lengthy in nature and consequently increase the 
chip development cycle and, thereby, the uncertainty surrounding the fabless chipmaker’s 
ability to keep up with the demand cycle. Fabless chipmakers would arguably avoid this 
added uncertainty by focusing their R&D strategy within its current product market(s). 
Moreover, the life cycle of manufacturing process technologies is typically longer than that 
of chip technologies, so process technology upgrades do not happen frequently enough to 
justify integrating R&D alliance relations with foundries within triads. It is therefore 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 3b Fabless chipmakers are more likely to form integrated triadic cross-industry 
R&D alliances without Foundries than with Foundries. 
4.3.5. Competitive pressures: Cross-industry co-opetition through triadic R&D alliances 
The constant race to efficiently yet swiftly develop better performing and highly integrated 
chips results in competition between chipmakers for access to technology and end-markets. 
The nature of competition among chipmakers is, however, not based on purely competitive 
relations, but often on co-opetitive relations whereby rival chipmakers, similar in 
technological skills, capabilities and strategic and operating routines (Gimeno, 2004; 
Madhavan et al., 2004; Rowley et al., 2004; Skilton and Bernardes, 2015), are part of one 
another’s R&D ego networks in result of competitive interdependencies among them. This 
relational pattern is known as homophily in the network literature (McPherson et al., 2001). 
Rival chipmakers can leverage competitive interdependencies in triadic R&D alliances to 
reduce risk and uncertainty by (1) complementing one another’s technological skills and 
resources (a) to capitalise on new end-market opportunities or accomplish new product 
innovations and technology advancements, and (b) to gain greater control over the uncertain 
environment and shortcomings in the internal resource base; or (2) chipmakers can benefit 
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from imitating or countering rivals’ partnering moves as a means of undermining the rival’s 
competitive advantage and reduce the relational rents appropriated by the rival. Partner 
choices within triadic network structures can thus be driven by a pursuit for both 
cooperative and competitive outcomes (as illustrated in Figure 4.3) and can lead to the 
maximisation of strategic utility in different ways, such as by integrating co-opetitive 
relations within the chipmaker’s ego network. 
Importantly, however, the extent to which competitive interdependencies exist as well as 
whether chipmakers may derive any strategic utility from integrating co-opetitive R&D 
alliance relations to rivals within triads, depends on the degrees of fragmentation and 
concentration of the competitive network structures of the semiconductor industry segments 
within which chipmakers operate. In which competitive landscape would configuring co-
opetitive R&D relations within integrated triads yield more strategic utility? 
Chipmakers operating in fragmented segments of the industry network should experience 
greater competitive pressure to expand into more product markets in order to remain 
competitive (Li and Greenwood, 2004; Skilton and Bernardes, 2015). This suggests that in 
industry network segments characterised with a greater diversity of rivals, such as in the 
segment for SoCs aimed at various end-markets, there is (a) greater potential to explore 
different end-markets by capitalising on the knowledge and expertise of co-opetitive R&D 
partners in developing market-specific chip technologies; and (b) greater cognitive distance 
between rivals focused on different, potentially complementary application areas for chips, 
which can be leveraged to create novel innovations by recombining rivals’ complementary 
knowledge and resource bases within triads; and (c)  space to cooperate in accessing and 
recombining complementary technologies for exploitation in different end-markets. Such a 
competitive environment renders collaborations with rivals potentially beneficial. 
By contrast, in industry segments where competitive activity is concentrated around a small 
number of rivals, which would be indicated by a high level of industry network 
centralisation, it is less critical for chipmakers to differentiate by expanding into different 
product markets (Skilton and Bernardes, 2015); moreover, there is less scope for resource 
complementarity with rivals and less environmental uncertainty. This arguably makes it 
more likely for rivals to ally within fragmented than concentrated product markets, as 
reflected in the previous paragraph. 
This provides an important basis for comprehending the strategic utility that fabless 
chipmakers and IDMs may derive from forming triadic R&D alliances with rivals – because 
IDMs operate in highly concentrated industry segments (e.g. memory chips and high-end 
microprocessors) and fabless chipmakers mainly in fragmented segments (e.g. system-level 
chips). The triadic constructs for these competitive R&D alliances are shown in Figure 4.7. 
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Chipmakers within the fragmented fabless segment are specialised to develop chips for 
relatively small end-markets (Saito, 2009), often requiring the integration of a wide range of 
complementary technologies onto a chip designed specifically for a single system. As such, 
the greater diversity of rivals, along with all of their ongoing technological advancements 
aimed at various application-specific technologies and product markets, expose fabless 
chipmakers to greater environmental uncertainty as well as internal uncertainty, owing to 
the presence of some degree of cognitive distance as well as the lack of core technological 
resources and experience needed to enter other product markets (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Yet, the smaller degree of overlap between rivals’ resource and knowledge bases increases 
the cognitive distance between them and consequently creates opportunities for these rivals 
to (1) enhance the novelty of value created through R&D collaboration, by recombining their 
complementary their technical knowledge, skills and IPs; (2) share access to technology and 
end-markets and enhance joint competitiveness; and (3) reduce the risk of becoming locked-
in within similar knowledge basis in less-diverse networks. Although cognitive similarity 
between rivals provides an important basis upon which R&D alliances can be formed, some 
cognitive distance is arguably necessary to enable the creation of novel innovations through 
resource complementarities – thus providing scope for competing fabless chipmakers to 
cooperate with one another (Nooteboom et al., 2007; Gilsing et al., 2008). Moreover, the 
fabless model, owing to foundries’ standardised fabrication technologies, provides flexibility 
through dynamic manufacturing capabilities which might be utilised into different product 
markets – as suggested by studies on dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; King and 
Tucci, 2001).  























There are clear strategic benefits to be gained by chipmakers in the fabless segment by 
organising and governing joint R&D within integrated triads. While the development of 
mutual trust and commitment between rivals is arguably a long process, this triadic tactic 
can be utilised to establish an effective governance structure with reputational hostages to 
minimise the lure of opportunism, which arguably creates greater uncertainty when 
strategic partners share the same competitive goals (Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1989). 
Consequently, integrated triads can help to avoid ‘unfunctional’ competitive conflicts and 
develop co-opetitive relations characterised with enhanced mutual cooperation and 
improved coordination of R&D tasks, to ensure the seamless integration of critical 
complementary semiconductor technologies, IPs and system components (Figure 4.7-a). Still, 
however, as there is no single chipmaker that dominates the fabless segment, there are also 
opportunities for fabless chipmakers to enhance their long-term market positions through 
the appropriation of relational rents and capabilities via co-opetitive triadic R&D alliances. 
Specifically, by allying with the technology and systems partners of a rival, who may (Figure 
4.7-a) or may not (Figure 4.7-b) be a partner as well, fabless chipmakers can minimise the 
value of the relational rents appropriated by its rival as well as attempt to expand into new 
product markets.  
By contrast, IDMs should be less likely to gain benefits from collaborating with their rivals. 
Namely, IDMs are the technological leaders within their concentrated markets and thus 
determine the pace of technological progress and, through their dominant market positions, 
largely define competition. Moreover, competing IDMs possess similar resource and 
knowledge bases as well as technological capabilities which are similarly advanced. Within 
this industry environment, IDMs consequently face relatively little uncertainty and scope for 
resource complementarity, which suggests that there is little strategic utility to be gained by 
IDMs from forming integrated triadic R&D alliances with their rivals. Similarly, as IDMs 
cannot sustain an efficient operation in small markets, there is likely also little strategic 
utility to be gained from mimicking rivals’ partnering decisions by allying with common 
technology or end-industry partners (see Figure 4.7-c and Figure 4.7-d). Accordingly, when 
competing in technology and systems markets: 
Hypothesis 4a Fabless chipmakers are more likely to form integrated triadic R&D alliances 
with other fabless chipmakers, than IDMs with other IDMs. 
Hypothesis 4b Fabless chipmakers are more likely to have common technology and systems 
partners than IDMs (both in triads and at a distance of two). 
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4.4. Research methodology 
4.4.1. Construction of the network sample and data collection 
The analysis conducted in this chapter relied on the alliance dataset used in Chapter 3. For 
details on the sources and the method of collection of the data used in the current chapter, 
please see Section 3.6.  
The current analysis was conducted on a network sample of 1,827 organisations, out of 
which 425 are chipmakers (38 IDMs and 387 fabless chipmakers), with a total of 4,559 intra- 
and cross-industry R&D alliance formations across the period 2004-20148. To set up the 
investigation into R&D collaboration for this study, we utilise the network of R&D alliances 
formed by chipmakers with partners based in various industries and research sectors. We 
define an R&D alliance as an agreement between at least two organisations with the aim of 
conducting research and/or development of a fundamental semiconductor technology or a 
new chip design using existing or novel technologies and IPs. The network sample thus 
involves joint development agreements, licensing agreements, equity joint ventures, 
technology acquisitions and technology-related strategic investments. These types of 
strategic alliances form an integral part of the R&D strategies of chipmakers, and are thus 
considered in the light of chipmakers’ triadic R&D alliance strategies.  
Another advantage of such a rich network sample comprised of R&D alliances between 
chipmakers and various types of alliance partners is that it also allows creating specific sub-
networks suitable for testing the individual hypotheses formulated in this study. Six sub-
networks are created to reflect distinct R&D alliance tactics as captured in the hypotheses. 
This sub-network approach, as opposed to analysing overall networks, helps to investigate 
whether chipmakers may derive strategic utility from specific triadic R&D alliance tactics. 
The sub-networks, within which these collaborative interactions between chipmakers and 
their R&D partners are captured, are based on one-mode matrices in which the direction of 
resource flows is also captured; as the network dataset captures both relatively unilateral 
licensing and investment agreements as well as bilateral R&D alliances.  
By creating sub-networks which are based on relevant triadic tactics and R&D alliance ties 
with specific partner types, it is possible to reduce the complexity of the network of interest 
and to more easily analyse whether and to what extend distinct R&D strategies are executed 
through the formation of specific triadic constructs within the sub-network. This follows a 
method of network construction utilised in other fields of research (e.g. Zhao et al., 2016; 
Hepburn, 2017). The specific definitions for each of the distinct sub-networks created in this 
study are provided together with the SAOM specifications in Section 4.4.3. 
 




4.4.2. Network analysis method: the stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) 
This study adopts stochastic actor-oriented modelling (Snijders, 1996, 2011) shortened for 
SAOM, as a method to examining the dynamic process of triadic R&D alliance formations. 
This method is advantageous over traditional regression techniques utilised by alliance 
researchers in a few ways. It is inherently based on the assumption that R&D alliance 
formations are not only driven by the pursuit for partner-specific assets, but also by the 
structure of the alliance network. Accordingly, it takes into account the interdependence that 
naturally exists in the formation of R&D alliances between pairs of organisations vis-à-vis 
the presence of other R&D ties (i.e. endogenous structural effects) as well as the 
characteristics of other organisations and distinctive attributes of dyadic and triadic alliance 
relations (i.e. exogenous structural effects) in the network.  
Capturing these structural effects is especially important in the analysis of triadic R&D 
alliances, as the configuration of triadic alliance structures, in terms of closure and 
brokerage, may represent different R&D alliance strategies and determine the kinds of 
strategic benefits that organisations may gain. Traditional regression methods, however, are 
unable to capture these structural effects. 
In contrast to traditional regression methods, the SAOM is an agent-based simulation model 
for network evolution (Ripley et al., 2019) which uses a different calculation mechanism, 
based on a combination of random utility models and continuous time Markov models (Van 
de Bunt and Groenewegen, 2007). This means that the SAOM can be used to test 
chipmakers’ preference for forming integrated and protective triads with different 
combinations of distinct types of R&D alliance partners, as encompassed by the formulated 
hypotheses. These R&D alliance choices are modelled through simulation and are based on 
the core assumption that chipmakers select triadic structures and R&D partners from which 
they are expected to derive optimal strategic utility.  
This model mechanism is defined by a utility function (also referred to as objective function), 
which is comparable with the linear predictor in generalised linear models, and which 
essentially expresses the probability that a chipmaker may change the structure (e.g. open vs 
closed triads) and composition (choice of partner type) of its network in a particular way 
(Snijders et al., 2010). In estimating the formation of integrated and protected triadic 
constructs, the utility function takes into account the current state of the chipmaker’s R&D 
alliance network as defined by its current partners and their characteristics as well as the 
presence or absence of ties between its partners.  
Accordingly, the utility function works with the assumption that the R&D alliance decisions 
of chipmakers, in light of the configuration of alliance relations within triads and the 
selection of strategic partners, can be explained by a linear combination of effects. This 
combination can be defined by tendencies towards particular structural network formations 
121 
 
(structural effects), such as transitive closure or brokerage, but also by the attributes of 
organisations (ego covariates) or pairs of organisations (dyadic covariates): 
𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑆𝑘𝑖(𝑥)
𝑘
 
where 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) is the value of the utility function for chipmaker 𝑖 depending on the state 𝑥 of 
the R&D sub-network, 𝑆𝑘𝑖(𝑥) are the effects, and 𝛽𝑘 are the statistical parameters (Snijders et 
al., 2010). The parameters can be interpreted as the ‘preference’ for, or the ‘attractiveness’ of 
a network configuration for a chipmaker. The parameter value 𝛽𝑘 = 0 indicates that the 
effect does not explain the formation of R&D alliance ties; 𝛽𝑘 > 0 indicates a higher 
probability that chipmakers have a preference for an R&D alliance network with higher 
values of the corresponding effect; and 𝛽𝑘 < 0 indicates the opposite. 
Although data on the duration of R&D alliances were not available to this study, the SAOM 
is capable of overcoming this limitation by allowing R&D alliances – once formed – to exist 
during the remainder of the sample period.  
The hypotheses tested with the SAOMs are implemented using the program SIENA 
(Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis) in the statistical tool R, which has 
been developed and maintained by Ripley et al. (2019). The model specifications and 
construction of the distinct sub-networks for each hypothesis are presented in the next 
section.  
4.4.3. SAOM and sub-network specifications 
To test the hypotheses on the formation of distinct triadic constructs within the R&D alliance 
network, distinct sub-networks are first created in line with the alliance partner 
combinations specified in each of the hypotheses. Then, SAOMs are specified for each of the 
formulated hypotheses, which include different effects as reflected in the hypotheses, to test 
chipmakers’ tendencies toward the formation of triadic R&D alliances vis-à-vis dyadic R&D 
alliances as well as their preferences for choosing specific types of partners when forming 
triadic R&D alliances. To capture these R&D alliance formation tendencies, several 
structural effects and ego and dyadic covariates are included in the models – i.e. observed 
variables (based on organisational characteristics) which we expect to explain the formation 
of triadic R&D alliances by chipmakers within distinct sub-networks. Specifications of the 




Table 4.3: Specification of SAOMs for hypothesis testing and the interpretation of structural, ego and 
dyadic effects (source: Ripley et al., 2019) 
 
 
Hypothesis Effect Formal expression Interpretation 







Captures the number of three-cycles 
(regarded as generalised reciprocity), 








Captures number of transitive patterns 
in i's relationships: where i has  an 
alliance with the pair (j, h) who are 
also tied to each other. Triplets of type 
{i  j  h; i  h} and  
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alliance tie h  j in a triad with ties  h 
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i  j. 
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i's out-degree weighted by its covariate 
value (V). 
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The number of alliance ties of i to all 
other actors j who have exactly the 
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Number of incoming ties received by 
those to whom i is tied and sent by 
others who have the same ego 
covariate value (V) as i. 
 Controls effect  
 












exp(ln(𝛼ℎ(𝑥𝑖 + 1))) = (𝑥𝑖+ + 1)
𝛼ℎ   
Log of out-degree effect 𝑥𝑖+ = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗  
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗= 1 indicates the presence of 
the tie i  j. 
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Preference for the formation of triadic R&D alliances vis-à-vis dyadic R&D alliances, 
captured with the 3-cycles and transitive triplets effects, is explicitly modelled only in 
hypotheses 1 and 2 because the sub-networks used for testing these hypotheses include both 
triadic and dyadic R&D alliances. It is important to note that both of these structural effects 
capture the tendency toward network closure through the formation of triads; however, 
they capture different directions of resource flows (see Table 4.3). The remaining hypotheses 
are tested on sub-networks composed of exclusively triadic R&D alliance structures, thus 
eliminating the need to include either of these triadic effects in the relevant models. Details 
on all distinct sub-networks, along with the model specifications for each of the hypotheses, 
are provided in Table 4.4.  
Furthermore, with the goal of modelling the formation of distinct triadic constructs that 
chipmakers may use to achieve strategic utility from their collaborative R&D strategies, 
several important ego and dyadic covariates are included across the models. Ego effects 
were used to determine whether an organisation is an IDM (𝐼𝐷𝑀-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋) (hypotheses 1b, 2a, 
2b, 4a, 4b) or a fabless chipmaker (𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋) (hypotheses 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b), as 
well as whether at least one of the triadic partners to a fabless chipmaker is an IDM 
(𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋) (hypothesis 3a) or a foundry (𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋) (hypotheses 3a 
and 3b). Dyadic effects are used to evaluate the preference of IDMs and fabless chipmakers 
to form triadic alliances with direct rivals on the basis of their integrated or fabless operating 
model (𝐼𝐷𝑀-same𝑋 and 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-same𝑋) (hypothesis 4a), and to assess their preference for 
choosing the same partners as their direct rivals (𝐼𝐷𝑀-same𝑋𝐼𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝 and 
𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-same𝑋𝐼𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝) (hypothesis 4b). Additionally, two-way structural-ego and ego-ego 
interactions between some of these effects are included 9. 
The choice of control variables is also different from the traditional regression models, 
because of the focus of the study and the specification of SAOMs. The SAOMs specified will 
control for chipmaker types as a proxy of firm-level attributes, such as size, age and R&D 
intensity, which are conventionally used by scholars to analyse the formation of R&D 
alliances. 
It is important to emphasise that the focus of the current study, however, is not on the choice 
of chipmakers to form or not to form R&D alliances, as all chipmakers in the sample do 
participate in R&D alliances. This study rather investigates the specific choice of chipmakers 
for distinct triadic tactics within the R&D alliance network, which are reflected by the 
configurations of their R&D alliance relations. The ‘chipmaker type’ proxy is relevant 
because the chipmaker’s choice to configure its R&D alliance relations within integrated or 
protected triads, as opposed to dyads, ought to be determined by the specific needs of the  
 
 
9 Ripley et al. (2019) advise that the individual effects underlying an interaction effect do not need to be included 
in the same model as well. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Overview of estimation equations and descriptions of associated sub-networks 
Hypothesis Estimation equation Sub-network description 
1a 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗ℎ + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗  Sub-network of fundamental R&D alliances. 
• Focal: chipmakers (IDM and fabless). 
• Partners: university/research centres; any other type. 
• Ties: both dyads and triads (read: only three-way alliance ties that are part of one and the same multi-
partner alliance) in which at least one chipmaker and one university/research centre are participants, 
and the third partner could be of any type. 
1b 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1(𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑀-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖) + 
𝛽2(𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗ℎ ∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖) + 𝛽3𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗 
2a 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑀-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖)  
+ 𝛽2(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ ∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖) 
Sub-network of cross-industry R&D alliances between technology and end-markets. 
• Focal: IDMs and fabless chipmakers. 
• Partners: TC and systems*. 
• Ties: both dyads and triads (of any type), formed between either IDMs-TC-systems or fabless-TC-
systems. Ties between IDMs and fabless are not included.  
2b 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1(𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑗ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑀-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖)  
+ 𝛽2(𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑗ℎ ∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖) + 𝛽3𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗 
+𝛽4𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖 








+𝛽3𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖 
Sub-network of market-driven cross-industry R&D alliances. 
• Focal: fabless chipmakers. 
• Partners: TC, systems, IDMs and foundries. 
• Ties: triads only (of any type), formed between a fabless chipmaker and either a TC or systems partner 
plus either an IDM or foundry partner. 
3b 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1(𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖 
∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖) 
Sub-network of cross-industry and manufacturing bridges. 
• Focal: fabless chipmakers. 
• Partners: TC, systems, foundries and any other. 
• Ties:  triads only (of any type), formed between a fabless chipmaker and either a foundry or TC/systems 
plus a third partner of any other type. 
4a 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑀-𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑗 
+𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑗 
Sub-network of co-opetitive cross-industry R&D alliances 
• Focal: IDMs and fabless chipmakers. 
• Partners: TC and systems. 
• Ties:  triads only (of any type), formed between either two rival IDMs and a third TC or systems 
partner, or two rival fabless chipmakers and a third TC or systems partner. 
4b 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑀-𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑋𝐼𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ 
+𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑋𝐼𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ 
Sub-network of common alliance ties among rivals. 
• Focal: IDMs and fabless chipmakers. 
• Partners: TC and systems. 
• Ties:  only those dyadic ties between either an IDM or fabless chipmaker and a TC or systems partner 
which are part of triads between either rival IDMs or rival fabless chipmakers (see direct competitor 
sub-network). 
*’TC’ is short for ‘technological complementor’ and ‘systems’ for ‘systems partners’ 
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operating model based on which it conducts business, namely either the IDM or fabless 
operating model; rather than direct effects of company-level attributes, as conventionally 
used with traditional regression models, to test the initial decision of companies to form 
alliances at all. Moreover, the methodology underlying the SAOM does not require 
conventional company-level attributes to estimate the effects of network closure and 
brokerage within triadic alliance configurations. 
Importantly, the chipmaker types do function as a proxies for the size, age and R&D 
intensity of chipmakers, because IDMs can only be successfully operated by large, well-
established companies with extensive financial resources, owing to the substantial financial 
constraints inherent to the IDM model; and smaller and younger organisations are therefore 
only able to efficiently sustain a fabless operation which is inherently centred on inter-
organisational collaboration. In addition, a few structural control effects are included in 
several models to control for skewed out-degree distributions of chipmakers (𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑔) 
as well as chipmakers’ tendency to reciprocate the formation of R&D alliance ties (𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝) – as 
advised by Ripley et al. (2019). 
4.5. Network analysis results 
4.5.1. Patterns of triadic R&D alliance formations across distinct sub-
networks 
The six sub-networks used to test the hypotheses are visualised in Table 4.5 on the next 
pages. The network graphs and descriptive statistics are based on alliance formation data 
recorded across the 2004-2014 sample period. Each network represents an aggregation of a 
different type of R&D strategy pursued by the chipmakers within it, in response to different 
kinds of industry pressures, as reflected by the different compositions of strategic partners 
as well as the presence or absence of alliance ties between them. The alliance ties depict the 
flows of technical knowledge, know-how and technology between chipmakers and their 
R&D partners. Important descriptive statistics related to each sub-network and relevant to 
the corresponding hypothesis are provided next to the network graphs.  
Table 4.5 also provides lists of the top 10 chipmakers within the sub-network based on the 
number of triad memberships, along with their degree and betweenness centralities – as an 
important indication of chipmakers’ R&D network strategy and their potentially privileged 
access to critical knowledge and information flowing through their sub-network. 
The sub-networks are non-valued, which means that any alliance tie between any two 
organisations is counted only once. As such, the sub-network statistics are based on the 
presence of a single alliance relationship between a given pair of organisations as opposed to 
potential multiplex alliance relations. In the tables, the counts of  R&D dyads refer to those 
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alliance relationships that may or may not be a part of a triadic alliance structure. Where 
relevant, a distinction is made between overall counts of  R&D dyads  within the entire sub-
network and R&D dyads which are not part of any triadic R&D alliance at all, such as in 
Table 4.5-a. 
R&D triads measure the number of closed triads which are formed by the organisations 
within a given sub-network and is not a measure of closed triad memberships from an 
organisation’s perspective. For example, for an R&D triad formed by two IDMs and one 
technological complementor, one triadic R&D alliance is counted; not the sum of two triad 
memberships accounted for by IDMs and one by a technological complementor. The 
tendency of chipmakers to form these triads can be indicated by the degree of transitivity, 
which is measured as the proportion of actual closed triads against the number of triads (i.e. 
structural groups of three organisations) in the network that could potentially be closed (i.e. 
where all three organisations are connected to one another through a three-way alliance). 
The descriptive results reveal that, across the distinct sub-networks, chipmakers exhibit a 
general tendency towards forming triadic R&D alliances. These results will be discussed in 
turn in relation to each sub-network and hypothesis. 
The visualisation and descriptive statistics of the sub-network for hypothesis 1a and 1b 
(Table 4.5-a) show that chipmakers in general seem to have a preference for executing their 
fundamental R&D strategy through triadic R&D alliances with partner universities and 
research centres (76%), as opposed to dyadic R&D alliances (24%). This preference seems to 
be particularly pronounced for IDMs in comparison to fabless chipmakers, as 81% of R&D 
ties with universities and research centres are formed by IDMs within triads, versus 73% in 
the case of fabless chipmakers.  These statistics suggest that triadic R&D alliances might 
provide an efficient governance mechanism which is especially beneficial to the 
fundamental R&D strategies pursued by IDMs.  
 The sub-network created to test hypothesis 2a and 2b (Table 4.5-c) is at the core of 
semiconductor innovation and is of particular interest due the growing challenge for 
chipmakers to integrate the development and commercialisation of new chip technologies. 
The presence of a total of 193 triads in this sub-network suggests that chipmakers might 
pursue the benefits of enhanced coordination and cooperation provided by the triadic 
governance mechanism to achieve this. The cross-industry R&D strategies pursued by 
fabless chipmakers display a relatively greater degree of transitivity (2.7%) in comparison to 
IDMs (2.4%). This suggests that although on average IDMs do participate in a greater 
absolute number of triadic R&D alliances, proportionally speaking fabless chipmakers 
exhibit a relatively greater tendency to form triadic R&D alliances with their existing 




Sub-network of fundamental R&D alliances (hypotheses 1a & 1b) 
 
Node size based on the firm’s number of triad memberships 
Node colour: Fabless; IDM; University/Research centre; Other 
(a) 
 Focal Partners 
R&D dyads R&D triads 















Fabless 32 47 28 126 60 16 27% 117 3.7 
IDM 13 24 22 132 37 7 19% 108 8.3 
Chipmaker 45 63 34 258 97 23 24% 225 5.0 









Freescale Semiconductor (IDM) 87 26 1,205 
Analog Devices (IDM) 85 26 238 
Texas Instruments (IDM) 84 23 5 
Xilinx (fabless) 84 24 84 
Nvidia (fabless) 84 23 5 
XMOS (fabless) 84 16 5 
AMD (fabless) 26 19 1,578 
STMicroelectronics (IDM) 20 14 567 
Dolphin Integration (fabless) 18 7 2 
IBM (IDM) 16 14 1,712 
 
Sub-network of cross-industry alliances (hypotheses 2a & 2b) 
 
Node size based on the firm’s number of triad memberships 
Node colour: Fabless; IDM; Tech. Compl./Systems 
(c) 
 Focal Partners R&D dyads R&D triads 
Transitivity 
 Chip. TC Systems Total Total Avg per chip. 
Fabless 116 276 263 668 16 0.1 2.7% 
IDM 24 183 186 523 48 2.1 2.4% 










Intel (IDM) 48 124 117,412 
Samsung Electronics (IDM) 31 29 7,525 
IBM (IDM) 30 23 6,452 
AMD (fabless) 7 48 37,831 
 Renesas Electronics (IDM) 7 31 24,967 
Mellanox Technologies (fabless) 7 19 11,525 
Sanken Electric (fabless) 6 7 1,784 
Toshiba Corporation (IDM) 6 10 3,620 
Hitachi (IDM) 6 6 418 
Siteco (fabless) 6 5 1 
 
Sub-network of market-driven cross-industry R&D alliances (hypothesis 3a) 
 
Node size based on the firm’s number of triad memberships 
Node colour: Fabless; IDM; Foundry; Tech. Compl./Systems 
(e) 
 Focal Partners R&D dyads R&D triads 
 Chip. TC Sys. Fndry IDM Total Fndry IDM Total Fndry IDM 
Fabless 35 39  31 3 17 170 3 61 174 7 167 









Intel (IDM) 37 38 2,950 
Freescale Semiconductor (IDM) 34 25 789 
Xilinx (fabless) 28 14 404 
Nvidia (fabless) 28 15 332 
Texas Instruments (IDM) 27 20 446 
Analog Devices (IDM) 21 12 18 
AMD (fabless) 14 15 851 
Broadcom Corp (fabless) 13 14 435 
Marvell Technology Group (fabless) 13 12 450 
XMOS (fabless) 12 7 6 
 




Table 4.5 continued 
Sub-network of cross-industry and manufacturing bridges (hypothesis 3b) 
 
Node size based on the firm’s number of triad memberships 
Node colour: Fabless; Foundry; Tech. Compl./Systems; Others 
(g) 
 Focal Partners R&D dyads R&D triads 
 Chip. TC Sys. Fndry Other Total Total Fndry % 
Fabless 59 60 66 10 51 327 526 32 6% 
Overall 59 60 66 10 51 576 620 55 11% 
(h) 







Nvidia 84 30 3,356 
Xilinx  80 20 913 
XMOS 57 13 12 
AMD 37 31 6,770 
Siteco  35 10 108 
Broadcom Corp 20 23 2,567 
Dynex Power  18 7 1 
Mellanox Technologies 15 15 1,782 
Sanken Electric 15 6 0 
Aptina Imaging Corporation 15 7 109 
  
Sub-network of co-opetitive cross-industry R&D alliances (hypothesis 4a) 
 
Node size based on the firm’s number of triad memberships 
Node colour: Fabless; IDM; Tech. Compl./Systems 
(i) 
 Focal Partners R&D dyads R&D triads 






Fab - Fab 25 19 9 83 20 24% 42 1.7 
IDM - IDM 22 32 38 255 51 20% 261 11.9 









Intel (IDM) 86 45 1,695 
Renesas Electronics (IDM) 74 30 914 
Samsung Electronics (IDM) 74 35 816 
IBM (IDM) 67 29 636 
Freescale Semiconductor (IDM) 59 29 1,084 
Texas Instruments (IDM) 49 28 1,233 
STMicroelectronics (IDM) 39 19 499 
Toshiba Corporation (IDM) 32 15 382 
Analog Devices (IDM) 20 11 22 
Nvidia (fabless) 18 16 763 
 
Sub-network of common ties among rivals (hypothesis 4b) 
 
Node size based on the firm’s degree centrality 


















 Chip. TC Sys TC Sys TC Sys TC Sys 
Fabless 116 276 263 5 36 119 89 23.8 2.5 668 
IDM 24 183 186 40 43 100 137 2.5 3.2 523 







Intel (IDM) 124 116,900 
Freescale Semiconductor (IDM) 55 51,284 
STMicroelectronics (IDM) 54 45,872 
Broadcom Corp (fabless) 52 40,355 
AMD (fabless) 48 38,477 
Texas Instruments (IDM) 40 29,267 
NXP Semiconductors (IDM) 33 30,495 
Renesas Electronics (IDM) 31 25,111 
Atmel (IDM) 30 24,053 




exhibit a tendency to broker structural holes between disconnected industries within the 
sub-network, as indicated by their relatively high degrees of betweenness centrality (Table 
4.5-d).  
The descriptive statistics and sub-network visualisation of the sub-network for hypothesis 
3a (Table 4.5-e) also highlights the central role of IDMs as brokers and mediators in triadic 
R&D alliances between fabless chipmakers and their technology and systems partners. 
Accordingly, triadic cross-industry R&D alliance strategies are not limited to choices of 
partners based exclusively in different industries. For example, fabless chipmakers may 
cooperate with (potentially competing) IDMs on cross-industry R&D projects or intensify 
their partnerships with foundries by involving them in cross-industry R&D alliances. The 
descriptive statistics highlight that the former is more prevalent (167 R&D triads with IDMs) 
than the latter (7 R&D triads with foundries), however, according to the descriptive 
statistics. The preference of IDMs for brokerage tactics is visible from their higher degrees of 
betweenness centrality (Table 4.5-f), which might indicate that partnering with IDMs 
resembles a relatively optimal route to accessing complementary technologies or new 
product markets; and governing this relationship using triadic structures might safeguard 
the fabless chipmaker against opportunism and enhance cooperation.  
Also within a wider sub-network of cross-industry triads, used for testing hypothesis 3b, the 
involvement of foundries in triads with fabless chipmakers is limited to only 6% of all triadic 
R&D alliances formed by fabless chipmakers (Table 4.5-g) – thus highlighting a preference 
by fabless chipmakers to conduct R&D with cross-industry partners within triadic alliances 
independently from their manufacturing partners. 
Furthermore, the descriptive results and sub-network visualisation of the sub-network for 
hypothesis 4a (Table 4.5-i) also show patterns in the potential competitive use of triadic 
cross-industry R&D alliances by chipmakers. With 24% of all dyadic R&D alliances formed 
by fabless chipmakers being to direct rivals, fabless chipmakers – in contrast to IDMs (20%) 
– appear to have a relatively greater tendency to collaborate with their direct rivals 
alongside cross-industry partners in triadic cross-industry R&D alliances.  
This pattern holds also true in the sub-network created for hypothesis 4b (Table 4.5-k), based 
on R&D alliances between chipmakers and the partners of their rivals – regardless of 
whether a direct R&D alliance tie between the rivals exists as well. Between IDMs and 
fabless chipmakers, there are considerably more fabless chipmakers that form R&D alliances 
with one and the same technological complementor – 23.8 fabless chipmakers on average. In 
contrast, on average there are only 2.5 IDMs per common technological complementor. This 
difference is much less pronounced in relation to common systems partners, in which case 
there are – on average – actually more IDMs (3.2) than fabless chipmakers (2.5) per common 
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systems partner. Overall, these descriptive results highlight the importance of triadic 
configurations to R&D collaborations between rival chipmakers. 
4.5.2. Stochastic actor-oriented model results 
The results obtained from the eight SAOMs are presented in Table 4.6. Each model output is 
focused on a single hypothesis as testing the formulated hypotheses required running the 
models on distinct sub-networks. Reported in Table 4.6 are only the final models with all 
structural effects and dyadic and ego covariates added simultaneously. However, 
robustness checks were performed for each structural, dyadic and ego effect by including 
these individually in the models. The additional effects improved model fit and were 
therefore included in the final models.  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Hypothesis H.1a H.1b H.2a H.2b H.3a H.3b H.4a H.4b 
Utility function         
 3-cycles  1.00**        
   (0.46)        
 IDM ego * 3-cycles  2221.67***       
    (434.24)       
 Fabless ego * 3-cycles  384.70***       
    (3.73)       
 IDM ego * transitive triplets   1.19      
     (1.06)      
 Fabless ego * transitive triplets   1.77***      
     (0.44)      
 IDM ego * betweenness     74.71     
      (-7019.02)     
 Fabless ego * betweenness     -268.66     
      (-6988.45)     
 Fabless ego * partner (IDM) ego     28.44**    
       (13.37)    
 Fabless ego * partner (Foundry) ego      -29.15*** -6.46***   
       (11.58) (1.53)   
 Same chipmaker (IDM)       -1.06***  
         (0.14)  
 Same chipmaker (Fabless)       0.74***  
         (0.22)  
 Indegree popularity from same IDM        0.03 
          (0.04) 
 Indegree popularity from same Fabless        0.10*** 
          (0.04) 
Control effects         
 Out-degree (log) Excl. Excl. Excl. Incl. Incl. Excl. Excl. Excl. 
 Reciprocity Incl. Incl. Excl. Incl. Incl. Excl. Excl. Excl. 
Overall maximum convergence ratio 0.17 5.92 0.12 3.66 2.95 0.08 0.14 0.07 
Sub-network characteristics       
 Number of organisations 159 
326 
473 
971 125 217 130 949 
 Number of alliance ties 1,312 280 492 338 1,191 
 Number of integrated triads 193 174 508 303 0 
Main entries represent estimated coefficients (standard errors are shown between brackets). Convergence ratio is a measure of 
model fit (<0.25 indicates a good fit). Significance indicated as * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 





The control effects 𝑜𝑢𝑡-𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 (𝑙𝑜𝑔) and 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 were not included in the final models 3, 
6, 7 and 8, as robustness checks did not indicate an improvement in explanatory power. 
Overall, no effects were dropped from the models and any insignificant effects were 
retained as they were of primary interest to the hypothesis tests. 
Model fit is indicated by good convergence of the estimation algorithm and measured by the 
overall maximum convergence ratio reported in Table 4.6. The convergence ratio is 
calculated as a t-ratio by dividing the average deviation of the simulated values from the 
observed values by their standard deviation, and should be less than 0.25 as advised by 
Ripley et al. (2019). Good convergence was obtained for models 1, 3, 6, 7 and 8, with t-ratios 
of less than 0.25. 
To confirm the statistical significance of the structural, dyadic and ego effects, one-sided 
p-values are used as the hypotheses were tested for either positive or negative relationships. 
The parameters of all models were tested by referring the t-ratios (
𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
) of all 
modelled effects to a standard normal distribution, in line with Snijders et al. (2010). 
The results obtained from the model estimations provide statistically significant support for 
hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3b, 4a and 4b; leaving hypotheses 2b and 3a unsupported. Model 2 also 
returns significant estimates, for hypothesis 1b; however, the convergence ratio is 5.92, 
which is greater than the benchmark of 0.25 for good model convergence. As indicated by 
statistically significant 3-𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 effect (t = 1.00/0.46 = 2.17, one-sided p < 0.05), chipmakers 
have a preference for conducting fundamental R&D through triadic alliances (H.1a), 
suggesting that triads, in contrast to dyads, may provide a more efficient and effective 
governance structure to reduce the risk of engaging in increasingly more costly and complex 
R&D projects. As for hypothesis 1b, the results indicate that the probability that IDMs will 
engage in triadic fundamental R&D alliances is indicated to be higher than that for fabless 
chipmakers, by the 𝐼𝐷𝑀 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 3-𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 interaction (t = 2,2221.67/434.24 = 5.12, one-sided p < 
0.01) and the 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 3-𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 interaction effects (t = 384.70/3.73 = 103.14, one-sided p < 
0.01), respectively.  
Model 3 provides support for hypothesis 2a, as indicated by the significant 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 interaction effect (t = 1.77/0.44 = 4.02, one-sided p < 0.001) and the 
insignificant 𝐼𝐷𝑀 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 interaction effect (t = 1.19/1.06 = 1.12, one-sided 
p > 0.10). This suggests that fabless chipmakers, in contrast to IDMs, have a relatively greater 
preference for forming cross-industry R&D triads by bridging the disconnectedness between 
technological complementors and systems companies in end-industries. Results obtained for 
the hypothesis (H.2b) indicating that IDMs are more likely than fabless chipmakers to broker 
the disconnectedness between these cross-industry partners are not supportive due to 
statistical insignificance of the 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 (t = 74.71/-7,019.02 = -0.01, one-
sided p > 0.10) and 𝐼𝐷𝑀 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 effects (t = -268.66/-6,988.45 = 0.04, one-sided p > 
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0.10), with a convergence ratio of 3.66; which is above the benchmark of 0.25 for good model 
convergence. The statistical insignificance of both interaction effects is an unexpected yet 
interesting result in itself as brokerage has commonly been underscored and found in past 
research to be an important network tactic for collaborative R&D (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Rowley 
et al., 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Shiri et al., 2014). In spite of the statistical insignificance, 
however, the obtained estimates do suggest a positive preference for brokerage for IDMs 
and a negative preference for fabless chipmakers.  
The results reported under Model 5 are not supportive of the hypothesised (H.3a) greater 
preference of fabless chipmakers to form triadic R&D alliances with foundry partners than 
with IDMs, alongside either a technology complementor or systems partner. This is 
indicated by the significant and negative 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 (𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑦) 𝑒𝑔𝑜 effect (t = -
29.15/11.58 = -2.52, one-sided p < 0.01) and the significant and positive 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 (𝐼𝐷𝑀) 𝑒𝑔𝑜 (t = 28.44/13.37 = 2.13, one-sided p < 0.05). Moreover, the convergence 
ratio of 2.95 indicates poor model convergence, as it is above the benchmark of 0.25 for good 
convergence. The results do, nevertheless, provide an indication that, together with either a 
technology complementor or systems partner, fabless chipmakers are more likely to form a 
triadic R&D alliance with IDMs than with foundries. s 
Results under Model 6, however, are supportive of the hypothesis (H.3b) that fabless 
chipmakers are more likely to form cross-industry triadic R&D alliances without the 
involvement of a foundry partner than with a foundry partner – as indicated by a significant 
and negative 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 (𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑦) 𝑒𝑔𝑜 effect (t = -6.46/1.53 = -4.22, one-sided p < 
0.01). 
Model 7 provides statistically significant evidence for the hypothesis (H.4a) that fabless 
chipmakers are more likely than IDMs to form triadic R&D alliances with direct rivals 
within their respective semiconductor industry segments – as indicated by the positive 
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 (𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠) effect (t = 0.74/0.22 = 3.36, one-sided p < 0.01) and the negative 
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 (𝐼𝐷𝑀) effect (t = -1.06/0.14 = -7.57, one-sided p < 0.01). Finally, as 
hypothesised (H.4b) and indicated by the results under Model 8, fabless chipmakers are also 
more likely than IDMs to form R&D alliances – both within triads and at a distance of 2 – 
with the partners of their rivals within their respective industry segments. This is indicated 
by statistically significant and positive 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 effect 
(t = 0.10/0.04 = 2.5, one-sided p < 0.01) in comparison to the insignificant 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝐼𝐷𝑀 effect (t = 0.03/0.04 = 0.75, one-sided p > 0.10). 
Overall, the obtained estimation results indicate that chipmakers – fabless chipmakers in 
particular – do exhibit a preference for forming triadic vis-à-vis dyadic R&D alliances across 
distinct sub-networks, in pursuit of achieving various strategic benefits and goals in the face 
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of several industry pressures. Strategic interpretations and discussions of the results are 
provided in the next section. 
4.6. Discussion of findings 
The outcome of this study confirms that chipmakers utilise distinct triadic tactics in pursuit 
of their R&D alliance strategies, which may relate to maximising the R&D outcomes of their 
strategic alliances in the face of industry pressures. Accordingly, we maintain that the 
maximisation of the strategic utility of R&D alliances is not only driven by the selection of 
strategic partners to gain access to short-term partner-specific benefits, as traditionally 
suggested by strategy scholars, but importantly also by the configuration of the R&D 
alliance relations with these partners within the chipmaker’s ego network. 
Overall, the findings suggest that by strategically organising their joint R&D activities 
within distinct triads, chipmakers may accumulate network benefits beyond the strategic 
benefits achievable within dyads. Notably, these include (1) bridging sectors for 
fundamental research, complementary technologies and end-industries to capitalise on 
cross-partner resource complementarities; (2) developing mutual trust and cooperation 
among R&D partners to enhance cross-industry R&D collaboration and knowledge 
exchanges, or controlling the process of (re)combining complementary resources and new 
knowledge by brokering cross-industry linkages; and (3) mitigating competitive conflicts 
and developing co-opetitive relations to collaborate with rivals. Triads can therefore help 
chipmakers to create more efficient and effective responses to the risks associated with the 
increasing cost of R&D as well as the uncertainties associated with the rapid technological 
advancements and updates in technology sectors, the successful commercialisation of new 
chip technologies in end-markets, and the intense competition for access to complementary 
technologies and end-markets. 
The first interesting finding shows that chipmakers evidently utilise distinct triadic tactics 
for their R&D alliances, which indicates that the concept of R&D alliances is not uniform in 
nature, but may in fact relate to diverse alliance strategies pursued by companies. 
Chipmakers, namely, utilise triadic tactics to achieve distinct R&D objectives in view of 
conducting fundamental R&D, (re)combining technologies through cross-industry linkages 
between partners within and outside the core semiconductor industry, and joining the 
development and commercialisation processes of new chip technologies – which lead to the 
creation of various triadic constructs.  
Chipmakers thus develop network strategies which might mitigate external risks and 
uncertainties through inclusivity via the integration of R&D alliance relations or through 
protection via network brokerage. Integrated triads enable chipmakers to create an open 
innovation environment based on mutual trust and close cooperation, while protective 
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triads enable them to gain control over the process of developing and commercialising new 
chip innovations by brokering the flows of knowledge and resources between distinct 
technological sectors and end-markets. Importantly, the findings suggest that the strategic 
utility that inclusive triadic R&D alliances may yield is not valued equally by IDMs and 
fabless chipmakers, because their inherently distinct operating models induce different 
perceptions of environmental uncertainties and thus require different network benefits to 
operate competitively.  
The first set of findings reveal different tendencies in the use of triadic tactics for 
fundamental R&D by IDMs and fabless chipmakers. Specifically, we find that IDMs exhibit 
a relatively greater preference for organising fundamental R&D within triadic alliance 
structures than fabless chipmakers, as indicated by a larger positive 𝐼𝐷𝑀 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 3-𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 
effect (H.1b). IDMs, owing to their capital intensive operating model, experience greater 
pressure to offset the risks associated with the growing cost of R&D and the uncertainty 
inherent in conducting fundamental R&D with faster commercialisation. By contrast, the 
‘openness’ of IDMs’ network strategies is not equally evident across distinct sub-networks of 
cross-industry R&D collaboration. The significance level and larger estimate for the 
formation of triads (H.2a) indicate that fabless chipmakers – not IDMs – tend to utilise triadic 
R&D alliances as mechanisms for establishing cross-industry bridges between technological 
complementors and systems companies based in adjacent technological industries. 
As such, the second set of findings reveal that fabless chipmakers, being the less hierarchical 
companies disadvantaged by larger resource constraints, are prompted to develop and 
utilise more effective networking strategies enabling them to encourage cooperation and 
knowledge exchange between partners from distinct sectors and end-markets in the face of 
increasing technological complexity and changing demand for the development of 
application-specific and often customised system-level chips. Specifically, fabless 
chipmakers seem to derive strategic utility from triadic R&D alliance strategies as they (1) 
provide a platform that enables capitalising on cross-industry resource complementarities 
between multiple partners, while simultaneously (2) creating an efficient governance 
structure based on mutual trust and cooperation which reduces the lure of opportunism and 
facilitates bridging any cognitive distance that might exist between R&D partners through 
the coordinated exchange of knowledge and division of tasks. Consequently, specialised 
fabless chipmakers pursue what we might consider a ‘true’ open innovation strategy based 
on inclusivity rather than protection; whereby integrated triads enable, by inducing mutual 
trust and commitment among R&D partners, effectively governing the open exchange of 
information and knowledge critical to the efficient and rapid joint integration of 
complementary technologies and IPs within systems. 
By contrast, we find that IDMs implement an opposite triadic tactic, namely by brokering 
the linkages between R&D partners based in distinct technology sectors and end-market. 
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This is indicated by the positive vis-à-vis negative 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 (H.2b) for IDMs and 
fabless chipmakers, respectively; which suggests that IDMs utilise triadic tactics as a means 
of protecting exclusive access to key technologies, IPs and non-redundant knowledge, as 
well as maintaining control over the process of (re)combining complementary technologies 
and integrating new chip innovations within market-specific systems.  
Importantly, however, the statistical insignificance of this result must be re-emphasised 
because on the surface this result seems to be at odds with common research results, namely 
that brokerage is a critical network tactic for R&D collaboration as it enables firms to 
diversify their partner portfolio and gain access to strategically critical non-redundant 
resources (e.g., McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Rowley et al., 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Shiri et 
al., 2014), particularly in cross-industry collaboration (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997). The 
statistically insignificant role of brokerage for both IDMs and fabless chipmakers, however, 
suggests that in the context of the semiconductor industry the benefits of mutual trust, 
cooperation, the open exchange of knowledge, transaction cost efficiency and reduced 
opportunism attainable through integrated triadic tactics might be considered relatively 
more important than the disadvantage of having a lower degree of access to diverse 
knowledge, expertise and technological assets. This is consistent with the findings of Ahuja 
(2000) and Schilling and Phelps (2007), namely that a large presence of structural holes in the 
firm’s network has a negative influence on its innovative output, and that integrated and 
protective triadic tactics may complement each other. 
Nevertheless, IDMs might utilise triadic tactics to establish themselves as lead firms in R&D 
collaborations. This finding can also be derived from the network visualisations (see Table 
4.5), which suggests that, across the distinct sub-networks, IDMs systematically utilise 
brokerage tactics to secure comparatively monopolistic positions within the wider industry 
network. This enables IDMs to act as a gatekeeper to specialised knowledge, complementary 
technologies and IP not just within their own ego networks, but within the entire industry 
network. This reflects a network strategy predicated on exclusionary triadic tactics, rather 
than on inclusivity, which provides IDMs with a power advantage (see Chapter 3.5.3.) over 
(potential) rivals, which they can leverage to protect their technological leadership and 
dominance in their respective product markets through exclusive access to information on 
new technological advancements made in distinct technology sectors as well as to 
downstream revenues.  
The triadic cross-industry alliance strategies of fabless chipmakers might also extend into 
adjacent segments within the semiconductor industry. Interestingly, the negative 
𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 (𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑦) 𝑒𝑔𝑜 effect indicates that fabless chipmakers do not derive 
strategic utility from using triads to govern the coordination between cross-industry chip 
development and manufacturing by foundries. By contrast, the 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 (𝐼𝐷𝑀) 𝑒𝑔𝑜 effect suggests that fabless chipmakers and IDMs may mutually derive 
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strategic utility from forming triadic R&D alliances with a common technology 
complementor or systems partner.  
We would argue that, in this case, triadic R&D alliances constitute a mutually beneficial 
network strategy that enables the IDM primarily to leverage the complementary capabilities 
and technologies of a specialised fabless chipmaker in order to reinforce its technological 
leadership and reduce the risk of technological lock-in, and the fabless chipmaker to 
leverage the IDM’s dominant market position to expand into a new product market. 
Concurrently, the presence of a common technology complementor or systems partner may 
either signify a joint attempt at driving innovation and market reach or an attempt at 
blocking value appropriation by the other chipmaker by imitating its partnering move. 
The third set of findings reveal that IDMs and fabless chipmakers utilise different co-
opetitive alliance tactics for R&D. This contrast is revealed both by the visualisation of the 
sub-network of co-opetitive R&D alliances (see Table 4.5) and the obtained model results 
(see Table 4.6). Specifically, we find that while IDMs do collaborate with one another across 
technology and end-markets within triadic R&D alliances, the negative 
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 (𝐼𝐷𝑀) effect and the positive 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 (𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠) effect indicate 
that they do so to a lesser extent than fabless chipmakers. IDMs, namely, develop co-
opetitive relations with rivals with whom they have a cooperative history, reflecting the 
utilisation of integrated triadic tactics to develop deep co-opetitive relations while sharing 
access to specialised knowledge, technologies and IPs within small groups. Fabless 
chipmakers, by contrast, utilise triadic tactics to establish co-opetitive relations with more 
diverse portfolio of rivals; which reflects a co-opetitive strategy with a greater focus on 
driving open innovation spanning across a wider range of fields of knowledge and product-
markets. 
Overall, important conclusions can be drawn from these findings, with implications for both 
theory building, future research and managerial decision-making. This will be the topic of 
discussion in the next section. 
4.7. Conclusions and implications 
With the introduction of strategic utility of triadic R&D alliances as a two-fold framework 
predicated on (1) partner selection and (2) the configuration of alliance relations, this 
industry study makes important contributions which are applicable to research on partner 
selection and alliance formations.  
First and foremost, this study demonstrates that to adequately understand the essence of 
alliance strategies in R&D networks, it is essential to combine strategic and network analysis 
approaches within a single analytical framework. The field of strategy, namely, does not 
offer tools to capture and disentangle the influence of the interdependence of the firm vis-à-
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vis other organisations within the industry network on the formation of R&D alliances. This 
is important, however, because the firm’s alliance strategy is not merely driven by its pursuit 
for partner-specific assets and complementary resources, as past strategy research has 
typically been advocating, but also by the firm’s strategic decisions on how it intends to 
configure its alliance relations within its wider ego network. The field of network analysis 
offers the tools needed to disentangle the interdependence between organisations, by 
analysing the structural configuration of alliance relations and explaining the strategic 
outcomes associated with distinct network configurations. Combining strategic and network 
analysis approaches therefore enables capturing both the firm’s partner choices and its 
decisions for the configuration of its alliances relations; and, consequently, improving our 
understanding of the strategic process through which firms form R&D alliances within 
industry networks. Future empirical alliance research should therefore adopt network 
analysis in order to explicitly model the endogenous structural processes that exist within 
R&D networks. 
Our findings indicate that when a chipmaker is presented with a choice among multiple 
potential partners with complementary resources, it is likely to select those partners whose 
portfolios of alliance ties to R&D partners within and outside of the core semiconductor 
industry (1) contribute most to the position of the chipmaker within the industry network 
and (2) fit in with the relational configuration of alliances within the chipmaker’s ego 
network. As such, a chipmaker would select those partners who would not only contribute 
valuable complementary resources, but who would also enable the chipmaker either to 
create an open innovation environment or to reinforce and protect its network position as a 
gatekeeper to specialised knowledge and key technologies. Future research and 
advancements in theory on the formation of R&D alliances should therefore expand their 
scope from a narrow focus on the firm’s short-term partnering strategy toward its longer-
term network strategy.  
Concurrently, this study also has implications for research on open innovation. The 
‘openness’ of firm’s R&D alliance strategies has typically been measured by the firm’s 
network position or density of the industry network (Boschma and Ter Wal, 2007; Gilsing et 
al., 2008; Lyu et al., 2019); the characteristics of the firm’s partner portfolio, such as the 
breadth and depth of its external search channels (Laursen and Salter, 2006) or the diversity 
of its partners (De Leeuw et al., 2014); or the firm’s willingness to share previously secret 
ideas (Henkel, 2006). This study demonstrates, however, that these measures of open 
innovation are not sufficient to fully comprehend how companies develop open innovation 
strategies, as it is also important to consider the network tactics at the level of the firm’s ego 
network as a reflection of how ‘open’ its open innovation strategy is. Network tactics, 
namely, can be utilised to foster the exchange of knowledge and enhance close cooperation 
and the coordinated (re)combining of complementary resources by integrating R&D alliance 
relations within triads; as well as to protect exclusive access to knowledge and resources and 
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to control the availability of these strategic assets to other parts of the industry network, 
such as to direct rivals or partners based in other technology sectors, through brokerage. 
Furthermore, the findings of this study also suggest that triadic tactics do not resemble R&D 
alliance tactics which are universally suitable for different types of firms. The comparison 
between IDMs and fabless chipmakers illustrates that different operational strategies 
contribute to likely dissimilar perceptions of risk and uncertainty arising from the same 
industry pressures, which may subsequently require different triadic tactics to accumulate 
long-term network benefits to mitigate these pressures. 
Finally, this study also makes methodological contributions by demonstrating the 
application and advantage of the social network analysis (SNA) approach to analysing R&D 
alliance network strategies. Firms engaged in R&D alliances are naturally embedded within 
complex industry networks. By analysing the relational structures within these networks to 
understand how precisely firms are linked to one another, we can advance our knowledge 
about how firms develop and utilise network strategies to achieve a long-term competitive 
advantage. To demonstrate the importance of SNA, this study adopted stochastic actor-
oriented modelling. In contrast to traditional regression methods, the SAOM methodology 
allows explicitly capturing the inherent interdependence of firms in R&D networks through 
the specification of structural network effects, such as firms’ tendency toward triadic 
closure, in addition to firm-specific attributes. This subsequently allows testing the 
importance of network configurations in determining the partner choices of firms. 
Accordingly, future alliance research would benefit from the wider adoption of this method 
to better comprehend the collaborative behaviour of organisations. 
Industry strategists can take lessons from the findings of this study. Business strategists are 
advised to, first of all, consider the configuration of their alliance network as an integral part 
of their strategic plan, taking into account the strategic implications of distinct network 
tactics for the creation of new value and the development of novel innovations. Strategists 
should thus consider their organisation’s position within a wider industry network of R&D 
alliances and to define a network strategy, inclusive or protective, in line with their long-term 
R&D objectives, and to evaluate whether the choice of a potential partner based on partner-
specific interests would fit in this network strategy. Please see Section 6.2 of Chapter 6 for a 
deeper discussion of the managerial implications of this study. 
A few limitations to this study should also be acknowledged. Given the industry-specific 
context of this study, with its focus on semiconductor companies, the findings might not be 
directly applicable to companies not based in high-technology industries. Importantly, 
however, a recent study by KPMG (2018) does emphasise on the growing importance of 
strategic alliances to organisation across 13 different industries; alliances for cross-industry 
collaboration in particular. As such, we may argue that the outcome of this research on 
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triadic R&D alliances does provide important insights which can be adopted for the analysis 
of alliance network strategies in other industries. Accordingly, there are opportunities for 
future research to adopt the framework presented in this study to examine and develop 
network strategies for organisations in other industries. 
Furthermore, one limitation of the empirical methodology applied in this study concerns the 
unavailability of data on specific contractual terms of the R&D alliances in the sample. This 
means that the analysis is based on the assumption that the R&D alliances do not fail or 
dissolve during the sample period. Future research on the formation of triadic R&D alliances 
should explicitly control for specific contract terms, such as the duration of an alliance. 
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5. ACHIEVING INTERNATIONALISATION ADVANTAGE 
THROUGH R&D ALLIANCE NETWORK STRATEGIES  
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced a framework for analysing the strategic utility of R&D 
alliances, underscoring the importance of triadic tactics to maximising the R&D outcomes of 
strategic alliances, such as novelty creation, reaping the profits of fundamental R&D, 
accelerating the commercialisation of new innovations through cross-industry linkages, and 
mitigating competitive conflicts in R&D collaboration.  
We demonstrated first of all that the strategic utility of R&D alliances is determined jointly by 
(1) the strategic selection of partners possessing complementary assets and (2) the 
configuration of the chipmaker’s alliance relations within triads. The relational configuration 
of triads can result in two distinct triadic tactics, namely integrated triads based on closure 
among partners and protective triads based on relational brokerage. These triadic tactics enable 
chipmakers to achieve different cross-partner resource complementarities, extend resource 
complementarities to the joint creation of novelty, and develop distinct governance structures 
facilitating the development of novel creations. Specifically, while integrated triads function 
as effective governance mechanisms which enable developing an open innovation 
environment based on mutual trust and cooperation, protective triads enable chipmakers to 
gain control over the process of developing and commercialising new innovations by 
brokering the flows of knowledge and resources between different R&D partners (see Chapter 
4, Section 4.2.2 for a detailed discussion). As such, chipmakers utilise these two triadic tactics 
as responses to industry pressures.  
The next important step is to investigate how these triadic tactics might be utilised by 
chipmakers to internationalise R&D through strategic alliances. R&D alliances are not formed 
only within or across industries but also internationally and inter-regionally. In fact, the 
international context adds a layer of complexity to the R&D industry network, which may 
change the strategic behaviour of chipmakers; first of all, in terms of the selection of partners 
in foreign industries and markets; and, secondly, in view of shaping the knowledge flows, 
control and power relations within alliance networks which span across national borders. 
The importance of R&D networks has clearly been highlighted in previous research showing 
that international R&D activities are nowadays increasingly organised through networks of 
(non-equity) inter-organisational alliances (Tolstoy and Henrik, 2010; Kedia and Mooty, 2013; 
Kranenburg et al., 2014; Cantwell, 2017) rather than through foreign direct investment (FDI). 
For example, in line with the RBV of alliances (Das and Teng, 2000), the IB literature has long 
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acknowledged that inter-organisational R&D networks are utilised by firms to exploit their 
value creation capabilities as well as acquire strategic assets and conduct intra-network 
learning during the internationalisation process (Andersson et al., 2016; Cano-Kollmann et al., 
2016; Sekliuckiene et al., 2016; Cantwell, 2017; Martínez-Noya and Narula, 2018). In addition, 
networks are utilised by companies to recognise opportunities for and develop strategic 
business relationships in foreign markets (Blankenburg Holm et al., 2015; Forsgren, 2016). In 
fact, equity-based alliance arrangements for R&D have been on a decline since the 1970s 
(Hagedoorn, 2002; Narula and Duysters, 2004). Hybrid arrangements rely on distinct 
(1) governance mechanisms, such as mutual trust and social control through brokerage, as a 
means of developing cooperative relations and directing the flows of knowledge and 
resources among network partners based in different countries; and (2) partner configurations 
to enable capitalising on different cross-partner resource complementarities. 
Especially within high-technology environments, such as the semiconductor industry, flexible 
non-equity alliance agreements are nowadays at the core of any international R&D strategy 
to leverage the diverse skills, capabilities and location advantages of foreign cross-industry 
partners necessary to drive innovation (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2016). In 
particular, the introduction of the System On Chip (SOC) as a new chip design methodology 
has increased the complexity of chip design, which has put greater importance on 
collaborating for R&D with a variety of foreign partners (Ernst, 2005).  
Importantly, the configuration of R&D alliance relations within triads enables chipmakers to 
complement cross-industry bridges with cross-border collaboration, which underscores that 
the choice to form a non-equity R&D alliance is not based on a uniform decision driven merely 
by short-term strategic benefits, such as access to complementary resources located in foreign 
markets, but that it is also about strategically linking different R&D activities performed 
across the globe through international alliance relations. It is therefore not merely a matter of 
a choice between non-equity and equity modes of internationalisation, as is conventionally 
assumed in the IB literature (Pan and Tse, 2000). This traditional view is oversimplified and 
does not capture the strategic reality of linking different alliances and R&D activities within 
the industry network.  
Internationalising R&D through hybrid modes, however, magnifies the strategic challenges 
faced by the company within its local market, in terms of risks of opportunism as well as the 
cognitive, cultural and geographical distance to its foreign partners. With this study, we aim 
to analyse and explain the internationalisation of joint R&D activities from a network 
perspective, and explore how international hybrid arrangements can be configured within 
triads to link different R&D activities within the industry network and overcome the strategic 
challenges inherent to international R&D collaboration – in view of achieving 
internationalisation advantage. Specifically, how does network advantage translate into 
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internationalisation advantage? This investigation is conducted by (1) linking concepts from 
the fields of international business (IB) and network analysis within a single framework for 
explaining the internationalisation of R&D through hybrid modes; and (2) developing 
hypotheses to test the tendency of chipmakers to configure to configure their alliance relations 
within triads as a means to internationalising R&D. 
With this aim, this study responds to the call to advance the established IB scholarship by 
systematically integrating network theory in the field of IB. Building on the concept of the 
strategic utility introduced in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.2), we develop a network-based 
framework to analyse and explain the internationalisation of R&D through strategic alliances 
by integrsating (1) the strategic selection of foreign R&D partners and (2) the configuration of 
international alliance relations within triads as core mechanisms integral to the R&D 
internationalisation process. This framework is premised on the idea that the strategic 
orchestration of the firm’s ego network along these two dimensions can help to enhance the 
value created through international R&D alliances as well as to accelerate the 
internationalisation of R&D. Triadic tactics, namely, can enable companies to (1) stimulate 
mutual trust and cooperation through collaboration with relatively redundant partners, and 
the exchange of knowledge in view of minimising the risks of opportunism and overcoming 
the cognitive, cultural and geographical distance to selected R&D partners in foreign 
countries; or (2) secure exclusive access to non-redundant assets in foreign markets and 
control the flow of knowledge across geographical borders in order to lead the process of 
developing and commercialising new innovations and to become an attractive R&D partner 
themselves. 
This network framework contributes to the IB literature both conceptually and 
methodologically. It offers a method of measuring the ambiguous IB concept of ‘network ties’ 
and an approach to analyse how firms can configure their strategic networks to develop and 
advance their value creation capabilities and achieve commercial success in foreign markets. 
As such, it also provides an alternative way of explaining differences between firms in terms 
of their internationalisation advantages, based on the different network tactics which they 
utilise to orchestrate the configuration of their ego networks of international R&D alliance 
relations. 
The traditional conception in the field of IB has long been that internationalisation reflects the 
exploitation of competitive advantage in foreign markets through FDI (Vernon, 1966; Caves, 
1971; Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1977, 1980; Tan and Meyer, 2010; Narula and Nguyen, 2011). 
This view is predicated on the idea that firms require firm-specific ownership (O), location (L) 
and internalisation (I) advantages (Dunning, 1980) in order to be able to internationalise their 
R&D through FDI.  As mentioned, however, the sources of the firm’s competitive advantage 
in foreign markets are increasingly located beyond what has traditionally been considered an 
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ownership advantage. Acknowledging the growing role of network building through hybrid 
strategies in the internationalisation of R&D, Dunning (1995) has broadened the concept of 
ownership advantages to also capture the costs and benefits derived from inter-organisational 
relationships within alliance networks – thus giving rise to the conception that networks 
belong to the transaction-type ownership advantages of the firm (Collinson and Narula, 2014; 
Alcácer et al., 2016; Cantwell, 2017).  
Importantly, however, this conception arguably neither allows capturing the inherent 
complexity of networks, nor does it provide a way of measuring precisely how networks 
facilitate the internationalisation of R&D. Instead, it implies that extant attempts at 
understanding the strategic utility of networks have been built on the firm as the unit of 
analysis with its associated firm-level characteristics, consequently relying on the idea that 
networks are somehow internal to the firm or owned by the firm. Understanding how firms 
utilise hybrid arrangements to internationalise R&D, however, requires analysing the 
network-level processes, such as reciprocity and transitivity, by which technology is 
transferred and knowledge is exchanged between the firm and its foreign network partners. 
This can only be accomplished by conducting the analysis at the level of the firm’s ego 
network or at the level of even more complex network configurations within and across 
industries. Namely, the fact of the presence of a given alliance in itself does not automatically 
equate to internationalisation advantage; rather, it depends on how the firm configures the 
alliance relation in view of directing the flow of resources and creating an effective governance 
structure within its wider ego network. Labelling networks as ownership advantages is thus 
arguably both conceptually and strategically inaccurate, considering that networks actually 
constitute an alternative entry mode through which hybrid arrangements are realised. 
Furthermore, even though Dunning (1995), in line with other studies (e.g. Powell, 1990; Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Contractor and Reuer, 2014), acknowledges the importance of mutual 
commitment and alternative governance structures based on trust – rather than written 
contracts – in hybrid arrangements, the OLI framework does not capture how these 
governance mechanisms are linked to the processes of (re)combining complementary 
resources and creating new knowledge in foreign markets. This is neither achieved in more 
recent research, such as Alcácer et al. (2016), who link the concept of I advantages to the 
orchestration of networks as a form of governance of inter-organisational collaborations in 
foreign markets. Other IB studies have, similarly, emphasised that the firm can act as an 
‘orchestrating flagship firm’ (Cano-Kollmann et al., 2016), ‘IB network orchestrator’ (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008) or ‘lead firm’ (Narula and Santangelo, 2012) in order to coordinate its 
collaborative activities with foreign partners. However, while also focusing on dyadic 
network ties, in spite of the inherent complexities of hybrid arrangements as recognised in the 
strategy and value chain literatures (Madhavan et al., 2004; Gereffi et al., 2005; Kim et al., 
2016), this extant approach does not capture how firms can actually orchestrate their 
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international hybrid arrangements in order to govern the asset flows and knowledge 
exchanges within their networks in view of maximising value creation and their R&D 
outcomes. 
This framework, therefore, does not hold conceptually and strategically to adequately analyse 
and explain the mechanisms underpinning the hybrid internationalisation strategies of many 
modern businesses. Conceptually, it does not help to understand how companies 
(1) configure their hybrid strategies to enter into foreign markets and (2) develop their 
internationalisation advantages in dynamic interactions with foreign R&D partners within 
networks. Strategically, it does not provide any guidance to measure and analyse how 
companies can utilise network tactics to shape hybrid internationalisation modes to maximise 
R&D outcomes by (1) creating new value through international resource allocations arising 
from bridging technology sectors and end-markets; and (2) developing governance 
mechanisms to improve the cross-border coordination of cross-industry technology transfers, 
knowledge exchanges and learning. 
In result, there is a notable lack of empirical analyses in the field of IB focused explicitly on 
the actual internationalisation advantages that firms can derive from their inter-organisational 
R&D networks, in terms of resource complementarities, new knowledge creation, cross-
industry bridges, control over resource flows and power asymmetries. This study, therefore, 
develops a new framework based on the network perspective, in order to explore and explain 
the essence of international R&D alliance networks and how firms can utilise R&D network 
strategies to develop and advance their internationalisation advantage. 
Accordingly, in this chapter we return to the fundamental frameworks of the RBV and TCA 
underpinning the established methods to analysing the internationalisation of firms, and 
integrate the premises of the RBV and TCA with the conceptual and methodological tools 
offered by the network approach (Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1992; Ripley et al., 2019) to analyse the 
formation of international R&D alliances within a single framework. In line with strategy 
research done by Dyer and Singh (1998) and Rowley and Baum (2008), we argue that to 
adequately understand how firms can advance or develop their internationalisation 
advantages through international R&D alliances, it is necessary to move the unit of analysis 
from the traditional firm level, and even the dyadic alliance level, toward the ego network 
level and to explore how firms expand their boundaries across borders to learn, pool 
complementary resources and develop effective governance structures by strategically 
configuring their hybrid arrangements within their ego networks. 
To overcome the deficiencies of existing frameworks, we build on the concept of the strategic 
utility (Chapter 4). As such, the central premise of this study is that the firm’s ability to achieve 
internationalisation advantage through R&D alliance networks is influenced by the strategic 
utility that it may derive from its international network strategy, which is a function of and 
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(1) the access to location-bound assets gained through the strategic selection of foreign 
partners and (2) the strategic outcomes associated with the configuration of its international 
R&D alliance relations within its ego network. 
This study makes several conceptual contributions to the field of IB by adopting the construct 
of strategic utility introduced in Chapter 4 to analyse how network advantage can be 
converted into internationalisation advantage. Firstly, it demonstrates how the premises of 
the RBV and TCA are inter-linked with the concepts of closure (Coleman, 1988) and brokerage 
(Burt, 1992) and the methods offered by the network approach to analysing the formation of 
international R&D alliances. Secondly, we adopt the concept of strategic utility to develop a 
framework that enables explaining how modern businesses utilise alliance network strategies 
to achieve internationalisation advantage. Thirdly, this framework is applied to (1) explain 
how firms might utilise integrated and protective triadic network tactics to enhance the 
obtainable value from international R&D via (a) resource complementarities and (b) mutual 
knowledge exchange; and (2) evaluate how the obtainable network advantages associated 
with alternative triadic network strategies might influence the ability of firms to develop and 
advance their internationalisation advantages. 
Empirically, we test this network perspective in the context of the global semiconductor 
industry. This study is aimed at addressing a number of research questions, including 
(1) whether integrated or protective triadic alliances might be the most efficient network 
strategy to internationalise R&D; (2) whether the two major types of chipmakers, namely 
IDMs and fabless chipmakers, show distinct preferences for triadic tactics due to their distinct 
operating models; (3) whether chipmakers utilise triadic international R&D strategies 
to enhance their internationalisation advantages by (a) accessing and acquiring the existing 
complementary assets and knowledge of foreign partners or (b) inter-organisational learning 
about technologies and foreign markets and commercial opportunities; and, finally, (4) how 
the interaction between alliance partner choices and the need for location-bound assets might 
drive the formation of alternative international R&D network strategies.  
To address these questions, 10 hypotheses are developed to test the tendencies of chipmakers 
to configure their international R&D alliance relations, with foreign partners who differ in 
their functional specialisation, within triads. The hypotheses are, therefore, designed to first 
of all test whether chipmakers configure their hybrid strategies within triads to enter into 
foreign markets at all; and, secondly, to also test whether these triadic tactics are utilised by 
chipmakers in view of achieving specific R&D objectives, such as gaining access to 
fundamental research expertise, complementary technologies and end-market knowledge, as 
well as establishing cross-industry bridges between foreign technology sectors and end-
markets. These hypotheses are tested on the same dataset used in Chapter 4, containing a 
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network sample of R&D alliances formed between chipmakers and their partners during the 
11 year period 2004-2014, using stochastic actor-oriented modelling (SAOM).  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we define the concept of 
strategic utility in view of international R&D; explore the core mechanisms determining the 
strategic utility of hybrid strategies in the internationalisation of R&D; and link these core 
mechanisms to the integrated and protective triadic tactics which chipmakers can utilise to 
internationalise R&D. The hypotheses are formulated in Section 5.3. This is followed by a 
discussion of the research methodology and SAOM specifications in Section 5.4.  Descriptive 
analyses and the statistical model results are presented in Section 5.5 and strategic 
interpretations are discussed in Section 5.6. Finally, in Section 5.7, we discuss the conclusions 
and implications of this study. 
5.2. Development of the conceptual framework 
5.2.1. The strategic utility of alliance networks for international R&D 
To explain the strategic utility of alliance network strategies for the internationalisation of 
R&D, we first of all need to understand the strategic function of alliance networks in driving 
the main outcomes in international R&D, namely the process of value creation and the 
accelerated access to technology sectors and end-markets. The network processes relate to the 
dynamic capabilities perspective, which suggests that value creation entails a dynamic 
process in which the chipmaker reconfigures its resource base by acquiring, integrating and 
recombining resources in response to changes in its industrial environment, in order to sustain 
a competitive advantage over time (Teece et al., 1997). These dynamic value creation processes 
entail (1) the development of novel technologies through the joint application of technical 
skills and capabilities and (2) the creation of new products by complementing existing 
resources and knowledge; and are best captured with a network perspective, as this can reveal 
the network processes through which resources and knowledge flow between chipmakers 
and their foreign network partners. 
From a dynamic internationalisation perspective, the ability of the chipmaker to create value 
through the internationalisation of its R&D activities is determined by its capability to 
(1) commit and reconfigure resources to conduct R&D in foreign markets (Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Hitt et al., 1997); and (2) develop a learning advantage by 
accumulating local market knowledge and developing new routines and processes for 
conducting R&D based on foreign market experience (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; 
Chang, 1995; Barkema et al., 1997).  
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International networks of R&D alliances fulfil important functions in this regard, as they 
enable chipmakers to leverage cross-industry resource complementarities, develop effective 
governance structures, enhance mutual trust and coordination (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2 
for an in-depth discussion on governance through alternative triadic network tactics) as well 
as avoid a lock-in situation within the local market through access to the outside world 
(Boschma and Ter Wal, 2007). The notion that networks enable value creation and, 
subsequently, enhance competitive advantage, however, not a new one (Gulati, 1998, 2000; 
Greve et al., 2014). In fact, the position of companies within inter-organisational networks has 
long been linked by scholars to innovation output and product development (Powell et al., 
1996; Rothaermel, 2001; Powell et al., 2005; Capaldo, 2007; Shiri, 2015), and to network 
advantages derived from access to technological resources (Tolstoy and Henrik, 2010), 
information and knowledge (Granovetter, 1992; Hadley and Wilson, 2003), as well as to status 
(Podolny, 1993), reputation (Gulati, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000), influence and prestige 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994), and power and control (Krackhardt, 1990; Alderson and 
Beckfield, 2004). 
Studies built on resource-based perspectives of alliances (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; 
Das and Teng, 2000) suggest that the value generated from resources committed in foreign 
markets will be greater when they are effectively complemented and recombined with other 
valuable resources and new knowledge bases possessed by local partners within the 
chipmaker’s R&D network (Teece, 1992; Dyer and Singh, 1998). The premise of this view, 
originally developed to explain value creation through alliances from a dyadic perspective, 
can be relaxed and used to also explain that networks of R&D alliances can help chipmakers 
to create new value in cross-border R&D. Namely, through strategic networking, chipmakers 
can join groups of foreign technology and end-market partners whose existing technologies, 
IPs as well as heterogeneous technical and market knowledge can be complemented to create 
unique ‘network resource combinations’ (Tolstoy and Henrik, 2010), or whose technical skills 
and capabilities can jointly be applied to develop new chip technologies.  
Importantly, however, creating new value by complementing assets or jointly applying 
technical skills and capabilities through international R&D collaboration requires that 
chipmakers – besides gaining access to location-bound research expertise, technologies and 
market knowledge – choose and implement a governance structure, based either on trust in 
relatively redundant alliance relations or on control in captive relations, which enables them 
to overcome the risks of opportunism and the geographical, cultural and cognitive distances 
to their foreign partners which constrain the transfer of technology, the exchange of 
knowledge and the coordination of joint technology development across borders (Contractor 
et al., 2011; Kranenburg et al., 2014). The strategic configuration of international R&D alliance 
relations within the chipmaker’s ego network is, therefore, critical to the dynamic value 
creation process. Moreover, when value creation within networks is combined with access to 
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foreign research expertise, technologies and end-markets, this can enable the chipmaker to 
also accelerate the internationalisation of R&D in light of the commercialisation of R&D 
outputs (Johanson and Mattsson, 1988; Criado et al., 2005).  
Differences in the capabilities of chipmakers to internationalise R&D are, therefore, 
increasingly due to differences in the network tactics which they utilise to reconfigure their 
committed resources and to develop their learning advantages (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 
1998). Specifically, we argue that chipmakers’ utilisation of distinct network tactics, based 
on the combination of strategically selected partners and the configuration of the R&D 
alliance relations to these partners within their ego networks, enable generating distinct 
strategic outcomes (these are discussed in Section 4.2.3 and depicted in Figure 4.3) which they 
can leverage to (1) enhance the creation of value and the development of new chip 
technologies as well as (2) accelerate the speed of the internationalisation of R&D and 
(novelty) value creation. This dynamic process of creation value through network tactics is 
illustrated by the conceptual model depicted in Figure 5.1, which will be explained in more 
detail over the following sub-sections. 
Utilising network tactics to enhance the value created through international R&D 
Chipmakers can utilise network tactics to advance and develop their ability to create value 
through international R&D by (1) capitalising on foreign resource complementarities and 
(2) developing their technical skills and know-how and foreign market knowledge through 
learning. First of all, through strategic networking a chipmaker can gain timely access to and 
acquire existing complementary proprietary resources and especially codified knowledge 









Ego network partner combination 
Ego network relational configuration 
Internationalisation capability 













from foreign (cross-industry) R&D partners which cannot be readily purchased from 
competitive markets (Beamish, 1994; Kogut, 1988; Teece, 1992; Madhok, 1997; Oliver, 1997; 
Stuart, 1998; Chetty and Wilson, 2003), but which are critical to its ability to enhance the value 
it can create through  international R&D by incrementally strengthening its own resource base 
(Nooteboom et al., 2007).  
In the context of the global semiconductor industry, enhancing the value of any chip design 
demands chipmakers to improve the performance and functionality of their core chip designs 
by complementing these at least with licensed IPs, electronic design automation tools, 
supplementary design services, software products and, depending on the type of chip under 
development, application-specific technologies and systems components (Ernst, 2005). 
Furthermore, the chipmaker may derive higher status and greater power from its network 
position within the industry and the utilised network tactics, which it may convert into greater 
bargaining power and control over the flow of complementary resources and knowledge 
throughout the network (Burt, 1992). 
Accordingly, the chipmaker’s position in the industry’s R&D network and the strategic 
configuration of its alliance relations within its ego network enable creating new value based 
on the complementarities between the existing technologies and knowledge bases of the 
chipmaker and its foreign network partners (Teece, 1986; March, 1991; Rothaermel, 2001; 
Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). Moreover, networks can help chipmakers to enhance close 
cooperation with R&D partners in regional innovation centres or end-markets to gain access 
to and leverage complementary resources which are not easily transferrable across national 
borders, such as technical expertise, R&D facilities and equipment, local market knowledge 
or partners’ reputation (Oliver, 1997) associated with global technological leadership status 
and prominence in foreign markets. Inherent to the effectiveness of such R&D alliances which 
are, in essence, aimed at exploiting existing assets, has been the notion that R&D partners 
should possess similar technological capital (Nooteboom et al., 2007), i.e. tacit knowledge and 
expertise accumulated through R&D, to enable complementing resources on the basis of the 
chipmaker’s absorptive capacity – to recognise the value of new knowledge and resources, 
and to assimilate and commercialise them (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Fleming and Sorenson, 
2001). 
Importantly, even prior to evaluating the potential novelty value of joining and combining 
resources with a given potential foreign partner (as visualised in Figure  4.2 in Chapter 4), 
firms are challenged to identify the optimal foreign R&D partner. Through networking, 
chipmakers can also acquire accurate and timely information about potential foreign R&D 
partners from trusted informants within the global R&D network (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 
1992), as well as to overcome the lack of perfect information and the cost and difficulty of 
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determining the value of complementary resource of potential partners (Dyer and Singh, 
1998). 
Besides capitalising on resource complementarities with foreign R&D partners, chipmakers 
can also utilise network tactics to establish and develop global ‘networks of learning’ (Powell 
et al., 1996), which enable accelerated learning about new technological discoveries and 
developments made in foreign innovation centres as well as new commercial opportunities in 
foreign end-markets to take place on the basis of routines for the exchange and sharing of tacit 
knowledge and fine-grained information between the chipmaker and its foreign R&D 
partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Das and Teng, 2000; Rothaermel, 2001; Hadley and Wilson, 
2003). Chipmakers can, consequently, leverage their network positions not only to establish a 
presence in foreign markets, but importantly also to develop novelty value in close 
cooperation with R&D partners in foreign markets by jointly applying their technical know-
how, skills and capabilities to explore, discover and experiment with new fundamental chip 
technologies and technological applications (March, 1991; Teece, 1992; Powell et al., 1996; 
Nooteboom, 2000). Network tactics for international R&D collaboration can thus help 
chipmakers to avoid the risk of getting locked in an established technological paradigm, as 
well as overcome their liability of foreignness by learning about foreign market opportunities 
and developing awareness of customer problems and technical product specifications 
required by foreign customers (Fang et al., 2007; Spence et al., 2008). 
Research has shown that the presence of cognitive distance between R&D partners, rather 
than cognitive similarity, is critical to the creation of novelty value in this respect (March, 1991; 
Nooteboom et al., 2007; Leiponen and Helfat, 2011). Importantly, cognitive distance becomes 
larger and therefore more challenging to overcome in international R&D collaboration due to 
the institutional and cultural barriers which a chipmaker may face when collaborating with 
R&D partners in foreign markets and which render communication and the exchange of 
knowledge more difficult (Freeman, 1995; Bertrand and Mol, 2013). As such, conducting R&D 
jointly with foreign network partners enables chipmakers to increase the cognitive distance to 
their R&D partners to such an extent that it creates potential for accelerating the development 
of their learning advantages and jointly creating novel chip technologies.  
Extant research has, however, highlighted challenges to creating novelty value through 
international R&D collaboration. The ability to convert cognitive distance into novelty 
creation, first of all, is constrained by the chipmaker’s capacity to comprehend and absorb the 
knowledge and technologies which are shared by its foreign R&D partners (Nooteboom et al., 
2007; Bertrand and Mol, 2013). Furthermore, obstacles in communication, risks of 
opportunism and differences in culture, tacit knowledge and strategic goals are important 
challenges which chipmakers are likely to face when collaborating with foreign R&D partners 
(Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Forsgren, 2016). 
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Strategic networking can facilitate in overcoming these challenges by establishing effective 
governance mechanisms, based on mutual trust and commitment, which foster the exchange 
of resources and knowledge and, in result, enable realising the creation of novelty value from 
international R&D collaboration. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, chipmakers can accomplish 
this by configuring their alliance relations to create a ‘relational’ type of governance structure 
(Lavie et al., 2012; Gereffi et al., 2005) which, based on mutual trust and commitment resulting 
from an increase in the redundancy of the ties in their network, can facilitate the process of 
exchanging knowledge and transferring technologies in cross-border R&D alliances to enable 
learning and creating (novelty) value through international R&D. Alternatively, chipmakers 
can configure their alliance relations to establish a ‘captive’ type of governance structure 
(Gereffi et al., 2005) in which the chipmaker orchestrates the process of complementing 
resources or joining technical skills and capabilities, enabling it to appropriate most of the 
value created from cross-border collaborations. Maximising the creation of value form 
international R&D, however, requires integrating mutual knowledge exchange mechanism of 
networks and this may thus imply shifting the nature of international R&D collaboration from 
a captive to a more relational style. The chipmaker’s choice of network tactic and its position 
in the global R&D network are therefore directly linked to its ability to learn to create value 
with new technologies and knowledge, and might consequently also enable it to enhance its 
absorptive capacity (Gilsing et al, 2008).  
Ultimately, chipmakers are thus faced with a triple challenge of (1) maintaining sufficient 
cognitive distance to foreign R&D partners to enable the creation of novelty value; 
(2) evaluating the reliability of potential foreign R&D partners as well as the value of their 
complementary resources, knowledge, technical skills and capabilities; and (3) once these 
foreign strategic assets are evaluated, choosing the right network tactic to access these assets 
and to bridge the necessary differences in cognitive focus in comparison with their foreign 
R&D partners and, subsequently, effectively complementing or jointly applying these 
strategic assets to create (novelty) value.  
Utilising network tactics to accelerate the internationalisation of R&D 
Chipmakers can further utilise network tactics to accelerate the process of internationalising 
R&D and consequently the speed at which firms can enhance the value created through 
international R&D, via the strategic selection of foreign R&D partners. The acceleration of the 
R&D internationalisation process implies that the firm transitions to an initial or more 
advanced state of internationalisation (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) as a result of the speed at 
which it (1) gains international market knowledge through learning and (2) commits resources 
to conducting R&D in foreign markets (Chetty et al., 2014). This process-based 
conceptualisation goes beyond merely considering the time between the firm’s establishment 
and the formation of its first international R&D alliance (Khavul et al., 2010; Ramos et al., 2011) 
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and can be linked to the network processes through which chipmakers might configure their 
ego networks of R&D alliance relations. 
Knowledge about foreign markets, particularly differences in culture, local formal institutions 
such as IP rights and product specifications demanded by local customers, is mainly 
accumulated through experience conducting R&D in different foreign markets (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977) and forms an essential basis for the firm’s ability to enhance the value created 
through international R&D. The firm can consequently learn about foreign markets faster by 
increasing the amount of experience it can gain within a given (shorter) time frame. By 
building strategically configured R&D alliance networks, however, firms can accelerate this 
learning process and time-to-market (Gilsing et al., 2008) by accessing and leveraging the local 
market experience and tacit knowledge of commercial opportunities possessed by 
strategically selected foreign R&D partners (Uzzi, 1997; Musteen et al., 2010), such as end-
market companies. 
Internationalising R&D at a higher speed further demands that the chipmaker allocates more 
resources and capabilities to conducting R&D in foreign markets (Oviatt and McDougall, 
2005; Chetty et al., 2014). Rather than committing to equity investments, such as FDI, however, 
the chipmaker can also capitalise on its network of strategically selected foreign R&D partners, 
such as those located in regional innovation centres (Florida, 1997), to gain access to low-cost 
R&D personnel, fundamental research expertise, facilities and equipment, and complement 
its own committed resources with the resources and knowledge of these foreign partners as 
well as jointly apply their technical skills and capabilities as a means of efficiently accelerating 
the speed and value-creation potential of international R&D. Importantly, by utilising their 
network tactics to link foreign research expertise, technologies and end-market knowledge, 
chipmakers can also accelerate the internationalisation of R&D by integrating the creation of 
new value or the joint development of new technologies with commercial opportunities. 
Overall, from this discussion we can derive that being better connected within the industry’s 
R&D network is linked to a greater ability to create (novelty) value and accelerate the speed 
at which value is created through international R&D. Fully understanding the strategic 
implications of ‘better connectedness’ for the novelty creation potential of international R&D 
alliance strategies, however, requires a deeper analysis of the distinct triadic tactics through 
which chipmakers can build their networks of international alliance relations. Taking into 
account the strategic outcomes of alternative triadic tactics as discussed in Section 4.2.3, in the 
next section we discuss how these triadic tactics might facilitate the hybrid 
internationalisation strategies of firms and explore what might be the most efficient and 
effective network strategy to internationalise R&D through alliances. 
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5.2.2. The importance of triadic network configurations to the 
internationalisation of R&D through alliances 
Central to the chipmaker’s ability to utilise network tactics to enhance the (novelty) value 
created through international R&D is its orchestration capability. This encapsulates the 
chipmaker’s capability to configure its alliance relations in view of (1) tactically combining 
cross-industry and cross-regional R&D collaboration to (a) maximise the creation of novelty 
by complementing or jointly applying resources and knowledge as well as (b) capture its 
value through accelerated commercialisation in end-markets (see Figure 5.1); (2) and 
developing effective governance mechanisms based on trust to enhance its absorptive 
capacity to bridge the cognitive differences vis-à-vis its foreign R&D partners necessary for 
novelty creation.  
We examine the chipmaker’s orchestration capabilities in line with the triadic framework 
introduced in Chapter 4. From a triadic perspective, chipmakers have two strategic options to 
configure their cross-border R&D alliance relations to enhance value creation via international 
R&D alliances: either through ‘open’ (protective) or ‘closed’ (integrated) triadic network 
configurations10.  
The standard view has been that protective triads are associated with greater recombination 
potential than integrated triads and are thus advantageous for novelty creation through 
international R&D alliances (Burt, 1992; Ahuja, 2000; Rowley and Baum, 2008). This potential 
stems from the notion that the non-redundant resources and alternative ways of thinking 
needed to create novelty value are located in relational groups within the network to which 
the chipmaker and its existing partners and rivals are not a member, on the opposite side of 
structural holes which – when brokered by the chipmaker – can grant access to new 
opportunities for creating novel resource combinations (Rowley and Baum, 2008).  
This logic is also applicable to international R&D collaboration. By brokering the relations 
between foreign partners, chipmakers can first of all increase the novelty creation potential of 
their international R&D strategies through access to foreign technologies, facilities, 
knowledge, skills and capabilities. The fewer companies, notably rivals, within the 
chipmaker’s immediate network and local market with who it shares access to the same non-
redundant resources possessed by foreign cross-industry partners and located in foreign 
innovation centres, the greater the novelty value the chipmaker can generate through 
international R&D. It is therefore arguably in the firm’s strategic interest to protect its access 
to these critical resources and to keep searching for new brokerage opportunities across 
 
10 These distinct triadic tactics were introduced in Section 4.2.3. 
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geographical borders – not just horizontally within its own industry, but especially between 
neighbouring industry networks (KPMG, 2018). 
As such, the orchestration of international R&D alliance relations within open triadic 
configurations constitutes a protective network tactic based on exclusionary tactics. It can grant 
the chipmaker a position of power (Greve et al., 2014) or dominance (Gereffi et al., 2005) over 
foreign R&D partners, enabling it to orchestrate the recombination potential of accessed 
resources and knowledge by playing off disconnected, dependent partners against each other 
(Gulati, 1998), controlling the mobilisation of complementary resources and knowledge across 
geographical borders (Galaskiewicz, 1979; Burt, 2004), and coordinating action and 
withholding or distorting information in order to maximise the value it can derive from its 
sources (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004). In result, brokerage within protective triads can also 
help chipmakers to maintain or reinforce their technological leadership both locally and 
abroad. 
To successfully create value by bridging the relational disconnect between foreign R&D 
partners, however, the chipmaker must possess a sufficiently large internal resource capacity 
that can be committed to bridging the cognitive and cultural distance to every additional 
foreign R&D partner, in order to effectively absorb and complement heterogeneous technical 
and market knowledge, jointly applying technical skills and capabilities, as well as 
overcoming a potential liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). In the absence of sufficient 
absorptive capacity, a predominant focus on this triadic strategy may thus, over time, limit 
the chipmaker’s ability to derive novelty value from its international R&D collaborations 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2004). Therefore, the long-term effectiveness of protective triadic tactics for 
novelty creation through international R&D alliances is highly dependent on the chipmaker’s 
available capacity to integrate and recombine the strategic assets, as suggested by Nooteboom 
et al. (2007); otherwise rendering the creation of value by exploiting complementary resources, 
while limiting equal access by others, a more achievable strategic objective. 
The development of absorptive capacity by the firm can effectively be enhanced through 
international R&D alliances when these are configured within integrated triads (Gilsing et al., 
2008), on the basis of the informational advantages and learning opportunities that it can 
derive from closure among its network of cross-industry R&D partners in foreign markets 
(Coleman, 1988). This logic dictates that by establishing a dense global network of R&D 
partners based on mutually understood norms of cooperation and trust (Grannovetter, 1973; 
Gulati, 1995a; Rowley, 1997; Walker et al., 1997), allowing for both codified and tacit technical 
and market knowledge as well as fine-grained information to be exchanged via high 
bandwidth communication channels across geographical borders (Narula and Santangelo, 
2012; Martínez-Noya and Narula, 2018), the firm can utilise its international R&D alliances to 
co-specialise (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and rapidly build-up its absorptive capacity by learning 
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about new technologies (Powell et al., 1996), foreign cultures (Heiman and Nickerson, 2004) 
and the reliability of potential foreign R&D partners (Gulati, 1998; Gilsing et al., 2008). 
Integrated triadic tactics consequently also enable reducing communication errors (Dyer, 
1996) and the psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) to other and future foreign R&D 
partners in view of more effective cross-border R&D collaboration and faster time-to-market. 
Integrating international R&D alliance relations within dense global network structures 
therefore not only advances the chipmaker’s resource endowments, but importantly it can 
also enhance its ability to effectively reconfigure its resource base to coordinate the cross-
border integration of complex complementary technologies and heterogenous knowledge to 
create new value and the joint application of technical skills and capabilities to develop novel 
technologies. Moreover, by integrating cross-border alliance relations with foreign R&D 
partners in both technology sectors and end-markets, chipmakers can enhance cross-industry 
resource flows and align the development and commercialisation of new technologies, as a 
means of also accelerating the speed at which they can effectively internationalise their R&D 
activities and derive greater value from these activities 
Imperative to understanding the advantage of this triadic tactic is that close integration of 
international alliance relations stimulates R&D partners to take a long-term rather than a 
short-term approach to building their international R&D alliances, in view of maximising the 
long-term strategic benefits for all partners involved, as advocated by Morgan and Hunt’s 
(1994) commitment-trust theory. While partners’ mutual agreement to create value jointly is 
entirely voluntarily, their perception of value might be subject to different estimations of value 
(Zajac and Olson, 1993) and the signing of an alliance agreement is not a guarantee even for 
short-term commitment to cooperation (Williamson, 1979, 1981; Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1996). 
The collective monitoring and sanctioning that is enabled by the rapid diffusion of partner-
specific information in dense networks, however, instils a sense of trust and cooperation 
(Gulati, 1998, 2000; Kogut, 2000; Rowley et al., 2000) beyond what can be established within 
protective triads or dyadic alliance relationships and which arguably resembles a more 
efficient means to governing joint R&D than contractual agreements and formal self-enforcing 
safeguards based on equity stakes (Dyer and Singh, 1998). This creates a powerful stimulus 
for global R&D partners to focus on the long-term value creation potential of their 
international R&D alliances rather than deviating from the short-term value creation 
initiatives that partners agreed to by acting opportunistically or appropriating R&D outcomes 
as a means of maximising their own short-term returns at the cost of their partners’, while also 
incurring long-term reputational damage and potential isolation from future participation in 
R&D projects across the wider network (Gulati, 1998; Rowley et al., 2000).  
Protective and integrated triadic configurations clearly lead to distinct alliance network tactics 
for international R&D. The former can arguably enhance the internationalisation capabilities 
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of leading chipmakers through access to and control over the process of integrating the non-
redundant technologies and knowledge possessed by cross-industry partners in foreign 
regions into their own proprietary products or technologies. By contrast, integrated triadic 
tactics can enable chipmakers to develop an international open innovation strategy to 
capitalise on the benefits of inclusivity, rather than exclusivity, among foreign cross-industry 
R&D partners to establish effective governance mechanisms to closely fuse partners’ strategic 
objectives and values, and overcome the inherent challenges to the creation of new value and 
the development of novel technologies through international R&D collaboration; such as risks 
of opportunism, geographical distance, and cognitive and cultural differences between 
geographically dispersed R&D partners. 
 
Still, the general view has largely been that open collaborative environments, created through 
integrated triadic tactics, might lead to ‘overembeddedness’ or technological lock-in and 
consequently reduce the non-redundancy of knowledge, technologies and other strategic 
resources (Uzzi, 1997) which chipmakers might find and leverage in foreign markets to create 
novelty value. This network perspective suggests that, in contrast to what had long been 
suggested by classical theories on the internationalisation process (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977), there are constraints to the chipmaker’s ability to maximise the creation of novelty value 
from the increasing involvement in foreign markets, and that these constraints can be 
overcome by strategically configuring international R&D alliance relations within triads. This 
renders the strategic utility of integrated triads for novelty creation through international 
R&D alliances, in particular, a matter of adequate network orchestration in line with the 
chipmaker’s long-term strategic vision and objectives, available resources and ongoing 
developments in the industry – not merely the result of a casual response to a short-term 
innovation opportunity. 
By combining cross-industry and cross-regional R&D collaboration within integrated triads, 
however, chipmakers can increase the cognitive differences to and among their foreign R&D 
partners to enhance the novelty creation potential of their international R&D alliances and, in 
result, reduce the risk of becoming overembedded. The chipmakers foreign R&D partners 
may, namely, well be specialised in radically different technological areas within the R&D 
ecosystem or be based in different industries entirely, such as in distinct technology sectors 
and foreign end-markets (KPMG, 2018). Therefore, rather than deliberately protecting its 
access to the non-redundant resources of these R&D partners, the chipmaker and its foreign 
R&D partners may generate greater value by cooperating more closely to complement one 
another’s capacity to recognise the recombination potential of the third partner’s technology, 
overcome cultural barriers, translate and absorb new codified and tacit knowledge, as well as 
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accelerate commercialising the combination of resources as a novel product of joint cross-
border and cross-industry innovation (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005; Gilsing et al., 2008).  
In such a situation, integrated triadic tactics do not merely function as a relational mechanism 
which enhances the chipmaker’s internationalisation capabilities in view of either (1) creating 
new value by complementing technologies and knowledge or (2) exploring and developing 
new chip technologies through learning and jointly applying technical skills and capabilities 
– but potentially both simultaneously due to more effective governance. Similarly, by 
integrating cross-industry R&D alliances bridging across multiple foreign countries within 
one triad, the firm can maximise the speed of R&D internationalisation by simultaneously 
accelerating its speed in committing resources to international R&D and its speed in learning 
about foreign markets. It is this distinctive function which could enable and accelerate creating 
and capturing superior novelty value from international R&D, consequently rendering 
integrating international alliances a more efficient and effective network strategy for 
internationalising R&D than protective triads and basic dyadic alliance strategies. Identifying 
and leveraging such coexisting opportunities would consequently represent a distinctive 
orchestration capability for chipmakers. 
5.3. Hypothesis development 
5.3.1. Enhancing the achievable value from international R&D through triadic 
tactics in the global semiconductor industry 
The strategic configuration of international R&D alliances within integrated triads may 
especially prove advantageous in the context of high-tech industries, such as the global 
semiconductor industry. The fundamental focus of semiconductor R&D is increasingly on the 
development of fully-integrated, multi-functional and high-performing chips through 
international collaboration (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2016). While faced with 
short product life cycles, volatile customer demand and competitive pressures (Section 4.3), 
this demands chipmakers to utilise their global networks of R&D alliances to (1) combine 
complementary resources and capabilities as well as (2) enhance their learning advantage 
through the mutual exchange of knowledge.  
The value of semiconductor chips is not merely a function of their speed, but rather their 
power efficiency, software, durability, functionality and size (Gloger et al., 2017). First of all, 
chipmakers can enhance the creation of new value through international R&D by utilising 
network tactics to swiftly and effectively coordinate the efficient integration of its core 
semiconductor technology with the complementary technologies (e.g. other semiconductor 
technology, IPs, (customised) software and systems) and capabilities (e.g. expertise in chip 
design and systems integration) of specialised technological complementors and systems 
158 
 
companies (Kapoor, 2010), located in regional innovation centres and end-markets 
(Semiconductor Industry Association, 2016), into broader platforms or systems via R&D 
collaboration. Internationalising R&D through networks can thus also help chipmakers to 
achieve ‘platform leadership’ (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002) in foreign markets, defining both 
the chipmaker’s ultimate long-term strategic goal and the superiority of its orchestration 
capability from a strategic network point of view.  
Furthermore, to maintain long-term technological leadership in foreign markets, it is equally 
crucial for chipmakers to incrementally advance their existing resources and capabilities, and 
to jointly apply their technical skills and capabilities with those of foreign R&D partners to 
develop radically new knowledge and technologies through explorative innovation. As such, 
chipmakers might also capitalise on their R&D networks as a means of establishing relational 
types of R&D alliances which enable enhancing their learning advantages as well as the 
novelty of the value created through international R&D. 
The choice of triadic tactic has clear implications for the internationalisation of R&D. The fact 
that foreign R&D partners are often based in various industry sectors, both within and outside 
the semiconductor industry (see Section 4.3), and that collaborating with these partners 
requires the exchange of tacit knowledge, renders the chip development process both 
cognitively and organisationally complex (Ernst, 2005). Chipmakers are simultaneously 
challenged to ensure their alliances bridge the cultural distance to their foreign R&D partners. 
Together, this requires that complementing resources and capabilities and recombining (new) 
knowledge bases is supported by efficient and effective task coordination as well as 
communication and knowledge-sharing practices, which can be more effectively established 
within integrated triadic R&D alliances than within dyadic or protective triadic R&D alliances.  
Importantly, to recombine resources and heterogenous knowledge bases to enhance the 
novelty of the value created through international R&D, the complexity of partners’ 
knowledge or technologies may easily exceed the absorptive capacity of a chipmaker so that 
knowledge-sharing practices cannot be effectively established within dyadic and protective 
triadic alliances. By contrast, complementing its existing resource base with the capabilities of 
a third R&D partner within an integrated triad may improve the chipmaker’s ability to 
recombine heterogenous knowledge and technologies by enhancing its absorptive capacity, 
and thereby its ability to effectively enhance the novelty of value created through international 
R&D.  
In sum, the following are hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 1a Chipmakers are more likely to internationalise R&D through integrated triadic 
R&D alliances than through dyadic R&D alliances. 
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Integrated triadic tactics might, concurrently, enhance the chipmaker’s ability to improve its 
learning advantage through international R&D. Namely, this tactic enables bridging greater 
cultural and cognitive distances among foreign R&D partners located in geographically 
different regions, not merely in other countries, as well as searching for and absorbing more 
valuable, non-local tacit knowledge embedded in these non-local knowledge networks. It is 
therefore also hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 1b Chipmakers pursuing inter-organisation learning (through integrated triads) 
have a significant tendency to form inter-regional R&D alliances. 
The operational strategy11 pursued by a chipmaker has implications for its ability to enhance 
the value created through international R&D by means of complementing its resources or 
advancing or developing (new) knowledge through learning. This should result in different 
degrees of strategic utility which chipmakers may derive from integrating their R&D alliances 
to enhance the value created through international R&D. Namely, accepting the premise that 
– in the global semiconductor industry – the optimal strategic utility of integrating 
international R&D alliances within triads stems from two mechanisms, (1) complementing 
core chip technologies with the technologies of foreign (cross-industry) partners and 
(2) learning through cross-border knowledge exchanges and the joint application of technical 
skills and capabilities within triadic structures, then the type of chipmaker likely to create the 
most value by internationalising R&D utilising integrated triadic tactics is the one best 
positioned to combine these two mechanisms within one triad. 
Both the IDM and fabless models are built on the pooling of complementary resources and 
capabilities, and this is consequently essential to chipmakers’ survival. The innovativeness of 
IDMs and fabless chipmakers alike is highly dependent on their ability to identify new 
advancements in complementary technologies and IPs which they can source from regional 
innovation centres and to combine or recombine these valuable assets with their own core 
technologies and capabilities (Ladendorf, 2004). Importantly, however, IDMs and chipmakers 
may have different motivations for integrating R&D alliance relations in foreign markets.  
The comparatively capital-intensive nature of the IDM model requires that especially these 
chipmakers dominate their markets as losing their platform leadership would result in a 
detrimental impact on the IDM’s ability to maintain a cost efficient operation and to survive. 
Maintaining market dominance in the modern semiconductor industry is, however, not 
possible by keeping operations and R&D processes within local markets. It is therefore crucial 
for IDMs to extend their R&D activities into foreign markets to reach complementary 
 
11 See Section 2.3 for a discussion about the main operational strategies pursued by chipmakers as well as the 
differences between them. 
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technologies, knowledge, skills and capabilities which are not accessible within their local 
markets, in order to maintain their technological leadership and competitive advantage. 
Forming triads (though captive in nature) with foreign R&D partners is important to their 
ability to rapidly develop and commercialise new products in their respective foreign markets 
by advancing the value achievable from integrating resource bases within triads (Saito, 2009).  
Fabless chipmakers are free from this pressure for maintaining market dominance in foreign 
markets (Hung et al., 2017) and consequently enjoy greater flexibility to focus on the 
development of new knowledge and technologies for integration into market-specific systems 
and the exploration of new product-specific applications through relational R&D alliances – 
in addition to complementing existing technologies and knowledge. Increasing the potential 
for developing novel technologies requires that fabless chipmakers enlarge the cognitive 
distances to their R&D partners, such as by collaborating with distinct technology and systems 
partners in foreign markets; as well as that cognitive differences with these foreign R&D 
partners are effectively bridged within integrated triads, by enhancing the exchange of 
knowledge for learning, combining skills and capabilities, and improving cross-industry 
coordination. 
Conversely, the IDM’s strategic commitment to maintaining dominance and technological 
leadership in foreign markets rather constrains its flexibility to learn through the exploration 
of new knowledge and technological areas. Yet, to maintain its technological leadership in 
foreign markets, the IDM is pressured to enhance its learning advantage in order to advance 
its capacity to develop and commercialise innovative chip technologies. The advancement of 
its existing knowledge by learning from foreign R&D partners and the development of new 
knowledge through joint explorative innovation in foreign markets are, therefore, also of 
strategic importance to the IDM. 
Although the inherent flexibility of the fabless operating model would arguably enable these 
chipmakers to more effectively integrate both complementing resources and learning within 
their international R&D triads, the importance of maintaining market dominance and 
platform leadership in foreign markets for IDMs might constitute a stronger force to form 
integrated relational alliances to combine reconfiguring its existing resource base and 
developing or advancing its learning advantage through international R&D. Consequently, 
we can argue that internationalising R&D through integrated triadic tactics can help especially 
IDMs to overcome their relative inflexibility by efficiently allocating their resources to the 
creation of new value and the development of novel technologies. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2a IDMs have a greater tendency than fabless chipmakers to internationalise R&D 
through integrated triadic R&D alliances than through dyadic R&D alliances. 
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Importantly, effectively maintaining long-term technological leadership in foreign markets 
arguably requires that IDMs, more than their fabless counterparts, protect their access to their 
foreign sources of value and novelty creation by brokering the alliance relations between their 
foreign R&D partners, such as those operating in distinct technology sectors and end-markets. 
This would enable IDMs to act as technological gatekeepers (Boschma and Ter Wal, 2007) 
between foreign technology and end-markets within the wider semiconductor R&D network. 
Technological leadership can then be effectively secured through exclusionary tactics aimed 
at maintaining privileged access to valuable non-redundant resources, knowledge, skills and 
capabilities in foreign innovation centres as well as controlling which other R&D partners, 
within their own local markets as well as in foreign markets, can benefit from indirect access 
to these strategic assets and the extent of the value which they may derive. Accordingly, it is 
also hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2b IDMs have a greater tendency than fabless chipmakers to broker international 
R&D alliances with foreign partners. 
5.3.2. Accelerating international R&D through triadic alliance partner 
selections in the semiconductor industry 
Access to fundamental research expertise in foreign innovation centres 
Fundamental research expertise is essential to the ability of chipmakers to explore and identify 
new directions for explorative innovation and to develop new chip technologies, as well as 
for reinforcing their positions in foreign markets. This expertise is typically located at 
universities and research centres based in regional innovation centres in the USA, Europe and 
Asia (Ernst, 2005), and are location-bound (Figure 5.1) owing to their highly tacit nature – 
consequently ‘pulling’ the fundamental R&D activities of chipmakers to these foreign partner 
locations (Granstrand et al., 1993; Cantwell and Iammarino, 2003; Watts, 2014).  
Chipmakers can, however, utilise integrated triadic tactics to enhance the transferability of 
these research skills and capabilities across borders through effective trust-based governance 
and, in result, accelerate the development as well as commercialisation of new chip 
technologies in foreign markets. The challenges inherent to jointly conducting fundamental 
R&D, such as opportunism and cognitive differences between R&D partners, are amplified 
when these partnerships extend into foreign markets, notably due to cultural differences, 
language barriers to communicating highly technical and complex information, and 
differences in R&D management practices (Frost and Zhou, 2005). By closely integrating their 
alliance relations with foreign fundamental R&D partners within triads, however, chipmakers 
can (1) enhance mutual trust and commitment, which are necessary conditions for successful 
cooperation in fundamental R&D, efficient coordination of research tasks, and the exchange 
of knowledge; as well as (2) facilitating communication among foreign R&D partners, 
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developing their learning advantages and capacity to absorb fundamental knowledge from 
their foreign partners through the process of triangulation (see Section 4.2.3). 
The following is therefore hypothesised:  
Hypothesis 3a Chipmakers are more likely to form international R&D alliances with 
fundamental R&D partners, notably universities and research centres, through 
integrated triads than through dyads.  
Access to complementary location-bound technological assets 
Similarly, radical changes in dominant design methodologies of chips, notably the SoC design, 
to enable the Internet of Things (IoT), have increased the cognitive and organisational 
complexity of developing new chips (Ernst, 2005; Bauer et al., 2015). The ability of a chipmaker 
to derive value from internationalising its R&D activities is consequently determined by its 
position as a platform leader in pooling complementary resources and knowledge from 
specialised foreign partners based in various distinct technology sectors, and integrating these 
strategic assets with their own chip technologies and design capabilities as swiftly as possible. 
To accelerate the speed of value creation by pooling and complementing these assets through 
international R&D alliances demands that leading chipmakers coordinate this process most 
efficiently – by integrating their captive R&D alliances within triadic structures rather than 
collaborating through dyadic alliances. A third R&D partner (whether local to the other 
partner or not) might facilitate the exchange of tacit knowledge within the triad by screening 
and interpreting potentially novel information and the value of this information to the leading 
chipmaker (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2003), as well as minimising cross-cultural communication 
errors. Moreover, a collaborative environment in which knowledge exchange and debate are 
fostered can enhance the leading chipmaker’s ability to more rapidly redirect the R&D process 
among multiple partners who work toward a common goal of enabling a given system 
(Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). Integrated triads might therefore act as a more effective 
mechanism for leading chipmakers to govern the process of creating value by complementing 
technological assets. 
Accordingly, the following is hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 3b Chipmakers are more likely to form international R&D alliances with 
technological complementors through integrated triads than through  dyads. 
Access to foreign end-market knowledge 
Enhancing the value created from international R&D further demands that leading 
chipmakers optimise their R&D network to accelerate commercialisation of product 
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innovations in foreign markets by pooling capacity to design the overall system architectures 
and specify product applications (Ernst, 2005). It is therefore optimal for chipmakers to 
conduct R&D in close collaboration with systems partners in foreign end-markets who 
possess the local market knowledge and direct access to end-user feedback needed to rapidly 
learn about foreign markets and design improved or novel products integrating the core chip 
technology of leading chipmakers. Access to this external knowledge is also critical to the 
chipmaker’s ability to achieve global platform leadership (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). 
To effectively increase the speed of learning about foreign markets and systems designs, 
however, chipmakers need to be able to transfer tacit knowledge efficiently from the foreign 
systems partner to the leading chipmaker within an integrated triadic alliance structure. 
Firstly, integrated triads can help chipmakers to establish mutual trust among foreign R&D 
partners which is critical to the exchange of tacit knowledge (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Secondly, 
collaborating with multiple foreign partners simultaneously within an integrated triad – 
whether both are systems companies or only one – who may possess complementary 
knowledge about the same foreign market or diverse knowledge about different foreign 
markets, would help to create the most effective learning tactic through which the leading 
chipmaker could further accelerate the development of its learning advantage and its ability 
to rapidly commercialise innovations across foreign markets (Figure 5.1).  
Accordingly, leading chipmakers might derive strategic utility from integrating systems 
partners based in foreign end-markets within triadic R&D alliances. The following is therefore 
hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 3c Chipmakers are more likely to form international R&D alliances with end-
market partners (systems companies) through integrated triads than through 
dyads. 
5.3.3. Combining cross-industry and international diversification R&D 
alliance strategies in triads 
Notably, the integration of the leading chipmaker’s own core chip technologies and design 
capabilities with both (1) the complementary technologies and technical capabilities of foreign 
technological complementors and (2) the local market knowledge and system/product-
specific expertise of foreign systems partners within triadic R&D alliances, would enable the 
leading chipmaker to not only (a) enhance the novelty value created from international R&D 
by complementing resources and jointly applying technical skills and capabilities, but to 
simultaneously (b) accelerate the process of internationalising R&D to create value, by 




This would therefore arguably help to create the most efficient and effective alliance strategy 
to swiftly create superior value through international R&D, and would consequently 
represent a distinctive network orchestration capacity which would enable the achievement 
of global platform leadership (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). Accordingly, it is hypothesised 
that: 
Hypothesis 4a Chipmakers have a significant tendency to form international cross-industry 
R&D alliances within integrated triads. 
With the aim of minimising the cultural and cognitive distance between R&D alliance partners 
within integrated triads, however, as a means of ensuring greater efficiency in coordinating 
the integration of pooled complementary resources and capabilities with tacit knowledge 
about local markets and system or product-specific architectures, we might expect that: 
Hypothesis 4b In international cross-industry R&D alliances within integrated triads, 
chipmakers are more likely to source complementary technological assets in 
proximity to the end-market. 
5.4. Research methodology 
5.4.1. Network sample and data 
The analysis conducted in this chapter relied on the alliance dataset used in Chapter 3. For 
details on the sources and the method of collection of the data used in the current chapter, 
please see Section 3.6. Specifically, the current study relies on the R&D network sample which 
was used in Chapter 4. This sample is composed of 1,827 organisations, out of which 425 are 
chipmakers (38 IDMs and 387 fabless chipmakers), with a total of 4,559 domestic and 
international R&D alliance formations12 across the period 2004-2014.  
In order to analyse whether triadic network tactics might prove more effective for 
internationalising R&D than dyadic tactics, most hypotheses require that distinct sub-
networks are created – as opposed to the overall network – which allow testing distinct 
international R&D alliance strategies and which are solely composed of R&D alliance ties to 
the types of strategic partners that chipmakers may specifically select to execute this 
international R&D alliance strategy within triadic structures. The sub-networks, within which 
these collaborative interactions between chipmakers and their R&D partners are captured, are 
based on one-mode matrices in which the direction of resource flows is also captured.  
By creating sub-networks which are based on specific triadic tactics and R&D alliance ties 
with specific foreign partner types, we can reduce the complexity of the network of interest 
 
12 Please see Section 4.4.1 for the types of R&D alliances included in this sample. 
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and more easily analyse whether and to what extend distinct R&D strategies are executed 
through the formation of specific triadic constructs within the sub-network. This follows a 
method of network construction utilised in other fields of research (e.g. Zhao et al., 2016; 
Hepburn, 2017). The specific definitions for each of the distinct sub-networks created in this 
study are provided together with the SAOM specifications in the next section. 
5.4.2. Specification of network models & international sub-networks 
This study follows Chapter 4 in adopting stochastic actor-oriented modelling13 (Snijders, 1996, 
2011), shortened for SAOM, to analyse the formation of international R&D alliances within 
triadic network structures over time. This method is advantageous over traditional regression 
techniques conventionally utilised by alliance researchers in IB. It is inherently based on the 
assumption that cross-border alliance formations are not only driven by the pursuit for foreign 
partner-specific and location-bound assets, but also by the structure of the alliance network. 
The method takes into account the interdependence that is inherent to the formation of 
international R&D alliances between pairs of organisations vis-à-vis the presence of other 
R&D alliance relations (i.e. endogenous structural effects) as well as the characteristics of other 
organisations and distinctive attributes of dyadic and triadic alliance relations (i.e. exogenous 
structural effects) in the network.  
SAOM is an important method to the study of internationalisation of R&D through alliances 
as it allows capturing endogenous structural effects (the presence of other R&D alliances 
within the firm’s network) and exogenous structural effects (the presence of other actors in 
the network and their attributes) which can help to explain the importance of network 
advantages associated with triadic structures to the formation of international R&D alliances. 
Traditional regression techniques typically utilised by IB scholars are not able to capture these 
network effects. We implement the SAOMs using the program SIENA (Simulation 
Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis) in the statistical tool R, which has been developed 
and maintained by Ripley et al. (2019).   
In this study, we specify several SAOMs and distinct sub-networks to test chipmakers’ 
tendencies toward the formation of international R&D alliances within triadic structures vis-
à-vis dyadic structures as a means of enhancing the value created through international R&D; 
as well as their preferences for choosing specific types of foreign R&D partners when forming 
international R&D alliances within triadic structures as a means of accelerating the 
internationalisation of R&D. To capture chipmakers’ tendencies to form international R&D 
alliances within triads, structural effects and ego and dyadic covariates are included in the 
models – i.e. observed variables (based on organisational characteristics) which are expected 
 
13 For a more detailed and technical description of this method, please see Section 4.4.2. 
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to explain the formation of international R&D alliances within triads by chipmakers, within 
distinct sub-networks. Table 5.1 provides an overview of all the effects which are included. 
Table 5.1: Specification of SAOMs for hypothesis testing and the interpretation of structural, ego and dyadic 
effects (source: Ripley et al., 2019) 
 
Preference for the formation of international triadic R&D alliances vis-à-vis dyadic R&D alliances, 
captured with the 3-cycles and transitive triplets effects, is explicitly modelled only in hypotheses 
1a, 2a, 3a, 3b and 3c because the sub-networks used for testing these hypotheses include both 
triadic and dyadic R&D alliances. It is important to note that both of these structural effects capture 
 
Hypothesis Effect Formal expression Interpretation 
 Structural   








Captures number of transitive 
patterns in i's relationships: where 
i has  an alliance with the pair (j, h) 
who are also tied to each other. 
Triplets of type {i  j  h; i  h} 
and  







Captures the number of three-
cycles (regarded as generalised 
reciprocity), within a triplet of 




∑ 𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝑥ℎ𝑗)
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Effect captures the non-existence 
of alliance tie h  j in a triad with 
ties  h  i and   
i  j. 
 Ego   




i's out-degree weighted by its 
covariate value (V). 






𝑣𝑗 −  𝑣𝑖) 
The alter-minus-ego difference of 
the covariate over all actors to 






𝑣𝑖 =  𝑣𝑗} 
The number of alliance ties of i to 
all other actors j who have exactly 
the same covariate value (V). 
 Controls   
1a; 1b; 3a; 





 Number of reciprocated ties 






= (𝑥𝑖+ + 1)
𝛼ℎ   
Log of out-degree effect 𝑥𝑖+ =
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗  where 𝑥𝑖𝑗= 1 indicates the 
presence of the tie i  j. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Overview of estimation equations and descriptions of associated sub-networks 
Hypothesis Estimation equation Sub-network description 
1a 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ + 
𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗 
Sub-network of cross-country R&D alliances 
• Focal: chipmakers (IDM and fabless). 
• Partners: any type*. 
• Ties: both dyads and triads in which both R&D partners are foreign to the chipmaker, but both partners can be located in the same foreign country. 
1b 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦-
𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗
  
Sub-network of triadic R&D alliances 
• Focal: chipmakers (IDM and fabless). 
• Partners: any type. 
• Ties: triads only, comprised of both domestic and international alliances. 
2a 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1(𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑀-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖) +  
𝛽2(𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗ℎ ∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖 ) 
Sub-network of cross-country R&D alliances 
• Focal: chipmakers (IDM and fabless). 
• Partners: any type. 
• Ties: both dyads and triads in which both R&D partners are foreign to the chipmaker, but both partners can be located in the same foreign country. 
2b 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1(𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑀-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖) +  
𝛽2(𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋𝑖) + 
𝛽3𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖  
3a 
𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ + 
𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗 
Sub-network of cross-country fundamental R&D alliances 
• Focal: chipmakers (IDM and fabless). 
• Partners: university/research centres; any other type. 
• Ties: both dyads and triads (read: only three-way alliance ties that are part of one and the same multi-partner alliance) in which at least one chipmaker 
and one university/research centre are participants, and the third partner could be of any type. All partners are foreign to the chipmaker. 
3b Sub-network of cross-country complementary technology alliances 
• Focal: chipmakers (IDM and fabless). 
• Partners: technological complementors (TC); any other type. 
• Ties: both dyads and triads in which both R&D partners are foreign to the chipmaker. Dyads only exist between chipmakers and TCs; triads are formed 
between at least one chipmaker, one TC and any other type of partner. 
3c Sub-network of cross-country end-market alliances 
• Focal: chipmakers (IDM and fabless). 
• Partners: end-industry partners (systems companies); any other type. 
• Ties: both dyads and triads in which both R&D partners are foreign to the chipmaker. Dyads only exist between chipmakers and end-industry partners; 
triads are formed between at least one chipmaker, one end-industry partner and any other type of partner. 
4a 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦-𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 
𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗 
Sub-network of triadic cross-industry, cross-country R&D alliances 
• Focal: chipmakers (IDM and fabless). 
• Partners: technological complementors (TC) and end-industry partners (systems companies). 
• Ties: triads only, in which at least one R&D partner is foreign to the chipmaker and, in the case when both partners are foreign, they can be located in the 
same foreign country.  
4b 𝑓𝑖(𝛽, 𝑥) =  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦-𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑗 Sub-network of triadic cross-industry, cross-country R&D alliances 
• Focal: chipmakers (IDM and fabless). 
• Partners: technological complementors (TC) and end-industry partners (systems companies). 
• Ties: triads only, in which both R&D partners are foreign to the chipmaker, but both partners can be located in the same foreign country. 
* Please see Table 4.2 in Section 4.3 for the types of R&D partners in the semiconductor R&D alliance network. 
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the tendency toward network closure through the formation of triads; however, they capture 
different directions of resource flows (see Table 5.1). The remaining hypotheses (1b, 4a, 4b and 4c) 
are tested on sub-networks composed of exclusively triadic R&D alliance structures, thus 
eliminating the need to include either of these triadic effects in the relevant models. Details on all 
distinct sub-networks, along with the model specifications for each of the hypotheses, are 
provided in Table 5.2. 
To model the formation of distinct triadic constructs that chipmakers may use to internationalise 
R&D through alliances, several important ego and dyadic covariates are included across the 
models. Ego effects are used to determine whether an organisation is an IDM (𝐼𝐷𝑀-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋) 
(hypotheses 2a and 2b) or a fabless chipmaker (𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠-𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑋) (hypotheses 2a and 2b). Dyadic 
effects are used to evaluate the preference of chipmakers in general to form R&D alliances with 
R&D partners in countries and regions different from their own. In light of capturing interregional 
R&D alliance formations, the sample has been split into the regions North America (Canada and 
the US), Europe, Asia and ‘Other’. Notably the former three regions resemble the established and 
upcoming regional innovation centres within the global semiconductor industry where the 
majority of collaborative R&D takes place (Ernst, 2005; Semiconductor Industry Association, 
2016). Additionally, two-way structural-ego and ego-dyadic interactions between some of the 
effects are included14.  
The choice of control variables is also different from the traditional regression models 
conventionally used in IB studies, because of the focus of the study and the specification of 
SAOMs. The SAOMs specified will control for chipmaker types as a proxy of firm-level 
attributes, such as size, age and R&D intensity, which are conventionally used in 
internationalisation studies to analyse the formation of international R&D alliances. 
The ‘chipmaker type’ proxy is relevant because the chipmaker’s choice to internationalise its 
R&D alliances through integrated or protected triadic tactics, as opposed to dyads, ought to 
be determined by the specific needs of the operating model based on which it conducts 
business, namely either the IDM or fabless operating model; rather than direct effects of 
company-level attributes, as conventionally used with traditional regression models. 
Moreover, the methodology underlying the SAOM does not require conventional company-
level attributes to estimate the effects of network closure and brokerage on the formation of 
international R&D alliances within triadic alliance configurations.  
Importantly, the chipmaker types do function as a proxies for the size, age and R&D intensity 
of chipmakers, because IDMs can only be successfully operated by large, long-established 
companies with extensive financial resources and market experience, owing to the substantial 
financial constraints inherent to the IDM model; and smaller and younger organisations with 
limited internal resources are therefore only able to efficiently sustain a fabless operation 
 
14 Ripley et al. (2019) advise that the individual effects underlying an interaction effect do not need to be included 
in the same model as well. 
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which is inherently centred on inter-organisational collaboration. In addition, a few structural 
control effects are included in several models to control for skewed out-degree distributions 
of chipmakers (𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑔) as well as chipmakers’ tendency to reciprocate the formation of 
R&D alliance ties (𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝) – as advised by Ripley et al. (2019). 
5.5. Network analysis results 
5.5.1. Patterns of international and interregional R&D alliance formations 
The importance of international alliances to R&D in the semiconductor industry is 
underscored by the vast dispersion of joint R&D across countries as well as geographical 
regions (see Table 5.3). The formation of international R&D alliances15 consistently accounts 
for over 50% of all alliance formations across the sample period, and interregional R&D 
alliances for just short of 50%. It is clear that for chipmakers it is not a matter of whether to 
collaborate internationally, but rather how to collaborate efficiently and effectively through 
the utilisation of distinct network tactics in order to maximise their internationalisation 
advantage.  
Table 5.3: International and interregional R&D alliance formations (multiplex alliance relations excluded) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
# international (cumulated) 191 353 604 781 962 1,107 1,277 1,505 1,643 1,779 1,952 
International ratio* 57% 56% 54% 55% 56% 54% 53% 54% 54% 54% 54% 
# interregional (cumulated) 164 307 529 684 823 941 1,087 1,277 1,398 1,513 1,648 
Interregional ratio 49% 49% 48% 48% 48% 46% 45% 46% 46% 46% 46% 
*International/regional ratio shows the number of international/regional alliances against the total (including domestic alliances) 
The process of inter-regionalisation of R&D, in particular, might be accelerated by the 
formation of strategic alliances within triadic configurations as a means of efficiently and 
effectively overcoming larger cultural and cognitive distances and outpacing incremental 
internationalisation processes suggested by traditional IB models (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977). This is illustrated by Figure 5.2, which shows that strategic partners from across the 
R&D ecosystem and across the industry’s most important and upcoming regional innovation 
centres – i.e. North America (notably the US), Europe and Asia (notably China, South Korea 
and Japan) – are increasingly pulled into the densely integrated gravitational centre of the 
semiconductor R&D network where semiconductor companies collaborate inter-regionally 
within triadic structures. Concurrently, there are no obvious indications that semiconductor 
 
 
15 When not specified otherwise, an R&D alliance is defined as a single collaborative relationship which exists 
between at least two partner organisations. It does not capture multiple agreements that a these alliance partners 
might potentially have between them. 
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Complete R&D alliance network (period 2004-2009) 
1,152 organisations; 2,044 dyads; 2,088 triads 
 
 
Complete R&D alliance network (period 2004-2014) 
1,827 organisations; 3,601 dyads; 4,212 triads 
 
Node size based on the firm’s number of triad memberships 
Node colour: North America; Europe; Asia; Other 




companies have a preference for geographical clustering within their home regions – neither 
in 2009, nor in 2014. 
The visuals suggest that this is especially the case for R&D partners based in Asia. While the 
industry’s regional innovation centres had traditionally been concentrated in the US, South 
Korea, Japan and Europe (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2016), with fabrication largely 
concentrated in other parts of Asia, Asia’s role as an innovation centre for semiconductor R&D 
has been rapidly growing since the start of the sample period (Ernst, 2005). This is notably 
due to the increasing population of Asian organisations specialising in the development of 
chip designs and electronic design automation (EDA) tools, and the growing emergence of 
Asian systems companies as customers or design partners to chipmakers in the age of the IoT 
(Ernst, 2005). 
This can also be seen from the descriptive statistics in Table 5.4, which show that a majority 
of the R&D conducted with Asian partners spans across regional borders. This may reflect the 
relatively new trend in the collaborative behaviour of chipmakers in view of moving their 
joint R&D activities from traditional innovation centres, such as in the USA, to those in Asia 
(Ernst, 2005). This trend has been highlighted in Section 2.1.1. The fact that the proportion of 
interregional alliances with Asian partners has been declining suggests that foreign and Asian 
semiconductor companies alike have recognised the potential value that they may derive from 
collaborating with (other) Asian R&D partners and are thus seeking to expand their R&D 
alliance networks within Asia to explore new opportunities for novelty value creation across 
technological fields and product applications which potential R&D partners in this region can 
offer. 
Table 5.4: Interregional R&D alliance formations broken down by region (multiplex alliance relations excluded) 
Region Metric 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
N. America 
# alliances (cum.) 149 277 463 595 717 815 938 1,112 1,215 1,315 1,427 
Interregional ratio* 52% 52% 52% 53% 54% 53% 54% 54% 54% 54% 54% 
Europe 
# alliances (cum.) 69 128 251 316 377 446 519 605 655 705 753 
Interregional ratio 79% 86% 79% 80% 77% 77% 71% 72% 72% 73% 73% 
Asia 
# alliances (cum.) 103 193 312 409 495 549 625 732 798 867 964 
Interregional ratio 86% 80% 78% 76% 75% 69% 68% 70% 70% 70% 68% 
Other 
# alliances (cum.) 7 16 32 48 57 72 92 105 128 139 152 
Interregional ratio 100% 100% 97% 94% 93% 94% 94% 94% 95% 95% 95% 
* Interregional ratio shows the number of interregional alliances against the total (including domestic alliances) 
The data in Table 5.5 show that, indeed, across the board there has been an increase in the 
R&D alliances formed with partners based in Asia. Notably, the number of intraregional R&D 
alliances between Asian partners has nearly doubled between 2009 and 2014 – from 244 to 445 
– and American-Asian R&D alliances have increased at a similar rate – from 432 to 765. 
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Proportionally, Asian organisations have also become a more prominent type of R&D partner 
within the industry’s global R&D network, while American organisations’ relative 
prominence has decreased. Accordingly, this suggests that R&D alliances enable 
semiconductor companies to efficiently and effectively conduct R&D internationally and to 
enhance the (novelty) value created through international R&D with R&D partners outside of 
traditional regional innovation centres. 
Table 5.5: Regional integration of R&D (two periods compared; multiplex alliance relations excluded) 
  Interregional R&D alliance formations (#) and ratios (%)* (2004-2009) 
 N. America Europe Asia Other N. America Europe Asia Other 
N. America 717 332 432 51 35.1% 16.2% 21.1% 2.5% 
Europe - 137 105 9 - 6.7% 5.1% 0.4% 
Asia - - 244 12 - - 11.9% 0.6% 
Other - - - 5 - - - 0.2% 
  Interregional R&D alliance formations (#) and ratios (%) (2004-2014) 
  N. America Europe Asia Other N. America Europe Asia Other 
N. America 1,222 554 765 108 33.9% 15.4% 21.2% 3.0% 
Europe - 278 177 22 - 7.7% 4.9% 0.6% 
Asia - - 445 22 - - 12.4% 0.6% 
Other - - - 8 - - - 0.2% 
*Interregional ratio shows the number of Region-to-Region alliances as a proportion of the total number of all intraregional and 
interregional alliances formed during the period 
The differences in the motives for IDMs and fabless chipmakers to internationalise R&D 
through alliances are evident from the descriptive statistics in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. Overall, 
Table 5.6 shows that 55% of all R&D alliances formed by chipmakers across the entire sample 
period are formed with foreign partners, which indicates a large overall preference for 
international R&D collaboration. This tendency appears to be stronger for IDMs than for 
fabless chipmakers, although there seems to be a shift by IDMs toward expanding their 
domestic R&D alliance networks, while fabless chipmakers appear to focus increasingly more 
on expanding their international R&D alliance networks. This is true in both North America 
and Asia, which points toward increasing integration of R&D between these two regions (as 




Table 5.6: Evolution of international R&D alliance formations, split by region and chipmaker type 
(multiplex alliance relations excluded) 
    2004-2009 2004-2014 
Region Metric IDM Fabless Overall IDM Fabless Overall 
N. America 
# alliances (cum.) 342 288 630 529 596 1,125 
International ratio* 58% 41% 49% 56% 46% 50% 
Europe 
# alliances (cum.) 100 63 163 143 147 290 
International ratio 94% 86% 91% 93% 80% 86% 
Asia  
# alliances (cum.) 54 94 148 59 179 238 
International ratio 53% 56% 55% 46% 57% 54% 
Other 
# alliances (cum.) 0 10 10 1 17 18 
International ratio - 100% 100% 100% 94% 95% 
Overall 
# alliances (cum.) 496 455 951 732 939 1,671 
International ratio 62% 48% 54% 59% 52% 55% 
*International ratio shows the number of international alliances against the total (including domestic alliances) 
The differences in internationalisation motives between IDMs and fabless chipmakers are 
further reflected by their foreign partner choices (see Table 5.7). With an increase from 36% to 
47% in the share of international R&D alliances with technology complementors between the 
end of 2009 and 2014, it is evident that the international R&D alliance strategies of fabless 
chipmakers are increasingly driven by a motive to access foreign technologies; namely, to 
complement their core technologies and chip design capabilities with the technologies, IPs 
and knowledge of foreign technological complementors in order to enhance the value of their 
chip technologies. By contrast, the international alliance formations of IDMs show an increase 
from 61% to 63% in the share of international R&D alliances with foreign end-market partners. 
This indicates a growing focus on linking the development and commercialisation of new chip 
technologies in foreign markets and may thus reflect IDMs’ motive to internationalise R&D 
to achieve and maintain their technological leadership and dominance in foreign markets. 
Table 5.7: Chipmakers' partner choices for international R&D collaboration (multiplex alliance relations excluded) 
 



















# of intl. alliances 14 82 123 334 23 139 175 503 
International ratio* 64% 59% 61% 64% 62% 57% 63% 62% 
Fabless 
# of intl. alliances 14 62 92 263 27 164 177 576 
International ratio 58% 36% 55% 47% 45% 47% 56% 52% 
*International ratio shows the number of international alliances against the total (including domestic) alliances formed with a given 
partner type; **‘Tech. C.’ is short for ‘Technological complementor’. 
Interestingly, while chipmakers’ do seem to have a strong focus on accessing fundamental 
R&D expertise from universities and research centres in foreign markets, chipmakers appear 
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to shift their fundamental R&D networks toward the domestic market – fabless chipmakers 
in particular, as indicated by the decreasing ratio of international alliances from 58% to 45%. 
This might suggest that fabless chipmakers, owing to resource constraints, are not yet as 
advanced as IDMs in their orchestration capability to design triadic network strategies to 
effectively overcome their cultural and cognitive distances to foreign R&D partners and 
consequently derive greater value from international R&D alliances. 
5.5.2. Stochastic actor-oriented model results 
Results were obtained for a total of 11 SAOMs, displayed in Table 5.8 on the next page. These 
models were run on distinct sub-networks, and results for each hypothesis are provided by a 
single model – with the exception of hypotheses 4a and 4b, which required a comparison of 
two models. It is indicated whether a model is focused on cross-country or cross-regional 
collaboration. Table 5.8 reports only the final model results; however, robustness checks were 
performed by including relevant structural, dyadic and ego effects individually in the models. 
We retained the models with the best model fit – as indicated by good convergence of the 
estimation algorithm and measured by the overall maximum convergence ratio in line with 
Ripley et al. (2019). Good convergence was obtained for all models except for model 5. 
The control effects 𝑂𝑢𝑡-𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 (𝑙𝑜𝑔) and 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 were only included in those models 
where an improved model fit was obtained, namely in all models except for models 4 and 9.1. 
No effects were excluded from the models and all insignificant effects were retained as they 
were of primary interest to the hypothesis tests. 
As the hypotheses were tested for positive relationships, one-sided p-values were used to 
confirm statistical significance of the included effects. We tested the model parameters by 
referring the t-ratios (
𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
) of all modelled effects to a standard normal distribution, 
following the method suggested by Snijders et al. (2010). 
Statistically significant support is obtained for all hypotheses, which will be discussed in detail 
one by one. Model 1 provides a statistically significant 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 effect (t = 6.74/1.52 
= 4.43, one-sided p < 0.01), indicating that chipmakers have a greater tendency to 
internationalise R&D through integrated R&D alliances than through dyadic R&D alliances 
(H.1a). This suggests that configuring international R&D alliances within triadic structures 
may help chipmakers to overcome cultural and cognitive distance and consequently enhance 
the value created through international R&D. In addition, model 2 provides a statistically 
significant 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦-𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑋 interaction effect (t = 0.01/0.004 = 2.5, one-sided 
p < 0.01), which indicates that chipmakers have a preference to form R&D alliances within 
triadic configurations when they collaborate with partners in foreign regions (H.1b). This 
suggests that R&D internationalisation is taking more complex network forms through triads. 
 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8.1 8.2 9.1 9.2 
























 Transitive triplets  6.74***    0.86** 1.91*** 4.82***     
   (1.52)    (0.40) (0.36) (1.41)     
 Chipmaker ego * country-sameX  0.01***          
    (0.004)          
 IDM ego * 3-cycles   0.54***         
     (0.25)         
 Fabless ego * 3-cycles   -1.04***         
     (0.29)         
 IDM ego * betweenness     128.29***        
      (33.97)        
 Fabless ego * betweenness     3.04**        
     (1.67)        
 Country-diffX        0.012**    
          (0.006)    
 Region-diffX         0.02   
          (0.11)   
 Country-sameX 
 
         2.46***  
          (0.39)  
 Region-sameX           1.30*** 
             (0.23) 
Control effects            
 Out-degree (log) Excl. Excl. Excl. Incl. Excl. Excl. Excl. Excl. Excl. Excl. Excl. 
 Reciprocity Incl. Incl. Excl. Excl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Excl. Incl. 
             
Overall maximum convergence ratio 0.16 0.08 0.12 4.26 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.14 
Sub-network characteristics16        
 Number of organisations 969 572 969 63 367 381 668 
 Number of alliance ties 1,886 2,483 1,886 99 501 556 291 
 Number of integrated triads 1,640 4,212 1,640 29 155 421 196 
Main entries represent estimated coefficients (standard errors are shown between brackets). Convergence ratio is a measure of model fit (<0.25 indicates a good fit). 
Significance indicated as * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
16 Please note that the figures indicating the number of integrated triads capture the total number of triad memberships of all organisations in the network, rather than the total 
number of triadic formations in the network. For example, a single triad would be counted as three triad memberships because there are three organisations in the triad. 





Model 3 offers support for hypothesis 2a, as indicated by the statistically significant 𝐼𝐷𝑀 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗
3-𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 (t = 0.54/0.25 = 2.16, one-sided p < 0.05) and the 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 3-𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 (t = -1.04/0.29 
= -3.59, one-sided p < 0.01) interaction effects. Both of these effects were consistently obtained 
with, respectively, positive and negative estimates in models where the 3-𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 effect was 
replaced with the 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 effect; however, the model with the 3-𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 effect 
provided better model fit. This result indicates that IDMs have a greater tendency than fabless 
chipmakers to internationalise R&D through integrated triadic R&D alliances.  
Concurrently, model 4 indicates that IDMs also have a greater tendency than fabless 
chipmakers to broker international R&D alliances with foreign partners (H.2b) – as indicated 
by the positive statistically significant 𝐼𝐷𝑀 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 (t = 128.29/33.97 = 3.78, one-
sided p < 0.01) and 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 (t = 3.04/1.67 = 1.82, one-sided p < 0.05) 
interaction effects. The larger estimate for the former effect indicates that this tendency is 
relatively greater for IDMs in comparison to fabless chipmakers. In spite of this result, 
however, model 4 did not obtain good model fit as indicated by the overall maximum 
convergence ratio of 4.26.  
Model 5 provides support for hypothesis 3a as indicated by the statistically significant 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 effect (t = 0.86/0.40 = 2.15, one-sided p < 0.05) – suggesting that chipmakers 
are more likely to internationalise fundamental R&D alliances through integrated triads than 
dyads. Similarly, in model 6, the 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 effect is also statistically significant (t = 
1.91/0.36 = 5.31, one-sided p < 0.01), which indicates that chipmakers are also more likely to 
form international R&D alliances with technological complementors through integrated 
triads than through dyads. Model 7 further confirms support for hypothesis 3c with a 
statistically significant 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 effect (t = 4.82/1.41 = 3.42, one-sided p < 0.01) – 
indicating that chipmakers have a greater tendency to form international R&D alliances with 
end-industry partners (systems companies) through integrated triads than through dyads. 
Overall, the results obtained from models 5-7 suggest that integrated triads for these R&D 
alliance strategies become a dominant form of internationalisation. 
Models 8.1 provides support for hypothesis 4a as indicated by the statistical significant 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦-𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑋 effect (t = 0.012/0.006 = 2.00, one-sided p < 0.05) – suggesting that chipmakers 
have a tendency to form international cross-industry R&D alliances within integrated triads 
with at least one foreign R&D partner. However, the statistically insignificant 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛-𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑋 
effect (t = 0.02/0.11 = 0.18, one-sided p > 0.10) obtained in model 8.2 suggests that chipmakers 
do not yet possess sufficiently advanced orchestration capabilities to utilise integrated triadic 
R&D alliances to cross regional border to search for and create cross-industry bridges to 
integrate complementary technologies and end-market capabilities or systems technologies, 
and align the development and commercialisation of new technological developments. 
177 
 
Chipmakers seem to be more capable of achieving this intra-regionally, at smaller psychic 
distances. 
In addition, model 9.1 offers support for hypothesis 4b as indicated by the statistically 
significant 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦-𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑋 effect (t = 2.46/0.39 = 6.31, one-sided p < 0.01) – suggesting that 
when chipmakers conduct R&D through international cross-industry alliances (within 
integrated triads), they are more likely to source complementary technologies in geographical 
proximity to end-markets. Model 9.2 confirms a similar result in view of interregional R&D 
collaboration, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛-𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑋 effect (t = 
1.30/0.23 = 5.65, one-sided p < 0.01). This result is particularly interesting as it suggests that, 
with relation to model 8.2, configuring R&D alliances with geographically proximate R&D 
partners within integrated triads provides chipmakers with a more efficient and effective way 
of conducting interregional R&D. 
5.6. Discussion of findings 
The study conducted in this chapter builds on the framework introduced in Chapter 4, with 
the goal of demonstrating that the choice of triadic network tactic should be driven by 
strategic considerations about the implications of the configuration of alliance relations as well 
as the selection of alliance partners within triads for the internationalisation of R&D. This view 
on the internationalisation of R&D, combining the configuration of relations and the selection 
of R&D partners as the two core elements of any international R&D alliance strategy, is 
missing in the field of IB. Specifically, the central premise of this study is that strategic 
networking, through the orchestration of international R&D alliances within triads as 
opposed to dyads, enables (a) enhancing the value and the novelty of value created through 
international R&D and (b) accelerating the process of internationalising R&D.  
The role of strategic networking in the internationalisation process of R&D goes beyond the 
mere formation of network ties to access partner-specific assets in foreign markets, as 
commonly viewed in the field of IB. It is critical for companies to strategically choose (1) the 
configuration of its ego network of international R&D alliances (i.e. a preference for protective 
versus inclusive triadic collaboration) and (2) the combination of foreign R&D partners in its 
ego network; intra-industry and cross-industry as well as intra-regional and cross-regional. 
This strategic choice at the level of the firm’s ego network ultimately defines its position in the 
industry’s wider global R&D network and consequently (a) its access to fundamental R&D 
expertise and (b) complementary technologies, resources and knowledge concentrated in 
regional innovation centres, as well as (c) access to foreign end-market knowledge and 
downstream commercial opportunities. 
The findings of this study suggest that the effect of network ties on the internationalisation 
process of R&D is more complex than commonly conceptualised in the IB literature and that 
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network ties should not be considered as another ownership advantage on the same line as 
firm-level resources. Firms choose a governance mechanism for their international R&D 
alliances which defines their choice of network tactic. The network approach may thus offer 
potential extensions to the transaction cost perspective on the internationalisation strategies 
of firms.  
Firms might consequently utilise their chosen network tactics to establish collaborative 
environments based on mutual trust, commitment and cooperation in order to foster mutual 
knowledge sharing and enable fusing the strategic visions, objectives and cultural differences 
of international R&D partners. By integrating R&D alliance relations within triads, the firm 
may consequently shift away from the creation of new value on the basis of inter-
organisational complementarities between existing resources in captive types of alliances, 
toward developing new assets, such as knowledge and technologies, by jointly applying 
technical skills and capabilities with foreign R&D partners in relational types of alliances.  
Accordingly, the firm’s network strategy has a very different role in facilitating the 
internationalisation process of its R&D. The outcome of this study suggests that the choice of 
network tactic will determine what value will be created through international R&D; how fast 
firms can commercialise their R&D outputs and reach foreign end-markets; and the extent of 
learning and new knowledge creation that can take place within the R&D alliances.  
This is firstly demonstrated as we find that the integration of R&D alliances within triadic 
configurations facilitates the internationalisation of R&D by chipmakers overall (H.1a) and 
IDMs in particular (H.2a). This may, from a resource-based view, be due to IDMs’ larger 
resource bases and more extensive market experience in comparison to fabless chipmakers, 
creating capacity to form and configure international R&D alliances within more complex 
network forms. These findings point at the unique advantage of integrated triads as compared 
to dyads in view of enhancing chipmakers’ value creation abilities in international R&D; as 
well as potentially combining both (1) complementing existing resources and (2) learning, as 
a means of not only creating and capturing new value , but also creating new knowledge and 
technologies. Moreover, the findings also suggest that chipmakers utilise integrated triads to 
enhance their learning advantage through international R&D (H.1b), because integrated triads 
can function as effective governance mechanisms which encourage the exchange of 
knowledge and enable complementing the chipmaker’s own absorptive capacity with that of 
a third partner. 
Importantly, however, the facilitatory role of integrated triads in the internationalisation of 
R&D is not shared by the relatively nimble fabless chipmakers, who rather appear inclined 
toward more exclusive R&D alliance relationships as indicated by the negative 𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑔𝑜 ∗
3-𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 effect.  Comparing this particular result to those revealed in Chapter 4, which showed 
that fabless chipmakers do have a greater tendency than IDMs to integrate their R&D alliances 
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within triads, fabless chipmakers seemingly change their R&D alliance strategies when 
collaborating in foreign markets. This may be due to fabless chipmakers’ constraints in their 
internal resources, such as financial resources and managerial capabilities and expertise, 
which large and long-established IDMs do have in relatively greater abundance.  
Concurrently, the results also indicate that fabless chipmakers do pursue brokerage 
opportunities within the industry’s wider global R&D network, which may again suggest that 
fabless chipmakers are not capable to extend their alliances across borders through 
configurations within integrated triads as this may require capabilities and skills beyond their 
internal resource base. However, as hypothesised, the tendency to utilise brokerage is 
relatively greater for IDMs (H.2b), which suggests that – in spite of poor convergence of model 
5 – strategic networking through the brokerage of international alliances between R&D 
partners in (different) foreign markets, as an alternative triadic network strategy, does also 
facilitate the internationalisation of R&D – on the basis of exclusive and privileged access to 
non-redundant resources and knowledge. The evolution of the firm’s ego network 
configuration is therefore not a choice of ‘either-or’, but instead a matter of the meticulous 
orchestration of complementary network tactics in line with its R&D strategy and objectives 
and external pressures. 
Furthermore, the study suggests that the integration, and notably bridging, of alliance relations 
with strategically selection foreign R&D partners within triads might help chipmakers to 
(1) foster cross-industry knowledge exchanges across regional borders and (2) accelerate the 
internationalisation of R&D through access to fundamental research expertise in foreign 
innovation centres (H.3a), location-found technological complementor (H.3b) or foreign end-
market knowledge (H.3c). This finding points toward the role of integrated triads in driving 
the regionalisation of semiconductor R&D and accelerating the internationalisation of R&D 
by providing chipmakers with access to location-bound partner-specific assets, located in 
regional innovation centres or foreign downstream end-markets. Namely, chipmakers can 
speed-up the process of creating value through international R&D by complementing their 
committed resources with the technological assets of their R&D partners or by leveraging and 
learning from the foreign market experience of foreign end-market partners. 
The internationalisation of R&D is not, however, a function of exclusively resource 
complementarities or learning. Importantly, our findings suggest that chipmakers’ 
internationalisation of R&D is facilitated by combining these two mechanisms via the 
integration cross-industry R&D partners, namely both a technological complementor and an 
end-industry partner, in one and the same triadic R&D alliance (H.4a) – as a means of 
generating cross-industry synergies to simultaneously enhance the value created through 
international R&D and accelerate the R&D internationalisation process in view of quicker 
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cross-industry technology alignment and commercialisation. This effectively results in a 
higher level of internationalisation advantage.  
Interestingly, however, these results suggest that chipmakers do possess the capabilities to 
orchestrate their strategic networks to unlock this superior internationalisation advantage 
intra-regionally, but not inter-regionally. At the same time, the apparent larger psychic 
distances in interregional R&D collaboration can seemingly be overcome by chipmakers when 
their technological complementor and end-industry partner within the same triadic R&D 
alliance are located in the same foreign country (H.4b). The integration of R&D alliances within 
triadic configurations, through meticulous strategic orchestration, therefore provides 
chipmakers with the potential to enhance the internationalisation as well as the inter-
regionalisation of semiconductor R&D.  
These findings provide significant contributions to the established theoretical models in the 
field of IB, as well as important implications for managers’ decision-making in relation to the 
internationalisation of their R&D activities. This will be discussed in the next section. 
5.7. Conclusions and implications 
The available traditional methods to analyse the internationalisation of firms, which are still 
relied on by many IB scholars, are insufficiently capable to explain the internationalisation 
decisions of many modern businesses in an age where these businesses rely increasingly on 
collaborative modes to internationalise. Extant IB frameworks, namely, do not consider how 
distinct relational configurations might change the outcomes of companies’ hybrid strategies 
in foreign markets and, therefore, do not explain how modern companies can utilise network 
tactics to maximise the R&D outcomes of their international hybrid strategies. Accordingly, 
we introduced a framework integrating (1) the fundamental  internationalisation concepts of 
resource commitment and learning advantages with (2) the network approach to analysing 
the formation of international R&D alliances. This study offers important conceptual and 
empirical contributions to the field of IB in view of explaining the R&D internationalisation 
decisions of modern international businesses from a network perspective. 
First and foremost, with our framework we provide an alternative approach to analyse and 
explain the internationalisation of R&D through strategic alliances. As such, this approach 
goes beyond the conception of dominant IB models that the firm’s capability to 
internationalise depends on its ability to exploit and reconfigure its committable resources 
and learning advantages to create value in foreign markets through FDI, and explicitly 
accounts for the fact that many firms, notably in high-tech industries, increasingly 
internationalise R&D through networks of non-equity hybrid arrangements. We are certainly 
not the first to make this observation and to examine the formation as strategic alliances as a 
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mode of R&D internationalisation; however, this study is different from many others in that 
it explores triadic network tactics as the essence of hybrid modes of R&D internationalisation. 
Instead, capitalising on the conceptual and methodological tools made available by the field 
of network science, our framework considers alliances or network ties as strategic 
mechanisms which facilitate (1) the creation of (novelty) with resource commitments in 
foreign markets via (a) combining existing complementary knowledge and technologies and 
(b) jointly applying technical skills and capabilities; as well as (2) the acceleration of R&D 
internationalisation by bridging cross-industry relations between strategically selected 
foreign technology and end-market partners within triadic configurations. As such, this 
framework integrates what is increasingly being recognised by IB scholars, yet insufficiently 
captured by established IB models, namely that networks are not only used by firms to exploit 
their competitive advantages in foreign markets. The central contribution of this study, 
therefore, comprises an alternative view on R&D internationalisation through a network lens. 
In addition, this comprises a conceptual contribution which also extends the view on asset 
complementarities in the strategic management literature. 
The IB literature typically considers the concept of ‘networks’ in light of the size of the firm’s 
portfolio of foreign alliance partners or the types of foreign partners it has connections to, e.g. 
customers or technology providers; however, these conceptions only capture one core aspect 
of the strategic utility which firms can derive from internationalising R&D through triadic 
tactics – namely, the partner composition of the firm’s ego network. Importantly, the 
configuration of its R&D alliance relations within its ego network is a second, arguably more 
strategically crucial, element of the strategic utility of networks, as the strategic configuration 
of alliance relations within integrated triads can help firms to develop effective governance 
mechanisms needed for the creation of new assets through international R&D. However, this 
has mostly been left out from analyses of international alliance networks. By combining and 
integrating these two core elements into a single framework, our approach offers an essential 
theoretical construct to analyse and explain the role of networks in the internationalisation of 
R&D as well as a way of empirically examining the network orchestration capabilities of 
MNEs, both of which had been missing from established IB approaches. 
Accordingly, this study also offers methodological contributions in view of the application of 
stochastic actor-oriented modelling (SAOM), as opposed to traditional regression methods, to 
capture both the partner composition and relational configuration of firms’ ego networks in 
empirical analyses and consequently develop more adequate explanations of the international 
network strategies of firms and differences in their internationalisation advantage. 
The contributions of this study are not limited to academia, but also offer lessons to strategists 
and managers of international businesses – notably in high-tech industries. Firstly, the ability 
to strategically orchestrate a network of international R&D alliances is a distinctive 
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competitive capability in today’s global industry environments. Secondly, strategists and 
managers should recognise the distinct network advantages associated with integrated and 
protective tactics in view of enhancing the value creation potential of international R&D. For 
example, while integrated triadic tactics can enhance time-to-market and help to overcome 
challenges to value creation in international collaboration owing to cognitive and cultural 
differences, language barriers, and risks to opportunism; protective triadic tactics can be 
utilised to protect technological leadership and foreign market dominance. Thirdly, managers 
should also recognise, specifically, how strategic partner selections within integrated triadic 
strategies might enable them to simultaneously enhance the value creation potential of 
international R&D, accelerate access to specialised skills and technologies as wells as improve 
time-to-market. Finally, they should define a long-term international network strategy by 
aligning the necessary network advantages to their international R&D objectives and integrate 
this long-term network view in their partner selection processes for international R&D. 
Finally, there are a few limitations to this study which should be acknowledged. Firstly, the 
focus of our empirical analysis on the semiconductor industry might mean that our findings 
are not directly applicable to companies based outside high-tech industries. Still, the 
framework developed in this study is not exclusively applicable to the semiconductor 
industry and therefore does provide a conceptual basis on which future work can build to 
analyse the internationalisation of companies in other industries. Importantly, however, 
future work should be done to explicitly test the direct links between network tactics and both 
internationalisation outcomes and innovation outcomes; to disentangle whether value created 
through international R&D collaboration differs between triadic tactics and whether the 
choice of network tactic has implications for novelty creation. In addition, the unavailability 
of data regarding specific contractual terms of the R&D alliances included in our sample, such 
as alliance duration, means that the execution of our empirical methodology is subject to some 
limitation. As such, future research should aim to control for specific contract terms, provided 
such data are available. 
In conclusion, in this study we developed and introduced an alternative framework to analyse 
and explain the R&D internationalisation of firms from a network perspective. Using this 
framework, the outcome of this study suggests that networks resemble critical strategic 
mechanisms through which firms can develop and advance their firm-specific advantages and 
accelerate their R&D internationalisation. By strategically orchestrating the composition and 





This research presented in this thesis has sought to demonstrate the strategic role of networks 
in the inter-organisational alliance strategies of companies and to advance the integration of 
social network analysis (SNA) into the fields of strategy and international business (IB). The 
idea that firms can orchestrate inter-organisational collaboration strategically within networks, 
through alternative microstructures as opposed to dyads, is not yet well explored by strategy 
and, notably, IB scholars. Through an in-depth investigation aimed at explaining how 
companies can construct alliance network strategies to facilitate achieving their desired 
outcomes from cross-industry and international collaboration in the semiconductor industry, 
this research offers important contributions to the fields of strategy and IB and improves our 
understanding of the cross-industry and international alliance strategies of modern 
companies. 
6.1. Conceptual and methodological contributions 
Spread over three independent but connected studies, this research has delivered several 
important findings and contributions. Set in the empirical context of the semiconductor 
industry, the research started from the premise that analysing the alliance network strategies 
of firms ought to begin with examining the overall network structure of the semiconductor 
industry landscape within which they operate.  
In doing so, the first study (Chapter 3) advances existing strategic management frameworks 
for explaining the formations and outcomes of strategic alliances which do not consider the 
implications of how alliance relations are configured within networks. We achieved this by 
explicitly linking the inter-organisational routines and processes, such as the extent of 
relational commitment, investment and knowledge-sharing practices, which semiconductor 
companies choose to implement when collaborating for distinct value chain activities, to the 
outcomes related to distinct network architectures – to investigate how the strategic benefits 
associated with distinct network architectures might facilitate the implementation of inter-
organisational routines and processes.  
Using this multidimensional framework, the study first of all confirmed that the 
semiconductor industry is integrated as a highly complex network of interconnected 
organisations – based both within as well as beyond the core semiconductor industry and in 
various countries and regions – and collaborative relationships, built on both dyads and 
alternative microstructures such as triads; and revealed clear variation in the degree of 
connectedness, clustering and concentration between sub-networks of distinct value chain 
activities. Especially the network of technology partnerships stood out as highly complex, 
displaying substantially higher degrees of interconnectedness and clustering among 
semiconductor companies and their R&D partners. This implies that the formation of strategic 
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alliances is a more complex process which cannot be explained only using existing theories 
and frameworks, such as the resource-based view (RBV) or transaction cost analysis (TCA), 
as they do not consider the importance and implications of network processes. As such, the 
network approach enables more comprehensively analysing and understanding industry 
structures, not just in terms of the number of competitors and their market shares, but as 
networks defined by interactions among rivals and strategic partners within and across 
industries, resource flows, concentrated knowledge hubs and power asymmetries. Networks 
consequently are a new source of competitive advantage. 
The variance in the architectural properties of the distinct networks of value chain activities 
is unlikely to emerge due to chance and rather points at underlying strategic reasons linked 
to the nature of companies’ alliance strategies upon which these networks are built in the first 
place. For example, the relatively interconnected and clustered architecture of the 
semiconductor R&D network, in particular, suggests that the formation of R&D alliances – 
often highly integrated, co-specialised and reciprocal in nature – is not merely driven by the 
companies’ pursuit for firm-specific assets, as is still often assumed in strategy studies. Rather, 
it indicates a collective and systematic preference by semiconductor companies for closure and 
building a relatively interconnected network which can function as a governance structure 
facilitating the build-up of mutual trust and cooperation and the flow of knowledge and 
resources necessary for joint R&D between the organisations within the network. As such, the 
outcome of this study offered first indications that the strategic role of alliance networks goes 
beyond the provision of access to external resources, and suggests that analytical frameworks 
in the field of strategy should explicitly account for the structural properties of the networks 
within which companies form their alliances. 
To adequately understand the strategic role of alternative microstructures vis-à-vis purely 
dyadic relationships in the orchestration of strategic alliances, deeper analyses into 
chipmakers’ ego networks within specifically the complex R&D network were performed in 
the second (Chapter 4) and third (Chapter 5) studies. The concept of the strategic utility of 
triads introduced in Chapter 4 contributes to the literatures on strategic management and IB 
because it disentangles the complexity of strategic networks. This approach goes beyond the 
strategic implications of R&D partner choices within dyadic alliance formations and enables 
demonstrating the importance of network tactics to (1) the maximisation of R&D outcomes by 
chipmakers and (2) the reduction of uncertainty projected upon chipmakers by industry 
pressures, via the orchestration of intra- and cross-industry R&D alliances within triadic 
microstructures. 
Empirical tests indicated that chipmakers overall, and fabless chipmakers in particular, 
exhibit a significant preference for collaborating for R&D within triads as opposed to dyads; 
and, importantly, with distinct combinations of different types of intra- and cross-industry 
R&D partners resembling distinct triadic R&D strategies utilised to respond to the increasing 
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cost of R&D, increasing technological complexity, highly volatile product demand and intense 
competition. The study thus advance classic frameworks like the RBV of alliances, which 
assume that the company’s alliance formation decision is driven by (1) a pursuit for the 
strategic assets of intra and cross-industry partners (as well as intra-regional and cross-
regional), as it demonstrated that it is in fact based on a dual choice which also takes into 
account (2) the strategic benefits associated with the configuration of alliance relations within 
the company’s ego network (i.e. exclusive dyadic relationships versus inclusive triadic 
collaboration).  
The combination of these two ego network elements creates (1) a basis for alliance strategy 
formulation and (2) a structure for minimising uncertainty through effective governance of 
(a) the exchange of information and know-how and (b) the pooling of complementary 
resources between different groups of strategic partners on the basis of mutual trust and 
cooperation. Therefore, future research and theory building should view access to partner-
specific assets through network tie formations as a part of the partner composition of the 
firm’s ego network, and should consider this jointly with the way in which the firm’s ego 
network of alliance relations is configured. 
The third study (Chapter 5) built on this view to advance the integration of a strategic network 
perspective into the IB literature, and demonstrate the role of networks in facilitating the 
internationalisation of R&D collaboration. The study proposed and applied an alternative 
framework which advances established IB models, such as the OLI paradigm, to explain how 
firms can configure their hybrid strategies to enter into foreign markets and create (novelty) 
value through international R&D; going beyond TCA to explain that effective governance 
structures can be created within networks to facilitate (1) the creation of (novelty) value via 
(a) combining existing complementary knowledge and technologies and (b) jointly applying 
technical skills and capabilities; as well as (2) the acceleration of R&D internationalisation by 
bridging cross-industry relations between strategically selected foreign technology and end-
market partners within triadic configurations.  
The strategic orchestration of alliance networks can consequently enable companies to convert 
network advantage into internationalisation advantage. Empirical hypothesis tests confirmed 
that the formations of international R&D alliances by chipmakers display patterns reflective 
of the theoretical premises encapsulated in the proposed framework. The tests revealed a 
systematic and consistent preference of chipmakers overall, and IDMs in particular, for 
undertaking international R&D through alliances integrated within triadic network structures 
as opposed to dyadic structures – both in general as well as with distinct types of R&D 
partners located in foreign regional innovation centres and end-markets. By applying the 
developed framework, we were thus able to advance extant IB research in demonstrating the 
inherent complexity of the hybrid strategies through which firms internationalise R&D.  
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Notable results suggested that triadic network tactics (1) provide a way to shift the captive 
(exploitative) nature of international R&D alliances toward a relational (explorative) nature 
which enables enhancing the creation of novelty value; and (2) can be utilised to create 
effective governance structures to facilitate simultaneously enhancing value creation and 
accelerating R&D internationalisation by efficiently overcoming larger psychic distances to 
inter-regional cross-industry R&D partners. Indeed, these findings point at a ‘network effect’ 
which is much more complex than commonly conceptualised in the field of IB and suggest 
that future research and theory building should give consideration to the fact that the nature 
of strategic networks is inherently different from firm-specific assets and subsequently to the 
strategic role that networks fulfil in the internationalisation process. Importantly, new IB 
models need to adequately conceptualise the essence of the international hybrid strategies of 
modern companies by explicitly accounting for the relational configurations of these 
strategies within networks. 
Beyond contributing to the advancement of theory building in the fields of strategy and IB, 
the research overall also contributes to these fields by demonstrating the application of 
methodological tools for SNA to the analysis of strategic alliance formations. The major 
advantage of these tools is that they are specifically designed to measure the structural 
features of networks, capture the relational configurations and governance structures of 
hybrid strategies, and estimate the magnitude of structural network effects on the formation 
of alliance ties and subsequently the evolution of the entire industry network. The first study 
(Chapter 3) demonstrated that overall network indicators for network interconnectedness, 
clustering and centralisation can be used to quantitatively describe the overall architecture of 
a network as well as measure the variation in the architecture of different networks.  
Methodological contributions in the second (Chapter 4) and third (Chapter 5) studies are 
made by demonstrating the application of the stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) to 
analyse the probability and extent to which that alliance formations are driven by a firm-level 
preference for particular network configurations explicitly specified by the researcher, such 
as firms’ preference for triadic closure. Accordingly, SAOMs are advantageous over 
traditional regression methods in that they allow explicitly capturing dependencies between 
alliance tie formations within a network. Future research on networks in strategy and IB 
would benefit from adopting this method in order to more precisely analyse the collaborative 
behaviour of organisations. 
6.2. Managerial implications 
The findings generated in this research are not limited to contributing to academia, but also 
offer lessons for strategists and managers of international businesses. Overall, the research 
underscores the fact that the ability of a firm to strategically manoeuvre through its network 
of R&D alliances nowadays resembles a distinctive competitive capability.  
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More specifically, managers should first of all consider the configuration of their alliance 
network as an integral part of their alliance strategy along with the strategic implications of 
distinct network tactics for the reconfiguration of existing technologies and the development 
of new technologies and knowledge. As such, they should strive to design their alliance 
strategies within a triadic framework, in line with a defined long-term network strategy aimed 
at (1) securing network dominance and power on the basis of exclusionary tactics and 
brokerage or at (2) building network closure through integrated triadic tactics to facilitate the 
exchange of knowledge and resources. This research argues that integrated triadic tactics, in 
particular, in modularised high-tech industries, are strategically advantageous in that they 
can help to create effective governance structures based on mutual trust between the manager 
and its external R&D partners and consequently facilitate the establishment of relational – as 
opposed to captive – alliances, enhancing the communication and mutual cooperation among 
them in relation to the exchange of knowledge, complementing technologies and knowledge, 
and jointly applying technical skills and capabilities.  
Notably, integrated triadic alliance configurations are particularly beneficial to those 
managers who seek to reduce external uncertainty and enhance the novelty of their firms’ 
innovative creations through cross-industry R&D collaboration, as well as to those who are 
contemplating or tasked with the formulation of alliance strategies for international R&D 
collaboration. Orchestrating alliances with cross-industry and inter-regional R&D partners 
within integrated triads, namely, enables capitalising on the absorptive capacity and (cross-
border) collaborative experience of a third partner, and may help in developing mutual trust, 
reducing the risk of opportunism, and subsequently bridging the cognitive and cultural 
differences which managers may experience in international R&D alliances. 
This is not to say that this research advises managers to consider integrated triads as a ‘go-to’ 
network strategy for their cross-industry and international R&D alliances. Although 
examining the optimal degree of network embeddedness was outside of the scope of this 
research, managers must consider the risks and consequences of a potential technological 
lock-in, especially in highly globalised industries, jointly with the recommendations of the 
current research. Managers may reduce the risk of technological lock-in, while maintaining 
technological leadership, by ensuring their firms do broker at least some alliance network 
relations between other companies, as a means of accessing non-redundant information, 
know-how and other strategic resources. As such, protective and integrated triadic tactics 
should ideally be viewed and utilised as complementary network tactics. 
In conclusion, managers should recognise the benefits of distinct network tactics, align their 
R&D objectives with the network advantages which they can obtain from particular network 
positions, and subsequently form R&D alliances with those partners which would enable the 
firm to reach and maintain the desired network position. Importantly, managers should strive 
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to integrate this process as an integral part of their long-term alliance strategy and alliance 
decision-making.  
6.3. Research limitations 
Ultimately, as this research has been focused specifically on the global semiconductor 
industry, the empirical findings that were obtained might not directly explain the cross-
industry and international alliance strategies of companies in other industries. This is not to 
say that the research does not contribute to understanding the strategic role of networks; on 
the contrary, the frameworks developed and introduced in this research were not designed 
for exclusive application in the context of the semiconductor industry and can thus be used as 
guidance for analysing and evaluating the strategic role of networks in the context of other 
industries. This is a key contribution of the research, demonstrated in the context of the 
semiconductor industry. Importantly, however, this framework cannot be used to explain 
how network tactics might vary across different industries. 
Notably, the execution of this research has, however, been restricted by the unavailability of 
data regarding specific contractual terms of the alliances included in the network sample. In 
particular, the unavailability of data on the duration of alliance agreements means that the 
empirical analyses conducted in this research are subject to some limitation. Future empirical 








AFUAH, A. (2013). Are network effects really all about size? The role of structure and 
conduct. Strategic Management Journal, 34, 257-273. 
AHUJA, G. (2000). Collaboration Networks, Structural Holes, and Innovation: A 
Longitudinal Study. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 425-455. 
AHUJA, G. & KATILA, R. (2004). Where do resources come from? The role of idiosyncratic 
situations. Strategic Management Journal, 25, 887-907. 
AHUJA, G., POLIDORO JR., F. & MITCHELL, W. (2009). Structural homophily or social 
asymmetry? The formation of alliances by poorly embedded firms. Strategic 
Management Journal, 30, 941-958. 
AHUJA, G., SODA, G. & ZAHEER, A. (2012). The Genesis and Dynamics of Organizational 
Networks. Organization Science, 23, 434-448. 
AIKEN, M. & HAGE, J. (1968). Organizational interdependence and intra-organizational 
structure. American Sociological Review, 33, 912-930. 
ALCÁCER, J., CANTWELL, J. & PISCITELLO, L. (2016). Internationalization in the 
information age: A new era for places, firms, and international business networks? 
Journal of International Business Studies, 47, 499-512. 
ALIXPARTNERS (2013). When the Chips are Down: The Need for Greater R&D Efficiency in 
the Semiconductor Industry. 
AMIT, R. & PAUL, J. H. S. (1993). Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent. Strategic 
Management Journal, 14, 33-46. 
AMIT, R. & ZOTT, C. (2001). Value creation in E-business. Strategic Management Journal, 
22, 493-520. 
ANAND, B. N. & KHANNA, T. (2000). Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances. 
Strategic Management Journal, 21, 295-315. 
ANDÉN, P., GNANASAMBANDAM, C. & STRÅLIN, T. (2015). The perils of ignoring 
software development. McKinsey Quarterly, February 2015. 
ANDERSSON, U., DASÍ, À., MUDAMBI, R. & PEDERSEN, T. (2016). Technology, 
innovation and knowledge: The importance of ideas and international connectivity. 
Journal of World Business, 51, 153-162. 
APPLEYARD, M. M. (1996). How does knowledge flow? Interfirm patterns in the 
semiconductor industry. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 137-154. 
190 
 
ASANUMA, B. (1989). Manufacture-Supplier Relationships in Japan and the Concept of 
Relation-Specific Skill. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 3, 1-30. 
BALDWIN, H. (2005). Where will startups come from? An industry veteran says to look for 
spin-offs rather than startups. Electronic Business. 
BAPTISTA, R. & SWANN, G. (1998). Do firms in clusters innovate more? Research Policy, 
27, 525-540. 
BARKEMA, H., SCHENKAR, O., VERMEULEN, F. & BELL, J. (1997). Working abroad, 
working with others: How firms learn to operate international joint ventures. 
Economic Systems Research, 40, 426-442. 
BARRINGER, B. R. & HARRISON, J. S. (2000). Walking a Tightrope: Creating Value 
Through Interorganizational Relationships. Journal of Management, 26, 367-403. 
BATRA, G., CHENG, S., LIVERMAN, B. & SANTHANAM, N. (2016). Creating mutually 
beneficial partnerships with distributors. McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
BAUER, H., BURKACKY, O., KUPFERSCHMIDT, J. & ROCHA, A. (2017). From hardware 
to software: How semiconductor companies can lead a successful transformation. 
McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
BAUER, H., GRAWERT, F., KAMMERLANDER, N., NAEHER, U. & WEIG, F. (2011). 
Getting Mo(o)re out of semiconductor R&D. McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
BAUER, H., PATEL, M. & VEIRA, J. (2015). The Internet of Things: Opportunities and 
challenges for semiconductor companies. McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
BAUM, J., CALABRESE, T. & SILVERMAN, B. (2000). Don't Go It Alone: Alliance Network 
Composition and Startups' Performance in Canadian Biotechnology. Strategic 
Management Journal, 21, 267-294. 
BAUM, J., COWAN, R. & JONARD, N. (2010). Network-Independent Partner Selection and 
the Evolution of Innovation Networks. Management Science, 56, 2094-2110. 
BAUM, J., ROWLEY, T., SHIPILOV, A. & CHUANG, Y.-T. (2005). Dancing with strangers: 
Aspiration performance and the search for underwriting syndicate partners. 
BAUM, J. A. C. & KORN, H. J. (1999). Dynamics of dyadic competitive interaction. Strategic 
Management Journal, 20, 251-278. 
BEAMISH, P. W. (1994). Joint Ventures in LDCs: Partner Selection and Performance. 
Management International Review, 34, 60-74. 
BECKFIELD, J. & S. ALDERSON, A. (2004). Power and Position in the World City System. 
American Journal of Sociology, 109. 
BELL, G. G. (2005). Clusters, networks, and firm innovativeness. Strategic Management 
Journal, 26, 287-295. 
191 
 
BENTON, W. C. & MALONI, M. (2005). The Influence of Power Driven Buyer-Seller 
Relationships on Supply Chain Satisfaction. Journal of Operations Management, 23, 
1-22. 
BERNOULLI, D. (1954 [1738]). Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk. 
Econometrica, 22, 23-36. 
BERTRAND, O. & MOL, M. (2013). The antecedents and innovation effects of domestic and 
offshore R&D outsourcing: The contingent impact of cognitive distance and 
absorptive capacity. Strategic Management Journal, 34, 751-760. 
BERTRAND, O. & MOL, M. J. (2013). The antecedents and innovation effects of domestic 
and offshore R&D outsourcing: The contingent impact of cognitive distance and 
absorptive capacity. Strategic Management Journal, 34, 751-760. 
BOEHE, D. (2009). Product Development in MNC Subsidiaries: Local Linkages and Global 
Interdependencies. Journal of International Management, 13, 488-512. 
BOJA, C. (2011). Clusters Models, Factors and Characteristics. International Journal of 
Economic Practices and Theories, 1. 
BORGATTI, S. (2005). Centrality and Network Flow. Social Networks, 27, 55-71. 
BORGATTI, S. & EVERETT, M. (1999). Models of core/periphery structures. Social 
Networks, 21, 375-395. 
BORGATTI, S., EVERETT, M. & FREEMAN, L. (2002). UCINET for Windows: Software for 
social network analysis. 
BORGATTI, S., EVERETT, M. & JOHNSON, J. (2013). Analyzing Social Networks, Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
BOSCHMA, R. (2005). Proximity and Innovation: A Critical Assessment. Regional Studies, 
39, 61-74. 
BOSCHMA, R. A. & TER WAL, A. L. J. (2007). Knowledge Networks and Innovative 
Performance in an Industrial District: The Case of a Footwear District in the South of 
Italy. Industry and Innovation, 14, 177-199. 
BOYD, B. (1990). Corporate linkages and organizational environment: A test of the resource 
dependence model. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 419-430. 
BRANDENBURG, A. M. & NALEBUFF, B. J. (1996). Co-opetition, Crown Publishing Group. 
BRIAN UZZI & JARRETT SPIRO (2005). Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World 
Problem. American Journal of Sociology, 111, 447-504. 
BROWN, A. O., LEE, H. L. & PETRAKIAN, R. (2000). Xilinx Improves Its Semiconductor 
Supply Chain Using Product and Process Postponement. Interfaces, 30, 65-80. 
192 
 
BROWNING, L., M. BEYER, J. & C. SHETLER, J. (1995). Building cooperation in a 
competitive industry: Sema-tech and the semiconductor industry. Academy of 
Management Journals, 38, 113-151. 
BRUYNSERAEDE, C. (2009). IMEC as a model of collaboration between research centres, 
local and global industry. IMEC. 
BUCKLEY, P. J., GLAISTER, K. W., KLIJN, E. & TAN, H. (2009). Knowledge Accession and 
Knowledge Acquisition in Strategic Alliances: The Impact of Supplementary and 
Complementary Dimensions. British Journal of Management, 20, 598-609. 
BURT, R. (2001). Structural Holes versus Network Closure as Social Capital. In: LIN, N., 
COOK, K. S. & BURT, R. S. (eds.) Social Capital: Theory and Research. New York: 
Aldine de Gruyter. 
BURT, R. S. (1992). Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition, Harvard 
University Press. 
BURT, R. S. (2004). Structural holes and good ideas. American Journal of Sociology, 110, 349-
399. 
BURT, R. S. (2010). Neighbor Networks: Competitive Advantage Local and Personal, New 
York, Oxford University Press. 
CABRAL, L. & PACHECO-DE-ALMEIDA, G. (2019). Alliance Formation and Firm Value. 
Management Science, 65, 879-895. 
CAMERER, C. F. (1997). Progress in Behavioral Game Theory. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 11, 167-188. 
CANO-KOLLMANN, M., CANTWELL, J., HANNIGAN, T. J., MUDAMBI, R. & SONG, J. 
(2016). Knowledge connectivity: An agenda for innovation research in international 
business. Journal of International Business Studies, 47, 255-262. 
CANTWELL, J. (2017). Innovation and international business. Industry and Innovation, 24, 
41-60. 
CANTWELL, J. & IAMMARINO, S. (2003). Multinational Corporations & European 
Regional Systems of Innovation, London and New York, Routledge. 
CAPALDO, A. (2007). Network structure and innovation: The leveraging of a dual network 
as a distinctive relational capability. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 585-608. 
CAPLOW, T. (1959). Further development of a theory of coalitions in the triad. American 
Journal of Sociology, 64, 488-493. 




CASSIMAN, B. & VEUGELERS, R. (2006). In Search of Complementarity in Innovation 
Strategy: Internal R&D and External Knowledge Acquisition. Management Science, 
52, 68-82. 
CAVES, R. E. (1971). International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign 
Investment. Economica, 38, 1-27. 
CHANG, S. J. (1995). International Expansion Strategy of Japanese Firms: Capability 
Building through Sequential Entry. The Academy of Management Journal, 38, 383-
407. 
CHESBROUGH, H. W. (2003). Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology, Boston, Harvard Business School Press. 
CHESBROUGH, H. W. (2006). Open Innovation: Researching a New Paradigm, Oxford 
University Press. 
CHESBROUGH, H. W. & TEECE, D. J. (1996). Organising for Innovation. Harvard Business 
Review. 
CHESNAIS, T. & THOMAS, C. (2017). How semiconductor companies can win in China's 
new product-development landscape. McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
CHETTY, S., JOHANSON, M. & MARTÍN MARTÍN, O. (2014). Speed of 
internationalization: Conceptualization, measurement and validation. Journal of 
World Business, 49. 
CHETTY, S. & STANGL, L. (2009). Internationalization and Innovation in a Network 
Relationship Context. European Journal of Marketing, 44, 1725-1743. 
CHETTY, S. K. & WILSON, H. I. M. (2003). Collaborating with competitors to acquire 
resources. International Business Review, 12, 61-81. 
CHIARONI, D., CHIESA, V. & FRATTINI, F. (2010). Unravelling the process from Closed to 
Open Innovation: evidence from mature, asset-intensive industries. R&D 
Management, 40, 222-245. 
CHOI, J. & CONTRACTOR, F. J. (2016). Choosing an appropriate alliance governance mode: 
The role of institutional, cultural and geographical distance in international research 
& development (R&D) collaborations. Journal of International Business Studies, 47, 
210-232. 
CHOI, T. Y. & WU, Z. (2009). TRIADS IN SUPPLY NETWORKS: THEORIZING BUYER–
SUPPLIER–SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 45, 
8-25. 
CHRISTENSEN, C. M. R., MICHAEL E. (2003). The Innovator's Solution: Creating and 
Sustaining Successful Growth, Harvard Business School Press. 
CISCO (2016). The Zettabyte Era: Trends and Analysis. 
194 
 
CLARKE, P. (2011). NEC joins IBM's global chip process partnership. EE Times. 
CLARKE, P. (2014). Foundry Sales Growing Faster Than Chip Market. EE Times, 12 August 
2014. 
CLOODT, M., HAGEDOORN, J. & ROIJAKKERS, N. (2010). Inter-firm R&D networks in the 
global software industry: An overview of major trends and patterns. Business 
History, 52, 120-149. 
COBEÑA, M., GALLEGO, Á. & CASANUEVA, C. (2017). Heterogeneity, diversity and 
complementarity in alliance portfolios. European Management Journal, 35. 
COHEN, W. M. & LEVINTHAL, D. A. (1990). Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 128-152. 
COLEMAN, J. S. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal 
of Sociology, 94, S95-S120. 
COLEMAN, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press. 
COLLETT, R. & PYLE, D. (2013). What happens when chip-design complexity outpaces 
development productivity? McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
COLLINSON, S. C. & NARULA, R. (2014). Asset recombination in international 
partnerships as a source of improved innovation capabilities in China. Multinational 
Business Review, 22, 394-417. 
COLOMBO, M., GRILLI, L. & PIVA, E. (2006). In Search of Complementary Assets: The 
Determinants of Alliance Formation of High-Tech Start-Ups. Research Policy, 35, 
1166-1199. 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2001). DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT 
[Online]. Available: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/768251/000119312505047783/dex1033.htm. 
CONTRACTOR, F., A. WOODLEY, J. & PIEPENBRINK, A. (2011). How tight an embrace? 
Choosing the optimal degree of partner interaction in alliances based on risk, 
technology characteristics, and agreement provisions. Global Strategy Journal, 1, 67-
85. 
CONTRACTOR, F. J. & LORANGE, P. (1988). Why should firms cooperate? The strategy 
and economics basis for cooperative ventures. In: CONTRACTOR, F. J. & 
LORANGE, P. (eds.) Cooperative Strategies in International Business. Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books. 
CONTRACTOR, F. J. & RA, W. (2002). How knowledge attributes influence alliance 
governance choices: A theory development note. Journal of International 
Management, 8, 11-27. 
195 
 
CONTRACTOR, F. J. & REUER, J. J. (2014). Structuring and Governing Alliances: New 
Directions for Research. Global Strategy Journal, 4, 241-256. 
CONTRACTOR, N. S., WASSERMAN, S. & FAUST, K. (2006). Testing Multitheoretical, 
Multilevel Hypotheses About Organizational Networks: An Analytic Framework 
and Empirical Example. Academy of Management Review, 31, 681-703. 
COOK, K. S. & EMERSON, R. M. (1978). Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange 
Networks. American Sociological Review, 43, 721-739. 
COX, A. (2001). Managing with Power: Strategies for Improving Value Appropriation from 
Supply Relationships. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 37, 42-47. 
CRIADO, A., JOSEP, R. & KNIGHT, G. (2005). The phenomenon of early internationalizing 
firms: What do we know after a decade (1993-2003) of scientific enquiry? 
International Business Review, 14, 147-166. 
CUSUMANO, M. & GAWER, A. (2002). The elements of platform leadership. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, Spring 2002, 51-58. 
D&R. (2010). Tri-Star Design, Inc. Becomes Member of Elite Xilinx Alliance Program 
[Online]. Available: https://www.design-reuse.com/news/24723/tri-star-elite-xilinx-
alliance-program.html. 
DAHLANDER, L. & GANN, D. M. (2010). How open is innovation? Research Policy, 39, 
699-709. 
DAS, T. K. & TENG, B.-S. (1998). Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in 
Partner Cooperation in Alliances. The Academy of Management Review, 23, 491-512. 
DAS, T. K. & TENG, B.-S. (2000). A Resource-Based Theory of Strategic Alliances. Journal of 
Management, 26, 31-61. 
DAVIS, J. P. (2016). The Group Dynamics of Interorganizational Relationships: Collaborating 
with Multiple Partners in Innovation Ecosystems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
61, 621-661. 
DHANARAJ, C. & PARKHE, A. (2006). Orchestrating Innovation Networks. Academy of 
Management Review, 31, 659-669. 
DIBIAGGIO, L. (2006). Semiconductor Industry Dynamics: An Investigation for a General 
Pattern of Evolution. 
DITTRICH, K. & DUYSTERS, G. (2007). Networking as a Means to Strategy Change: The 
Case of Open Innovation in Mobile Telephony. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 24, 510-521. 
DUNNING, J. H. (1977). Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: a search for an 
eclectic approach. In: OHLIN, B., HESSELBORN, P. O. & WIJKMAN, P. M. (eds.) 
International Allocation of Economic Activity. London: Macmillan. 
196 
 
DUNNING, J. H. (1980). Toward an eclectic theory of international production: some 
empirical tests. Journal of International Business Studies, 11, 9-31. 
DUNNING, J. H. (1995). Reappraising the Eclectic Paradigm in an Age of Alliance 
Capitalism. Journal of International Business Studies, 26, 461-491. 
DUNNING, J. H. & LUNDAN, S. M. (2008). Multinational Enterprises and the Global 
Economy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
DUYSTERS, G., BEERKENS, B. E., GILSING, V. & VANHAVERBEKE, W. P. M. (2009). The 
role of alliance network redundancy in the creation of core and non-core 
technologies: A local action approach. Journal of Management Studies, 46. 
DUYSTERS, G. & HAGEDOORN, J. (1993). The Cooperative Agreements and Technology 
Indicators (CATI) Information System. 
DUYSTERS, G. & LOKSHIN, B. (2011). Determinants of Alliance Portfolio Complexity and 
Its Effect on Innovative Performance of Companies. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 28, 570-585. 
DYER, J., KALE, P. & SINGH, H. (2004). When to Ally & When to Acquire. Harvard 
Business Review, 82, 108-15, 188. 
DYER, J. & NOBEOKA, K. (2000). Creating and Managing a High-Performance Knowledge-
Sharing Network: The Toyota Case. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 345-367. 
DYER, J. & SINGH, H. (1998). The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of 
Interorganizational Competitive Advantage. The Academy of Management Review, 
23. 
DYER, J. H. (1996). SPECIALIZED SUPPLIER NETWORKS AS A SOURCE OF 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUTO INDUSTRY. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17, 271-291. 
DYER, J. H. (1997). Effective interim collaboration: how firms minimize transaction costs and 
maximise transaction value. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 535-556. 
EE-TIMES. (2000). TSMC offers net-based chip design collaboration. EE Times, 24 April 
2000. 
EISENHARDT, K. M. & SCHOONHOVEN, C. B. (1996). Resource-based View of Strategic 
Alliance Formation: Strategic and Social Effects in Entrepreneurial Firms. 
Organization Science, 7, 136-150. 
ERNST, D. (2005). Complexity and Internationalisation of Innovation - Why is Chip Design 
Moving to Asia? International Journal of Innovation Management, 9. 




FANG, Y., WADE, M., DELIOS, A. & BEAMISH, P. (2007). International diversification, 
subsidiary performance, and the mobility of knowledge resources. Strategic 
Management Journal, 28, 1053-1064. 
FANGARIA, P. (2014). Semiconductor Strategy - From Productivity to Profitability [Online]. 
SemiWiki.com. Available: https://www.semiwiki.com/forum/content/3250-
semiconductor-strategy-productivity-profitability.html. 
FLEMING, L. & SORENSON, O. (2001). Technology as a complex adaptive system: evidence 
from patent data. Research Policy, 30, 1019-1039. 
FLORIDA, R. (1997). The globalization of R&D: Results of a survey of foreign-affiliated R&D 
laboratories in the USA. Research Policy, 26, 85-103. 
FORSGREN, M. (2016). A note on the revisited Uppsala internationalization process model – 
the implications of business networks and entrepreneurship. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 47, 1135-1144. 
FREEMAN, C. (1991). Networks of innovators: A synthesis of research issues. Research 
Policy, 20, 499-514. 
FREEMAN, C. (1995). The 'National System of Innovation' in Historical Perspective. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19, 5-24. 
FREEMAN, L. C. (1978). Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. Social 
Networks, 1, 215-239. 
FROST, T. S. & ZHOU, C. (2005). R&D co-practice and ‘reverse’ knowledge integration in 
multinational firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 36, 676-687. 
FRUCHTERMAN, T. M. J. & REINGOLD, E. M. (1991). Graph drawing by force-directed 
placement. Software: Practice and Experience, 21, 1129-1164. 
GADDE, L.-E., HUEMER, L. & HÅKANSSON, H. (2003). Strategizing in Industrial 
Networks. Industrial Marketing Management, 32, 357-364. 
GALASKIEWICZ, J. (1979). The Structure of Community Organizational Networks. Social 
Forces, 57, 1346-1364. 
GALASKIEWICZ, J. (1985). Interorganizational Relations. Annual Review of Sociology, 11, 
281-304. 
GAMMELGAARD, J., MCDONALD, F., STEPHAN, A., TÜSELMANN, H. & 
DÖRRENBÄCHER, C. (2012). The impact of increases in subsidiary autonomy and 
network relationships on performance. International Business Review, 21, 1158-1172. 
GARCIA, M., ZOUAGHI, F. & SÁNCHEZ, M. (2016). Capturing value from alliance 




GASSMANN, O. (2006). Opening up the innovation process: towards an agenda. R&D 
Management, 36, 223-228. 
GASSMANN, O., ENKEL, E. & CHESBROUGH, H. (2010). The future of open innovation. 
R&D Management, 40, 213-221. 
GAWER, A. & CUSUMANO, M. (2002). Platform Leadership: How Intel, Palm, Cisco and 
Others Drive Industry Innovation, Cambridge, MA, Harvard Business School Press. 
GEREFFI, G., HUMPHREY, J. & STURGEON, T. (2005). The governance of global value 
chains. Review of International Political Economy, 12, 78-104. 
GILSING, V., LEMMENS, C. E. A. V. & DUYSTERS, G. (2007). Strategic Alliance Networks 
and Innovation: A Deterministic and Voluntaristic View Combined. Technology 
Analysis and Strategic Management, 19. 
GILSING, V. & NOOTEBOOM, B. (2005). Density and Strength of Ties in Innovation 
Networks: An Analysis of Multimedia and Biotechnology. European Management 
Review, 2. 
GILSING, V., NOOTEBOOM, B., VANHAVERBEKE, W., DUYSTERS, G. & VAN DEN 
OORD, A. (2008). Network Embeddedness and the Exploration of Novel 
Technologies: Technological Distance, Betweenness Centrality and Density. Research 
Policy, 37, 1711-1731. 
GIMENO, J. (2004). Competition within and between networks: The contingent effect of 
competitive embeddedness on alliance formation. Academy of Management Journal, 
47. 
GLAISTER, K. W. & BUCKLEY, P. J. (1996). Strategic Motives For International Alliance 
Formation. Journal of Management Studies, 33, 301-332. 
GLOGER, M., MEHROTRA, R., OGRINS, A. & SUNDARAM, A. (2017). Semiconductor 
Industry: Strategies for growth in the Internet of Things era. Strategy&. 
GOBBO JR, J. & OLSSON, A. (2010). The Transformation between Exploration and 
Exploitation Applied to Inventors of Packaging Innovations. 
GOMES-CASSERES, B. (1994). Group Versus Group: How Alliance Networks Compete. 
Harvard Business Review, 72, 62. 
GOMES-CASSERES, B. (2003). Competitive Advantage in Alliance Constellations. Strategic 
Organization, 1, 327-335. 
GRANOVETTER, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481-510. 
GRANOVETTER, M. (1992). Problems of explanation in economic sociology. In: NOHRIA, 
N. & ECCLES, R. (eds.) Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form and Action. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
199 
 
GRANOVETTER, M. S. (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 
78, 1360-1380. 
GRANSTRAND, O., HAKANSON, L. & SJÖLANDER, S. (1993). Internationalization of R&D 
— a survey of some recent research. 
GRANT, R. M. (1996). Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17, 109-122. 
GREVE, H., ROWLEY, T. & SHIPILOV, A. (2014). Network Advantage: How to Unlock 
Value From Your Alliances and Partnerships, Jossey-Bass. 
GREVE, H. R. (2009). Bigger and safer: the diffusion of competitive advantage. Strategic 
Management Journal, 30, 1-23. 
GRUBER, H. (2000). The evolution of market structure in semiconductors: the role of 
product standards. Research Policy, 29, 725-740. 
GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR ALLIANCE (2012). Capital-lite business model strategies & 
tools: A startup's guide to surviving an investment drought. 
GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR ALLIANCE (2016). Charting a New Course for 
Semiconductors. 
GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR ALLIANCE (2018). Monetizing Semiconductors: From Silicon 
to Services. 
GULATI, R. (1995a). Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for 
Contractual Choice in Alliances. The Academy of Management Journal, 38, 85-112. 
GULATI, R. (1995b). Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns: A Longitudinal 
Analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 619-652. 
GULATI, R. (1998). Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 293-317. 
GULATI, R. (1999). Network location and learning: the influence of network resources and 
firm capabilities on alliance formation. Strategic Management Journal, 20, 397-420. 
GULATI, R. & GARGIULO, M. (1999). Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come 
From? American Journal of Sociology, 104, 1439-1493. 
GULATI, R., NOHRIA, N. & ZAHEER, A. (2000). Strategic networks. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21, 203-215. 
GULATI, R. & SINGH, H. (1998). The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination 
Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 43, 781-814. 
GULATI, R. & SYTCH, M. (2008). Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of 
trust. Managerial and Decision Economics, 29, 165-190. 
200 
 
GULATI, R., SYTCH, M. & TATARYNOWICZ, A. (2011). The Rise and Fall of Small Worlds: 
Exploring the Dynamics of Social Structure. Organization Science, 23, 449-471. 
HACKI, R. L., J. (2001). The Future of the Networked Company. The McKinsey Quarterly. 
HADLEY, R. D. & WILSON, H. I. M. (2003). The network model of internationalisation and 
experiential knowledge. International Business Review, 12, 697-717. 
HAGEDOORN, J. (1993). Understanding the rationale of strategic technology partnering: 
Interorganizational modes of cooperation and sectoral differences. Strategic 
Management Journal, 14, 371-385. 
HAGEDOORN, J. (2002). Inter-Firm R&D Partnerships: An Overview of Major Trends and 
Patterns Since 1960. Research Policy, 31, 477-492. 
HAGEDOORN, J., CLOODT, D. & KRANENBURG, H. (2005). Intellectual property rights 
and the governance of international R&D partnerships. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 36, 175-186. 
HAGEDOORN, J. & DUYSTERS, G. (2002). External Sources of Innovative Capabilities: The 
Preferences for Strategic Alliances or Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of 
Management Studies, 39, 167-188. 
HAGEDOORN, J. & FRANKORT, H.T.W. (2008). The gloomy side of embeddedness: The 
effects of overembeddedness on inter-firm partnership formation. In: FRANKORT 
HANS, T. W., JOEL, A. C. B. & TIMOTHY, J. R. (eds.) Network Strategy. Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. 
HAMEL, G. (1991). Competition for competence and interpartner learning within 
international strategic alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 83-103. 
HARGADON, A. & SUTTON, R. I. (1997). Technology Brokering and Innovation in a 
Product Development Firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 716-749. 
HARLIN, K. (2010). Going Fabless And Fancy-Free Chip firms let others handle costly 
factories, may face capacity crunch. Investor's Business Daily, 24 May 2010. 
HARRIGAN, K. R. (1985). An application of clustering for strategic group analysis. Strategic 
Management Journal, 6, 55-73. 
HECK, S., KAZA, S. & PINNER, D. (2011). Creating value in the semiconductor industry. 
McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
HEIMAN, B. A. & NICKERSON, J. A. (2004). Empirical evidence regarding the tension 
between knowledge sharing and knowledge expropriation in collaborations. 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 25, 401-420. 
HEMSOTH, N. (2016). CAN OPEN SOURCE HARDWARE CRACK SEMICONDUCTOR 





HENKEL, J. (2006). Selective Revealing in Open Innovation Processes: The Case of 
Embedded Linux. Research Policy, 35, 953-969. 
HENNART, J.-F. (1988). A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9, 361-374. 
HEPBURN, P. (2017). Introduction to Social Network Analysis [PowerPoint Presentation] 
[Online]. University of Liverpool Heseltine Institute for Public Policy and Practice. 
Available: 
https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/engage/Engage,SNA,workshop.pdf. 
HILL, C. W. L. (1995). National institutional structures, transaction cost economizing, and 
competitive advantage: The case of Japan. Organization Science, 6. 
HITACHI (2019). History of semiconductors [Online]. Available: http://www.hitachi-
hightech.com/global/products/device/semiconductor/history.html. 
HITT, M. A., HOSKISSON, R. E. & KIM, H. (1997). International Diversification: Effects on 
Innovation and Firm Performance in Product-Diversified Firms. The Academy of 
Management Journal, 40, 767-798. 
HOF, R. D. (2011). Lessons from Sematech. MIT Technology Review. 
HOLM, D., JOHANSON, M. & KAO, P. (2015). From outsider to insider: Opportunity 
development in foreign market networks. Journal of International Entrepreneurship, 
13. 
HUIZINGH, E. (2011). Open Innovation: State of the Art and Future Perspectives. 
Technovation, 31, 2-9. 
HUNG, H.-C., CHIU, Y.-C. & WU, M.-C. (2017). Analysis of Competition Between IDM and 
Fabless–Foundry Business Models in the Semiconductor Industry. IEEE Transactions 
on Semiconductor Manufacturing, 30, 254-260. 
HYMER, S. (1976). The International Operations of Nation Firms: A Study of Foreign Direct 
Investment, Cambridge, MIT Press. 
IBM (2015). IBM and Xilinx Announce Strategic Collaboration to Accelerate Data Center 
Applications: Companies team to develop open acceleration infrastructure, software 
and middleware to address emerging data center workloads. Austin, Texas. 
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS (2016). Annual report 2016. 
MAXIM INTEGRATED (2017). Maxim Integrated Products Inc Conference Call to Update its 
Business Model For Investors. 
202 
 
INTEL (2019). Intel Authorized Distributors and Approved Suppliers [Online]. Available: 
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/partner/where-to-buy/overview.html. 
JOEL, A. C. B. & OLIVER, C. (1991). Institutional Linkages and Organizational Mortality. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 187-218. 
JOHANSON, J. & MATTSSON, L.-G. (1988). Internationalization in industrial systems - a 
network approach. In: HOOD, N. & VAHLNE, J.-E. (eds.) Strategies in Global 
Competition. New York: Croom Helm. 
JOHANSON, J. & VAHLNE, J.-E. (1977). The Internationalization Process of the Firm—A 
Model of Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 8, 23-32. 
JOHANSON, J. & WIEDERSHEIM-PAUL, F. (1975). THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
THE FIRM — FOUR SWEDISH CASES 1. Journal of Management Studies, 12, 305-
323. 
K. DAS, T. & TENG, B. S. (1996). Risk Types and the Inter-Firm Alliance Structures. Journal 
of Management Studies, 33, 827-843. 
KÄHKÖNEN, A.-K. & VIROLAINEN, V. M. (2011). Sources of structural power in the 
context of value nets. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 17, 109-120. 
KANTER, R. M. (1994). Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances. Harvard Business 
Review, 74, 96-108. 
KAPOOR, R. (2010). Collaborative innovation in the global semiconductor industry: A 
report on the findings from the 2010 Wharton-GSA semiconductor ecosystem survey. 
KAPOOR, R. (2012). Managing complexity and change in the semiconductor ecosystem: 
Findings from the Wharton-ATREG industry study. 
KATILA, R. & AHUJA, G. (2002). Something Old, Something New: A Longitudinal Study of 
Search Behavior and New Product Introduction. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 45, 1183-1194. 
KATIRCIOGLU, K. & GALLEGO, G. (2011). A practical multi echelon inventory model with 
semiconductor manufacturing application. In: KEMPF, K. G., KESKINOCAK, P. & 
UZSOY, R. (eds.) Planning Production and Inventories in the Extended Enterprise. 
Springer New York. 
KEDIA, B. & MOOTY, S. E. (2013). Learning and innovation in collaborative innovation 
networks. In: KEDIA, B. & JAIN, S. C. (eds.) Restoring America's Global 
Competitiveness Through Innovation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
KHANNA, T. & W. RIVKIN, J. (2006). Interorganizational Ties and Business Group 




KHAVUL, S., PÉREZ-NORDTVEDT, L. & WOOD, E. (2010). Organizational entrainment 
and international new ventures from emerging markets. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 25, 104-119. 
KILDUFF, M. & BRASS, D. (2010). Organizational Social Network Research: Core Ideas and 
Key Debates. The Academy of Management Annals, 4, 317-357. 
KIM, J. Y., HOWARD, M., COX PAHNKE, E. & BOEKER, W. (2016). Understanding 
network formation in strategy research: Exponential random graph models. Strategic 
Management Journal, 37, 22-44. 
KING, A. A. & TUCCI, C. L. (2002). Incumbent Entry into New Market Niches: The Role of 
Experience and Managerial Choice in the Creation of Dynamic Capabilities. 
Management Science, 48, 171-186. 
KLEIN, B. (1980). Transaction cost determinants of "unfair" contractual arrangements. 
American Economic Review, 70, 56-62. 
KLEIN, B., CRAWFORD, R. G. & ALCHIAN, A. A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable 
rents and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 
297-326. 
KLEINDORFER, P. R. & WU, D. J. (2003). Integrating Long- and Short-Term Contracting via 
Business-to-Business Exchanges for Capital-Intensive Industries. Management 
Science, 49, 1597-1615. 
KLEPPER, S. & GRADDY, E. (1990). The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants 
of Market Structure. RAND Journal of Economics, 21, 27-44. 
KOGUT, B. (1988). Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9, 319-332. 
KOGUT, B. (1989). The Stability of Joint Ventures: Reciprocity and Competitive Rivalry. 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 38, 183-98. 
KOGUT, B. (2000). The network as knowledge: generative rules and the emergence of 
structure. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 405-425. 
KPMG (2016). The right to win in semiconductors: Driving R&D efficiency through portfolio 
management. 
KPMG (2018). Strategic alliances: a real alternative to M&A? Driving growth through 
strategic alliances. Realizing value series. 
KRACKHARDT, D. (1990). Assessing the Political Landscape: Structure, Cognition, and 
Power in Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 342-369. 
KRACKHARDT, D. (1994). Graph theoretical dimensions of informal organizations. In: 
CARLEY, K. M. & PRIETULA, M. J. (eds.) Computational organization theory. 
Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
204 
 
KRUGMAN, P. (1991). Geography and trade, London, MIT Press/Leuven UP. 
LADENDORF, K. (2004). Absolutely fabless: Chip makers save money by using faraway 
factories. Austin American-Statesman. 
LAPEDUS, M. (2016). Inside The OSAT Business [Online]. Semiconductor Engineering. 
Available: http://semiengineering.com/inside-the-osat-business/. 
LARSON, A. (1992). Network Dyads in Entrepreneurial Settings: A Study of the Governance 
of Exchange Relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 76-104. 
LAURSEN, K. & SALTER, A. (2006). Open for innovation: the role of openness in explaining 
innovation performance among U.K. manufacturing firms. Strategic Management 
Journal, 27, 131-150. 
LAVIE, D. (2007). Alliance portfolios and firm performance: A study of value creation and 
appropriation in the U.S. software industry. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 1187-
1212. 
LAVIE, D., HAUNSCHILD, P. R. & KHANNA, P. (2012). ORGANIZATIONAL 
DIFFERENCES, RELATIONAL MECHANISMS, AND ALLIANCE 
PERFORMANCE. Strategic Management Journal, 33, 1453-1479. 
LAVIE, D., HAUNSCHILD, P. R. & KHANNA, P. (2012). Organizational differences, 
relational mechanisms, and alliance performance. Strategic Management Journal, 33, 
1453-1479. 
LAVIE, D. & ROSENKOPF, L. (2006). Balancing Exploration and Exploitation in Alliance 
Formation. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 797-818. 
LAVIE, D. & SINGH, H. (2012). The Evolution of Alliance Portfolios: The Case of Unisys. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 21. 
LAZER, D. & FRIEDMAN, A. (2007). The Network Structure of Exploration and 
Exploitation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52, 667-694. 
LEEUW, T., LOKSHIN, B. & DUYSTERS, G. (2014). Returns to alliance portfolio diversity: 
The relative effects of partner diversity on firm's innovative performance and 
productivity. Journal of Business Research, 67, 1839–1849. 
LEIPONEN, A. & HELFAT, C. E. (2011). Location, Decentralization, and Knowledge Sources 
for Innovation. Organization Science, 22, 641-658. 
LEVINE, S. & E. WHITE, P. (1961). Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of 
Inter-Organizational Relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 5, 583. 
LEVINSON, N. S. & ASAHI, M. (1995). Cross-national alliances and interorganizational 
learning. Organizational Dynamics, 24, 50-63. 
205 
 
LI, S. X. & GREENWOOD, R. (2004). The effect of within-industry diversification on firm 
performance: synergy creation, multi-market contact and market structuration. 
Strategic Management Journal, 25, 1131-1153. 
LOGAR, N., ANADON, L. & NARAYANAMURTI, V. (2014). Semiconductor Research 
Corporation: A Case Study in Cooperative Innovation Partnerships. Minerva, 52, 
237-261. 
LORENZONI, G. & BADEN-FULLER, C. (1995). Creating a Strategic Center to Manage a 
Web of Partners. California Management Review, 37, 146-163. 
LORENZONI, G. & LIPPARINI, A. (1999). The leveraging of interfirm relationships as a 
distinctive organizational capability: a longitudinal study. Strategic Management 
Journal, 20, 317-338. 
LYU, Y., HE, B., ZHU, Y. & LI, L. (2019). Network embeddedness and inbound open 
innovation practice: The moderating role of technology cluster. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 144, 12-24. 
MACHER, J. T., MOWERY, D. C. & SIMCOE, T. S. (2002). E-Business and the Semiconductor 
Value Chain: Implications for Vertical Specialization and Integrated Semiconductor 
Manufacturers. East-West Center Working Papers, 47. 
MADHAVAN, R., GNYAWALI, D. & HE, J. (2004). Two's Company, Three's a Crowd? 
Triads in Cooperative-Competitive Networks. Academy of Management Journal, 47, 
918-927. 
MADHAVAN, R., GNYAWALI, D. & HE, J. (2007). Two's Company, Three's a Crowd? 
Triads in Cooperative-Competitive Networks. Academy of Management Journal, 47, 
918-927. 
MADHAVAN, R., R. KOKA, B. & PRESCOTT, J. (1998). Networks in Transition: How 
Industry Events (Re)shape Interfirm Relationships. Strategic Management Journal, 
19, 439-459. 
MADHOK, A. (1997). Cost, Value and Foreign Market Entry Mode: The Transaction and the 
Firm. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 39-61. 
MADHOK, A. & TALLMAN, S. B. (1998). Resources, Transactions and Rents: Managing 
Value Through Interfirm Collaborative Relationships. Organization Science, 9, 326-
339. 
MAGNACHIP. (2019). IP Alliances [Online]. Available: 
http://www.magnachip.com/foundryservices/services/services_sub04.html. 
MAHINDROO, A. & SANTHANAM, N. (2015). Ray Stata on the evolution of the 
semiconductor industry. McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
206 
 
MAHNKE, V. & OVERBY, M. L. (2005). Portfolio Management of R&D-Collaborations: The 
Case of Mobile Services. 
MAKIMOTO, T. (2002). The Hot Decade of Field Programmable Technologies. 
MALHOTRA, D. K. & LUMINEAU, F. (2011). Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of 
Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure. Academy of Management Journal, 54, 981-
998. 
MALONI, M. & BENTON, W. C. (2000). Power influence in the supply chain. Journal of 
Business Logistics, 21, 49-73. 
MARCH, J. G. (1991). Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. 
Organization Science, 2, 71-87. 
MARITI, P. & SMILEY, R. H. (1983). Co-Operative Agreements and the Organization of 
Industry. Journal of Industrial Economics, 31, 437-51. 
MARTÍNEZ-NOYA, A. & NARULA, R. (2018). What more can we learn from R&D 
alliances? A review and research agenda. BRQ Business Research Quarterly, 21, 195-
212. 
MCLELLAN, P. (2014). ASIC Days Are Here Again [Online]. SemiWiki.com. Available: 
https://semiwiki.com/x-subscriber/sonics/4109-asic-days-are-here-again/. 
MCEVILY, B. & ZAHEER, A. (1999). Bridging ties: a source of firm heterogeneity in 
competitive capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, 20, 1133-1156. 
MCPHERSON, M., SMITH-LOVIN, L. & COOK, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily 
in social networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 415-444. 
MILLER, P., MOLL, J. & O'LEARY, T. (2012). Managing inter-firm interdependencies in 
R&D investment: Insights from the semiconductor industry, CIMA. 
MOKHOFF, N. (2012). Semi industry fab costs limit industry growth. EE Times. 
MOLM, L. D. (2014). Chapter 9 - Experiments on Exchange Relations and Exchange 
Networks in Sociology. In: WEBSTER, M. & SELL, J. (eds.) Laboratory Experiments 
in the Social Sciences (Second Edition). San Diego: Academic Press. 
MORGAN, R. M. & HUNT, S. D. (1994). The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship 
Marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58, 20-38. 
MOROSINI, P. (2004). Industrial Clusters, Knowledge Integration and Performance. World 
Development, 32, 305-326. 
MUKHERJEE, D., GAUR, A., GAUR, S. & P. SCHMID, F. (2011). External and Internal 
Influences on R&D Alliance Formation: Evidence from German SMEs. Journal of 
Business Research, 66. 
207 
 
MUSTEEN, M., FRANCIS, J. & DATTA, D. (2010). The influence of international networks 
on internationalization speed and performance: A study of Czech SMEs. Journal of 
World Business, 45, 197-205. 
NAEHER, U., SUZUKI, S. & WISEMAN, B. (2011). The evolution of business models in a 
disrupted value chain. McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
NARULA, R. (2001). Choosing Between Internal and Non-internal R&D Activities: Some 
Technological and Economic Factors. Technology Analysis and Strategic 
Management, 13. 
NARULA, R. & DUNNING, J. H. (1998). Globalisation and New Realities for MNE-
Developing Host Country Interaction. Research Memorandum. Maastricht 
University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology 
(MERIT). 
NARULA, R. & DUYSTERS, G. (2004). Globalization and Trends in International R&D 
Alliances. Journal of International Management, 10, 199-218. 
NARULA, R. & HAGEDOORN, J. (1996). Choosing Organizational Modes of Strategic 
Technology Partnering. Journal of International Business Studies, 27, 265-284. 
NARULA, R. & HAGEDOORN, J. (1999). Innovating Through Strategic Alliances: Moving 
Towards International Partnerships and Contractual Agreements. Technovation, 19, 
283-294. 
NARULA, R. & SANTANGELO, G. (2012). Location and collocation advantages in 
international innovation. 
NARULA, R. & T. K. NGUYEN, Q. (2011). Emerging country MNEs and the role of home 
countries: separating fact from irrational expectations, MERIT Working Papers 021, 
United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on 
Innovation and Technology (MERIT). 
NELSON, R. & WINTER, S. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change, Cambridge, 
MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
NENNI, D. & MCLELLAN, P. (2013). Fabless: The transformation of the semiconductor 
industry, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. 
NICHIA (2005). Nichia Announces New Patent Cross License Agreement With Cree Inc. 
Tokushima, Japan. 
NIETO, M. J. & SANTAMARÍA, L. (2007). The importance of diverse collaborative networks 
for the novelty of product innovation. Technovation, 27, 367-377. 
NIKKEI (2010). Chipmakers Taking Outsourcing One Step Further. Tokyo, Japan. 
NOHRIA, N. & GARCIA-PONT, C. (1991). Global strategic linkages and industry structure. 
Strategic Management Journal, 12, 105-124. 
208 
 
NOOTEBOOM, B. (1999). Innovation, Learning and Industrial Organisation. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 23, 127-50. 
NOOTEBOOM, B. (2000). Learning and innovation in organizations and economics, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
NOOTEBOOM, B. (2002). Trust: Forms, foundations, functions, failures and figures, Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 
NOOTEBOOM, B., VAN HAVERBEKE, W., DUYSTERS, G., GILSING, V. & VAN DEN 
OORD, A. (2007). Optimal cognitive distance and absorptive capacity. Research 
Policy, 36, 1016-1034. 
NOOTEBOOM, B. G., VICTOR; VANHAVERBEKE, WIM; DUYSTERS, GEERT; VAN DEN 
OORD, AD (2006). Network embeddedness and the exploration of novel 
technologies: Technological distance, betweenness centrality and density. DRUID 
Summer Conference. Copenhagen, Denmark. 
NORMANN, R. & RAMIREZ, R. (1993). From Value Chain to Value Constellation: Defining 
Interactive Strategy. Harvard business review, 71, 65-77. 
NVIDIA (2016). NVIDIA CORPORATION ANNUAL REVIEW. 
NXP (2015). NXP Semiconductors Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2015 Results. 
NXP. (2019). NXP Partner Directory [Online]. Available: 
https://www.nxp.com/support/support/nxp-partner-directory:PARTNER-
DIRECTORY?lang=en#/. 
OERLEMANS, L. A. G., KNOBEN, J. & PRETORIUS, M. W. (2013). Alliance portfolio 
diversity, radical and incremental innovation: The moderating role of technology 
management. Technovation, 33, 234-246. 
OKADA, Y. (2000). Competitive-cum-Cooperative Interfirm Relations and Dynamics in the 
Japanese Semiconductor Industry, Springer Japan. 
OLIVER, C. (1990). Determinants of Interorganizational Relationships: Integration and 
Future Directions. The Academy of Management Review, 15, 241-265. 
OLIVER, C. (1997). Sustainable competitive advantage: Combining institutional and 
resource-based views. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 697-714. 
OVIATT, B. M. & MCDOUGALL, P. P. (2005). Defining International Entrepreneurship and 
Modeling the Speed of Internationalization. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
29, 537-553. 
OWEN-SMITH, J. & POWELL, W. W. (2004). Knowledge Networks as Channels and 
Conduits: The Effects of Spillovers in the Boston Biotechnology Community. 
Organization Science, 15, 5-21. 
209 
 
PAN, Y. & TSE, D. K. (2000). The Hierarchical Model of Market Entry Modes. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 31, 535-554. 
PARKHE, A. (1991). Interfirm Diversity, Organizational Learning, and Longevity in Global 
Strategic Alliances. Journal of International Business Studies, 22, 579-601. 
PATEL, M., SHANGKUAN, J. & THOMAS, C. (2017). What's new with the Internet of 
Things? McKinsey on Semiconductors. 
PAULSON, S. K. (1976). A theory and comparative analysis of interorganizational dyads. 
Rural Sociology, 41, 311-329. 
PENNINGS, J. M. (1981). Strategically interdependent organizations. In: NYSTROM, P. C. & 
STARBUCK, W. H. (eds.) Handbook of organizational design. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
PERRY-SMITH, J. E. & SHALLEY, C. E. (2003). The social side of creativity: A static and 
dynamic social network perspective. The Academy of Management Review, 28, 89-
106. 
PFEFFER, J. (1987). A resource dependence perspective on interorganizational relations. In: 
MIZRUCHI, M. S. & SCHWARTZ, M. (eds.) Intercorporate relations: The structural 
analysis of business. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
PFEFFER, J. & NOWAK, P. (1976). Joint Ventures and Interorganizational Dependence. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 21. 
PFEFFER, J. & SALANCIK, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations, New York, 
Harper & Row. 
PISANO, G. (1990). The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis. 
PODOLNY, J. M. (1993). A Status-Based Model of Market Competition. American Journal of 
Sociology, 98, 829-872. 
POLTRONETTI, T. (2007). Semiconductor industry faces structural changes around IP 
[Online]. Electronic Systems Design  Engineering Incorporating Chip Design. 
Available: http://chipdesignmag.com/display.php?articleId=1133. 
POPPO, L. & ZENGER, T. (2002). Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function 
as Substitutes or Complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23, 707-725. 
PORTER, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors, New York, Free Press. 
PORTER, M. E. (1985). Competitive advantage: Creating and sustaining superior 
performance, New York, Free Press. 
PORTER, M. E. & FULLER, M. B. (1986). Coalitions and global strategy. In: PORTER, M. E. 
(ed.) Competition in Global Industries. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
210 
 
POWELL, W. (1990). Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. 
Research in Organizational Behaviour, 12, 295-336. 
POWELL, W. & BRANTLEY, P. (1992). Competitive cooperation in biotechnology: Learning 
through networks? In: NOHRIA, N. & ECCLES, R. (eds.) Networks and 
Organizations: Structure, Form and Action. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
POWELL, W., KOPUT, K. W. & SMITH-DOERR, L. (1996). Interorganizational Collaboration 
and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 41, 116-145. 
POWELL, W. & SMITH-DOERR, L. (1994). Networks and Economic Life. In: SMELSER, N. 
& SWEDBURG, R. (eds.) Handbook of economic sociology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
PROVAN, K., M. BEYER, J. & KRUYTBOSCH, C. (1980). Environmental Linkages and 
Power in Resource Dependent Relations Between Organizations. 25, 200. 
QUINTANA-GARCÍA, C. & BENAVIDES-VELASCO, C. A. (2004). Cooperation, 
competition, and innovative capability: a panel data of European dedicated 
biotechnology firms. Technovation, 24, 927-938. 
RAMOS, E., ACEDO, F. & GONZÁLEZ-RODRÍGUEZ, M. (2011). Internationalisation speed 
and technological patterns: A panel data study on Spanish SMEs. Technovation, 31, 
560-572. 
REA, D. G., BROOKS, H., BURGER, R. M. & LASCALA, R. (1997). The Semiconductor 
Industry—Model for Industry/University/Govemment Cooperation. Research-
Technology Management, 40, 46-54. 
REAGANS, R. & MCEVILY, B. (2003). Network Structure and Knowledge Transfer: The 
Effects of Cohesion and Range. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48, 240-267. 
RENESAS (2019). Alliance Partners. 
REUER, J. J. & ARIÑO, A. (2007). Strategic Alliance Contracts: Dimensions and 
Determinants of Contractual Complexity. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 313-330. 
RIPLEY, R. M., SNIJDERS, T. A. B., BODA, Z., VÖRÖS, A. & PRECIADO, P. (2019). Manual 
for RSiena. 
ROBINSON, D. T. & STUART, T. E. (2002). Financial Contracting in Biotech Strategic 
Alliances. Columbia University Working Paper. 
ROSENKOPF, L. & SCHILLING, M. A. (2007). Comparing alliance network structure across 




ROTHAERMEL, F. T. (2001). Incumbent's advantage through exploiting complementary 
assets via interfirm cooperation. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 687-699. 
ROTHAERMEL, F. T. & BOEKER, W. (2008). Old technology meets new technology: 
complementarities, similarities, and alliance formation. Strategic Management 
Journal, 29, 47-77. 
ROTHAERMEL, F. T. & DEEDS, D. L. (2004). Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: a system of new product development. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25, 201-221. 
ROTHAERMEL, F. T. & HILL, C. W. L. (2005). Technological Discontinuities and 
Complementary Assets: A Longitudinal Study of Industry and Firm Performance. 
Organization Science, 16, 52-70. 
ROWLEY, T., BEHRENS, D. & KRACKHARDT, D. (2000). Redundant governance 
structures: An analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the steel and 
semiconductor industries. Strategic Management Journal, 21. 
ROWLEY, T. J. (1997). Moving beyond Dyadic Ties: A Network Theory of Stakeholder 
Influences. The Academy of Management Review, 22, 887-910. 
ROWLEY, T. J. & BAUM, J. A. C. (2008). The dynamics of network strategies and positions. 
In: BAUM, J. & ROWLEY, T. (eds.) Network Strategy (Advances in Strategic 
Management). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
ROWLEY, T. J., BAUM, J. A. C., SHIPILOV, A. V., GREVE, H. R. & RAO, H. (2004). 
Competing in groups. Managerial and Decision Economics, 25, 453-471. 
RUEF, M. (2002). Strong ties, weak ties and islands: structural and cultural predictors of 
organizational innovation. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11, 427-449. 
S. KRAATZ, M. (1998). Learning by Association? Interorganizational Networks and 
Adaptation to Environment Change. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 621-643. 
SAHLMAN, W. A. & STEVENSON, H. H. (1985). Capital market myopia. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 1, 7-30. 
SAITO, M. (2009). Global semiconductor industry trend - IDM versus foundry approaches. 
Proceedings of the IEEE, 97. 
SAKO, M. (1991). The role of "trust" in Japanese buyer-supplier relationships. Ricerche 
Economiche, 45, 449-474. 
SAMPSON, R. C. (2007). R&D Alliances and Firm Performance: The Impact of Technological 
Diversity and Alliance Organization on Innovation. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 50, 364-386. 
SARKAR, M., AULAKH, P. S. & MADHOK, A. (2009). Process Capabilities and Value 
Generation in Alliance Portfolios. Organization Science, 20, 583-600. 
212 
 
SAVIOTTI, P. P. (1996). Technological Evolution, Variety and the Economy, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar. 
SCHILLING, M. A. & PHELPS, C. C. (2007). Interfirm Collaboration Networks: The Impact 
of Large-Scale Network Structure on Firm Innovation. Management Science, 53, 
1113-1126. 
SCHURR, P. H. & OZANNE, J. L. (1985). Influences on Exchange Processes: Buyers' 
Preconceptions of a Seller's Trustworthiness and Bargaining Toughness. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 11, 939-953. 
SCOTT, W. R. (1981). Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ, Prentice-Hall. 
SHERMAN, S. (1992). Are Strategic Alliances Working? Fortune, (September), 77-78. 
SEKLIUCKIENE, J., SEDZINIAUSKIENE, R. & VIBURYS, V. (2016). Adoption of Open 
Innovation in the Internationalization of Knowledge Intensive Firms. Engineering 
Economics, 27, 607–617. 
SEMATECH. (2013). SEMATECH History [Online]. Available: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130702191328/http://www.sematech.org/corporate/his
tory.htm. 
CYPRUS SEMICONDUCTOR (2015). 2015 Annual Report. 
LATTICE SEMICONDUCTOR (2007). Lattice Semiconductor and Silicon Laboratories 
Collaborate on SONET/SDH Compliant Solution. 
SHAN, W. (1990). An empirical analysis of organizational strategies by entrepreneurial 
high-technology firms. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 129-139. 
SHIPILOV, A. (2012). Strategic multiplexity. Strategic Organization, 10, 215-222. 
SHIRI, G., SAUVÉE, L. & ABDIRAHMAN, Z.-Z. (2014). Bridge and redundant ties in 
networks: the impact on innovation in food SMEs. European Journal of Innovation 
Management, 18, 355-379. 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (2014). Comments of the Semiconductor 
Industry Association (SIA) On the Notice of Request for Information on "Critical and 
Strategic Materials Supply Chains". 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (2015). The US Semiconductor Industry: 
2015 Factbook [PowerPoint presentation] [Online]. Semiconductor Industry 
Association. 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (2016). Beyond borders: The global 
semiconductor value chain. 
213 
 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (2019). Research [Online]. Available: 
https://www.semiconductors.org/policies/research/. 
SILTALOPPI, J. & VARGO, S. L. (2017). Triads: A review and analytical framework. 
Marketing Theory, 17, 395-414. 
SIMMEL, G. (1950). The Triad. In: WOLFF, K. H. (ed.) The Sociology of George Simmel. 
Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
SIMON, T. (2015). When talking about IoT, don’t forget memory [Online]. SemiWiki.com. 
Available: https://semiwiki.com/semiconductor-manufacturers/tsmc/5195-when-
talking-about-iot-dont-forget-memory/. 
SKILTON, P. F. & BERNARDES, E. (2015). Competition network structure and product 
market entry. Strategic Management Journal, 36, 1688-1696. 
SMIC (2015). SMIC, Huawei, imec and Qualcomm in Joint Investment on SMIC's New 
Research and Development Company. Shanghai. 
SNIJDERS, T. A. B. (1996). Stochastic actor‐oriented models for network change. The Journal 
of Mathematical Sociology, 21, 149-172. 
SNIJDERS, T. A. B. (2011). Statistical Models for Social Networks. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 37, 131-153. 
SNIJDERS, T. A. B., VAN DE BUNT, G. G. & STEGLICH, C. E. G. (2010). Introduction to 
stochastic actor-based models for network dynamics. Social Networks, 32, 44-60. 
SODA, G. (2011). The management of firms’ alliance network positioning: Implications for 
innovation. European Management Journal, 29, 377-388. 
SORENSON, O. & STUART, T. E. (2001). Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distribution 
of Venture Capital Financing. American Journal of Sociology, 106. 
SPENCE, M. M., MANNING, L. M. & CRICK, D. (2008). An investigation into the use of 
collaborative ventures in the internationalization of high performing Canadian 
SMEs. European Management Journal, 26, 412-428. 
SPERLING, E. (2012). Firms rethink fabless-foundry model [Online]. Semiconductor 
Engineering. Available: http://semiengineering.com/firms-rethink-fabless-foundry-
model/. 
STATISTA. (2019). Statista [Online]. Available: https://www.statista.com/. 
STUART, T. E. (1998). Network Positions and Propensities to Collaborate: An Investigation 
of Strategic Alliance Formation in a High-Technology Industry. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 43, 668-698. 
214 
 
STUART, T. E. (2000). Interorganizational alliances and the performance of firms: a study of 
growth and innovation rates in a high-technology industry. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21, 791-811. 
SUBRAMANIAN, A. M. & SOH, P.-H. (2017). Linking alliance portfolios to recombinant 
innovation: The combined effects of diversity and alliance experience. Long Range 
Planning, 50, 636-652. 
SYDOW, J., MÜLLER-SEITZ, G. & PROVAN, K. (2013). Managing uncertainty in alliances 
and networks - From governance to practice. In: DAS, T. K. (ed.) Managing 
Knowledge in Strategic Alliances. Greenwood, Conn.: IAP. 
TAMME, S., SCHOTT, S., GUNES, D., WALLACE, J., BOADWAY, R., RAZAVI, F. & PÉPIN, 
M. (2013). Trends and opportunities in semiconductor licensing. Semiconductor 
Licensing Trends. 
TAN, D. & MEYER, K. (2010). Business groups' outward FDI: A managerial resources 
perspective. Journal of International Management, 16, 154-164. 
TATARYNOWICZ, A., SYTCH, M. & GULATI, R. (2016). Environmental Demands and the 
Emergence of Social Structure: Technological Dynamism and Interorganizational 
Network Forms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 61, 52-86. 
AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES (2006). Agilent Technologies and Freescale collaborate to 
streamline development of ZigBee solutions. Barcelona, Spain. 
IHS TECHNOLOGY (2015). Preliminary 2015 Semiconductor Market Shares [Online]. 
Available: https://technology.ihs.com/553230/preliminary-2015-semiconductor-
market-shares. 
TEECE, D. (1988). Capturing Value from Technological Innovation: Integration, Strategic 
Partnering, and Licensing Decisions. Interfaces, 18, 46-61. 
TEECE, D. (1992). Competition, cooperation, and innovation: Organizational arrangements 
for regimes of rapid technological progress. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 18, 1-25. 
TEECE, D. (2000). Strategies for Managing Knowledge Assets: The Role of Firm Structure 
and Industrial Context. Long Range Planning, 33. 
TEECE, D., PISANO, G. & SHUEN, A. (1997). Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 509-533. 
TEECE, D. J. (1986). Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy, 15, 285-305. 
TOLSTOY, D. & HENRIK, A. (2010). Network resource combinations in the international 
venturing of small biotech firms. Technovation, 30, 24-36. 
TSANG, E. (1998). Motives for strategic alliance: A resource-based perspective. 
215 
 
TSMC. (2010). TSMC Begins Construction on Gigafab In Central Taiwan [Online]. Taichung, 
Taiwan, R.O.C.: TSMC. Available: 
http://www.tsmc.com/uploadfile/ir/BusinessRelease/0716%20Fab15%20Groundbreak
ing%20_E.pdf. 
TSMC. (2019). IP Alliance [Online]. Available: 
https://www.tsmc.com/english/dedicatedFoundry/services/ip_alliance.htm. 
TSMC. (2019). Open Innovation Platform [Online]. Available: 
https://www.tsmc.com/english/dedicatedFoundry/oip/index.htm. 
TSMC. (2020). TSMC University Collaboration Programs [Online]. Available: 
https://www.tsmc.com/csr/en/update/innovationAndService/caseStudy/2/index.html 
ULRICH, D. & BARNEY, J. (1984). Perspectives in Organizations: Resource Dependence, 
Efficiency, and Population. 
UZZI, B. (1996). The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic 
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect. American Sociological Review, 
61, 674-698. 
UZZI, B. (1997). Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of 
Embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 35-67. 
UZZI, B. & GILLESPIE, J. J. (2002). Knowledge spillover in corporate financing networks: 
embeddedness and the firm's debt performance. Strategic Management Journal, 23, 
595-618. 
VAN BEERS, C. & ZAND, F. (2014). R&D Cooperation, Partner Diversity, and Innovation 
Performance: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 31, 
292-312. 
VAN DE BUNT, G. G. & GROENEWEGEN, P. (2007). An Actor-Oriented Dynamic Network 
Approach: The Case of Interorganizational Network Evolution. Organizational 
Research Methods, 10, 463-482. 
VAN DE VRANDE, V., DE JONG, J. P. J., VANHAVERBEKE, W. & DE ROCHEMONT, M. 
(2009). Open innovation in SMEs: Trends, motives and management challenges. 
Technovation, 29, 423-437. 
VAN KRANENBURG, H., HAGEDOORN, J. & LORENZ-ORLEAN, S. (2014). Distance 
Costs and The Degree of Inter-Partner Involvement in International Relational-Based 
Technology Alliances. Global Strategy Journal, 4, 280-291. 
VANHAVERBEKE, W., BEERKENS, B. E. & DUYSTERS, G. (2003). Explorative and 
exploitative learning strategies in technology-based alliance networks, Technische 
Universiteit Eindhoven, Eindhoven. 
216 
 
VANHAVERBEKE, W. & CLOODT, M. (2006). Open Innovation in Value Networks. In: 
CHESBROUGH, H. W., VANHAVERBEKE, W. & WEST, J. (eds.) Open Innovation: 
Researching a New Paradigm. Oxford University Press. 
VERNON, R. (1966). International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 190-207. 
VERSPAGEN, B. & DUYSTERS, G. (2004). The Small Worlds of Strategic Technology 
Alliances. Technovation, 24, 563-571. 
VON HIPPEL, E. (1988). Sources of Innovation, New York NY, Oxford University Press. 
WALKER, G., KOGUT, B. & SHAN, W. (1997). Social Capital, Structural Holes and the 
Formation of an Industry Network. Organization Science, 8, 109-125. 
WALTER W. POWELL, DOUGLAS R. WHITE, KENNETH W. KOPUT & JASON OWEN‐
SMITH (2005). Network Dynamics and Field Evolution: The Growth of 
Interorganizational Collaboration in the Life Sciences. American Journal of 
Sociology, 110, 1132-1205. 
WASSERMAN, S. & FAUST, K. (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
WASSMER, U. & DUSSAUGE, P. (2011). Value Creation in Alliance Portfolios: The Benefits 
and Costs of Network Resource Interdependencies. European Management Review, 
8, 47-64. 
WATTS, M. (2014). IMEC's 30th Anniversary: A Consortium With Impact [Online]. 
Semiconductor Engineering. Available: https://semiengineering.com/imecs-30-th-
anniversary-a-consortium-with-impact/. 
WEST, J., VANHAVERBEKE, W. & CHESBROUGH, H. (2006). Open Innovation: A research 
agenda. In: CHESBROUGH, H. W., VANHAVERBEKE, W. & WEST, J. (eds.) Open 
Innovation: Researching a New Paradigm. Oxford University Press. 
WHETTEN, D. (1977). Toward a Contingency Model for Designing Interorganizational 
Service Delivery Systems. Organization and Administrative Sciences, 7. 
WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1979). Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 233-261. 
WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost 
Approach. American Journal of Sociology, 87, 548-577. 
WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism, New York, Free Press. 
WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1991). Strategizing, economizing, and economic organization. 
Strategic Management Journal, 12, 75-94. 
217 
 
WINGARD, D. (2014). Makimoto's Wave Revisited for Multicore SoC Design. EE Times, 29 
July 2014. 
BUSINESS WIRE (2005). Kopin Forms Alliance with Solomon Systech To Market Binocular 
Display Module Products in China. 
BUSINESS WIRE (2007). Freescale and Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Establish Joint R&D Lab 
in China: Leading Rail Transportation Company in China Aims to Accelerate Rail 
System Application Development. 
WONG, D., CHANDA, A., PAULIN, P. & LONG, C. E. (2014). Semiconductor Industry 
Primer. Wells Fargo (Equity Research). 
WU, X., KOUVELIS, P., MATSUO, H. & SANO, H. (2014). Horizontal Coordinating 
Contracts in the Semiconductor Industry. European Journal of Operational Research, 
237, 887-897. 
XILINX (2015). Form 10-K (Annual Report): Filed 05/13/15 for the Period Ending 03/28/15. 
XILINX (2017). XILINX INC FORM 10K. 
XILINX. (2019). Xilinx Partner Program [Online]. Available: 
https://www.xilinx.com/alliance.html. 
YINUG, F. (2016). Made in America: The Facts about Semiconductor Design, Semiconductor 
Industry Association. 
ZAHEER, A. & BELL, G. G. (2005). Benefiting from network position: firm capabilities, 
structural holes, and performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26, 809-825. 
ZAHEER, S. (1995). Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 38, 341-363. 
ZAJAC, E. J. & OLSEN, C. P. (1993). FROM TRANSACTION COST TO TRANSACTIONAL 
VALUE ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES. Journal of Management Studies, 30, 131-
145. 
ZHANG, G. Q. & VAN ROOSMALEN, A. J. (2009). The Changing Landscape of 
Micro/Nanoelectronics. In: ZHANG, G. Q. & VAN ROOSMALEN, A. J. (eds.) More 
than Moore: Creating High Value Micro/Nanoelectronics Systems. Springer. 
ZHANG, J., BADEN-FULLER, C. & MANGEMATIN, V. (2007). Technological knowledge 
base, R&D organization structure and alliance formation: Evidence from the 
biopharmaceutical industry. Research Policy, 36, 515-528. 
ZHAO, K., WANG, X., CHA, S., COHN, A. M., PAPANDONATOS, G. D., AMATO, M. S., 
PEARSON, J. L. & GRAHAM, A. L. (2016). A Multirelational Social Network 
Analysis of an Online Health Community for Smoking Cessation. Journal of medical 












APPENDIX A: TOP 50 'OTHER' ALLIANCE PARTNER INDUSTRIES 
‘Other’ industry # firms ‘Other’ industry # firms 
Communications equipment 240 Household appliances 11 
Electronic components 149 Computer storage devices 11 
Software 115 Motor vehicles and passenger car 
bodies 
11 
Technology hardware, storage and 
peripherals 
101 Electronic manufacturing services 10 
Technology distributors 92 Information retrieval services 8 
Consumer electronics 67 Photographic equipment 8 
Application software 49 Radiotelephone communications 8 
Systems software 39 Heavy electrical equipment 7 
Internet software and services 31 Auto parts and equipment 7 
Electronic computers 30 Lighting equipment 7 
Aerospace and defense 28 IT consulting and other services 7 
Electrical equipment 25 Radio and television broadcasting and 
communications equipment 
6 
Industrial machinery 24 Commodity chemicals 6 
Prepackaged software 21 Video equipment 6 
Electronic equipment and instruments 21 Auto parts 6 
Healthcare equipment 19 Cable and satellite 6 
Computer programming services 18 Kitchen cabinet manufacturing 5 
Electrical components and equipment 18 Electric utilities 5 
Applications software 16 Road and railway 5 
Computer peripheral equipment 14 Computer integrated systems design 5 
Renewable energy 13 IT consulting 5 
Communications services 13 Consortium 5 
Household audio and video 
equipment 
12 Electronic parts and equipment 5 
Distributors 12 Systems integration 5 





APPENDIX B: FULL SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
Country # firms Country # firms 
United States of America 1,288 Philippines 4 
China 340 Portugal 4 
Taiwan 277 New Zealand 4 
Japan 220 Turkey 4 
United Kingdom 149 Saudi Arabia 4 
Republic of Korea 145 Egypt 3 
Germany 141 Argentina 3 
Canada 84 Greece 3 
France 80 Vietnam 3 
Israel 72 Mexico 2 
India 57 Luxembourg 2 
Hong Kong 47 South Africa 2 
Singapore 45 Hungary 2 
Netherlands 30 Qatar 2 
Switzerland 30 Slovakia 1 
Italy 26 Slovenia 1 
Sweden 23 Romania 1 
Russia 20 Bangladesh 1 
Finland 16 Virgin Islands 1 
Australia 15 Cayman Islands 1 
Belgium 15 Bulgaria 1 
Denmark 15 Morocco 1 
Ireland 15 Lithuania 1 
Spain 14 Lebanon 1 
Austria 14 Liechtenstein 1 
Malaysia 13 INDONESIA 1 
Brazil 12 Cyprus 1 
Norway 12 Thailand 1 
United Arab Emirates 5 Czech Republic 1 
Poland 5   
  Total 3,282 
 
